Is The Public Utility Holding Company Act A Model For Breaking Up The Banks That Are Too-Big-To-Fail, 2011 Brooklyn Law School
Is The Public Utility Holding Company Act A Model For Breaking Up The Banks That Are Too-Big-To-Fail, Roberta S. Karmel
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Reparations, Microfinance, And Gender: A Plan, With Strategies For Implementation, 2011 Brooklyn Law School
Reparations, Microfinance, And Gender: A Plan, With Strategies For Implementation, Anita Bernstein, Hans D. Siebel
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Bankruptcy’S Protection For Non-Debtors From Securities Fraud Litigation, 2011 Fordham Law School
Bankruptcy’S Protection For Non-Debtors From Securities Fraud Litigation, John M. M. Wunderlich
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Given the recent economic climate, the judiciary faces an all too familiar challenge: navigate through the web that is bankruptcy and securities fraud. So far, bankruptcy has evolved into a tool to resolve mass tort litigation, like securities fraud. However, this Article explores bankruptcy as a tool to resolve securities litigation against non-debtors, those that never file for bankruptcy protection. The protection the Bankruptcy Code provides to non-debtors, like officers and directors, goes largely unnoticed, much to the detriment of securities fraud victims. Mindful that we now are in the midst of another financial crisis and that attention will slowly …
323 Non-Managing Underwriters’ Role In Securities Offerings: Just Eye Candy?, 2011 Fordham Law School
323 Non-Managing Underwriters’ Role In Securities Offerings: Just Eye Candy?, Elena Marty-Nelson
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
While there is considerable scholarship on the due diligence defense of lead underwriters in defective corporate securities offerings, there is surprisingly little analysis of the due diligence defense of non-managing underwriters. This article challenges the common perception that lead and non-managing underwriters necessarily “sink or swim” together for purposes of due diligence. An analysis of the statutory structure of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 reveals that non-managing underwriters are not inextricably tethered to the lead. Rather, non-managing underwriters who actively question the lead’s due diligence investigation should be able to meet their own affirmative defense even when …
Restoring Transparency To Automated Authority, 2011 Brooklyn Law School
Restoring Transparency To Automated Authority, Frank Pasquale
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Investment Recommendations And The Essence Of Duty, 2011 Tulane University Law School
Investment Recommendations And The Essence Of Duty, Onnig H. Dombalagian
American University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Local To Global: Rethinking Spheres Of Authority After A World Financial Crisis: An Introduction, 2011 Pacific McGeorge School of Law
Local To Global: Rethinking Spheres Of Authority After A World Financial Crisis: An Introduction, Franklin A. Gevurtz
Global Business & Development Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Regulating For The Next Financial Crisis, 2011 Cornell Law School
Regulating For The Next Financial Crisis, Charles K. Whitehead
Global Business & Development Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Local To Global: Rethinking Spheres Of Authority After A World Financial Crisis: An Introduction, 2011 Pacific McGeorge School of Law
Local To Global: Rethinking Spheres Of Authority After A World Financial Crisis: An Introduction, Franklin A. Gevurtz
McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles
No abstract provided.
Book Review (Reviewing Leonard Orland's A Final Accounting), 2011 University of Baltimore School of Law
Book Review (Reviewing Leonard Orland's A Final Accounting), Adeen Postar
All Faculty Scholarship
Leonard Orland is the Oliver Ellsworth Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut. He has written a fine, if a bit unwieldy, book that traces the sad history of money and other assets deposited in supposedly sacrosanct Swiss banks by European Jews during the Nazi era to its long overdue resolution by the American justice system. The book provides background and perspective on how and why the $12.1 billion in pre-war dollars (about $250 trillion today) of financial assets of Holocaust victims disappeared into thin air in the years following World War II. These assets were given over to …
Complex Financial Institutions And Systemic Risk, 2011 Florida State University College of Law
Complex Financial Institutions And Systemic Risk, Utset A. Utset
Georgia Law Review
Modern financial institutions are large, complex, and
highly interconnected. In the wake of the financial crisis
of 2007-2009, commentators and policymakers have given
considerable attention to large institutions, particularly
those that can become "too-big-to-fail." This Article takes
a novel approach to this general problem. It begins by
asking a foundational question: given the extraordinary
volume of transactions between large, complex
institutions, what mechanisms do they use to protect
themselves from the risks created by their complexity, and
how do those mechanisms affect the stability of the
financial system? To keep the problem manageable, the
Article focuses on one type of …
Financial Reform And The Causes Of The Financial Crisis, 2011 American University Washington College of Law
Financial Reform And The Causes Of The Financial Crisis, Brooksley Born
American University Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
Transparency And Contrarian Experts In Financial Regulation: A Brief Response To Professor Bradley, 2011 American University Washington College of Law
Transparency And Contrarian Experts In Financial Regulation: A Brief Response To Professor Bradley, Daniel Schwarcz
American University Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
Living Wills And Pre-Commitment, 2011 American University Washington College of Law
Living Wills And Pre-Commitment, Adam Feibelman
American University Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
Financial Regulation Reform And Too Big To Fail, 2011 American University Washington College of Law
Financial Regulation Reform And Too Big To Fail, Brett Mcdonnell
American University Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
Of The Conditional Fee As A Response To Lawyers, Bankers And Loopholes, 2011 American University Washington College of Law
Of The Conditional Fee As A Response To Lawyers, Bankers And Loopholes, Claire Hill, Richard Painter
American University Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
Transparency Is The New Opacity: Constructing Financial Regulation After The Crisis, 2011 American University Washington College of Law
Transparency Is The New Opacity: Constructing Financial Regulation After The Crisis, Caroline Bradley
American University Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
Regulating Informational Intermediation, 2011 American University Washington College of Law
Regulating Informational Intermediation, Onnig H. Dombalagian
American University Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
Wall Street As Community Of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 2011 Cornell Law School
Wall Street As Community Of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, Saule T. Omarova
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
This Article proposes an approach to regulatory design that aims to create structural incentives for the emergence of a new model of embedded self-regulation in the financial industry. Without a doubt, the ideas laid out in this Article are more of a thought experiment than a polished set of fully developed regulatory proposals. These ideas and suggestions need a great deal of additional thought and a deeper, more granular and rigorous analysis of their potential consequences, benefits, and costs. Moreover, this Article explores only how to create conditions conducive to the emergence of comprehensive industry self-regulation that is embedded in …
Risk, Speculation, And Otc Derivatives: An Inaugural Essay For Convivium, 2011 Cornell Law School
Risk, Speculation, And Otc Derivatives: An Inaugural Essay For Convivium, Lynn A. Stout
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Speculative trading, including speculative trading in derivatives, is often claimed to provide social benefits by decreasing risk and improving the accuracy of market prices. This assumption overlooks the possibility that speculation can be driven not just by differences in traders' risk aversion and information investments, but also by differences in traders' subjective expectations. Disagreement-based speculation erodes traders' returns, increases traders' risks, and can distort market prices. There is reason to believe that by 2008, the market for OTC derivatives may have been dominated by disagreement-based speculation that contributed to the Fall 2008 credit crisis.