The Creation Of Authority In A Sermon By St. Augustine,
2010
University of Michigan Law School
The Creation Of Authority In A Sermon By St. Augustine, James Boyd White
Articles
My way of honoring Joe today will not be to describe or extol his achievements directly but to try to show something of what I have learned from him, particularly in the way I approach a new text and problem, in this case the creation of authority in one of Augustine's sermons.
The Consequence Of Human Differences,
2010
University of Michigan Law School
The Consequence Of Human Differences, Jospeh Vining
Articles
This essay explores the ways in which the recognition of individual and person in the legal form of thought distinguishes it from forms of thought in evolutionary biology and mathematics that are put forward as means to a complete picture of the world. The essay observes that the legal form of thought is in fact deeply involved in our modern understanding of Nature itself.
Susan Wolf On The Meaning Of Life: A Review,
2010
Columbia Law School
Susan Wolf On The Meaning Of Life: A Review, Joseph Raz
Faculty Scholarship
The book comprises the two Tanner Lectures given by Susan Wolf at Princeton in 2007; helpful comments by John Koethe, Robert M. Adams, Nomy Arpaly, and Jonathan Haidt;Wolf ’s replies; and a brief introduction by Stephen Macedo. Wolf writes elegantly and thoughtfully, and the book, which seems to preserve in length and style its origins as two lectures, is full of sensible, suggestive ideas. The Tanner Lectures are meant to reach a nonspecialist audience, and some specialist readers may wish to have more on less, a desire likely to affect especially those who, like myself, share Wolf ’s basic approach …
Being In The World,
2010
Columbia Law School
Being In The World, Joseph Raz
Faculty Scholarship
Actions for which we are responsible constitute our engagement with the world as rational agents. What is the relationship between such actions and our capacities for rational agency? I take this to be a question about responsibility in a particular use of that term, which I shall call ‘responsibility’. We are not responsible for all our intentional actions (actions under hypnosis, for example), but we can nevertheless be responsible for actions we do not adequately control, for negligent actions, and for non‐intentional omissions. Appreciating this helps show that familiar principles of responsibility are false: those which delimit responsibility to intentional …
