Bitch V. Whore: The Current Trend To Define The Requirements Of An Actionable Hostile Environment Claim In Verbal Sexual Harassment Cases, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 465 (1999-2000),
UIC John Marshall Law School
Bitch V. Whore: The Current Trend To Define The Requirements Of An Actionable Hostile Environment Claim In Verbal Sexual Harassment Cases, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 465 (2000), Jamie Lynn Cook
UIC John Marshall Law Review
No abstract provided.
All In The Family As A Single Shareholder Of An S Corporation,
University of Michigan Law School
All In The Family As A Single Shareholder Of An S Corporation, Douglas A. Kahn, Jeffrey H. Kahn, Terrence G. Perris
Articles
Subject to a few exceptions, a corporation that has elected to be taxed under subchapter S of chapter 1 of subtitle A of title 26 of the United States tax code is not taxed on its net income. Instead, the income, deductions, credits, and other tax items of an S corporation pass through to its shareholders on a pro rata basis. To qualify for subchapter S treatment, an electing corporation must satisfy the requirements that are set forth in section 1361, one of which is that the corporation can have no more than 100 shareholders. One aspect of that requirement ...
Choice Of Organizational Form For The Start-Up Business,
University of Minnesota Law School
Choice Of Organizational Form For The Start-Up Business, John H. Matheson
Articles
Limited liability is a fundamental principle of corporate law. Yet liability has never been absolutely limited. Courts occasionally allow creditors to "pierce the corporate veil," which means that shareholders must satisfy creditors' claims. "Piercing" seems to happen freakishly. Like lightning, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled. There is a consensus that the whole area of limited liability, and conversely of piercing the corporate veil, is among the most confusing in corporate law. 1
Multiple Directorships: The Fiduciary Duties And Conflicts Of Interest That Arise When One Individual Serves More Than One Corporation, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 561 (2000),
UIC John Marshall Law School
Multiple Directorships: The Fiduciary Duties And Conflicts Of Interest That Arise When One Individual Serves More Than One Corporation, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 561 (2000), John K. Wells
UIC John Marshall Law Review
No abstract provided.
Tort Law – Tortious Interference With Business Expectancy – A Trap For The Wary And Unwary Alike,
University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law
Tort Law—Tortious Interference With Business Expectancy – A Trap For The Wary And Unwary Alike, Larry Watkins
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review
Despite remaining stable and unchanged over the last decade, tortious interference has also remained problematic in Arkansas. Although tortious interference with contract in Arkansas suffers from many ailments, this note focuses on interference with business expectancy, discussing interference with contract only as necessary. Specifically, the note argues that tortious interference in Arkansas should be formally separated into two distinct rules—interference with contract and interference with business expectancy—in order to keep courts from mixing terms and standards from both rules when addressing only one cause of action. This note further proposes that the improper element of tortious interference in ...
How Serious Is The Problem Of Base Erosion And Profit Shifting?,
University of Michigan Law School
How Serious Is The Problem Of Base Erosion And Profit Shifting?, James R. Hines Jr.
Articles
In recent years, the problem of base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) by multinational corporations has entered the public consciousness as a potentially important impediment to tax collections. The purpose of this article is to identify the nature of BEPS, consider empirical evidence of its magnitude, and evaluate proposed policy responses. There is considerable evidence that multinational firms arrange their affairs in a tax-sensitive manner, from which it is easy—indeed, perhaps a little too easy—to infer that beps is a serious problem. There are journalistic accounts of apparently spectacular international tax-avoidance schemes used by multinational corporations, though these ...
Potential Competitive Effects Of Vertical Mergers: A How-To Guide For Practitioners,
Georgetown University Law Center
Potential Competitive Effects Of Vertical Mergers: A How-To Guide For Practitioners, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The purpose of this short article is to aid practitioners in analyzing the competitive effects of vertical and complementary product mergers. It is also intended to assist the agencies if and when they undertake revision of the 1984 U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines. Those Guidelines are out of date and do not reflect current enforcement or economic thinking about the potential competitive effects of vertical mergers. Nor do they provide the tools needed to carry out a modern competitive effects analysis. This article is intended to partially fill the gap by summarizing the various potential competitive harms and benefits that ...
Dividend Policy Inside The Multinational Firm,
Harvard University
Dividend Policy Inside The Multinational Firm, Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, James R. Hines Jr.
Articles
This paper examines the determinants of profit repatriation policies for US multinational firms. Dividend repatriations are surprisingly persistent and resemble dividend payments to external shareholders. Tax considerations influence dividend repatriations, but not decisively, as differentially-taxed entities feature similar policies and some firms incur avoidable tax penalties. Parent companies requiring cash to fund domestic investments, or to pay dividends to common shareholders, draw on the resources of their foreign affiliates through repatriations. Incompletely controlled affiliates are more likely than others to make regular dividend payments and to trigger avoidable tax costs through repatriations. The results indicate that traditional corporate finance concerns ...
Transfer Pricing Disputes In The United States,
University of Michigan Law School
Transfer Pricing Disputes In The United States, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Book Chapters
In 1988, the US Treasury Department published a study of inter-company pricing (the 'White Paper') that included the following endorsement of the so-called arm's length standard (ALS) for examining the reasonableness of transactions between related parties for tax purposes: The arm's length standard is embodied in all U.S. tax treaties; it is in each major model treaty, including the U.S. Model Convention; it is incorporated into most tax treaties to which the United States is not a party; it has been explicitly adopted by international organizations that have addressed themselves to transfer pricing issues; and virtually ...
A Control-Based Approach To Shareholder Liability For Corporate Torts,
University of Michigan Law School
A Control-Based Approach To Shareholder Liability For Corporate Torts, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
Some commentators defend limited shareholder liability for torts and statutory violations as efficient, even though it encourages corporations to overinvest in and to externalize the costs of risky activity. Others propose pro rata unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts. Both approaches, however, fail to account fully for qualitative differences among shareholders. Controlling shareholders, in particular, may have lower information costs, greater influence over managerial decisionmaking, and greater ability to benefit from corporate activity. This Article develops a control-based approach to shareholder liability. It first explores several differences among shareholders. For example, a controlling shareholder can more easily curb managerial risk ...
