President/Executive Department Commons^™

National Performance Review: A Renewed Commitment To Strengthening The Intergovernmental Partnership, Patricia E. Salkin

Patricia E. Salkin

No abstract provided.

Who Decides On Security?, Aziz Rana

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Despite over six decades of reform initiatives, the overwhelming drift of security arrangements in the United States has been toward greater—not less— executive centralization and discretion. This Article explores why efforts to curb presidential prerogative have failed so consistently. It argues that while constitutional scholars have overwhelmingly focused their attention on procedural solutions, the underlying reason for the growth of emergency powers is ultimately political rather than purely legal. In particular, scholars have ignored how the basic meaning of "security" has itself shifted dramatically since World War II and the beginning of the Cold War in line with changing ideas …

Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

There is a documented increase in the volume of regulatory activity during the last 90 days of presidential administrations. The phenomenon of late-term regulatory activity has been called “Midnight Regulation” based on a comparison to the Cinderella story in which the magic wears off at the stroke of midnight. This Report, prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States, looks closely at one species of Midnight Regulation, namely Midnight Rules, promulgated in the last 90 days of an administration. The Report examines the phenomenon and concludes with recommendations adopted by the Administrative Conference of the United States at its …

Making Executive Privilege Work: A Multi-Factor Test In An Age Of Czars And Congressional Oversight, Ken Klukowski

Faculty Publications and Presentations

No abstract provided.

Foreign Affairs Federalism And The Limits On Executive Power, Zachary D. Clopton

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

On February 23 of this year, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a California statute permitting victims of the Armenian genocide to file insurance claims, finding that the state's use of the label "Genocide" intruded on the federal government's conduct of foreign affairs. This decision, Movsesian v. Versicherung AG, addresses foreign affairs federalism—the division of authority between the states and the federal government. Just one month later, the Supreme Court weighed in on another foreign affairs issue: the separation of foreign relations powers within the federal government. In Zivotofsky v. Clinton, the Supreme Court ordered the lower courts to …

The Nuclear Terrorism Readiness And Alert Center: Transforming The Aspirational Nature Of International Law Into Operational Capabilities, Mckay Smith

McKay Smith

Senior government officials, particularly those in the Intelligence Community, need to find a novel and creative solution for combating the deadly threat of nuclear terrorism. For decades the United States has been heavily involved in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons through traditional international law. It is noteworthy, however, that the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the crown jewel of all arms control treaties, does not contain a feasible method of countering the threat of nuclear terrorism. Taken as a whole, treaty law does not lend itself to conflicts against non-state actors such as al-Qaeda. Specifically, terrorists do not sign non-proliferation treaties …

Filling The Judicial Vacancies In A Presidential Election Year, Carl Tobias

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

What President Obama Should Have Said About The Supreme Court And The Affordable Care Act, Eric J. Segall

Faculty Publications By Year

No abstract provided.

The Indefensible Duty To Defend, Neal Devins, Saikrishna B. Prakash

Faculty Publications

Modern Justice Department opinions insist that the executive branch must enforce and defend laws. In the first article to systematically examine Department of Justice refusals to defend, we make four points. First, the duties to enforce and defend lack any sound basis in the Constitution. Hence, while President Obama is right to refuse to defend the Defense of Marriage Act, he is wrong to continue to enforce a law he believes is unconstitutional. Second, rather than being grounded in the Constitution, the duties are better explained by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) desire to enhance its independence and status. By …

The Institutions Of Antitrust Law: How Structure Shapes Substance, William E. Kovacic

Michigan Law Review

Daniel Crane's The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement ("Institutional Structure") may do for antitrust law what Essence of Decision did for public administration. Unlike most literature on antitrust law, this superb volume does not address pressing issues of substantive analysis (e.g., when can dominant firms offer loyalty discounts?). Instead, Institutional Structure studies the design and operation of the institutions of U.S. antitrust enforcement. Professor Crane skillfully advances a basic and powerful proposition: to master analytical principles without deep knowledge of the policy implementation mechanism is dangerously incomplete preparation for understanding the U.S. antitrust system, or any body of competition law. …

The Roberts Court & Executive Power, Jeffrey Rosen

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Iranian Hostage Crisis And The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: Implications For International Dispute Resolution And Diplomacy, Warren Christopher, Richard M. Mosk

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal

This is the twenty-fifth anniversary of what has become known as the Iranian Hostage Crisis. We shall look back on those events in order to point to possible issues, lessons and solutions for the future.

The Article Ii Safeguards Of Federal Jurisdiction, Tara Leigh Grove

Faculty Publications

Jurisdiction stripping has long been treated as a battle between Congress and the federal judiciary. Scholars have thus overlooked the important (and surprising) role that the executive branch has played in these jurisdictional struggles. This Article seeks to fill that void. Drawing on two strands of social science research, the Article argues that the executive branch has a strong incentive to use its constitutional authority over the enactment and enforcement of federal law to oppose jurisdiction-stripping measures. Notably, this structural argument has considerable historical support. The executive branch has repeatedly opposed jurisdiction-stripping proposals in Congress. That has been true even …

Disclosure's Effects: Wikileaks And Transparency, Mark Fenster

Mark Fenster

The Assault Of Jamie Leigh Jones: How One Woman's Horror Story Is Changing Arbitration In America, Jeffrey Adams

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal

This article examines Jones v. Halliburton Co., the "Al Franken Amendment" to the 2010 U.S. Defense Department Budget (Franken Amendment) that was created in response to Jones, and the impact that both could have on mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts in the future. Part II recounts the troubling events that led to Jones and the inclusion of the Franken Amendment in the 2010 Defense Department Budget. Part III details the arguments made for and against the inclusion of the Franken Amendment. Part IV analyzes the impact that the Franken Amendment could have on mandatory arbitration clauses in contacts in …

Inside Agency Preemption, Catherine M. Sharkey

Michigan Law Review

A subtle shift has taken place in the mechanics of preemption, the doctrine that determines when federal law displaces state law. In the past, Congress was the leading actor, and courts and commentators focused almost exclusively on the precise wording of its statutory directives as a clue to its intent to displace state law. Federal agencies were, if not ignored, certainly no more than supporting players. But the twenty-first century has witnessed a role reversal. Federal agencies now play the dominant role in statutory interpretation. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the ascendancy of federal agencies in preemption disputes-an ascendancy …

Reasserting Its Constitutional Role: Congress's Power To Independently Terminate A Treaty, David (Dj) C. Wolff

David (Dj) C. Wolff

Who has the authority to terminate a treaty? The Constitution’s text is silent on the matter and historical precedent has been anything but consistent. Recently, the debate has focused on whether the President can unilaterally terminate a treaty without considering Congressional concerns: witness President Carter’s termination of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan and President Bush’s 2001 termination of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia. There has been comparatively little analysis of the converse question; does Congress have the unilateral power to terminate a treaty in the face of Presidential opposition? This question invokes strong separation of powers considerations; …

Beyond The Executive Agreement: The Foreign Policy Preference Under Movsesian And The Return Of The Dormant Foreign Affairs Power In Norton Simon, Amir M. Tikriti

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Auditor For The Auditors' Auditor: Accounting For The Unitary Executive In Free Enterprise Fund V. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Kelsey Elizabeth Stapler

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Hunger And U.S. Governmental Policies, Evangelical Advocacy: A Response To Global Poverty

Bibliographies

No abstract provided.