Constitutional Law Commons^™

Covid-19 And The Law: Elections, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

With one Supreme Court decision, lower federal and state court decisions, pending litigation, and proposals around the country for major changes in how elections are conducted, COVID-19 has already had and likely will continue to have a significant impact on election law.

The discussion that follows proceeds in two parts. The first addresses the initial consequences of COVID-19 as an electoral emergency. Voters were due to go to the polls in states around the country just as the pandemic was gathering force and governors and mayors were calling on people to stay at home and avoid large gatherings – which, …

Covid-19 And Lgbt Rights, Suzanne B. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

Even in the best of times, LGBT individuals have legal vulnerabilities in employment, housing, healthcare and other domains resulting from a combination of persistent bias and uneven protection against discrimination. In this time of COVID-19, these vulnerabilities combine to amplify both the legal and health risks that LGBT people face.

This essay focuses on several risks that are particularly linked to being lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender, with the recognition that these vulnerabilities are often intensified by discrimination based on race, ethnicity, age, disability, immigration status and other aspects of identity. Topics include: 1) federal withdrawal of antidiscrimination protections; 2) …

Symposium: The Puzzling And Troubling Grant In Kisor, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

From one perspective, the Supreme Court’s decision to grant review in Kisor v. Wilkie is not surprising. Dating back at least to Justice Antonin Scalia’s 2011 concurrence in Talk America v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., through Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center in 2013 and Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association in 2015, there’s been growing interest on the Supreme Court’s conservative wing in overturning Auer deference, or the doctrine that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is “controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” The campaign to overturn Auer v. Robbins then stalled, with the court denying …

Fixing America's Founding, Maeve Glass

Faculty Scholarship

The forty-fifth presidency of the United States has sent lawyers reaching once more for the Founders’ dictionaries and legal treatises. In courtrooms, law schools, and media outlets across the country, the original meanings of the words etched into the U.S. Constitution in 1787 have become the staging ground for debates ranging from the power of a president to trademark his name in China to the rights of a legal permanent resident facing deportation. And yet, in this age when big data promises to solve potential challenges of interpretation and judges have for the most part agreed that original meaning should …

Reframing Affirmative Action: From Diversity To Mobility And Full Participation, Susan P. Sturm

Faculty Scholarship

Legality and efficacy call for reframing the affirmative-action debate within a broader institutional effort to address structural inequality in higher education. Although defending affirmative action as we know it continues to be important and necessary, it is crucial to identify and address the disconnect between affirmative action and higher education's practices that contribute to enduring racial and economic inequality and waning social mobility. There is a persistent and growing gap between higher education’s rhetoric of diversity, opportunity, and mobility and the reality of underparticipation, polarization, and stratification. That gap has racial, gender, and socioeconomic dimensions. The path to shoring up …

Cyberattacks And The Constitution, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

Contrary to popular view, cyberattacks alone are rarely exercises of constitutional war powers – and they might never be. They are often instead best understood as exercises of other powers pertaining to nonwar military, foreign affairs, intelligence, and foreign commerce, for example. Although this more fine-grained, fact-specific conception of cyberattacks leaves room for broad executive leeway in some contexts, it also contains a strong constitutional basis for legislative regulation of cyber operations.

Delegating Or Divesting?, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

A gratifying feature of recent scholarship on administrative power is the resurgence of interest in the Founding. Even the defenders of administrative power hark back to the Constitution’s early history – most frequently to justify delegations of legislative power. But the past offers cold comfort for such delegation.

A case in point is Delegation at the Founding by Professors Julian Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley. Not content to defend the Supreme Court’s current nondelegation doctrine, the article employs history to challenge the doctrine – arguing that the Constitution does not limit Congress’s delegation of legislative power. But the article’s most …

The Lost Promise Of Lambert V. California, Cynthia Alkon

Faculty Scholarship

This Article will start with a brief overview of the Lambert case. It will then discuss the differing views on how to interpret this relatively short case. Next, it will review the cases citing to Lambert that illustrate the narrow approach that courts have taken when applying this case. Finally, it will offer some thoughts on how Lambert could have played a role in preventing some of the excesses of mass incarceration, but failed.

Welcome To Cordell Perspectives, Neil M. Richards, Jonathan W. Heusel

Scholarship@WashULaw

The world around us is changing. Let’s talk about it together. Introducing a series of articles and opinions by the world’s leading experts concerning COVID-19 as it relates to precision medicine and data privacy: Welcome to Cordell Perspectives.

Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, Travis Crum

Scholarship@WashULaw

Racially polarized voting makes minorities more vulnerable to discriminatory changes in election laws and therefore implicates nearly every voting rights doctrine. In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court held that racially polarized voting is a necessary—but not a sufficient—condition for a vote dilution claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Court, however, has recently questioned the propriety of recognizing the existence of racially polarized voting. This colorblind approach threatens not only the Gingles factors but also Section 2’s constitutionality.

The Court treats racially polarized voting as a modern phenomenon. But the relevant starting point is the 1860s, …

The Superfluous Fifteenth Amendment?, Travis Crum

Scholarship@WashULaw

This Article starts a conversation about reorienting voting rights doctrine toward the Fifteenth Amendment. In advancing this claim, I explore an unappreciated debate—the “Article V debate”—in the Fortieth Congress about whether nationwide black suffrage could and should be achieved through a statute, a constitutional amendment, or both. As the first significant post-ratification discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Article V debate provides valuable insights about the original public understandings of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the distinction between civil and political rights.

The Article V debate reveals that the Radical Republicans’ initial proposal for nationwide black suffrage included both …

The Right Approach To Harmless Error, Daniel Epps

Scholarship@WashULaw

My article “Harmless Errors and Substantial Rights” challenged conventional wisdom about the harmless constitutional error doctrine in criminal procedure. Specifically, I contended that the traditional way of understanding harmless error as a remedial doctrine rooted in so-called “constitutional common law” created significant anomalies. Instead, harmless constitutional error doctrine can only be understood as part of the definition and judicial enforcement of constitutional rights.

Few legal scholars have thought as deeply about the mysteries of harmless error as Professor John M. Greabe, and he is well equipped to give the remedial perspective the best possible defense. Nonetheless, despite Professor Greabe’s able …

"The Road I Can't Help Travelling": Holmes On Truth And Persuadability, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Failed Transparency Regime For Executive Agreements: An Empirical And Normative Analysis, Oona A. Hathaway, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith

Faculty Scholarship

The Constitution specifies only one process for making international agreements. Article II states that the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” The treaty process has long been on a path to obsolescence, however, with fewer and fewer treaties being made in each presidential administration. Nevertheless, the United States has not stopped making international agreements. Even as Article II treaties have come to a near halt, the United States has concluded hundreds of binding international agreements each year. These agreements, known as …

A Unified Constitutional View Of Financial Punishment: Synthesizing The Excessive Fines Clause And Bearden­ Based Protections, Joshua A. Feinzig

Faculty Scholarship

This Note coordinates the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause with the Fourteenth Amendment wealth-discrimination protection set forth in Bearden v. Georgia It is generally assumed that the two protections operate independently: while the Excessive Fines Clause protects individuals against exorbitant financial obligations, Bearden limits the state from converting criminal debt into a severe liberty deprivation. But in recognizing how the two doctrines are normatively and functionally reinforcing, this Note proposes a single framework for considering financial punishment's constitutionality.

If the Eighth Amendment protection applies at the imposition of a financial punishment, Bearden provides a "second look" at the constitutionality of …

Misplaced Constitutional Rights, Brandon L. Garrett

Faculty Scholarship

Constitutional rulings risk an unnoticed type of mission creep: misplacement through adoption in settings that they were not designed to regulate. This Article describes how in a set of important areas—and sometimes despite the Supreme Court’s explicit cautionary language—constitutional rules have taken hold outside of the settings that they were primarily designed to regulate, providing unanticipated additions to rules and practice. Constitutional rights and standards are often context limited to particular government actors, procedural settings, or remedies. Based on the text of the Constitution or precedent, some rights apply only during civil cases, while others apply only during criminal cases; …

Diploma Privilege And The Constitution, Patricia E. Salkin, Claudia Angelos, Sara J. Berman, Mary Lu Bilek, Carol L. Chomsky, Marsha Griggs, Joan W. Howarth, Eileen Kaufman, Deborah Jones Meritt, Judith Wegner, Andrea Curcio

Scholarly Works

The COVID-19 pandemic and resulting shutdowns are affecting every aspect of society. The legal profession and the justice system have been profoundly disrupted at precisely the time when there is an unprecedented need for legal services to deal with a host of legal issues generated by the pandemic, including disaster relief, health law, insurance, labor law, criminal justice, domestic violence, and civil rights. The need for lawyers to address these issues is great but the prospect of licensing new lawyers is challenging due to the serious health consequences of administering the bar examination during the pandemic.

State Supreme Courts are …

Constitutional Scholars As Constitutional Actors, Liora Lazarus

All Faculty Publications

Few constitutional scholars would dispute that Carl Schmitt played a legitimating role in the downfall of the Weimar Republic, or that Albert Venn Dicey has defined the UK and other commonwealth constitutions. Why then is there no general conception of constitutional scholars as constitutional actors? It is now well established that ‘to understand how our Constitution and laws are practised, it is necessary to study and understand many more institutions in the system than simply the Judiciary’ While the focus has broadened to include a range of constitutional office holders and institutions, little has been said about the role and …

Individual Preferences In Policy Analysis: A Normative Framework, Gabriel Weil

Scholarly Works

Measures of individual preferences are a key input in cost-benefit analysis. However, behavioral science has raised questions about the rationality of these preferences. The Nudge thesis relies on that scientific research to prescribe interventions to influence individual choices. However, the more modest step of limiting reliance on these preferences in evaluating non-paternalistic government policies has not been taken up. We lack a consistent theory of when public policy should defer to these preferences, with legal and policy advocates adopting ad hoc result-oriented approaches. I argue that policymakers should be prepared to override individual preferences in cases where their only plausible …

Chiafalo: Constitutionalizing Historical Gloss In Law And Democratic Politics, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Guy-Uriel Charles

Articles by Maurer Faculty

We make one central point in this Article. Justice Kagan’s opinion in Chiafalo uses historical gloss to entrench a particular and modern view of political participation—which is best reflected by American political practices— by rejecting an alternative and anachronistic view—which is best reflected by the text and structure of the Constitution. Part I argues that Chiafalo is not a textualist opinion because Article II, Section 1 does not support the majority’s conclusion that states have the power to limit elector discretion. The majority’s reasoning to the contrary is not persuasive, even on its own terms. Part II argues that Chiafalo …