March 2, 2018: To Cure American Politics, There Must Be A Reformation In Secularism, 2018 Duquesne University
March 2, 2018: To Cure American Politics, There Must Be A Reformation In Secularism, Bruce Ledewitz
Hallowed Secularism
Blog post, “To Cure American Politics, There Must Be a Reformation in Secularism“ discusses politics, theology and the law in relation to religion and public life in the democratic United States of America.
Originalism, 2018 Harvard University
Originalism, Cass R. Sunstein
Notre Dame Law Review
Originalism might be defended on two very different grounds. The first is that it is in some sense mandatory—for example, that it follows from the very idea of interpretation, from having a written Constitution, or from the only legitimate justifications for judicial review. The second is that originalism is best on broadly consequentialist grounds. While the first kind of defense is not convincing, the second cannot be ruled off limits. In an imaginable world, it is right; in our world, it is usually not. But in the context of impeachment, originalism is indeed best, because there are no sufficiently helpful …
March 1, 2018: Want To Make America Great? Pay Your Bills, 2018 Duquesne University
March 1, 2018: Want To Make America Great? Pay Your Bills, Bruce Ledewitz
Hallowed Secularism
Blog post, “Want to Make America Great? Pay Your Bills“ discusses politics, theology and the law in relation to religion and public life in the democratic United States of America.
Holy Gender! Promoting Free Exercise Of Gender By Discernment Without Establishing Binary Sex Or Compulsory Fluidity, 2018 Florida International University
Holy Gender! Promoting Free Exercise Of Gender By Discernment Without Establishing Binary Sex Or Compulsory Fluidity, José Gabilondo
Seattle Journal for Social Justice
No abstract provided.
“Who Is A Latcrit?”: Jerome Culp And Angela Harris Provide Answers And Ways Of Being, 2018 University of New Mexico School of Law
“Who Is A Latcrit?”: Jerome Culp And Angela Harris Provide Answers And Ways Of Being, Margaret Montoya
Seattle Journal for Social Justice
No abstract provided.
Foreword: What’S Next? Counter-Stories And Theorizing Resistance, 2018 Seattle University School of Law
Foreword: What’S Next? Counter-Stories And Theorizing Resistance, Tayyab Mahmud
Seattle Journal for Social Justice
No abstract provided.
On Margaret Montoya & Jerome Culp: An Appreciation, 2018 University of California - Davis
On Margaret Montoya & Jerome Culp: An Appreciation, Angela P. Harris
Seattle Journal for Social Justice
No abstract provided.
Invisible Adjudication In The U.S. Courts Of Appeals, 2018 Texas A&M University School of Law
Invisible Adjudication In The U.S. Courts Of Appeals, Michael Kagan, Rebecca Gill, Fatma Marouf
Faculty Scholarship
Non-precedent decisions are the norm in federal appellate courts, and are seen by judges as a practical necessity given the size of their dockets. Yet the system has always been plagued by doubts. If only some decisions are designated to be precedents, questions arise about whether courts might be acting arbitrarily in other cases. Such doubts have been overcome in part because nominally unpublished decisions are available through standard legal research databases. This creates the appearance of transparency, mitigating concerns that courts may be acting arbitrarily. But what if this appearance is an illusion? This Article reports empirical data drawn …
Brain Perspectives On Investor Behavior And Decision-Making Errors, 2018 Seattle University School of Law
Brain Perspectives On Investor Behavior And Decision-Making Errors, Owen D. Jones
Seattle University Law Review
I want to start off with what I consider to be the statement of the problem. As I understand it, you’re concerned that the time horizons for maximizing the value of an investment vary among individuals in surprisingly wide, imperfectly predictable, and often seemingly irrational ways. And, if I understand your target here, the idea is that a deeper understanding of the causes of this variation might aid in the planning and design of legal and corporate policies. To jump into this, I’m going to give a little bit of an introduction about behavioral biases, and something that I’ve called …
An Identity Theory Of The Short- And Long-Term Investor Debate, 2018 Seattle University School of Law
An Identity Theory Of The Short- And Long-Term Investor Debate, Claire A. Hill
Seattle University Law Review
Economics famously treats market actors as homogeneous. People are homo economicus, rational self-interested maximizers of their own utility. So far, so good, notwithstanding supposed behavioral “deviations” from rationality (more on those later). That people can view their own utility very differently from one another is recognized in theory, but not so much in practice. Also not sufficiently recognized is the extent to which people’s views of their own utility reflect their theories of who they are and how the world works, and that they hold such views and theories not just atomistically, but also collectively—that is, socially.
Federalism Of Personal Finance: State & Federal Retirement Plans, 2018 Seattle University School of Law
Federalism Of Personal Finance: State & Federal Retirement Plans, William A. Birdthistle
Seattle University Law Review
In this Article, I consider possible approaches that attempt to improve the plans through which millions of Americans tend to their life savings. I begin by considering the inadequacies of our current system of defined contribution accounts and then address two possible alternatives: the first being a federal account universally available to Americans based largely on the model of the Thrift Savings Plan; the second being a system of statebased retirement accounts like those that have already been developed in a handful of states. Though I conclude that a single, federal plan would be superior, either alternative approach would be …
Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, And The Liability Structure Of Investor Time Horizons, 2018 Seattle University School of Law
Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, And The Liability Structure Of Investor Time Horizons, Andrew Verstein
Seattle University Law Review
Do investor time horizons lead to inefficient business conduct in the real economy? An extensive finance literature analyzes whether particular practices (e.g., high frequency trading and stock buybacks) lead firms to operate with inefficiently myopic investment horizons, and an extensive legal literature considers the appropriateness of policy interventions. This Article joins those debates by charting the space of possibilities: what might be the causes of problematic time horizons? What solutions are available? One implication of this analysis is that there may be unexplored market-based solutions located on the liability side of investors’ balance sheets. This Article also argues that we …
Corporate Governance As Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A Proposal, 2018 Seattle University School of Law
Corporate Governance As Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A Proposal, Lynn Stout, Sergio Gramitto
Seattle University Law Review
In this Article, we show how our society can use corporate governance shifts to address, if not entirely resolve, a number of currently pressing social and economic problems. These problems include: rising income inequality; demographic disparities in wealth and equity ownership; increasing poverty and income insecurity; a need for greater innovation and investment in solving problems like disease and climate change; the “externalization” of many costs of corporate activity onto third parties such as customers, employees, creditors, and the broader society; the corrosive influence of corporate money in politics; and discontent and loss of trust in the capitalist system among …
20/20 Vision In The Long & Short-Termism Debate, 2018 Seattle University School of Law
20/20 Vision In The Long & Short-Termism Debate, Anne Tucker
Seattle University Law Review
What is an optimal investment time horizon—for institutions, individual shareholders and corporations? This question can evoke emotional, ideological, and theoretical responses. The answers usually deeply entrenched debates over the fundamental roles of markets versus regulation and between the appropriate loci of corporate power: the board of directors versus the shareholders. Too long-term and it is myopia; too near-term and is it short-termism. Neither label is inconsequential, so the debates are not tepid, academic, or marginal.
Are Investor Time Horizons Shortening?, 2018 Seattle University School of Law
Are Investor Time Horizons Shortening?, Rachelle Sampson, Yuan Shi
Seattle University Law Review
The rise in quarterly capitalism in corporate America—increased pressure to meet quarterly earnings predictions and cater to shareholder preferences for short-term returns—has gained significant coverage in the business world and popular press in recent years. Increasingly, popular opinion suggests that firms bow to shareholder pressures, taking steps to smooth earnings and boost share prices in the short-term; firms do so by cutting Research and Development (R&D) investment, engaging in extensive cost-cutting, or increasing dividends and share buybacks. Recent estimates at the industry level show that investor discount rates have increased in recent years, supporting the notion that shorttermism is on …
Flash Traders (Milliseconds) To Indexed Institutions (Centuries): The Challenges Of An Agency Theory Approach To Governance In The Era Of Diverse Investor Time Horizons, 2018 Seattle University School of Law
Flash Traders (Milliseconds) To Indexed Institutions (Centuries): The Challenges Of An Agency Theory Approach To Governance In The Era Of Diverse Investor Time Horizons, Harold Weston, Conrad Ciccotello
Seattle University Law Review
One aspect of the problem in trying to align a corporate investment horizon (the time period for return on investment) to that of its shareholders is the enormous range of investor time horizons, which can range from milliseconds to centuries. A second aspect of the problem is whether ownership of shares equates to ownership of the corporation. A third aspect of the problem is that, despite the theories and advocacy of shareholders being owners, based on the agency model of corporate finance first developed in the 1970s, the theory is contrary to corporate law. These three aspects will be developed …
Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, And Firm Value, 2018 Seattle University School of Law
Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, And Firm Value, K.J. Martijn Cremers, Simone M. Sepe
Seattle University Law Review
In the corporate governance debate, the short-term versus longterm contention has grown into perhaps today’s most controversial topic. In this debate, descriptions of institutional investors tend to present a dichotomic nature. These investors are alternatively portrayed as homogenously short-termist or as consistent “forces for good,” focused on targeting underperforming companies. This Article moves beyond this dichotomy. It shows empirically that aggregate institutional investor behavior presents nuances that depend on a variety of factors, including individual firm characteristics, institutional ownership levels, and institutional propensity toward activism.
The Myth Of The Ideal Investor, 2018 Seattle University School of Law
The Myth Of The Ideal Investor, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Seattle University Law Review
Critiques of specific investor behavior often assume an ideal investor against which all others should be compared. This ideal investor figures prominently in the heated debates over the impact of investor time horizons on firm value. In much of the commentary, the ideal is a longterm investor that actively monitors management, but the specifics are typically left vague. That is no coincidence. The various characteristics that we might wish for in such an investor cannot peacefully coexist in practice. If the ideal investor remains illusory, which of the real-world investor types should we champion instead? The answer, I argue, is …
The Long And Short Of It: Are We Asking The Right Questions? Modern Portfolio Theory And Time Horizons, 2018 Seattle University School of Law
The Long And Short Of It: Are We Asking The Right Questions? Modern Portfolio Theory And Time Horizons, Jim Hawley, Jon Lukomnik
Seattle University Law Review
The heavy shadow of modern portfolio theory (MPT) has had a massive impact on everything from market structure, investment philosophy, and investor behavior, to the research that examines those disciplines. Researchers believe that they are casting light onto investment issues (including, for this purpose, specifically investor time horizons), but generalized acceptance of MPT allows it to continue to darken what should be enlightened.
Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise Of International Stewardship Codes, 2018 Seattle University School of Law
Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise Of International Stewardship Codes, Jennifer G. Hill
Seattle University Law Review
Shareholder participation in corporate governance and investor activism are topics du jour in the United States and around the world. In the early part of the 20th century, Professors Berle and Means considered that shareholder participation was impossible in the transformed commercial world that they described in The Modern Corporation and Private Property. This was a world characterized by dispersed and vulnerable shareholders, in which owners do not manage, and managers do not own, the corporation. In such an environment, the goal of corporate law became one of protecting shareholder interests rather than providing shareholders with participation rights. The structure …