Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Does Climate Disclosure Work To Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions? Emerging Evidence Suggests Cautious Optimism, Cynthia A. Williams

Seattle University Law Review

Significant regulatory resources have been spent developing global, voluntary climate and sustainability disclosure standards, such as the TCFD, TNRD, and ISSB’s Sustainability and Climate Disclosure standards, or domestically required disclosures, such as in the EU and in the U.S. Thus, it is important to evaluate whether this disclosure, particularly voluntary, qualitative disclosure, will have the power to shift the allocation of capital, will have a significant effect on the management of climate risk within firms, and ultimately will reduce climate change risk and biodiversity loss.

In this Article, several interrelated questions will be discussed. First, what does the empirical evidence …

Public-Private Partnerships After Murthy V. Missouri, Danielle Keats Citron, Jeff Stautberg

Indiana Law Journal

This Essay considers the future of public-private collaboration in the wake of the Murthy v. Missouri litigation, which cast doubt on the constitutionality of information sharing between federal agencies and social media companies. The litigation has been a good and a bad teacher. On one hand, the lower court decisions made legible the risks to free expression, accountability, transparency, and intimate privacy posed by government-industry collaborations. On the other hand, the litigation chilled information sharing between federal agencies, state election officials, and social media companies at the moment that such collaboration could and should help protect against foreign malign influence …

On Entityness And Takeovers: Acquisition Valuation, Theory Of The Firm, And Coase's Error, Robert J. Rhee

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article advances a theory of entityness that theorizes the firm and its relationship to the acquisition premium. This theory is the first scholarly analysis to construct a general model of takeover valuation by integrating the modern finance theory of asset value and a corrected Coasean theory of the firm. The acquisition premium is an enigma. Acquirers must pay it. But why? Isn’t the market price tethered to fundamental value through an efficient market? This enigma reveals a key insight about firms. The theory of entityness postulates that the acquisition premium is compensation for a capitalized asset intrinsic in the …

Do Ais Dream Of Electric Boards?, Robert J. Rhee

UF Law Faculty Publications

When artificial intelligence (“AI”) acquires self-awareness, agency, and unique intelligence, it will attain ontological personhood. Management of firms by AI would be technologically and economically feasible. The law could confer AI with the status of legal personhood, as it did with the personhood of traditional business firms in the past, thus dispensing with the need for inserting AI as property within the legal boundary of a firm. As a separate and distinct entity, AI could function independently as a manager in the way that legal or natural persons do today: i.e., AI as director, officer, partner, member, or manager. Such …

Repeal The Federal Arbitration Act's "Arising Out Of" Requirement, Stephen J. Ware

American University Business Law Review

Suppose Pfizer and CVS agree to arbitrate not only any disputes that might arise out of their contract containing an arbitration agreement but also any disputes that might arise out of any of the many earlier contracts between these two large corporations. Or Apple and Samsung agree to arbitrate any patent infringement claims either has against the other for the next five years. Or FedEx and UPS agree to arbitrate any tort claims either has against the other due to any collision of their vehicles in the next ten years. Or members of the Walton (Walmart) family agree to arbitrate …

Section 4 -- Jury, Trial: A Misnomer In The Faa, Tracey B. Frisch

American University Business Law Review

The purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), according to the Supreme Court, was not merely to reverse judicial hostility towards arbitration by placing agreements to arbitrate on the same footing as other contracts but to actively promote the use of arbitration on a national scale. It is not surprising then that most provisions of the FAA envision limited court intervention into the arbitration process.

The Problem Of Unreasoned Reasoned Awards And The Judicial Failure To Remedy It: Statutory And Rule Solutions, John B. Mcarthur, Mark Travis

American University Business Law Review

American arbitrators have long been choosing between two common forms of awards: "reasoned awards" and "standard awards" with no reasons enumerated. Yet neither arbitration rules nor statutes define "reasoned award." This lack of guidance has gotten arbitration in trouble and threatens its ability to satisfy users' needs.

Without Noncompete Agreements, Can Employers Keep A (Trade) Secret?, Cynthia L. Dahl

American University Business Law Review

Data, algorithms, and proprietary information and processes are critical assets for increasing numbers of companies. Since information assets often cannot be protected through patent, companies may instead rely on trade secret law. To meet the legal standard of a trade secret, companies must show that their information assets confer a competitive advantage to them by virtue of the secret status, and that they have taken reasonable measures to preserve the secrecy.

One of the reliable methods companies use to maintain secrecy, and to show that they have taken the required reasonable measures, is the use of restrictive covenants. Traditionally, companies …

Conceptualizing Caremark, Roy Shapira

Indiana Law Journal

Who is accountable for corporate compliance failures? The issue of compliance has emerged as one of the most significant developments in corporate governance over the past decades. However, until recently, corporate law has had surprisingly little to say about the question, leaving the policing of issues such as toxic pollution, product safety, or data privacy, to other regulators. This situation has changed dramatically over the past few years. Today, virtually every corporate fiasco is followed by an oversight duty lawsuit against the company’s directors and officers for not doing enough to prevent the debacle. But the rapid resurgence of oversight …

Rowling Record 2025, The Robert B. Rowling Center For Business Law & Leadership

Rowling Record

No abstract provided.

How To Let A Democracy Die: “First,…Let’S Kill All The Lawyers” And Other Lessons From The Bard, Jena Martin

Faculty Articles

This article serves to provide a much-needed perspective on how international legal mechanisms (or the lack thereof) impact democratic in institutions.

Vice Capital, Andrew K. Jennings, Kimberly D. Krawiec

Faculty Articles

Academic and market interest in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investing has grown markedly in recent years. Although less prominent, a substantial literature also explores whether “sin pays” in the public capital markets. This literature’s underlying theory is that social norms discourage the funding of businesses that promote vice. According to this theory, some investors—particularly institutions sensitive to social norms, such as pension funds and foundations—will shun vice investments. A consequence of this aversion is a “vice premium” for those investors who will invest in such companies. Largely unexplored, however, is what industries or business models qualify as “vice,” how …

Criminal Investors, Andrew K. Jennings

Faculty Articles

This Article reassesses the culpability of those who invest in law-breaking firms. Prosecutors currently treat investors as victims of corporate wrongdoing rather than as actors who might bear responsibility for it. This Article observes, though, that investment can facilitate, and even cause, illicit corporate activity. When investors intentionally contribute to those effects, substantive criminal law imposes liability on them just the same as it does on accomplices, conspirators, or principals in other contexts. Despite this formal parity, however, investor criminal liability is more a theoretical proposition than a practical reality.

This Article questions that status quo by asking whether and …

Interlocking Directorates In The United States, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

In corporate America, directors wield increasing influence across multiple companies, often within the same industry (“horizontal directors”), which creates tension between antitrust laws and corporate governance. Horizontal directors are well-positioned to bring industry expertise and potentially increase higher profits, benefiting shareholders but also possibly enabling potential collusion. This chapter provides an overview of the prevalence of horizontal directors, the regulatory grey space in which they exist and the connection to some recently debated issues, including that of common ownership by institutional investors. To inform this debate, this chapter provides a thorough overview of horizontal directors from corporate and antitrust perspectives …

Labor Law, Ownership, And The Firm, Sanjukta Paul

Articles

In shaping economic coordination within and across both firms and markets, one significant action of law is to allocate privileges or rights between people or groups of people. These include the right to coordinate with other people or groups of people in particular ways regarding core economic decisions-a type of activity that is not always or in all circumstances legally permissible. An area that makes this more general action of law especially concrete is antitrust or competition law, with its collection of "exemptions." Antitrust's formal and informal exemptions quite directly allocate economic coordination rights, for particular kinds of activity, and …

Business Law In The Ring: Nevada's Rebel Rules Versus Delaware's Corporate Crown, Kalin Sokell, Collin Weires

Nevada Law Journal Forum

This White Paper will begin with an analysis of specialized courts, starting with the Delaware Court of Chancery. It will then compare Delaware’s courts with the business courts in Texas and Nevada and will provide a detailed implementation plan for a specialized business court in Nevada. Next, this White Paper will address the differences between the corporate laws in Nevada and Delaware, including the benefits of incorporating in Nevada versus Delaware. The White Paper will then briefly discuss the proposed general jurisdiction bill in Nevada, and why it ultimately failed. Finally, this White Paper will end with remarks on where …

Alternatives To Delaware? Evaluating Corporate Law In Nevada, Texas, And Wyoming, Joseph Landau, Bailey Swartz, Anthony Rickey, Robert Ragazzo, Benjamin Edwards, George A. Mocsary

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

The Political Commitment Of The Supreme Court Of Texas To Protecting Controlling Equity Owners, Val Ricks

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

The Supreme Court of Texas has revealed a political commitment to protecting controlling equity owners—e.g., shareholders, LLC members, limited partners—from liability related to their equity ownership. The Court does not say this, of course. The commitment the Court intends to reveal is a legal one. The political commitment must be teased out of what the Court does. The purpose of this article is to tease. Its method is to examine how the Supreme Court of Texas, in cases involving controlling or significant equity owners, extends the reasoning of its opinions out beyond law, and sometimes in conflict with it. When …

Reviving Shareholder Voice By Redefining Pre-Suit Demand, Wendy Gerwick Couture

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

This Article diagnoses, and seeks to cure, an undertheorized dynamic relationship between two levers of shareholder influence in the modern public corporation: suit and voice. This Article demonstrates that, under current Delaware law, a shareholder must stifle its voice in order to retain the ability to pursue a viable derivative claim, thus inhibiting the shareholder’s monitoring and information-sharing roles. In particular, the onerous “demand made” litigation pathway disincentivizes pre-suit demand, and the expansive definition of pre-suit demand captures shareholder communications to the board seeking corrective action other than litigation. To avoid this collision between suit and voice, this Article proposes …

Networking Among The Human Capitalists: The Organizational Dynamics Of Change And Power In The Large Corporate Law Firm, Alan James Klugel

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Law firms are unique creatures. They are subject to market pressures as well as ethical obligations and professional norms. They are in direct competition with other organizations for both clients and the lawyers necessary to perform work for those clients. They are comprised of lawyers who are simultaneously cooperative and competitive with one another. They are neither hierarchy nor anarchy, neither a collection of independent actors nor an entity under which its employees are subsumed. Instead, they are organizations shaped and reshaped by their members; organized around shared goals, internal contestations and external constraints; and defined by the ties between …