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The Shifting Tides Of Merger Litigation, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Randall S. Thomas 2017 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

The Shifting Tides Of Merger Litigation, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

In 2015, Delaware made several important changes to its laws concerning merger litigation. These changes, which were made in response to a perception that levels of merger litigation were too high and that a substantial proportion of merger cases were not providing value, raised the bar, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win a lawsuit challenging a merger and more difficult for plaintiffs’ counsel to collect a fee award.

We study what has happened in the courts in response to these changes. We find that the initial effect of the changes has been to decrease the volume of merger ...


Mutually Assured Protection Among Large U.S. Law Firms, Tom Baker, Rick Swedloff 2017 University of Pennsylvania Law School

Mutually Assured Protection Among Large U.S. Law Firms, Tom Baker, Rick Swedloff

Faculty Scholarship

Top law firms are notoriously competitive, fighting for prime clients and matters. But some of the most elite firms are also deeply cooperative, willingly sharing key details about their finances and strategy with their rivals. More surprisingly, they pay handsomely to do so. Nearly half of the AmLaw 100 and 200 belong to mutual insurance organizations that require member firms to provide capital; partner time; and important information about their governance, balance sheets, risk management, strategic plans, and malpractice liability. To answer why these firms do so when there are commercial insurers willing to provide coverage with fewer burdens, we ...


Disrupting Immigration: How Administrative Rulemaking Could Transform The Landscape For Immigrant Entrepreneurs, Tess Douglas 2017 Pepperdine University

Disrupting Immigration: How Administrative Rulemaking Could Transform The Landscape For Immigrant Entrepreneurs, Tess Douglas

Pepperdine Law Review

Immigrant entrepreneurs come to the United States and start thriving companies that create jobs, drive the economy, and facilitate innovation. However, U.S. laws do not provide a clear path for immigrant entrepreneurs to lawfully enter and work in America. Therefore, immigrant entrepreneurs must seek lawful status in the United States through unusual routes. While Congress, the President, and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) recognize the need for clear and accessible immigration standards for immigrant entrepreneurs, the politicized nature of immigration law has impeded significant change. This Comment details how administrative rules could offer a less politicized ...


Common Legal Concerns For Small Business And Nonprofits, Jayme M. Reisler 2017 University of Houston - Main

Common Legal Concerns For Small Business And Nonprofits, Jayme M. Reisler

Jayme M Reisler

Small businesses often operate in the same market as larger companies, but differ in a multitude of ways, including size, financing, and short- and long-term goals. These differences create unique obstacles for small businesses. The same goes for nonprofits, which have distinct concerns about tax-exempt status. This article illuminates common legal concerns for small businesses and nonprofits, and briefly discusses strategies for dealing with them.


The Bylaw Puzzle In Delaware Corporate Law, David A. Skeel Jr. 2017 University of Pennsylvania Law School

The Bylaw Puzzle In Delaware Corporate Law, David A. Skeel Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

In less than a decade, Delaware’s legislature has overruled its courts and reshaped Delaware corporate law on two different occasions, with proxy access bylaws in 2009 and with shareholder litigation bylaws in 2015. Having two dramatic interventions in quick succession would be puzzling under any circumstances. The interventions are doubly puzzling because with proxy access, Delaware’s legislature authorized the use of bylaws or charter provisions that Delaware’s courts had banned; while with shareholder litigation, it banned bylaws or charter provisions that the courts had authorized. This Article attempts to unravel the puzzle.

I start with corporate law ...


Who Bleeds When The Wolves Bite? A Flesh-And-Blood Perspective On Hedge Fund Activism And Our Strange Corporate Governance System, Leo E. Strine Jr. 2017 University of Pennsylvania

Who Bleeds When The Wolves Bite? A Flesh-And-Blood Perspective On Hedge Fund Activism And Our Strange Corporate Governance System, Leo E. Strine Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines the effects of hedge fund activism and so-called wolf pack activity on the ordinary human beings—the human investors—who fund our capital markets but who, as indirect of owners of corporate equity, have only limited direct power to ensure that the capital they contribute is deployed to serve their welfare and in turn the broader social good.

Most human investors in fact depend much more on their labor than on their equity for their wealth and therefore care deeply about whether our corporate governance system creates incentives for corporations to create and sustain jobs for them ...


Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz 2017 Duke Law School

Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied to firm performance.


Corporate Officers As Agents, Deborah A. DeMott 2017 Duke Law School

Corporate Officers As Agents, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

Although officers are crucial to corporate operations, scholarly and theoretical accounts tend to slight officers and amalgamate them with directors into a single category, "managers." This essay anchors officers within the common law of agency-as does black-letter law-which crisply differentiates officers from directors. Understanding that agency is central of the legal account of officers' positions and responsibilities is crucial to seeing why, like directors, officers are fiduciaries, but distinctively so, not as instances of generic "corporate fiduciaries." Officers, like directors, owe duties of loyalty, but also particularized duties of care, competence, and diligence. Additionally, officers' duties of performance encompass two ...


Marquetta Carzell Et Al., Order On Defendants' Motion To Dismiss, Or In The Alternative For Judgment On The Pleadings, John J. Goger 2016 Fulton County Superior Court, Judge

Marquetta Carzell Et Al., Order On Defendants' Motion To Dismiss, Or In The Alternative For Judgment On The Pleadings, John J. Goger

Georgia Business Court Opinions

No abstract provided.


Disciplining Corporate Boards And Debtholders Through Targeted Proxy Access, Michelle M. Harner 2016 University of Maryland School of Law

Disciplining Corporate Boards And Debtholders Through Targeted Proxy Access, Michelle M. Harner

Indiana Law Journal

Corporate directors committed to a failed business strategy or unduly influenced by the company’s debtholders need a dissenting voice—they need shareholder nominees on the board. This Article examines the biases, conflicts, and external factors that impact board decisions, particularly when a company faces financial distress. It challenges the conventional wisdom that debt disciplines management, and it sug-gests that, in certain circumstances, the company would benefit from having the shareholders’ perspective more actively represented on the board. To that end, the Article proposes a bylaw that would give shareholders the ability to nominate direc-tors upon the occurrence of predefined ...


Thoughts On Those Transperfect Ads, Lawrence A. Hamermesh 2016 Widener Law

Thoughts On Those Transperfect Ads, Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.


Purchasing Power, Llc Order On Bluestem Brands, Inc.'S Motion To Dismiss The Tortious Interference And Unjust Enrichment Claims And Plaintiff's Cross-Motion To Strike References To Vacated Summary Judgment Order, Melvin K. Westmoreland 2016 Fulton County Superior Court, Judge

Purchasing Power, Llc Order On Bluestem Brands, Inc.'S Motion To Dismiss The Tortious Interference And Unjust Enrichment Claims And Plaintiff's Cross-Motion To Strike References To Vacated Summary Judgment Order, Melvin K. Westmoreland

Georgia Business Court Opinions

No abstract provided.


Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence From My Hometown, Leo E. Strine Jr. 2016 University of Pennsylvania

Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence From My Hometown, Leo E. Strine Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

This paper is the first in a series considering a rather tired argument in corporate governance circles, that corporate laws that give only rights to stockholders somehow implicitly empower directors to regard other constituencies as equal ends in governance. By continuing to suggest that corporate boards themselves are empowered to treat the best interests of other corporate constituencies as ends in themselves, no less important than stockholders, scholars and commentators obscure the need for legal protections for other constituencies and for other legal reforms that give these constituencies the means to more effectively protect themselves.

Using recent events in the ...


Dashboard Compliance: Benefit, Threat, Or Both?, James Fanto 2016 Brooklyn Law School

Dashboard Compliance: Benefit, Threat, Or Both?, James Fanto

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

This Article poses the basic question that is reflected in its title and that was the subject of the conference where the Article was initially presented: whether technology poses any threats to the mission of compliance and the position of compliance officers, whether it is just another useful tool for them, or whether it is something of both. It begins by explaining the origin of compliance in broker-dealers and investment advisers and its important current position in those firms. It then discusses why compliance officers have always been drawn to technology, particularly to keep up with the business sides of ...


The Question Concerning Technology In Compliance, Sean J. Griffith 2016 Brooklyn Law School

The Question Concerning Technology In Compliance, Sean J. Griffith

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

In this symposium Essay, I apply insights from philosophy and psychology to argue that modes of achieving compliance that focus on technology undermine, and are undermined by, modes of achieving compliance that focus on culture. Insisting on both may mean succeeding at neither. How an organization resolves this apparent contradiction in program design, like the broader question of optimal corporate governance arrangements, is highly idiosyncratic. Firms should therefore be accorded maximum freedom in designing their compliance programs, rather than being forced by enforcement authorities into a set of de facto mandatory compliance structures.


Intrapreneurship, Darian M. Ibrahim 2016 William & Mary Law School

Intrapreneurship, Darian M. Ibrahim

Faculty Publications

This Article on “intrapreneurship” has several goals. First, it points out that while much of the legal literature on innovation is concerned with startups (entrepreneurship), the innovation that takes place inside our largest corporations (intrapreneurship) is substantial, important, and understudied. Second, the Article observes that while large technology corporations that used to be startups may remain intrapreneurial in culture, intrapreneurship is less common in the aggregate than we might expect. Reasons include organizational bureaucracy, laws favoring entrepreneurship, and what Clayton Christensen (Harvard Business School) calls “the innovator’s dilemma.” The innovator’s dilemma is, put simply, that good management causes ...


Collective Coercion, Benjamin Means, Susan S. Kuo 2016 University of South Carolina School of Law

Collective Coercion, Benjamin Means, Susan S. Kuo

Boston College Law Review

When a collective-choice situation places coercive pressure on individual participants, the law’s traditional protection of individual autonomy against coercion must be reconciled with its necessary role in resolving problems of collective action. On the one hand, the law might seek to remove coercion from the equation so that individuals are free to make their own decisions. On the other hand, the law might empower a central authority to decide, thereby solving a problem of collective action in order to maximize the group’s shared interests. The tension between these two approaches creates deep uncertainty for the regulation of collective-choice ...


Corporate Privacy Failures Start At The Top, Victoria L. Schwartz 2016 Pepperdine University School of Law

Corporate Privacy Failures Start At The Top, Victoria L. Schwartz

Boston College Law Review

With the rise of big data, numerous corporations are in the privacy business. Yet even corporations not directly in the privacy business must also make important decisions potentially impacting the privacy of their employees, consumers, and shareholders. A wide consensus of scholars and commentators has agreed that corporations fail to adequately protect privacy. The existing scholarship has largely focused on demand-side market failures to explain this privacy failure phenomenon. This Article offers a supply-side market distortion theory that reinforces the existing demand-side explanations to better account for corporate privacy failures. Under this supply-side theory, extensive corporate disclosure requirements, including the ...


“Profit, People, Planet” Perverted: Holding Benefit Corporations Accountable To Intended Beneficiaries, Michael A. Hacker 2016 Boston College Law School

“Profit, People, Planet” Perverted: Holding Benefit Corporations Accountable To Intended Beneficiaries, Michael A. Hacker

Boston College Law Review

For-profit social entrepreneurship is a steadily growing movement. As part of this movement, numerous states have enacted legislation authorizing the incorporation of benefit corporations, a new for-profit corporate form. In addition to generating profit for shareholders, benefit corporations must “create” a “public benefit.” The mandate that a for-profit corporation pursue a humanitarian cause in addition to generating profit is a significant departure from shareholder primacy: the maxim that the sole purpose of a corporation is to generate return on investment for its shareholders. Although this legislation is a necessary and progressive evolution in corporate law, the current benefit corporation form ...


The Andean Foreign Investment Code: An Overview, Lloyd Pike 2016 University of Georgia School of Law

The Andean Foreign Investment Code: An Overview, Lloyd Pike

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.


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