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Clinical Clemency: Scaling Clemency Mountain With Student Guides, Adam Stevenson 2016 University of St. Thomas, Minnesota

Clinical Clemency: Scaling Clemency Mountain With Student Guides, Adam Stevenson

University of St. Thomas Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Preparing The Pardon Power For The 21st Century, P. S. Ruckman Jr. 2016 University of St. Thomas, Minnesota

Preparing The Pardon Power For The 21st Century, P. S. Ruckman Jr.

University of St. Thomas Law Journal

No abstract provided.


The President And The Pardon Power: A Bibliographic Essay, 1989-2015, Jeffrey Crouch 2016 University of St. Thomas, Minnesota

The President And The Pardon Power: A Bibliographic Essay, 1989-2015, Jeffrey Crouch

University of St. Thomas Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Reviewing Clemency In A Time Of Change, Mark Osler 2016 University of St. Thomas School of Law

Reviewing Clemency In A Time Of Change, Mark Osler

University of St. Thomas Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Foreign Policy And The Government Legal Adviser, Henry Darwin 2016 Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Foreign Policy And The Government Legal Adviser, Henry Darwin

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.


Foreign Policy And The Government Legal Adviser, Stephen M. Schwebel 2016 Johns Hopkins University

Foreign Policy And The Government Legal Adviser, Stephen M. Schwebel

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.


Law Professors Want Hearing, Vote On Garland, Eric Berger, Kristen M. Blankley, Brian H. Bornstein, Eve M. Brank, Robert C. Denicola, Alan H. Frank, Stephen S. Gealy, Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, David Landis, Craig M. Lawson, Richard Leiter, William H. Lyons, Richard H. Lawson, Matt Novak, Allen Overcash, Stefanie S. Pearlman, Ross Pesek, Kevin Ruser, Robert F. Schopp, Anthony Schutz, Anna Williams Shavers, Brett C. Stohs, Ryan Sullivan, Richard L. Weiner, Steven L. Willborn, Sandra Zellmer 2016 University of Nebraska College of Law

Law Professors Want Hearing, Vote On Garland, Eric Berger, Kristen M. Blankley, Brian H. Bornstein, Eve M. Brank, Robert C. Denicola, Alan H. Frank, Stephen S. Gealy, Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, David Landis, Craig M. Lawson, Richard Leiter, William H. Lyons, Richard H. Lawson, Matt Novak, Allen Overcash, Stefanie S. Pearlman, Ross Pesek, Kevin Ruser, Robert F. Schopp, Anthony Schutz, Anna Williams Shavers, Brett C. Stohs, Ryan Sullivan, Richard L. Weiner, Steven L. Willborn, Sandra Zellmer

College of Law, Faculty Publications

Dear Senator Fischer and Senator Sasse,

We write this as citizens, but we all teach at the University of Nebraska College of Law. We hold different political viewpoints and disagree frequentIy with each other on political and legal issues. As law professors, however, we share a deep commitment to the rule of law and an impartial judiciary. We therefore urge you to hold confirmation hearings and a vote on President Obama's Supreme Court nominee, Chief Judge Merrick B. Garland.


Prosecuting Beyond The Rule Of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed Through Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Jennifer Arlen 2016 NYU Law School

Prosecuting Beyond The Rule Of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed Through Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Jennifer Arlen

New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers

U.S. corporate criminal enforcement policy encourages prosecutors to enter into deferred and non-prosecution agreements (D/NPAs) that impose corporate reform mandates on firms with detected misconduct. This article concludes that the process governing prosecutors’ use of D/NPA mandates is inconsistent with the rule of law. The rule of law requires that individual executive branch actors not be given sufficient authority to restrict the rights of others to achieve personal aims, including idiosyncratic conceptions of the public interest. To satisfy the rule of law, modern governments granting discretion to executive branch actors constrain this authority by both limiting the ...


Prosecuting Beyond The Rule Of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed Through Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Jennifer Arlen 2016 NYU Law School

Prosecuting Beyond The Rule Of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed Through Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Jennifer Arlen

New York University Law and Economics Working Papers

U.S. corporate criminal enforcement policy encourages prosecutors to enter into deferred and non-prosecution agreements (D/NPAs) that impose corporate reform mandates on firms with detected misconduct. This article concludes that the process governing prosecutors’ use of D/NPA mandates is inconsistent with the rule of law. The rule of law requires that individual executive branch actors not be given sufficient authority to restrict the rights of others to achieve personal aims, including idiosyncratic conceptions of the public interest. To satisfy the rule of law, modern governments granting discretion to executive branch actors constrain this authority by both limiting the ...


Making Parliament Irrelevant: A Postcard From India, Shubhankar Dam 2016 SMU School of Law

Making Parliament Irrelevant: A Postcard From India, Shubhankar Dam

Shubhankar Dam

Separation of powers is a common feature of modern constitutions. The three principal branches of government perform distinct functions. But they aren't exclusive; the functions often overlap. This article is about one such overlap: The power of the executive to make primary legislation. Ordinarily, Parliament makes laws in India. But the Indian executive also enjoys vast legislative powers. The Indian Constitution, in Article 123, authorises the executive to promulgate ordinances if certain conditions are satisfied. These ordinances are temporary; they lapse without parliamentary ratification in due course. What about reintroducing a lapsed ordinance? It is a byzantine workaround. Is ...


Submission On Specific Aspects Of The Elected Presidency, Jack Tsen-Ta Lee 2016 Singapore Management University

Submission On Specific Aspects Of The Elected Presidency, Jack Tsen-Ta Lee

Jack Tsen-Ta LEE

This submission, to which minor redactions have been made, was prepared in response to a call for public feedback (archived here) by the Constitutional Commission to study and make recommendations on specific aspects of the Elected Presidency chaired by the Honourable Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon.


Maintaining Institutional Power And Constitutional Principles: A Rhetorical Analysis Of United States V. Nixon, R. Scott Medsker, Todd F. McDorman 2016 Wabash College

Maintaining Institutional Power And Constitutional Principles: A Rhetorical Analysis Of United States V. Nixon, R. Scott Medsker, Todd F. Mcdorman

Speaker & Gavel

In examining these implications we argue that the Court’s Nixon decision was a uniquely strategic response to a complex rhetorical situation. In fact, the elements of the situation were so fundamental to the tenor of the Court’s response that this essay’s framework is drawn from Lloyd F. Bitzer’s construction of the rhetorical situation. The use of this system will allow for deeper consideration of the context of United States v. Nixon as well as assessment of the legal text as responsive to that context.


Controlling Presidential Control, Kathryn A. Watts 2016 University of Washington School of Law

Controlling Presidential Control, Kathryn A. Watts

Michigan Law Review

Presidents Reagan and Clinton laid the foundation for strong presidential control over the administrative state, institutionalizing White House review of agency regulations. Presidential control, however, did not stop there. To the contrary, it has evolved and deepened during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Indeed, President Obama’s efforts to control agency action have dominated the headlines in recent months, touching on everything from immigration to drones to net neutrality. Despite the entrenchment of presidential control over the modern regulatory state, administrative law has yet to adapt. To date, the most pervasive response both inside and outside ...


The Indefinite Deflection Of Congressional Standing, Nat Stern 2016 Pepperdine University

The Indefinite Deflection Of Congressional Standing, Nat Stern

Pepperdine Law Review

Recent litigation brought or threatened against the administration of President Obama has brought to prominence the question of standing by Congress or its members to sue the President for nondefense or non-enforcement of federal law. While scholars divide over the normative propriety of such suits, the Court has never issued a definitive pronouncement on their viability. Nevertheless, the Court’s rulings when the issue has arisen have displayed a distinct pattern. While the Court has not formally repudiated suits of this nature, neither has it issued a decision that hinges on the presence of congressional standing. On the contrary, the ...


Originalism And The Executive, Neil Kinkopf 2016 Georgia State University College of Law

Originalism And The Executive, Neil Kinkopf

Neil J. Kinkopf

No abstract provided.


Cost-Benefit Analysis And The Structure Of The Administrative State: The Case Of Financial Services Regulation, Richard L. Revesz 2016 NYU School of Law

Cost-Benefit Analysis And The Structure Of The Administrative State: The Case Of Financial Services Regulation, Richard L. Revesz

New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers

The viability and desirability of conducting cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation is a subject of intense academic debate. Opponents claim that such analysis is feasible for environmental regulation but not for financial regulation because of the difference in the benefits that require monetization in the respective areas. This Article argues that the recent debate misses an important part of the problem. In large part, cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation cannot currently be performed successfully because of institutional shortcomings, not analytical difficulties. Compared to Executive Branch agencies, independent agencies, like the major financial regulatory agencies, lack the capacity to do cost-benefit ...


Amnesty Now! Ending Prison Overcrowding Through A Categorical Use Of The Pardon Power, Jonathan Simon 2016 University of Miami Law School

Amnesty Now! Ending Prison Overcrowding Through A Categorical Use Of The Pardon Power, Jonathan Simon

University of Miami Law Review

America’s practice of mass incarceration is coming under growing criticism as fiscally unsustainable and morally indefensible. Chronic overcrowding of prisons, a problem that epitomizes the destructive and unlawful core of mass incarceration, now afflicts the federal prison system and nearly half the states. Actual reforms, however, like President Obama’s recent grant of clemency to forty-six federal prisoners serving long drug sentences for non-violent conduct, or recent one-off sentencing reforms aimed at preventing imprisonment for minor drug or property crimes, are manifestly insufficient to end mass incarceration, or even the chronic overcrowding that represents its most degrading and destructive ...


Publius's Political Science, John A. Ferejohn, Roderick M. Hills 2016 NYU Law School

Publius's Political Science, John A. Ferejohn, Roderick M. Hills

New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers

“Publius,” the collective author of The Federalist, was not just a polemicist and normative theorist but also a political scientist. We argue that the political psychology, and institutional predictions that comprise The Federalist are best understood as political science, because the predictions could be – and were – revised in light of “that best oracle of wisdom, experience” (Federalist 15). After outlining some “maintained hypotheses” about human nature that undergird The Federalist, we describe three respects in which James Madison revised, in light of post-1790 experience, Publius’ institutional predictions. The Federalist pressed the view that the national legislature would be the most ...


Cost-Benefit Analysis And The Structure Of The Administrative State: The Case Of Financial Services Regulation, Richard L. Revesz 2016 NYU School of Law

Cost-Benefit Analysis And The Structure Of The Administrative State: The Case Of Financial Services Regulation, Richard L. Revesz

New York University Law and Economics Working Papers

The viability and desirability of conducting cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation is a subject of intense academic debate. Opponents claim that such analysis is feasible for environmental regulation but not for financial regulation because of the difference in the benefits that require monetization in the respective areas. This Article argues that the recent debate misses an important part of the problem. In large part, cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation cannot currently be performed successfully because of institutional shortcomings, not analytical difficulties. Compared to Executive Branch agencies, independent agencies, like the major financial regulatory agencies, lack the capacity to do cost-benefit ...


Ted Cruz Is Not Eligible To Be President, Mary Brigid McManamon 2016 Widener University - Delaware Campus

Ted Cruz Is Not Eligible To Be President, Mary Brigid Mcmanamon

Mary Brigid McManamon

Editorial discussing the original intent of "natural born citizen."


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