Changing The First Lady's Mystique: Defining The First Lady's Legal Role And Upending Gender Norms,
2018
University of Richmond - School of Law
Changing The First Lady's Mystique: Defining The First Lady's Legal Role And Upending Gender Norms, Ashlee A. Paxton-Turner
Law Faculty Publications
This Article explores the lack of formal guidelines governing the First Lady by first considering the history of the role and how the three branches of government have typically dealt with the role. Attention is also given to the possible intersection with the anti-nepotism statute when and if the First Lady acts as an advisor to the President. This Article then goes on to suggest that this lack of formality has allowed gender norms to govern the role. In an era where women’s rights have resurfaced as a central theme in political discourse, this Article concludes by suggesting some possible …
The Perpetual "Invasion": Past As Prologue In Constitutional Immigration Law,
2018
University of Baltimore School of Law
The Perpetual "Invasion": Past As Prologue In Constitutional Immigration Law, Matthew J. Lindsay
Roger Williams University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Leveraging Social Science Expertise In Immigration Policymaking,
2018
University of Colorado Law School
Leveraging Social Science Expertise In Immigration Policymaking, Ming H. Chen
Publications
The longstanding uncertainty about how policymakers should grapple with social science demonstrating racism persists in the modern administrative state. This Essay examines the uses and misuses of social science and expertise in immigration policymaking. More specifically, it highlights three immigration policies that dismiss social scientific findings and expertise as part of presidential and agency decision-making: border control, crime control, and extreme vetting of refugees to prevent terrorism. The Essay claims that these rejections of expertise undermine both substantive and procedural protections for immigrants and undermine important functions of the administrative state as a curb on irrationality in policymaking. It concludes …
Excavating The Forgotten Suspension Clause,
2018
University of Colorado Law School
Excavating The Forgotten Suspension Clause, Helen Norton
Publications
No abstract provided.
The Commenting Power: Agency Accountability Through Public Participation,
2018
University of Oklahoma College of Law
The Commenting Power: Agency Accountability Through Public Participation, Donald J. Kochan
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
Can The President Control The Department Of Justice?,
2018
Fordham University School of Law
Can The President Control The Department Of Justice?, Bruce A. Green
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Obergefell Liberates Bathrooms,
2018
New York Law School
Can The President Control The Department Of Justice?,
2018
New York Law School
Can The President Control The Department Of Justice?, Bruce Green, Rebecca Roiphe
Articles & Chapters
As the investigation into President Trump's campaign ties to Russia grows increasingly intense, it is critical to understand how much control the President has over the Attorney General and the Department of Justice. Some critics claim that the President has absolute power to direct federal prosecutors and control their decisions. The President and his lawyers, joined by several scholars, take this claim one step further by arguing that the chief executive could not be guilty of obstruction of justice because his control over all prosecutorial decisions is absolute. This issue last arose during the Nixon Administration. The Department of Justice …
May Federal Prosecutors Take Direction From The President?,
2018
New York Law School
May Federal Prosecutors Take Direction From The President?, Bruce Green, Rebecca Roiphe
Articles & Chapters
Suppose the president sought to serve as prosecutor-in-chief telling prosecutors when to initiate or dismiss criminal charges in individual cases and making other discretionary decisions that are normally reserved to trained professionals familiar with the facts, law, and traditions of the U.S. Department of Justice. To what extent may prosecutors follow the president's direction? In recent presidential administrations, the president has respected prosecutorial independence; while making policy decisions, the president deferred to the Attorney General and subordinate federal prosecutors to conduct individual criminal cases. In a recent article, we argued that this is as it should be because the president …
Talking Trump And The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Correcting The Record On Section 4,
2018
Saint Louis University School of Law
Talking Trump And The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Correcting The Record On Section 4, Joel K. Goldstein
All Faculty Scholarship
The first year of the presidency of Donald J. Trump brought attention to Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, the constitutional provision that allows the Vice President and a Cabinet majority to transfer presidential powers and duties from a President who is “unable to discharge the powers and duties” of his office. Although the ensuing media discussion included many thoughtful contributions, it also produced many mistaken assertions by scholars, journalists and other commentators regarding the importance, scope, operation, and effect of Section 4. These mistakes are troubling because they may produce enduring misunderstanding regarding a provision designed to handle some …
The President, Prosecutorial Discretion, Obstruction Of Justice, And Congress,
2018
University of Richmond
The President, Prosecutorial Discretion, Obstruction Of Justice, And Congress, Henry L. Chambers Jr.
Law Faculty Publications
The executive power of the United States is vested in the President of the United States. That power includes prosecutorial discretion—the power to prosecute or decline to prosecute. Consequently, the President would appear to have the constitutional authority to initiate or end a federal criminal prosecution or investigation. This would seem particularly so in an era in which executive power arguably continues to expand. Nonetheless, an ongoing debate exists regarding whether a President obstructs justice when he attempts to end a criminal investigation for improper reasons. Those who argue in favor of the possibility of obstruction of justice suggest that …
Qui Tam Litigation Against Government Officials: Constitutional Implications Of A Neglected History,
2018
University of Georgia School of Law
Qui Tam Litigation Against Government Officials: Constitutional Implications Of A Neglected History, Randy Beck
Scholarly Works
The Supreme Court concluded twenty-five years ago, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, that uninjured private plaintiffs may not litigate “generalized grievances” about the legality of executive branch conduct. According to the Lujan Court, Congress lacked power to authorize suit by a plaintiff who could not establish some “particularized” injury from the challenged conduct. The Court believed litigation to require executive branch legal compliance, brought by an uninjured private party, is not a “case” or “controversy” within the Article III judicial power and impermissibly reassigns the President’s Article II responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” The …
Promoting Executive Accountability Through Qui Tam Legislation,
2018
University of Georgia School of Law
Promoting Executive Accountability Through Qui Tam Legislation, Randy Beck
Scholarly Works
For hundreds of years prior to ratification of the U.S. Constitution, Anglo-American legislatures used qui tam legislation to enforce legal constraints on government officials. A qui tam statute allows a private informer to collect a statutory fine for illegal conduct, even if the informer lacks the particularized injury normally required for Article III standing. This essay explores whether qui tam regulation should be revived as a means of ensuring executive branch legal accountability."
Suing The President For First Amendment Violations,
2018
University of Georgia School of Law
Suing The President For First Amendment Violations, Sonja R. West
Scholarly Works
On any given day, it seems, President Donald Trump can be found attacking, threatening, or punishing the press and other individuals whose speech he dislikes. His actions, moreover, inevitably raise the question: Do any of these individuals or organizations (or any future ones) have a viable claim against the President for violating their First Amendment rights?
One might think that the ability to sue the President for violation of the First Amendment would be relatively settled. The answer, however, is not quite that straightforward. Due to several unique qualities about the First Amendment and the presidency, it is not entirely …
The Economic Justice Imperative For Lawyers In Trump Country,
2018
American University Washington College of Law
The Economic Justice Imperative For Lawyers In Trump Country, Priya Baskaran
Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals
This article serves as a call to action for rural law schools to meaningfully incorporate economic justice into transactional legal education, and in doing so, train much needed rural advocates, legal experts, and local leaders. Rural areas are continuously portrayed as “Trump Country” in today’s mainstream media coverage, which largely focuses on socio-cultural differences between urban and rural areas. Many rural scholars and activists are troubled by the “Trump Country” label as it masks the structural poverty issues that lead to housing insecurity, water insecurity, poor public health indicators, unemployment, underemployment, troubled public education systems, and environmental degradation impacting both …
The Constitutional Argument Against The Vice President Casting Tie-Breaking Votes On Judicial Nominees,
2018
University of Maryland School of Law
The Constitutional Argument Against The Vice President Casting Tie-Breaking Votes On Judicial Nominees, Samuel Morse
Cardozo Law Review de•novo
Article I of the Constitution vests the Vice President with the power to vote in the Senate in the event of a tie. Textually, this power is not subject to any additional qualifications. However, there are reasons to believe that the Framers intended this tie-breaking power to have certain practical limits, specifically in the context of confirming Article III judges. This essay argues that concerns about the separation of powers, the differences between legislation and the confirmation of presidential nominees, anti-majoritarianism, and the forsaken sixty-vote threshold for Supreme Court nominees all militate toward a prudential limit that restricts the Vice …
Whose Lands? Which Public? The Shape Of Public-Lands Law And Trump's National Monument Proclamations,
2018
Columbia Law School
Whose Lands? Which Public? The Shape Of Public-Lands Law And Trump's National Monument Proclamations, Jedediah S. Purdy
Faculty Scholarship
President Trump issued a proclamation in December 2017 purporting to remove two million acres in southern Utah from national monument status, radically shrinking the Grand-Staircase Escalante National Monument and splitting the Bears Ears National Monument into two residual protected areas. Whether the President has the power to revise or revoke existing monuments under the Antiquities Act, which creates the national monument system, is a new question of law for a 112-year-old statute that has been used by Presidents from Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama to protect roughly fifteen million acres of federal land and hundreds of millions of marine acres. …
Impeachment: A Handbook,
2018
Columbia Law School
Impeachment: A Handbook, Philip C. Bobbitt
Faculty Scholarship
Charles Black’s Impeachment: A Handbook, first published in 1974 at the height of the Watergate crisis, has become the authoritative guide on the subject of presidential impeachment. In September, the Yale University Press published a new edition of the classic handbook, incorporating a new preface and new material by constitutional theorist Philip Bobbitt. Bobbitt’s contribution to the new edition appears in the Essay that follows.
Because Professor Black’s original text had no accompanying notes, the publisher decided to continue this format in the new print edition. In this re-publication, the Journal worked with Bobbitt to present his chapters with …
Congress, The Courts, And Party Polarization: Why Congress Rarely Checks The President And Why The Courts Should Not Take Congress’S Place,
2018
William & Mary Law School
Congress, The Courts, And Party Polarization: Why Congress Rarely Checks The President And Why The Courts Should Not Take Congress’S Place, Neal Devins
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Government Lies And The Press Clause,
2018
University of Colorado Law School
Government Lies And The Press Clause, Helen Norton
Publications
This essay considers a particular universe of potentially dangerous governmental falsehoods: the government's lies and misrepresentations about and to the press.
Government's efforts to regulate private speakers' lies clearly implicate the First Amendment, as many (but not all) of our own lies are protected by the Free Speech Clause. But because the government does not have First Amendment rights of its own when it speaks, the constitutional limits, if any, on the government's own lies are considerably less clear.
In earlier work I have explored in some detail the Free Speech and Due Process Clauses as possible constraints on certain …
