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On The Guise Of The Good, Joseph Raz 2010 Columbia Law School

On The Guise Of The Good, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

The chapter examines the main argument for, and the presuppositions of the claim that intentional actions are actions taken in, and because of, a belief that there is some good in them. An analysis of intentional actions, and of action for a (normative) reason, followed by a consideration of a number of objections to the thesis of the Guise of the Good force various revisions and refinements of the thesis yielding a defensible version of it. It is argued that the revised thesis is supported by the same argument that inspired the Guise of the Good from the beginning and …


The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure And Legal Realism As A Jurisprudence Of Law Reform, David Marcus 2010 University of Arizona Rogers College of Law

The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure And Legal Realism As A Jurisprudence Of Law Reform, David Marcus

Georgia Law Review

Since the 1930s, legal realism has weathered claims that its adherents had no use for legal rules and lacked a positive program of law reform. This Article uses the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the major procedural reform of the twentieth century, to illuminate more accurately the treatment of rules in realism as well as its constructive potential. It draws upon the published and unpublished writings of Charles Clark, the primary author of the Federal Rules and a leading realist, to describe a realist procedural jurisprudence and to explain why the Federal Rules neatly illustrate this jurisprudence in practice. Part …


When And How (If At All) Does Law Constrain Official Action?, Frederick Schauer 2010 University of Virginia

When And How (If At All) Does Law Constrain Official Action?, Frederick Schauer

Georgia Law Review

Debates about the obligation to obey the law have been around for literally thousands of years, but the empirical side has received much less attention. Moreover, most of the existing empirical work has focused on citizens and not officials, and consequently we know little about the extent to which law qua law motivates official action. This Article seeks to encourage empirical inquiry into the particular question of whether officials obey the law as law, independent of the content of the law and independent of the possibility of sanctions for non-compliance. It offers the hypothesis that although there is much talk …


Federal Philosophy Of Science: A Deconstruction- And A Reconstruction, Susan Haack 2010 University of Miami School of Law

Federal Philosophy Of Science: A Deconstruction- And A Reconstruction, Susan Haack

Articles

No abstract provided.


Bentham On Stilts: The Bare Relevance Of Subjectivity To Retributive Justice, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, David C. Gray 2010 Florida State University College of Law (Deceased)

Bentham On Stilts: The Bare Relevance Of Subjectivity To Retributive Justice, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, David C. Gray

All Faculty Scholarship

In recent work, various scholars have challenged retributive justice theorists to pay more attention to the subjective experience of punishment, specifically how punishment affects the experiences and well-being of offenders. The claim developed by these “subjectivists” is that because people’s experiences with pain and suffering differ, both diachronically and inter-subjectively, their punishments will have to be tailored to individual circumstances as well.

Our response is that this set of claims, once scrutinized, is either true, but of limited significance, or nontrivial, but unsound. We don’t doubt the possibility that different people will react differently to the same infliction of punishment. …


Liberalism's Ambivalence, Anne Dailey 2010 University of Connecticut School of Law

Liberalism's Ambivalence, Anne Dailey

Faculty Articles and Papers

This short comment on Nomi Stolzenberg's symposium paper, Liberalism in Love (28 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 593 (2010)), addresses the enduring conflict between rationalism and romanticism as it manifests itself in law. In psychology, the cognitive/behavioral revolution has brought about a dramatic decline in the prominence of psychoanalytic research and therapy. But I argue that this conquest should be seen more in terms of an ambivalence. In law, rationalist ideas about the self and individual decision making necessarily coexist with more romantic ideas about identity and selfhood. Nomi Stolzenberg's essay moves us to think about law in integrated terms: not defined …


Hobbes And Wolf-Man: Melancholy And Animality In Modern Sovereignty, Diego Rossello 2010 Northwestern University

Hobbes And Wolf-Man: Melancholy And Animality In Modern Sovereignty, Diego Rossello

Studio for Law and Culture

Homo homini lupus, man is a wolf to man, remains one of the most well-known and often quoted dictums in the tradition of political theory. Political theorists take this phrase by Thomas Hobbes in the Epistle Dedicatory of De Cive to illustrate the brutish, anarchical and violent condition of man in the natural condition, prior to the establishment of a civil state. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I suggest that this brief passage directs our attention to lycanthropy: an acute melancholic syndrome which 17th century physiologists thought could turn humans into animals. I suggest that Hobbes’s political theory stands for a …


Abstention: The Unexpected Power Of Withholding Your Vote, Grant M. Hayden 2010 Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law

Abstention: The Unexpected Power Of Withholding Your Vote, Grant M. Hayden

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

This Article examines the effect of abstentions on the outcome of votes. Scholars (and voters) operate under two basic assumptions about the nature of abstention. First, they assume that an abstention affects all alternatives in equal measure. Second, and relatedly, people assume that a voter’s preferred alternative will be less likely to win if that voter abstains (and, of course, more likely to win if she votes). Removing the potential full support of a vote and replacing it with the fifty-fifty proposition of an abstention should hurt the chances of a voter’s preferred alternative. These two assumptions guide the thinking …


On Respect, Authority & Neutrality: A Response, Joseph Raz 2010 Columbia Law School

On Respect, Authority & Neutrality: A Response, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

I owe a great debt to Professors Wall, Darwall, and Green for their willingness to challenge, develop, and question some of my publications, which forced me to confront a few of the shortcomings in my views and, I hope, to clarify and improve some of them. Given the diversity of the topics, I respond to each separately. I aimed to avoid minor points and to write only on matters which affect the cogency of my views or theirs on important issues.1 For that reason, as well as for reasons of space, not all the issues they raise are dealt …


Rescuing Jerry From (Basic) Principles, Joseph Raz 2010 Columbia Law School

Rescuing Jerry From (Basic) Principles, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

I will say something on two or three related but distinct topics. First, something on the grounding of normative beliefs, a topic – as I see it – in moral epistemology, and then after a brief remark on explanation, something against a certain understanding of basic principles. My observations were prompted by reflection on Jerry’s desire to rescue justice from the facts.


Philosophical Legal Ethics: Ethics, Morals, And Jurisprudence, Alice Woolley, W. Bradley Wendel, William H. Simon, Stephen Pepper, Daniel Markovitz, Katherine R. Kruse, Tim Dare 2010 Columbia Law School

Philosophical Legal Ethics: Ethics, Morals, And Jurisprudence, Alice Woolley, W. Bradley Wendel, William H. Simon, Stephen Pepper, Daniel Markovitz, Katherine R. Kruse, Tim Dare

Faculty Scholarship

The authors and moderator David Luban participated in a plenary session of the International Legal Ethics Conference IV, held at Stanford. Each author answered and discussed questions arising from short papers they had written about the principal concern of legal ethics was the morality of lawyers, the morality of clients, or the morality of laws?

Those papers, which are to be published in Legal Ethics, are compiled here, along with the question and background information with which the panelists were provided.


Human Rights Without Foundations, Joseph Raz 2010 Columbia Law School

Human Rights Without Foundations, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

This is a good time for human rights. Not that they are respected more than in the past. The flagrant resort to kidnapping, arbitrary arrests, and torture by the United States of America (USA), and the unprecedented restriction of individual freedom in the USA, and in Great Britain (GB), cast doubt about that. It is a good time for human rights in that claims about such rights are used more widely in the conduct of world affairs than before. There are declarations of and treaties about human rights, international courts and tribunals with jurisdiction over various human right violations. They …


Ghana Journey: Private Investment, Public Funding, And Domestic Reform, Ronald C. Griffin 2010 Florida A & M University College of Law

Ghana Journey: Private Investment, Public Funding, And Domestic Reform, Ronald C. Griffin

Journal Publications

Some folks are good. But man is evil. He is driven by impulses, avarice, reason, scholarship, and barbarism. Ghana's history affirms some of the social and philosophical claims about man and evil. A scholarly narrative about American economic life, trenched in Ghana like an overlay, will unveil bits about big businesses, small businesses, and doing business in Ghana.


Empirical Desert And The Moral Economy Of Punishment, Zachary R. Calo 2010 Touro University Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center

Empirical Desert And The Moral Economy Of Punishment, Zachary R. Calo

Scholarly Works

This paper considers Paul Robinson's theory of empirical desert as an argument for moving beyond the debate between utilitarian and retributivist accounts of punishment. It is argued that empirical desert, in its attempt to replace philosophy with the insights of the social and biological sciences, fails to ground the foundational act of punishment in an adequate theoretical warrant. A particular problem confronting empirical desert is that while Robinson shifts the locus of punishment from theory to the intuitions of the relevant community, he does not adequately account for the dynamic process by which communities shape and structure their internal moral …


The Creation Of Authority In A Sermon By St. Augustine, James Boyd White 2010 University of Michigan Law School

The Creation Of Authority In A Sermon By St. Augustine, James Boyd White

Articles

My way of honoring Joe today will not be to describe or extol his achievements directly but to try to show something of what I have learned from him, particularly in the way I approach a new text and problem, in this case the creation of authority in one of Augustine's sermons.


The Consequence Of Human Differences, Jospeh Vining 2010 University of Michigan Law School

The Consequence Of Human Differences, Jospeh Vining

Articles

This essay explores the ways in which the recognition of individual and person in the legal form of thought distinguishes it from forms of thought in evolutionary biology and mathematics that are put forward as means to a complete picture of the world. The essay observes that the legal form of thought is in fact deeply involved in our modern understanding of Nature itself.


Being In The World, Joseph Raz 2010 Columbia Law School

Being In The World, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

Actions for which we are responsible constitute our engagement with the world as rational agents. What is the relationship between such actions and our capacities for rational agency? I take this to be a question about responsibility in a particular use of that term, which I shall call ‘responsibility’. We are not responsible for all our intentional actions (actions under hypnosis, for example), but we can nevertheless be responsible for actions we do not adequately control, for negligent actions, and for non‐intentional omissions. Appreciating this helps show that familiar principles of responsibility are false: those which delimit responsibility to intentional …


Susan Wolf On The Meaning Of Life: A Review, Joseph Raz 2010 Columbia Law School

Susan Wolf On The Meaning Of Life: A Review, Joseph Raz

Faculty Scholarship

The book comprises the two Tanner Lectures given by Susan Wolf at Princeton in 2007; helpful comments by John Koethe, Robert M. Adams, Nomy Arpaly, and Jonathan Haidt;Wolf ’s replies; and a brief introduction by Stephen Macedo. Wolf writes elegantly and thoughtfully, and the book, which seems to preserve in length and style its origins as two lectures, is full of sensible, suggestive ideas. The Tanner Lectures are meant to reach a nonspecialist audience, and some specialist readers may wish to have more on less, a desire likely to affect especially those who, like myself, share Wolf ’s basic approach …


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