Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law and Economics Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

6233 Full-Text Articles 3419 Authors 2475095 Downloads 130 Institutions

All Articles in Law and Economics

Faceted Search

6233 full-text articles. Page 1 of 164.

Contingent Judicial Deference: Theory And Application To Usury Laws, Bernardo Guimarães, Bruno Meyerhof Salama 2017 FGV Law School in Sao Paulo

Contingent Judicial Deference: Theory And Application To Usury Laws, Bernardo Guimarães, Bruno Meyerhof Salama

Bruno Meyerhof Salama

Legislation is less likely to be enforced when courts disagree with it. Building on this premise, we propose a model of Bayesian adjudicators that use their own prior knowledge to evaluate the appropriateness of legislation. The model yields a non-monotonic relation between written rules and effectively enforced rules. Hence the enactment of legislation prohibiting something raises the probability that courts will allow related things not expressly forbidden. Moreover, legal uncertainty is greater with legislation that commands little deference from courts than with legislation that commands none. We discuss examples of e§ects of legislated prohibitions (and, in particular, usury laws ...


Crime, Punishment And The Value Of Corporate Social Responsibility, Inessa Liskovich 2017 University of Texas at Austin

Crime, Punishment And The Value Of Corporate Social Responsibility, Inessa Liskovich

Law, Economics, & Business Workshop

No abstract provided.


Corporate Cash Shortfalls And Financing Decisions, Jay R. Ritter 2017 University of Florida

Corporate Cash Shortfalls And Financing Decisions, Jay R. Ritter

Law, Economics, & Business Workshop

No abstract provided.


Synthetic Credit Ratings And The Inefficiency Of Agency Ratings, Doron Nissim 2017 Columbia Business School

Synthetic Credit Ratings And The Inefficiency Of Agency Ratings, Doron Nissim

Law, Economics, & Business Workshop

No abstract provided.


Contingent Fee Litigation In New York City, Eric Helland, Daniel M. Klerman, Brenda Dowling, Alexander Kappner 2017 Claremont McKenna College

Contingent Fee Litigation In New York City, Eric Helland, Daniel M. Klerman, Brenda Dowling, Alexander Kappner

University of Southern California Legal Studies Working Paper Series

Since 1957, New York courts have required contingent fee lawyers to file “closing statements” that disclose settlement amounts, lawyers’ fees, an accounting of expenses, and other information. This article provides preliminary analysis of these data for the period 2004-2013. Among this article’s findings are that settlement rates in New York state courts are very high (84%) relative to previous studies, that very few cases are resolved by dispositive motions, that litigated cases and settled cases have almost exactly the same average recovery, that median litigation expenses, other than attorney’s fees, are 3% of gross recovery, that claims are ...


Maybe There's No Bias In The Selection Of Disputes For Litigation, Eric Helland, Daniel M. Klerman, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee 2017 Claremont McKenna College

Maybe There's No Bias In The Selection Of Disputes For Litigation, Eric Helland, Daniel M. Klerman, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee

University of Southern California Legal Studies Working Paper Series

New York “closing statement” data provide unique insight into settlement and selection. The distributions of settlements and adjudicated damages are remarkably similar, and the average settlement is very close to the average judgment. One interpretation is that selection effects may be small or non-existent. Because existing litigation models all predict selection bias, we develop a simple, no-selection-bias model that is consistent with the data. Nevertheless, we show that the data can also be explained by generalized versions of screening, signaling, and Priest-Klein models.


Persistent Operating Losses And Corporate Financial Policies, Stephen B. McKeon 2017 University of Oregon

Persistent Operating Losses And Corporate Financial Policies, Stephen B. Mckeon

Law, Economics, & Business Workshop

No abstract provided.


Unequal Justice For The Poor: Theory, Research, And Commentary, Mitchell S. G. Klein, Walter J. Burkard 2017 St. John's University School of Law

Unequal Justice For The Poor: Theory, Research, And Commentary, Mitchell S. G. Klein, Walter J. Burkard

The Catholic Lawyer

No abstract provided.


The Untold Story Of The Justice Gap: Integrating Poverty Law Into The Law School Curriculum, Vanita S. Snow 2017 University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law

The Untold Story Of The Justice Gap: Integrating Poverty Law Into The Law School Curriculum, Vanita S. Snow

Pace Law Review

No abstract provided.


Critical Developments In The Vow Of Poverty Area And Update On Unrelated Business, Charles M. Whelan, S.J., Professor of Law, Fordham Law School; Office of General Counsel, United States Catholic Conference 2017 St. John's University School of Law

Critical Developments In The Vow Of Poverty Area And Update On Unrelated Business, Charles M. Whelan, S.J., Professor Of Law, Fordham Law School; Office Of General Counsel, United States Catholic Conference

The Catholic Lawyer

No abstract provided.


The Right Tax At The Right Time, Edward D. Kleinbard 2017 University of Southern California

The Right Tax At The Right Time, Edward D. Kleinbard

University of Southern California Legal Studies Working Paper Series

The companion paper to this (Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality) argues that a moderate flat-rate (proportional) income tax on capital imposed and collected annually has attractive theoretical and political economy properties that can be harnessed in actual tax instrument design. This paper continues the analysis by specifying in detail how such a tax might be designed.

The idea of the Dual Business Enterprise Income Tax, or Dual BEIT, is to offer business enterprises a neutral profits tax environment in which to operate, in which normal returns to capital are exempt from tax by means of an annual capital ...


Protecting Confidential Information Entrusted To Others In Business Transactions: Data Breaches, Identity Theft, And Tort Liability, Mark A. Geistfeld 2017 New York University School of Law

Protecting Confidential Information Entrusted To Others In Business Transactions: Data Breaches, Identity Theft, And Tort Liability, Mark A. Geistfeld

New York University Law and Economics Working Papers

Tort litigation over data breaches—defined here as the theft of one’s confidential information entrusted to another in a business transaction—most commonly involves the negligence cause of action. These claims turn on a number of issues that require searching analysis, including the manner in which the economic loss rule affects the tort duty, the relation between the negligence standard of care and strict liability, and the appropriate forms of compensable loss. Substantive analysis of these issues shows that they all can be resolved in favor of the negligence claim, which in turn justifies a rule of strict liability ...


Protecting Confidential Information Entrusted To Others In Business Transactions: Data Breaches, Identity Theft, And Tort Liability, Mark A. Geistfeld 2017 New York University School of Law

Protecting Confidential Information Entrusted To Others In Business Transactions: Data Breaches, Identity Theft, And Tort Liability, Mark A. Geistfeld

New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers

Tort litigation over data breaches—defined here as the theft of one’s confidential information entrusted to another in a business transaction—most commonly involves the negligence cause of action. These claims turn on a number of issues that require searching analysis, including the manner in which the economic loss rule affects the tort duty, the relation between the negligence standard of care and strict liability, and the appropriate forms of compensable loss. Substantive analysis of these issues shows that they all can be resolved in favor of the negligence claim, which in turn justifies a rule of strict liability ...


Cuando Otros Deciden Por Ti: La Eficiencia En La Intervención Judicial De Los Contratos Civiles, Diego Angulo Osorio 2017 ALACDE

Cuando Otros Deciden Por Ti: La Eficiencia En La Intervención Judicial De Los Contratos Civiles, Diego Angulo Osorio

The Latin American and Iberian Journal of Law and Economics

When the supply crosses with the acceptance of the contract, it is an optimal situation because the resources available, in theory, have been assigned efficiently and have been allocated to more valuable uses. However, this optimistic situation will not last forever; over time, it almost always affects the economic balance of the contract. The benefit or consideration becomes more valuable in comparison with the other, becoming too costly to comply with the contract, because the cost-benefit ratio was broken. How can the contractual balance be restored? Two paths are considered. On the one hand, judicialization, on the other renegotiation under ...


Acciones De Clase, “Microdaños” A Los Consumidores Y Fluid Recovery: Alternativas Institucionales Y Costos Sociales, Pamela Tolosa 2017 ALACDE

Acciones De Clase, “Microdaños” A Los Consumidores Y Fluid Recovery: Alternativas Institucionales Y Costos Sociales, Pamela Tolosa

The Latin American and Iberian Journal of Law and Economics

Usually, class actions have advantages in dealing with negative expected-value claims by consumers —when the expected cost of claiming exceeds the expected benefits of doing so—. In those cases, it is assumed that affected consumers do not have incentives to sue. Consequently, class action can be seen as a device to internalize the social costs of harms caused to consumers. Nevertheless, in order to achieve such a goal, the condemnatory sentence or the settlement agreement must be effectively enforced. In that stage of proceedings, the lack of incentives for claiming consumer damages is frequent. Fluid recovery or cy prés mechanims ...


Buying The Verdict, Lauren Cohen 2017 Harvard Business School

Buying The Verdict, Lauren Cohen

Law, Economics, & Business Workshop

No abstract provided.


The New International Economic Order And Christian Charity, Lilia R. Bautista 2017 St. John's University School of Law

The New International Economic Order And Christian Charity, Lilia R. Bautista

The Catholic Lawyer

No abstract provided.


The New International Economic Order: Christian Principles Between Developed And Developing Countries, Carolyn J. Slasinski 2017 St. John's University School of Law

The New International Economic Order: Christian Principles Between Developed And Developing Countries, Carolyn J. Slasinski

The Catholic Lawyer

No abstract provided.


Regulating Robo Advice Across The Financial Services Industry, Tom Baker, Benedict G. C. Dellaert 2017 University of Pennsylvania Law School

Regulating Robo Advice Across The Financial Services Industry, Tom Baker, Benedict G. C. Dellaert

Faculty Scholarship

Automated financial product advisors – “robo advisors” – are emerging across the financial services industry, helping consumers choose investments, banking products, and insurance policies. Robo advisors have the potential to lower the cost and increase the quality and transparency of financial advice for consumers. But they also pose significant new challenges for regulators who are accustomed to assessing human intermediaries. A well-designed robo advisor will be honest and competent, and it will recommend only suitable products. Because humans design and implement robo advisors, however, honesty, competence, and suitability cannot simply be assumed. Moreover, robo advisors pose new scale risks that are different ...


Antitrust And The Design Of Production, Herbert J. Hovenkamp 2017 University of Pennsylvania Law School

Antitrust And The Design Of Production, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship

Both economics and antitrust policy have traditionally distinguished “production” from “distribution.” The former is concerned with how products are designed and built, the latter with how they are placed into the hands of consumers. Nothing in the language of the antitrust laws suggests much concern with production as such. Although courts do not view it that way, even per se unlawful naked price fixing among rivals is a restraint on distribution rather than production. Naked price fixing assumes a product that has already been designed and built, and the important cartel decision is what should be each firm’s output ...


Digital Commons powered by bepress