Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Energy Competition: From Commodity To Boutique & Back, James W. Coleman

Faculty Scholarship

Energy products such as power, gas, and oil have long been the world’s premier commodities. Consumers demand that power and fuel are available when they want it and they prefer to pay less for it. Few know or care where their fuel or power comes from. So for years energy companies believed that efforts to differentiate their products were mostly ineffective — they were re-signed to compete on price in fierce global commodity markets. But in recent years, a new focus on regulating how energy commodities are produced has begun to splinter previously integrated energy markets, creating markets for boutique ...

Whatever Did Happen To The Antitrust Movement?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Antitrust in the United States today is caught between its pursuit of technical rules designed to define and implement defensible economic goals, and increasing calls for a new antitrust “movement.” The goals of this movement have been variously defined as combating industrial concentration, limiting the economic or political power of large firms, correcting the maldistribution of wealth, control of high profits, increasing wages, or protection of small business. High output and low consumer prices are typically unmentioned.

In the 1960s the great policy historian Richard Hofstadter lamented the passing of the antitrust “movement” as one of the “faded passions of ...

Common Ownership And Coordinated Effects, Edward Rock, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

New York University Law and Economics Working Papers

With the growth of common ownership and investor engagement with portfolio firms, the possibility of adverse competitive effects of common ownership has become an important issue. To date, most of the focus has been on “unilateral” effects. In this Article, we shift the focus to the potential “coordinated” effects of common ownership and the appropriate antitrust treatment. After examining the ways in which a common owner could be a particularly effective cartel facilitator, we identify five scenarios, based on antitrust case law and enforcement experience, in which common ownership could plausibly increase the potential for coordinated conduct in concentrated markets ...

Prophylactic Merger Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

An important purpose of the antitrust merger law is to arrest certain anticompetitive practices or outcomes in their “incipiency.” Many Clayton Act decisions involving both mergers and other practices had recognized the idea as early as the 1920s. In Brown Shoe the Supreme Court doubled down on the idea, attributing to Congress a concern about a “rising tide of economic concentration” that must be halted “at its outset and before it gathered momentum.” The Supreme Court did not explain why an incipiency test was needed to address this particular problem. Once structural thresholds for identifying problematic mergers are identified there ...

Antitrust Overreach: Undoing Cooperative Standardization In The Digital Economy, Jonathan M. Barnett

University of Southern California Legal Studies Working Paper Series

Information technology markets in general, and wireless communications markets in particular, rely on standardization mechanisms to develop interoperable devices for rapid and secure data processing, storage and transmission. From 2G through the emergent 5G standard, wireless communications markets have largely achieved standardization through cooperative multi-firm arrangements that likely outperform the historically dominant alternatives of government monopoly, which is subject to informational deficits and regulatory capture, and private monopoly, which suffers from pricing and other distortions inherent to protected market positions. This cooperative process has successfully relied on a mix of reasonably secure patents, quasi-contractual licensing commitments supplemented by reputational discipline ...

Revising The Vertical Merger Guidelines (Ftc Hearings), Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This slide deck was the author’s presentation at the FTC Hearings on Vertical Mergers (November 1, 2018). The deck sets out a summary of the author’s economic analysis and proposed revisions to the U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines.

The At&T/Time Warner Merger: How Judge Leon Garbled Professor Nash, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The US District Court in the AT&T/Time Warner vertical merger case has issued its opinion permitting the merger. At of this writing in August 2018, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has appealed to the DC Circuit and filed its brief, as have several Amici. I was disappointed that the DOJ was unable to prove its case to the satisfaction of Judge Leon, the trial judge. Notwithstanding the court’s confidence that the merger is procompetitive, I remain concerned that it will have anti- competitive effects, both on its own and following the subsequent vertical mergers in the TV ...

The Duality Of Provider And Payer In The Current Healthcare Landscape And Related Antitrust Implications, Julia Kapchinskiy

San Diego Law Review

Health care landscape has changed with the introduction of the ACA and will keep changing due to the proposed repeal. The only constant is the desire of health plans and providers to maximize profits and minimize costs, which is attainable through consolidation. This Comment advocates a revision of the existing antitrust guidelines that would (1) recognize unique nature of health care market, (2) be independent from the current or proposed legislation to the maximum possible extent, and (3) reflect the insurer-provider duality, which heavily influences the quality and accessibility of the healthcare for the consumer.

Forum Selling Abroad, Stefan Bechtold, Jens Frankenreiter, Daniel M. Klerman

University of Southern California Legal Studies Working Paper Series

Judges decide cases. Do they also try to influence which cases they decide? Clearly plaintiffs “shop” for the most attractive forum, but do judges try to attract cases by “selling” their courts? Some American judges actively try to enlarge their influence by making their courts attractive to plaintiffs, a phenomenon known as “forum sell-ing.” This article shows that forum selling occurs outside the U.S. as well, focusing on Germany, a country that is often held up as the paragon of the civil law approach to adjudication. As in the U.S., German courts attract cases primarily through the pro-plaintiff ...

Complementary Macroprudential Regulation Of Nonbank Entities And Activities, Patricia A. Mccoy, Daniel Schwarcz, Jeremy Kress

Boston College Law School Faculty Papers

In this blog entry, the authors describe their forthcoming law review article in Southern California Law Review.

Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994–July 2018, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This is a revised version of our earlier listing of vertical merger enforcement actions by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission since 1994. This revised listing includes 58 vertical matters beginning in 1994 through July 2018. It includes challenges and certain proposed transactions that were abandoned in the face of Agency concerns. This listing can be treated as an Appendix to Steven C. Salop and Daniel P. Culley, Revising the Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1 (2016).

Update On Antitrust And Pay-For-Delay: Evaluating “No Authorized Generic” And “Exclusive License” Provisions In Hatch-Waxman Settlements, Saami Zain

San Diego Law Review

In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, the United States Supreme Court held that a patent litigation settlement where a branded drug company pays a generic drug company to end the litigation and delay launching its generic may violate the antitrust laws. Although the decision ended years of controversy over whether such settlements were subject to antitrust scrutiny, many issues remain unresolved concerning the lawfulness of these settlements. In particular, courts have struggled in assessing the legality of patent settlements between branded and generic drug manufacturers involving non-cash compensation or benefits. This article discusses one type of non-cash compensation that is ...

Looking For Venue In The Patently Right Places: A Parallel Study Of The Venue Act And Venue In Anda Litigation, Mengke Xing

San Diego Law Review

Like any other type of litigation, venue is often an important strategic decision for patent infringement litigants. Under the traditional nation-wide venue rule, a patent owner was able to sue a corporate defendant almost in every district in the country, giving rise to abusive forum shopping and the popularity of the Eastern District of Texas. Last year, the Supreme Court in TC Heartland dramatically changed the legal framework of venue in patent litigation, while leaving some issues unaddressed. After a discussion of the evolvement of venue laws and the significance of TC Heartland, this Comment focuses on the Venue Equity ...

Serial Collusion By Multi-Product Firms, Michael Meurer, William Kovacic, Robert Marshall

Faculty Scholarship

We provide empirical evidence that many multi-product firms have each participated in several cartels over the past 50 years. Standard analysis of cartel conduct, as well as enforcement policy, is rooted in the presumption that each cartel in which a given firm participates is a singular activity, independent of other cartel conduct by the firm. We argue that this analysis is deficient in many respects in the face of serial collusion by multi-product firms. We offer policy recommendations to reign in serial collusion, including a mandatory coordinated effects review for any merger involving a serial colluder, regardless of the apparent ...

Intellectual Property And The Economics Of Product Differentiation, Christopher S. Yoo

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The literature applying the economics of product differentiation to intellectual property has been called the most important development in the economic analysis of IP in years. Relaxing the assumption that products are homogeneous yields new insights by explaining persistent features of IP markets that the traditional approaches cannot, challenging the extent to which IP allows rightsholders to earn monopoly profits, allowing for sources of welfare outside of price-quantity space, which in turn opens up new dimensions along which intellectual property can compete. It also allows for equilibria with different welfare characteristics, making the tendency towards systematic underproduction more contingent and ...

The Policy Challenge Of Artificial Intelligence, James Bessen

Faculty Scholarship

New "artificial intelligence" (AI) technology promises to bring dramatic social and economic changes, demanding major policy changes. In intellectual property and antitrust law, AI will exacerbate a damaging trend: across all major sectors of the economy, proprietary information technology is increasing the market dominance of large firms. This trend might not seem like bad news, but it is evidence of a slowdown in the spread of technical knowledge throughout the economy. The result is rising industry concentration, slower productivity growth and growing wage inequality. The key challenge to IP and antitrust policy will be counter this trend yet maintain innovation ...

Agribusiness And Antitrust: The Bayer-Monsanto Merger, Its Legality, And Its Effect On The United States And European Union, Aleah Douglas

The Global Business Law Review

This note examines the current and historical antitrust laws of the United States and the European Union as they relate to the currently pending merger between Bayer and Monsanto. It focuses alternatively on the legality of the merger under modern antitrust laws and the impact such a deal could have on the agribusiness industry in both Europe and the United States. Ultimately, the note argues that the Bayer-Monsanto merger is illegal and should be blocked by the proper authorities in the United States and the European Union.

Non-Parties: The Negative Externalities Of Regional Trade Agreements In A Private Law Perspective, Daniela Caruso

Faculty Scholarship

In private law theory and in international trade law alike, a new strand of scholarship has emerged in recent years. This strand is characterized by a focus on market actors who are excluded from deals struck by other parties and suffer economic hardship as a result. Scholars have also focused on doctrines and legal concepts apt to identify this type of hardship and to provide non-parties with justiciable claims and remedies. Private-law and trade-law scholars involved in this mode of research are often moved by justice concerns and by the realization that rules based solely on the enforcement of bilateral ...

An Antitrust-Informed Approach To Regulating Internet Interconnection, Daniel A. Lyons

Boston College Law School Faculty Papers

For over a decade, net neutrality has dominated telecommunications policy. Advocates targeted broadband networks because of their strategic position as the gateway to consumers, which potentially positions them to shape the flow of information online. Yet as former the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or the “Commission”) Chairman Julius Genachowski noted, these broadband providers are merely the “onramps” to the Internet— the last mile of a system that brings over 35,000 networks together to move information packets from origin to destination.

Interconnection agreements stitch these networks together. These arms’ length transactions define the terms by which networks exchange traffic with ...

Is Antitrust's Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Antitrust’s consumer welfare principle stands for the proposition that antitrust policy should encourage markets to produce output as high as is consistent with sustainable competition, and prices that are accordingly as low. Such a policy does not protect every interest group. For example, it opposes the interests of cartels or other competition-limiting associations who profit from lower output and higher prices. It also runs counter to the interest of less competitive firms that need higher prices in order to survive. Market structure is relevant to antitrust policy, but its importance is contingent rather than absolute – that is, market structure ...