Fourth Amendment Commons^™

A Unified Theory For Seizures Of The Person, Ronald J. Bacigal

Law Faculty Publications

Perhaps there is something about the final stages of their careers that causes people to resolve conflicts by reconciling the seemingly irreconcilable. Albert Einstein spent the last days of his career searching for a unified field theory that would eliminate the contradictory laws governing relativity and quantum mechanics. Stephen Hawking has taken up this quest which has been renamed a search for the Theory of Everything. On a “slightly” more modest level, I find the later stages of my career drawing me toward formulating a unified theory governing seizures of the person. The challenge is to blend three different tests …

Setting Us Up For Disaster: The Supreme Court's Decision In Terry V. Ohio, Thomas B. Mcaffee

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

Getting Back To The Fourth Amendment: Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, Mireille Dee

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Growing Up Policed In The Age Of Aggressive Policing Policies, Brett G. Stoudt, Michelle Fine, Madeline Fox

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Due Process In American Military Tribunals After September 11, 2001, Gary Shaw

Touro Law Review

The Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF") provides broad powers for a president after September 11, 2001. President Bush, under the AUMF, claimed he had the power to hold "enemy combatants" without due process. This gave rise to two questions that the article addresses: "Could they be held indefinitely without charges or proceedings being initiated? If proceedings had to be initiated, what process was due to the defendants?"

Camreta And Al-Kidd: The Supreme Court, The Fourth Amendment, And Witnesses, Kit Kinports

Faculty Scholarship

Although few noticed the link between them, two Supreme Court cases decided in the same week last Term, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd and Camreta v. Greene, both involved the Fourth Amendment implications of detaining witnesses to a crime. Al-Kidd, an American citizen, was arrested under the federal material witness statute in connection with an investigation into terrorist activities, and Greene, a nine-year-old suspected victim of child abuse, was seized and interrogated at school by two state officials. The opinions issued in the two cases did little to resolve the constitutional issues that arise in witness detention cases, and in fact …

Warrantless Cell Phone Searches And The 4th Amendment: You Think You Deleted Those Text Messages…But You Have No Idea…, Amanda Brill

Student Works

No abstract provided.

Gps Tracking And The Fourth Amendment: The New Frontier In Counterterrorism Efforts, German Rozencranc

Student Works

No abstract provided.

The Rise, Decline And Fall(?) Of Miranda, Yale Kamisar

Articles

There has been a good deal of talk lately to the effect that Miranda1 is dead or dying-or might as well be dead.2 Even liberals have indicated that the death of Miranda might not be a bad thing. This brings to mind a saying by G.K. Chesterton: "Don't ever take a fence down until you know the reason why it was put up."4

Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, And Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes Of Age, Laura K. Donohue

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Federal interest in using facial recognition technology (“FRT”) to collect, analyze, and use biometric information is rapidly growing. Despite the swift movement of agencies and contractors into this realm, however, Congress has been virtually silent on the current and potential uses of FRT. No laws directly address facial recognition—much less the pairing of facial recognition with video surveillance—in criminal law. Limits placed on the collection of personally identifiable information, moreover, do not apply. The absence of a statutory framework is a cause for concern. FRT represents the first of a series of next generation biometrics, such as hand geometry, iris, …

Advisory Adjudication, Girardeau A. Spann

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Supreme Court decision in Camreta v. Greene is revealing. The Court first issues an opinion authorizing appeals by prevailing parties in qualified immunity cases, even though doing so entails the issuance of an advisory opinion that is not necessary to resolution of the dispute between the parties. And the Court then declines to reach the merits of the underlying constitutional claim in the case, because doing so would entail the issuance of an advisory opinion that was not necessary to the resolution of the dispute between the parties. The Court's decision, therefore, has the paradoxical effect of both honoring …

Virtual Blinds: Finding Online Privacy In Offline Precedents, Allyson W. Haynes

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

A person in a building shows a desire for privacy by pulling her blinds shut or closing her curtains. Otherwise, she cannot complain when her neighbor sees her undressing from the window, or when a policeman looks up from the street and sees her marijuana plants. In the online context, can we find an analogy to these privacy blinds? Or is the window legally bare because of the nature of the Internet?

This Article argues that by analyzing the privacy given to communications in the offline context, and in particular, by analyzing case law recognizing privacy in an otherwise public …

No More Chipping Away: The Roberts Court Uses An Axe To Take Out The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, Tracey Maclin, Jennifer Marie Rader

Faculty Scholarship

This article considers the current status of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule under the Roberts Court, as well as what the future holds for the rule. Despite Justice Kennedy’s 2006 declaration that “the continued operation of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt,” this Article demonstrates why this is not the case. Kennedy’s statement is noteworthy and has been accorded substantial weight primarily because it was made at a time when it was thought that four Justices (Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) were prepared to announce the demise of …

Beyond Law Enforcement: Camreta V. Greene, Child Protection Investigations, And The Need To Reform The Fourth Amendment Special Needs Doctrine, Joshua Gupta-Kagan

Faculty Scholarship

The Fourth Amendment “special needs” doctrine distinguishes between searches and seizures that serve the “normal need for law enforcement” and those that serve some other special need, excusing non-law-enforcement searches and seizures from the warrant and probable cause requirements. The United States Supreme Court has never justified drawing this bright line exclusively around law enforcement searches and seizures but not around those that threaten important noncriminal constitutional rights.

Child protection investigations illustrate the problem: millions of times each year, state child protection authorities search families' homes and seize children for interviews about alleged maltreatment. Only a minority of these investigations …

Searching Secrets, Nita A. Farahany

Faculty Scholarship

A Fourth Amendment violation has traditionally involved a physical intrusion such as the search of a house or the seizure of a person or her papers. Today, investigators rarely need to break down doors, rummage through drawers, or invade one’s peace and repose to obtain incriminating evidence in an investigation. Instead, the government may unobtrusively intercept information from electronic files, GPS transmissions, and intangible communications. In the near future, it may even be possible to intercept information directly from suspects’ brains. Courts and scholars have analogized modern searches for information to searches of tangible property like containers and have treated …

A Mosaic Shield: Maynard, The Fourth Amendment, And Privacy Rights In The Digital Age, Erin Smith Dennis

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.

Crime-Severity Distinctions And The Fourth Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness In A Changing World, Jeffrey Bellin

Faculty Publications

A growing body of commentary calls for the Supreme Court to recalibrate its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in response to technological and social changes that threaten the traditional balance between public safety and personal liberty. This Article joins the discussion, highlighting a largely overlooked consideration that should be included in any modernization of Fourth Amendment doctrine—crime severity.

The Supreme Court emphasizes that “reasonableness” is the “touchstone” of Fourth Amendment analysis. Yet, in evaluating contested searches and seizures, current Fourth Amendment doctrine ignores a key determinant of reasonableness, the crime under investigation. As a result, an invasive search of a suspected murderer …

Can A Password Stop Police From Searching Your Cell Phone Incident To Arrest?, Adam M. Gershowitz

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Notes On Borrowing And Convergence, Robert L. Tsai, Nelson Tebbe

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This is a response to Jennifer E. Laurin, "Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence," 111 Colum. L. Rev. 670 (2011), which analyzes the Supreme Court's resort to tort-based concepts to limit the reach of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. We press three points. First, there are differences between a general and specific critique of constitutional borrowing. Second, the idea of convergence as a distinct phenomenon from borrowing has explanatory potential and should be further explored. Third, to the extent convergence occurs, it matters whether concerns of judicial administration or political reconstruction are driving doctrinal changes.

Notes On Borrowing And Convergence, Robert L. Tsai, Nelson Tebbe

Faculty Scholarship

This is a response to Jennifer E. Laurin, "Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence," 111 Colum. L. Rev. 670 (2011), which analyzes the Supreme Court's resort to tort-based concepts to limit the reach of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. We press three points. First, there are differences between a general and specific critique of constitutional borrowing. Second, the idea of convergence as a distinct phenomenon from borrowing has explanatory potential and should be further explored. Third, to the extent convergence occurs, it matters whether concerns of judicial administration or political reconstruction are driving doctrinal changes.