Choice Of Organizational Form For The Start-Up Business,
University of Minnesota Law School
Choice Of Organizational Form For The Start-Up Business, John H. Matheson
Articles
Limited liability is a fundamental principle of corporate law. Yet liability has never been absolutely limited. Courts occasionally allow creditors to "pierce the corporate veil," which means that shareholders must satisfy creditors' claims. "Piercing" seems to happen freakishly. Like lightning, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled. There is a consensus that the whole area of limited liability, and conversely of piercing the corporate veil, is among the most confusing in corporate law. 1
Tender Offers By Controlling Shareholders: The Specter Of Coercion And Fair Price,
University of Michigan Law School
Tender Offers By Controlling Shareholders: The Specter Of Coercion And Fair Price, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
Taking your company private has never been so appealing. The collapse of the tech bubble has left many companies whose stock prices bordered on the stratospheric now trading at small fractions of their historical highs. The spate of accounting scandals that followed the bursting of the bubble has taken some of the shine off the aura of being a public company-the glare of the spotlight from stock analysts and the business press looks much less inviting, notwithstanding the monitoring benefits that the spotlight purports to confer. Moreover, the regulatory backlash against those accounting scandals has made the costs of being …
Enforceability Of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses For Shareholder-Corporation Disputes,
University of Michigan Law School
Enforceability Of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses For Shareholder-Corporation Disputes, Garry D. Hartlieb
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
Investor litigation is an increasingly vexatious field of law. Nearly every time a significant change of control or corporate ownership occurs, plaintiffs’ attorneys file standardized complaints to set in motion class action suits. Ultimately, the settlements shareholders receive fail to achieve the practical effects that parties on both sides desire. Shareholders may receive pennies on the dollar of what they allege was lost by corporate wrongdoing, and, in some cases, shareholders may not receive monetary recovery as the settlement requires only that the corporation to make changes to its governing documents. These suits distract directors and management from the core …
Market Power In Power Markets: The Filed-Rate Doctrine And Competition In Electricity,
American Antitrust Institute
Market Power In Power Markets: The Filed-Rate Doctrine And Competition In Electricity, Sandeep Vaheesan
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
State and federal initiatives have opened the American electric power industry to competition over the past four decades. Although the process has not occurred uniformly across the country, wholesale electricity markets exist everywhere today. Independent power producers can construct generation facilities and sell their output to utilities and industrial customers through bilateral contracts. In many regions, centralized power markets now facilitate the sale of billions of dollars in electricity annually through auctions. Although market forces have replaced direct price regulation in electricity, antitrust enforcement has not expanded its role commensurately. A lack of competition has been a serious problem in …
Ironic Simplicity: Why Shaken Baby Syndrome Misdiagnoses Should Result In Automatic Reimbursement For The Wrongly Accused,
Seattle University School of Law
Ironic Simplicity: Why Shaken Baby Syndrome Misdiagnoses Should Result In Automatic Reimbursement For The Wrongly Accused, Jay Simmons
Seattle University Law Review
Shaken baby syndrome (SBS)’s shortcomings include the debatable science behind SBS theory and diagnosis—the questioning of which has grown more vociferous—and the arguably biased, discriminatory treatment of the accused. Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer notes that the evolving SBS skepticism and contentious debate has resulted in "chaos" in many SBS adjudications and within the medical and biomechanical fields, with the same SBS proponents and opponents continually crusading for and clashing over their beliefs. The issues surrounding the medical and biomechanical components of SBS diagnoses have been repeatedly examined and discussed, and are not the focus of this Note. This Note recounts those …
Hostile Takeovers And Overreliance,
Seattle University School of Law
Hostile Takeovers And Overreliance, Anthony Niblett
Seattle University Law Review
Commentators have argued that employees should be compensated in the event of a hostile takeover; otherwise, the threat of such a takeover will fail to incentivize firm-specific investments by employees. Such deferred compensation is analogous to the payment of damages following a breach of contract. The analogous breach, here, is the breach of an implicit contract between management and employees. Employees trusted management to compensate them for firm-specific investments not explicitly contracted for. This Article uses a familiar result from the contract law literature: There is no measure of damages for breach of contract that can generate both efficient breach …
A Reconsideration Of The Shareholder's Remedy For Oppression In Singapore,
Singapore Management University
A Reconsideration Of The Shareholder's Remedy For Oppression In Singapore, Pearlie Koh
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
The statutory remedy for oppression plays an important role in minority shareholder protection in Singapore. Both the scope of its application and the court's jurisdiction to make remedial orders must necessarily be wide in order for the remedy to be effective. Nevertheless, the remedy is not without limits. Indeed, it is crucial that the boundaries of the remedy be made clear so that legitimate rule of the majority is not too often, and erroneously, equated with tyranny by the majority. This paper considers a number of issues as to the scope of the oppression remedy in Singapore through a careful …
Gender Diversity On Corporate Boards: How Racial Politics Impedes Progress In The United States,
St. John's University School of Law
Gender Diversity On Corporate Boards: How Racial Politics Impedes Progress In The United States, Cheryl L. Wade
Pace International Law Review
The excellent conference organized by Darren Rosenblum comparing global approaches to board diversity inspired me to think about how progress in this context has unfolded in the United States. Even though the issue of diversity on corporate boards has become a global issue, few U.S. boards have moved beyond mere tokenism when it comes to female directors. One reason for the lack of diversity among corporate directors is that board selection has been based on membership in a particular network. This essay, however, focuses on the persisting problem of discrimination—a more invidious explanation for the fact that very few corporate …
Law Firm Selection And The Value Of Transactional Lawyering,
Duke Law School
Law Firm Selection And The Value Of Transactional Lawyering, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Faculty Scholarship
Following the contraction in demand for law firms’ services during the Great Recession, “Big Law” was widely diagnosed as suffering from several maladies that would spell its ultimate demise, including excessive fees, excessive size, increased competition from in-house counsel, the commoditization of legal work, and the decline in demand for “relationship firms.” While each of these market pressures is only too real for certain segments of the law-firm population, their threat to the most elite U.S. law firms has been largely misunderstood. Even as many firms reduce their fees and contract in size, we should expect certain firms to continue …
Choosing The Partnership: English Business Organization Law During The Industrial Revolution,
Seattle University School of Law
Choosing The Partnership: English Business Organization Law During The Industrial Revolution, Ryan Bubb
Seattle University Law Review
For most of the period associated with the Industrial Revolution in Britain, English law restricted access to incorporation and the Bubble Act explicitly outlawed the formation of unincorporated joint stock companies with transferable shares. Furthermore, firms in the manufacturing industries most closely associated with the Industrial Revolution were overwhelmingly partnerships. These two facts have led some scholars to posit that the antiquated business organization law was a constraint on the structural transformation and growth that characterized the British economy during the period. Importantly, however, the vast majority of manufacturing firms in the modern sector were partnerships. An easy explanation for …
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