The Monopolization/Abuse Offense,
2013
Prof. & Dir., Inst. For Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago, School of Law
The Monopolization/Abuse Offense, Spencer Weber Waller
Spencer Weber Waller
No abstract provided.
What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price Discrimination? The Law And Ethics Of Using Personal Information For Pricing,
2013
SelectedWorks
What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price Discrimination? The Law And Ethics Of Using Personal Information For Pricing, Akiva A. Miller
Akiva A Miller
New information technologies have dramatically increased sellers’ ability to engage in retail price discrimination. Debates over using personal information for price discrimination frequently treat it as a single problem, and are not sufficiently sensitive to the variety of price discrimination practices, the different kinds of information they require in order to succeed, and the different ethical concerns they raise. This paper explores the ethical and legal debate over regulating price discrimination facilitated by consumers’ personal information. Various kinds of “privacy remedies”—self-regulation, technological fixes, state regulation, and legislating private causes of legal action—each have their place. By drawing distinctions between various …
Professional Activities And The Antitrust Laws,
2013
Notre Dame Law School
Professional Activities And The Antitrust Laws, Joseph P. Bauer
Joseph P. Bauer
No abstract provided.
Mark Mckenna Quoted In The Guardian Article "Samsung Says $52m, Not $380m, Is Owed For Apple Patent Infringement,
2013
Notre Dame Law School
Mark Mckenna Quoted In The Guardian Article "Samsung Says $52m, Not $380m, Is Owed For Apple Patent Infringement, Mark Mckenna
Mark P. McKenna
Mark McKenna quoted in The Guardian article by Charles Arthur "Samsung says $52m, not $380m, is owed for Apple patent infringement. “Most cases with these enormous stakes would have settled by now – particularly once the court ordered a new trial on damages, which could substantially increase or decrease the damage award," McKenna said by email. "But once the court took off the table the possibility of an injunction (which would have taken Samsung products off the market), the risk to Samsung was significantly lower, reducing its incentive to settle. And Apple wants something significant to show for its efforts. …
Mark Mckenna Quoted In Ap Article On Apple, Samsung Trial,
2013
Notre Dame Law School
Mark Mckenna Quoted In Ap Article On Apple, Samsung Trial, Mark Mckenna
Mark P. McKenna
Mark McKenna was quoted in the Associated Press article by PAUL ELIAS Apple, Samsung resume court battle over smartphone patents as trial opens in Silicon Valley "Most cases with these enormous stakes would have settled by now — particularly once the court ordered a new trial on damages, which could substantially increase or decrease the damage award," said Notre Dame law school professor Mark McKenna, who specializes in technology. But McKenna said a key incentive for both companies to reach a settlement was removed by U.S. District Judge Lucy Koh when she refused to ban U.S. sales of the Samsung …
Understanding Behavioral Antitrust,
2013
Notre Dame Law School
Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, Avishalom Tor
Avishalom Tor
Behavioral antitrust – the application to antitrust analysis of empirical evidence of robust behavioral deviations from strict rationality – is increasingly popular and hotly debated by legal scholars and the enforcement agencies alike. This Article shows, however, that both proponents and opponents of behavioral antitrust frequently and fundamentally misconstrue its methodology, treating concrete empirical phenomena as if they were broad hypothetical assumptions. Because of this fundamental methodological error, scholars often make three classes of mistakes in behavioral antitrust analyses: First, they fail to appreciate the variability and heterogeneity of behavioral phenomena; second, they disregard the concrete ways in which markets, …
Overcoming Impediments To Information Sharing,
2013
Notre Dame Law School
Overcoming Impediments To Information Sharing, Avishalom Tor, Amitai Aviram
Avishalom Tor
When deciding whether to share information, firms consider their private welfare. Discrepancies between social and private welfare may lead firms excessively to share information to anti-competitive ends - in facilitating of cartels and other harmful horizontal practices - a problem both antitrust scholarship and case law have paid much attention to. On the other hand, legal scholars have paid far less attention to the opposite type of inefficiency in information sharing among competitors - namely, the problem of sub-optimal information sharing. This phenomenon can generate significant social costs and is of special importance in network industries because the maintenance of …
Unilateral, Anticompetitive Acquisitions Of Dominance Or Monopoly Power,
2013
Notre Dame Law School
Unilateral, Anticompetitive Acquisitions Of Dominance Or Monopoly Power, Avishalom Tor
Avishalom Tor
The prohibition of certain types of anticompetitive unilateral conduct by firms possessing a substantial degree of market power is a cornerstone of competition law regimes worldwide. Yet notwithstanding the social costs of monopoly modern legal regimes refrain from prohibiting it outright. Instead, competition laws prohibit monopolies or dominant firms from engaging in those types of anticompetitive conduct that amount to monopolizing or an abuse of dominant position. Importantly, anticompetitive conduct can take place both on the road to monopoly and, later on, once substantial market power has been achieved. Legal regimes nevertheless tend either to ignore or pay only limited …
Introduction: Expansion And Contraction In Monopolization Law,
2013
Notre Dame Law School
Introduction: Expansion And Contraction In Monopolization Law, Michael S. Gal, Spencer Weber Waller, Avishalom Tor
Avishalom Tor
This article introduces a special symposium issue of the Antitrust Law Journal based on a conference on monopolization. It argues that monopolization law has been experiencing simultaneous expansion and contraction processes that are not wholly contradictory but at least partly complementary. Specifically, the authors suggest that the contraction of monopolization law in the United States and the EU might serve to facilitate its expansion and increased importance worldwide, providing other antitrust regimes with more focused and effective tools to address the challenges involved in regulating dominant firms. Moreover, monopolization law's increased reach internationally also has made its refinement and rationalization …
Illustrating A Behaviorally Informed Approach To Antitrust Law: The Case Of Predatory Pricing,
2013
Notre Dame Law School
Illustrating A Behaviorally Informed Approach To Antitrust Law: The Case Of Predatory Pricing, Avishalom Tor
Avishalom Tor
One of the core assumptions of the traditional economic approach to antitrust law is that competitors are perfectly rational, profit-maximizing, decision makers. Sometimes, this assumption serves as a useful simplification of business behavior, providing an effective foundation for antitrust doctrine. At other times, however, assuming strictly rational behavior on the part of competitors is not “approximately right” but, instead, “perfectly wrong.” In these latter cases, the reliance on the perfect rationality assumption can lead scholars to mispredict market behavior and, possibly, advocate erroneous prescriptions for antitrust policy. In contrast, a behaviorally informed approach to antitrust law is based on scientific …
Insurance (Annual Survey Of The Law Of New Jersey, 1954-55),
2013
Notre Dame Law School
Insurance (Annual Survey Of The Law Of New Jersey, 1954-55), Robert Rodes
Robert Rodes
No abstract provided.
Trademark Law's Faux Federalism,
2013
Notre Dame Law School
Trademark Law's Faux Federalism, Mark Mckenna
Mark P. McKenna
Federal and state trademark laws regulate concurrently: The Lanham Act does not preempt state law, and in fact many states have statutorily and/or judicially developed trademark or unfair competition laws of their own. This state of affairs, which is now well-accepted even if it has not always been uncontroversial, distinguishes trademark law from patent and copyright law, since federal patent and copyright statutes preempt state law much more broadly. The Patent Act entirely preempts state law with respect to non-secret inventions and the 1976 Copyright Act preempts state copyright law with respect to all works fixed in a tangible medium …
Back To The Future: Rediscovering Equitable Discretion In Trademark Cases,
2013
Notre Dame Law School
Back To The Future: Rediscovering Equitable Discretion In Trademark Cases, Mark P. Mckenna
Mark P. McKenna
Courts in recent years have increasingly made blunt use of their equitable powers in trademark cases. Rather than limiting the scope of injunctive relief so as to protect the interests of a mark owner while respecting the legitimate interests of third parties and of consumers, courts in most cases have viewed injunctive relief in binary terms. This is unfortunate, because greater willingness to tailor injunctive relief could go a long way to mitigating some of the most pernicious effects of trademark law’s modern expansion. This Essay urges courts to reverse this trend towards crude injunctive relief, and to re-embrace their …
Is Pepsi Really A Substitute For Coke? Market Definition In Antitrust And Ip,
2013
Notre Dame Law School
Is Pepsi Really A Substitute For Coke? Market Definition In Antitrust And Ip, Mark Mckenna
Mark P. McKenna
No abstract provided.
Senator Rufus Blodgett: The Sherman Anti-Trust Act’S Lone Dissenter,
2013
Selected Works
Senator Rufus Blodgett: The Sherman Anti-Trust Act’S Lone Dissenter, Steven Lavender
Steven Lavender
No abstract provided.
A Channel Worth Changing? The Individual Regional Sports Network: Proliferation, Profits, Parity, And The Potential Administrative And Antitrust Issues That Could Follow,
2013
Pepperdine University
A Channel Worth Changing? The Individual Regional Sports Network: Proliferation, Profits, Parity, And The Potential Administrative And Antitrust Issues That Could Follow, Stephen Dixon
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
No abstract provided.
Public Policy In International Investment And Trade Law: Community Expectations And Functional Decision-Making,
2013
University of Hawaii William S. Richardson School of Law
Public Policy In International Investment And Trade Law: Community Expectations And Functional Decision-Making, Diane A. Desierto
Diane A Desierto
This article uses a contextual policy-oriented approach to assess how the standing debate on a State's regulatory freedom has been treated within international investment law (e.g. case-by-case interpretation of variant treaty design in each case), in contrast with how the issue of domestic regulatory autonomy in international trade law has evolved towards coordination (e.g. attempted harmonization of the same set of instruments). The article submits a different view from many primarily trade law/investment law scholars (and other systemic integrationists who idealize a seamless shift from trade law to investment law), who have postulated that this fundamental issue of State regulatory …
Eu 경쟁당국의 기습현장조사,
2013
SelectedWorks
Emerging Issues With Respect To Merger Enforcement Standards,
2013
Notre Dame Law School
Emerging Issues With Respect To Merger Enforcement Standards, Daniel F. Kolb, Edward W. Large, David Boies, Thomas Dieterich, Malcolm R. Pfunder, Joseph P. Bauer
Joseph P. Bauer
No abstract provided.
Antitrust Exemptions For Private Requests For Governmental Action: A Critical Analysis Of The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine,
2013
Notre Dame Law School
Antitrust Exemptions For Private Requests For Governmental Action: A Critical Analysis Of The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, Earl W. Kintner, Joseph P. Bauer
Joseph P. Bauer
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful for persons to engage in a combination or conspiracy, in restraint of trade. A variety of undertakings by persons seeking legislative action, judicial relief, administrative agency activity, or action by the executive branch of government may result in governmental steps which restrain competitors or diminish competition. Indeed, the very act of seeking governmental intervention, even if unsuccessful, may have adverse competitive effects. Similarly, monopolization or attempts to monopolize, proscribed by Section 2 of the Sherman Act, might actually be advanced by governmental activities or by an individual merely seeking governmental assistance. …
