President/Executive Department Commons^™

Absolute Immunity: General Principles And Recent Developments, Erwin Chemerinsky

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Transformative Twelfth Amendment, Joshua D. Hawley

Faculty Publications

This paper argues that the Twelfth Amendment represents far more than a mechanical adjustment of the electoral college. Rather, it is the constitutional text that gives us the political presidency that we know today. The Twelfth Amendment worked a major structural change in the relationship between the legislative and executive branches and for that reason bears directly on the debate over the unitary executive and the meaning of “executive power.” Specifically, presidential removal power is best justified not by the original Article II, but by the constitutional structure the Twelfth Amendment created. And the scope and definition of executive power …

Targeted Killing: United States Policy, Constitional Law, And Due Process, Mark Febrizio

Senior Honors Theses

The increased incorporation of targeted killing, primarily through the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, into United States policy raises salient questions regarding its consistency with the U.S. Constitution. This paper contrasts interpretations of constitutional due process with the current legal framework for conducting targeted killing operations. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution establishes the due process owed to U.S. citizens. This paper determines that the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen, was accomplished in a manner inconsistent with constitutional due process and demonstrates an over-extension of executive branch power. This paper examines one scholarly recommendation that seeks to increase …

Law Matters, Even To The Executive, Julian Davis Mortenson

Michigan Law Review

In both constitutional and international law, many legal rules cannot be implemented without what most people would describe as the voluntary compliance of their target. Is that really “law”? Or is rule compliance in such circumstances just an expression of “interests”? Forget jurisprudence for the moment. As a practical matter, what does it mean to work as a lawyer in a field where the rules are not coercively enforced against private parties by an independent judiciary whose orders are implemented by a cooperative executive? This question has particularly high stakes for national security policy, where we find judicial deference at …

The Transformative Twelfth Amendment, Joshua D. Hawley

William & Mary Law Review

Scholars have long treated the Twelfth Amendment as a constitutional obscurity, a merely mechanical adjustment to the electoral college—and perhaps a less than successful one at that. This consensus is mistaken. In fact, the Twelfth Amendment accomplished one of the most consequential changes to the structure of our constitutional government yet. It fundamentally altered the nature of the Executive and the Executive’s relationship to the other branches of government. The Amendment changed the Executive into something it had not been before: a political office. The presidency designed at Philadelphia was intended to be neither a policymaking nor a representative institution, …

The Necessary And Proper Clauses, John Mikhail

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Article's main purpose is to provide a new and more accurate account of the origins of the Necessary and Proper Clauses. I refer to the Necessary and Proper “Clauses” rather than to the Necessary and Proper “Clause” to emphasize that the relevant constitutional text is comprised of three distinct provisions, only the first of which concerns the enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8:

1. “Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers”
2. “Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws …

Inside Epa: A Former Insider’S Reflections On The Relationship Between The Obama Epa And The Obama White House, Lisa Heinzerling

Pace Environmental Law Review

This essay is an expanded version of remarks delivered on March 12, 2013, as the Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on Environmental Law at Pace Law School.

This essay discusses the relationship between the Environmental Protection Agency and the White House. It focuses specifically on the role that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, within the Office of Management and Budget, plays in reviewing the EPA’s regulatory output.

Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

Scholars and jurists have long assumed that, when the executive branch declines to defend a federal statute, Congress may intervene in federal court to defend the law. When invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act, for example, no Supreme Court Justice challenged the authority of the House of Representatives to defend federal laws in at least some circumstances. At the same time, in recent litigation over the Fast and Furious gun-running case, the Department of Justice asserted that the House could not go to court to enforce a subpoena against the executive. In this Article, we seek to challenge both claims. …

Why Should We Care About An Agency’S Special Insight?, Stephen M. Degenaro

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note offers some additional thoughts on the outer limits of Seminole Rock deference. Part I discusses the three concerns associated with unchecked Seminole Rock deference that comprise the self-delegation problem—violation of constitutional norms, exploitation of a statutory loophole, and perverse incentives. It explores the potential for abuse they create and recommends what the limitations should look like in order to avoid this potential. Part II explains the two rationales for Seminole Rock deference: the pragmatic and originalist rationales. It describes how the two rationales relate to each other, explains how courts use pragmatic and originalist arguments in their opinions, …

Plausible Absurdities And Practical Formalities: The Recess Appointments Clause In Theory And Practice, David Frisof

Michigan Law Review

The recent controversy surrounding President Obama’s recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau while the Senate was holding pro forma sessions illustrates the need to reach a new understanding of the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution. For the Recess Appointments Clause to be functional, it must fulfill two essential constitutional purposes: it must act as a fulcrum in the separation of powers, and it must ensure the continued exercise of the executive power. Achieving this functionality depends not only on the formal constructions of the Clause but also on the ways in …

The Unitary Executive And The Plural Judiciary: On The Potential Virtues Of Decentralized Judicial Power, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.

Notre Dame Law Review

The federal judiciary features a highly decentralized system of courts. The Supreme Court of the United States reviews only a few dozen cases each year. Meanwhile, regional U.S. courts of appeals operate independently of each other; district courts further divide and separate the exercise of federal judicial power. The role of the state courts in enforcing federal law further subdivides responsibility for the adjudication of federal law claims. Indeed, the Office of Chief Justice itself incorporates and reflects this vesting of the judicial power of the United States exclusively in collegial institutions—literally in a multiplicity of hands—effectively precluding its unilateral …

Game Of Bombs: President Barack Obama’S Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, Jeffrey F. Addicott

University of Baltimore Journal of International Law

One of President Barack Obama’s favorite solutions to reducing or halting armed conflict in the world centers around his often-stated desire to rid the world of nuclear weapons. While this simplistic formula for a more peaceful world has certainly been voiced by other occupants of the oval office, the world is, and always has been, an extremely dangerous place, and the machinations of competing spheres of power in a “Game of Thrones” will always exist in human history. Coupled with an aggressive Russia and China, the dangers associated with the new era of radical Islamic extremism rubricate the need to …

Bypassing Congress On Federal Debt: Executive Branch Options To Avoid Default, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Even a “technical” default by the United States on its debt, such as a delay in paying principal or interest due to Congress’s failure to raise the federal debt ceiling, could have serious systemic consequences, destroying financial markets and undermining job creation, consumer spending, and economic growth. The ongoing political gamesmanship between Congress and the Executive Branch has been threatening — and even if temporarily resolved, almost certainly will continue to threaten — such a default. The various options discussed in the media for averting a default have not been legally and pragmatically viable. This article proposes new options for …

The Drone Games, 47 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1507 (2014), Elizabeth Fleming

UIC Law Review

This Comment focuses on the Executive’s power to target American citizens who are believed to be terrorists abroad and the due process implications of such attacks. Part II provides background information pertaining to the rise

A Whole Text Reading Of The War Powers Clauses: Why The Constitution’S Text Obviates Esoteric War Powers Debates And Encourages Policy Flexibility And Democratic Accountability, Antonio F. Perez

Scholarly Articles

This paper is a lightly-footnoted and modestly expanded version of my presentation at the Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy Symposium’s panel on Executive War Powers, Syria, and President Obama’s “Red Line”—Did President Obama Have the Power to Use Force in Syria without Congressional Approval? While criticizing the President’s policy decision, this paper argues that the President would have been well within his authority to use force. Relying r on a whole text reading of the relevant constitutional provisions, it argues that the President’s authority to use force is virtually plenary, while Congress’s authority is limited to governing the …

"So Help Me?": Religious Expression And Artifacts In The Oath Of Office And The Courtroom Oath, Frederick B. Jonassen

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Power Games, Aneil Kovvali

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

According to the traditional account, Congress has the "necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments" by the president. As commentators have recognized, however, the traditional account does not match reality. Individuals in Washington, D.C., are more interested in fighting for their political party than for their branch of government, and the essentially reactive legislative branch lacks the capacity to respond to a rapidly changing policy environment. But the traditional account suffers from a more basic flaw. The president can decide whether or not to cooperate with Congress on a situation-by-situation basis. By contrast, Congress's tools for disciplining the …

Constitutional Conflict And Congressional Oversight, Andrew Mccanse Wright

Marquette Law Review

In matters of oversight, Congress and the President have fundamentally incompatible views of their institutional roles within the constitutional structure. This Article offers an explanation of divergent branch behavior and legal doctrine. Congress, much like a party to litigation, views itself as having fixed substantive rights to obtain desired information from the Executive and private parties. In contrast, the Executive views itself like a party to a business transaction, in which congressional oversight requests are the opening salvo in an iterative negotiation process to resolve competing interests between co-equal branches. In general, legislators want to litigate and executive officers want …

The Courts And National Security: The Ordeal Of The State Secrets Privilege, David Rudenstine

University of Baltimore Law Review

No abstract provided.

More Bang For Their Buck: How Federal Dollars Are Militarizing American Law Enforcement, 47 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1479 (2014), Jeffrey Endebak

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.