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Energy Competition: From Commodity To Boutique & Back, James W. Coleman 2019 Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law

Energy Competition: From Commodity To Boutique & Back, James W. Coleman

Faculty Scholarship

Energy products such as power, gas, and oil have long been the world’s premier commodities. Consumers demand that power and fuel are available when they want it and they prefer to pay less for it. Few know or care where their fuel or power comes from. So for years energy companies believed that efforts to differentiate their products were mostly ineffective — they were re-signed to compete on price in fierce global commodity markets. But in recent years, a new focus on regulating how energy commodities are produced has begun to splinter previously integrated energy markets, creating markets for boutique ...


The Duality Of Provider And Payer In The Current Healthcare Landscape And Related Antitrust Implications, Julia Kapchinskiy 2018 University of San Diego

The Duality Of Provider And Payer In The Current Healthcare Landscape And Related Antitrust Implications, Julia Kapchinskiy

San Diego Law Review

Health care landscape has changed with the introduction of the ACA and will keep changing due to the proposed repeal. The only constant is the desire of health plans and providers to maximize profits and minimize costs, which is attainable through consolidation. This Comment advocates a revision of the existing antitrust guidelines that would (1) recognize unique nature of health care market, (2) be independent from the current or proposed legislation to the maximum possible extent, and (3) reflect the insurer-provider duality, which heavily influences the quality and accessibility of the healthcare for the consumer.


Forum Selling Abroad, Stefan Bechtold, Jens Frankenreiter, Daniel M. Klerman 2018 ETH Zurich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology)

Forum Selling Abroad, Stefan Bechtold, Jens Frankenreiter, Daniel M. Klerman

University of Southern California Legal Studies Working Paper Series

Judges decide cases. Do they also try to influence which cases they decide? Clearly plaintiffs “shop” for the most attractive forum, but do judges try to attract cases by “selling” their courts? Some American judges actively try to enlarge their influence by making their courts attractive to plaintiffs, a phenomenon known as “forum sell-ing.” This article shows that forum selling occurs outside the U.S. as well, focusing on Germany, a country that is often held up as the paragon of the civil law approach to adjudication. As in the U.S., German courts attract cases primarily through the pro-plaintiff ...


Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994–July 2018, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley 2018 Georgetown University Law Center

Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994–July 2018, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This is a revised version of our earlier listing of vertical merger enforcement actions by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission since 1994. This revised listing includes 58 vertical matters beginning in 1994 through July 2018. It includes challenges and certain proposed transactions that were abandoned in the face of Agency concerns. This listing can be treated as an Appendix to Steven C. Salop and Daniel P. Culley, Revising the Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1 (2016).


Update On Antitrust And Pay-For-Delay: Evaluating “No Authorized Generic” And “Exclusive License” Provisions In Hatch-Waxman Settlements, Saami Zain 2018 University of San Diego

Update On Antitrust And Pay-For-Delay: Evaluating “No Authorized Generic” And “Exclusive License” Provisions In Hatch-Waxman Settlements, Saami Zain

San Diego Law Review

In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, the United States Supreme Court held that a patent litigation settlement where a branded drug company pays a generic drug company to end the litigation and delay launching its generic may violate the antitrust laws. Although the decision ended years of controversy over whether such settlements were subject to antitrust scrutiny, many issues remain unresolved concerning the lawfulness of these settlements. In particular, courts have struggled in assessing the legality of patent settlements between branded and generic drug manufacturers involving non-cash compensation or benefits. This article discusses one type of non-cash compensation that is ...


Looking For Venue In The Patently Right Places: A Parallel Study Of The Venue Act And Venue In Anda Litigation, Mengke Xing 2018 University of San Diego

Looking For Venue In The Patently Right Places: A Parallel Study Of The Venue Act And Venue In Anda Litigation, Mengke Xing

San Diego Law Review

Like any other type of litigation, venue is often an important strategic decision for patent infringement litigants. Under the traditional nation-wide venue rule, a patent owner was able to sue a corporate defendant almost in every district in the country, giving rise to abusive forum shopping and the popularity of the Eastern District of Texas. Last year, the Supreme Court in TC Heartland dramatically changed the legal framework of venue in patent litigation, while leaving some issues unaddressed. After a discussion of the evolvement of venue laws and the significance of TC Heartland, this Comment focuses on the Venue Equity ...


Intellectual Property And The Economics Of Product Differentiation, Christopher S. Yoo 2018 University of Pennsylvania Law School

Intellectual Property And The Economics Of Product Differentiation, Christopher S. Yoo

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The literature applying the economics of product differentiation to intellectual property has been called the most important development in the economic analysis of IP in years. Relaxing the assumption that products are homogeneous yields new insights by explaining persistent features of IP markets that the traditional approaches cannot, challenging the extent to which IP allows rightsholders to earn monopoly profits, allowing for sources of welfare outside of price-quantity space, which in turn opens up new dimensions along which intellectual property can compete. It also allows for equilibria with different welfare characteristics, making the tendency towards systematic underproduction more contingent and ...


Agribusiness And Antitrust: The Bayer-Monsanto Merger, Its Legality, And Its Effect On The United States And European Union, Aleah Douglas 2018 Cleveland-Marshall College of Law

Agribusiness And Antitrust: The Bayer-Monsanto Merger, Its Legality, And Its Effect On The United States And European Union, Aleah Douglas

The Global Business Law Review

This note examines the current and historical antitrust laws of the United States and the European Union as they relate to the currently pending merger between Bayer and Monsanto. It focuses alternatively on the legality of the merger under modern antitrust laws and the impact such a deal could have on the agribusiness industry in both Europe and the United States. Ultimately, the note argues that the Bayer-Monsanto merger is illegal and should be blocked by the proper authorities in the United States and the European Union.


Non-Parties: The Negative Externalities Of Regional Trade Agreements In A Private Law Perspective, Daniela Caruso 2018 Boston University School of Law

Non-Parties: The Negative Externalities Of Regional Trade Agreements In A Private Law Perspective, Daniela Caruso

Faculty Scholarship

In private law theory and in international trade law alike, a new strand of scholarship has emerged in recent years. This strand is characterized by a focus on market actors who are excluded from deals struck by other parties and suffer economic hardship as a result. Scholars have also focused on doctrines and legal concepts apt to identify this type of hardship and to provide non-parties with justiciable claims and remedies. Private-law and trade-law scholars involved in this mode of research are often moved by justice concerns and by the realization that rules based solely on the enforcement of bilateral ...


Is Antitrust's Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp 2018 University of Pennsylvania Law School

Is Antitrust's Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Antitrust’s consumer welfare principle stands for the proposition that antitrust policy should encourage markets to produce output as high as is consistent with sustainable competition, and prices that are accordingly as low. Such a policy does not protect every interest group. For example, it opposes the interests of cartels or other competition-limiting associations who profit from lower output and higher prices. It also runs counter to the interest of less competitive firms that need higher prices in order to survive. Market structure is relevant to antitrust policy, but its importance is contingent rather than absolute – that is, market structure ...


Talent Can't Be Allocated: A Labor Economics Justification For No-Poaching Agreement Criminality In Antitrust Regulation, Rochella T. Davis 2018 Brooklyn Law School

Talent Can't Be Allocated: A Labor Economics Justification For No-Poaching Agreement Criminality In Antitrust Regulation, Rochella T. Davis

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

As of late, labor markets have been a focus point in antitrust enforcement. In 2016 the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced an unprecedented policy to pursue no-poaching agreements criminally. More recently, in January 2018, the DOJ’s Attorney General indicated that the agency is following through on the policy. This Article argues that the DOJ’s new policy is logical and prudent because the economic effects that no-poaching agreements have on labor markets mirror the anticompetitive effects of customer allocation agreements. It also shows that the policy is well-supported by labor economics and antitrust policies. In efforts to comply with ...


Has The Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, Jonathan M. Barnett 2018 University of Southern California

Has The Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, Jonathan M. Barnett

University of Southern California Legal Studies Working Paper Series

Scholarly commentary widely asserts that technology markets suffer from a triplet of adverse effect arising from the strong patent regime associated with the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982: "patent" thickets burdening innovation with transaction and litigation costs; "patent holdup" resulting in excessive payouts to opportunistic patent holders; and "royalty stacking" causing exorbitant patent licensing fees. Together these effects purportedly depress innovation and inflate prices for end-users. These repeated assertions are inconsistent with the continuing robust output, declining prices, and rapid innovation observed in the most patent-intensive technology markets during the more that three ...


Regulation And The Marginalist Revolution, Herbert J. Hovenkamp 2018 University of Pennsylvania Law School

Regulation And The Marginalist Revolution, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The marginalist revolution in economics became the foundation for the modern regulatory State with its “mixed” economy. Marginalism, whose development defines the boundary between classical political economy and neoclassical economics, completely overturned economists’ theory of value. It developed in the late nineteenth century in England, the Continent and the United States. For the classical political economists, value was a function of past averages. One good example is the wage-fund theory, which saw the optimal rate of wages as a function of the firm’s ability to save from previous profits. Another is the theory of corporate finance, which assessed a ...


Trading Goods For Bad: Is Public Policy Undermined By Investor State Dispute Mechanisms?, Michelle C. Perez 2018 University of Miami Law School

Trading Goods For Bad: Is Public Policy Undermined By Investor State Dispute Mechanisms?, Michelle C. Perez

University of Miami Inter-American Law Review

No abstract provided.


Competition Policy For Exclusionary Pricing: Experimental Evidence, Aaron Edlin 2018 Selected Works

Competition Policy For Exclusionary Pricing: Experimental Evidence, Aaron Edlin

Aaron Edlin

We study the effects of above-cost exclusionary pricing and the efficacy of three
policy responses. We run a series of experiments involving a monopoly incumbent
and a potential entrant. Our experiments show that under a laissez-faire regime,
the threat of post-entry price cuts discourages entry, and allows incumbents to
charge monopoly prices. Current U.S. policy (Brooke Group) does not help. In
contrast, a policy suggested by Baumol (1979) lowers post-exit prices, while Edlin’s
(2002) proposal reduces pre-entry prices and encourages entry in the experiments.
While both policies have less competitive outcomes after entry than Laissez-faire
does, they nevertheless ...


Keynote Address To The Atlas Conference: “International Business Disputes In An Era Of Receding Globalism”, Lord Peter H. Goldsmith QC, PC 2018 Debevoise & Plimpton LLP

Keynote Address To The Atlas Conference: “International Business Disputes In An Era Of Receding Globalism”, Lord Peter H. Goldsmith Qc, Pc

Georgia State University Law Review

This is a transcript of the luncheon keynote address by Lord Peter Goldsmith at the Sixth Annual Conference of the Atlanta International Arbitration Society (AtlAS) on October 23, 2017.

Lord Peter Goldsmith QC, PC, is London Co-Managing Partner and Chair of European and Asian Litigation at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP. He joined the firm after serving as the UK’s Attorney General from 2001-2007, prior to which he was in private practice as one of the leading barristers in London.

Lord Goldsmith has a long practice in arbitration and in the interface between arbitration and litigation. He appears as counsel for ...


How Meyer V. Uber Could Demonstrate That Uber And The Sharing Economy Fit Into Antitrust Law, Nicholas Andrew Passaro 2018 Dechert LLP

How Meyer V. Uber Could Demonstrate That Uber And The Sharing Economy Fit Into Antitrust Law, Nicholas Andrew Passaro

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Recently, Uber driver (and former Uber CEO) Travis Kalanick has been sued under antitrust laws. The plaintiffs argue that Mr. Kalanick and the other Uber drivers have engaged in a price fixing arrangement that violates §1 of the Sherman Act. The case, Meyer v. Uber (originally Meyer v. Kalanick), is still being litigated. This Comment will analyze each side’s potential arguments and will ultimately conclude that the court should find Uber drivers not guilty of a Sherman Act violation. This determination will be based on: the merits of the various arguments, how such a holding would fit within the ...


China's Anti-Corruption Crackdown And The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Daniel C.K. Chow 2018 Ohio State University Moritz College of Law

China's Anti-Corruption Crackdown And The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Daniel C.K. Chow

Texas A&M Law Review

China’s highly publicized crackdown on corruption may affect the type and number of cases in China that arise under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), but it should not be assumed that the crackdown will necessarily lead to fewer FCPA prosecutions. Although there is some overlap of the goals of China’s corruption crackdown and the goals of the FCPA, China’s crackdown also serves important goals of the ruling Communist Party. The main goal of the current crackdown is to reinforce the Party’s power by targeting enemies and rivals of the current leadership. The crackdown is not ...


Market Power And American Express, John B. Kirkwood 2018 Seattle University School of Law

Market Power And American Express, John B. Kirkwood

University of Miami Business Law Review

The Second Circuit ruled that American Express did not have market power because it operated in a two-sided market and any leverage it exercised over merchants derived from its successful competition for cardholders. As a result, the relevant market had to include both sides of a credit card transaction, the company’s market share was modest, and it could not exploit both merchants and cardholders. In Market Power and Antitrust Enforcement (forthcoming in B.U. L. REV.), I propose a new approach that infers market power from the likely effects of the challenged conduct. This approach shows that American Express ...


Assessing The Competitive Effects Of Surcharging The Use Of Payment Mechanisms, Steven Semeraro 2018 Thomas Jefferson School of Law

Assessing The Competitive Effects Of Surcharging The Use Of Payment Mechanisms, Steven Semeraro

University of Miami Business Law Review

The Department of Justice’s theory of liability in its case attacking the non–discrimination provisions in American Express’s merchant contracts contends that point–of–sale competition on the price of making a purchase with a credit card is an instrument creating economic efficiency. That is, the economy would run more efficiently, and consumers would be better off, if merchants were free to charge variable prices for different types of credit cards. After all, charging different prices for using different types of payment mechanisms appears to be just another form of presumptively positive price competition.

The Second Circuit rejected ...


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