The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy G: The Special Case Of Derivatives,
2019
Yale School of Management
The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy G: The Special Case Of Derivatives, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
When it filed for bankruptcy protection in September 2008, Lehman Brothers was an active participant in the derivatives market and was party to 906,000 derivative transactions of all types under 6,120 ISDA Master Agreements with an estimated notional value of $35 trillion. The majority of Lehman’s derivatives were bilateral agreements not traded on an exchange but in the over-the-counter (OTC) market. Because derivatives enjoyed an exemption from the automatic stay provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, parties to Lehman’s derivatives could seek resolution and self-protection without the guidance and restraint of the bankruptcy court. The rush of counterparties to novate …
The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy F: Introduction To The Isda Master Agreement,
2019
Yale School of Management
The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy F: Introduction To The Isda Master Agreement, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
When Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (LBHI) sought Chapter 11 protection, the more than 6,000 counterparties with which its subsidiaries had entered into over 900,000 over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives transactions faced the question of how best to respond to protect their interests. The existence of standardized documentation developed by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) for entering into such transactions meant that the counterparties likely thought that they were dealing with a well-defined and robust set of options in answering this question. Yet, in practice, the resolution of Lehman’s OTC derivatives portfolio ended up being less orderly than the existence of …
The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy E: The Effects On Lehman’S U.S. Broker-Dealer,
2019
Yale School of Management
The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy E: The Effects On Lehman’S U.S. Broker-Dealer, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
Lehman’s U.S. broker-dealer, Lehman Brothers Inc. (LBI), was excluded from the parent company’s bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008, because it was thought that the solvent subsidiary might be able to wind down its affairs in a normal fashion. However, the force of the parent’s demise proved too strong, and within days, LBI and dozens of Lehman subsidiaries around the world were also in liquidation. As a regulated broker-dealer, LBI was required to comply with the Securities and Exchange Commission financial-responsibility rules for broker-dealers, including maintaining customer assets separately. However, the corporate complexity and enterprise integration that characterized the Lehman …
The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy C: Managing The Balance Sheet Through The Use Of Repo 105,
2019
Yale School of Management
The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy C: Managing The Balance Sheet Through The Use Of Repo 105, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
The Lehman Brothers court-appointed bankruptcy examiner produced a 2,200-page report detailing possible claims that the estate might pursue. The most surprising revelation of the report was that during its last year Lehman had relied heavily on an unusual financing transaction—Repo 105. The examiner concluded that Lehman’s aggressive use of Repo 105 transactions enabled it to remove up to $50 billion of assets from its balance sheet at quarter-end and to manipulate its leverage ratio so that it could report more favorable results. This case considers in-depth Lehman’s questionable use of Repo 105 transactions and its impact.
The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy B: Risk Limits And Stress Tests,
2019
Yale School of Management
The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy B: Risk Limits And Stress Tests, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
Investment banks are in the business of taking calculated risks. Risk management infrastructure facilitates the safe pursuit of profits and the balancing of associated risks. By 2006, Lehman Brothers was thought to have a very respectable risk management system, and even its regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission, viewed its risk framework as being fully compliant with regulatory requirements. In its public disclosures, Lehman characterized its risk controls as “meaningful constraints on its risk taking” and evidence of its continued financial stability. Beginning in late 2006, however, Lehman began dismantling its carefully crafted risk management framework as it pursued a …
The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy A: Overview,
2019
Yale School of Management, Yale School of Management
The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy A: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., the fourth-largest U.S. investment bank, sought Chapter 11 protection, initiating the largest bankruptcy proceeding in U.S. history. The demise of the 164-year old firm was a seminal event in the global financial crisis. Under the direction of its long-time Chief Executive Officer Richard Fuld, Lehman had been very successful pursuing a high-leverage, high-risk business model that required it to daily raise billions of dollars to fund its operations. Beginning in 2006, Lehman began to invest aggressively in real-estate-related assets and soon had significant exposures to housing and subprime mortgages, just as these …
The Future Of Blockchain: As Technology Spreads, It May Warrant More Privacy Protection For Information Stored With Blockchain,
2019
University of North Carolina School of Law
The Future Of Blockchain: As Technology Spreads, It May Warrant More Privacy Protection For Information Stored With Blockchain, Ashley N. Longman
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
Is The United States Becoming The “New Switzerland”?: Why The United States’ Failure To Adopt The Oecd’S Common Reporting Standard Is Helping It Become A Tax Haven,
2019
University of North Carolina School of Law
Is The United States Becoming The “New Switzerland”?: Why The United States’ Failure To Adopt The Oecd’S Common Reporting Standard Is Helping It Become A Tax Haven, Rachel E. Brinson
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
Tearin’ Up Iheart: The Recent Trend With Troubled Companies And The Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic,
2019
University of North Carolina School of Law
Tearin’ Up Iheart: The Recent Trend With Troubled Companies And The Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic, Brad Cheek
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
The High Cost Of Low Supervision: How Servicemembers Will Inevitably Pay For The Cfpb’S Reactive Approach To The Military Lending Act,
2019
University of North Carolina School of Law
The High Cost Of Low Supervision: How Servicemembers Will Inevitably Pay For The Cfpb’S Reactive Approach To The Military Lending Act, Courtney C. Cornelius
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
The Modern Threat: Data Breaches, Security Measures, And A Call For Changes,
2019
University of North Carolina School of Law
The Modern Threat: Data Breaches, Security Measures, And A Call For Changes, Zachary N. Layne
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
“Super Lien” Doesn’T Mean Super Risk: Money Market Intermediation, Security Interests, Federal Home Loan Bank Lien Protections And Systemic Risk,
2019
University of North Carolina School of Law
“Super Lien” Doesn’T Mean Super Risk: Money Market Intermediation, Security Interests, Federal Home Loan Bank Lien Protections And Systemic Risk, Jonathan A. Scott, Reginald T. O'Shields
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
An Attempt To Negate Iranian Sanctions: How Special Purpose Vehicles May Be The Eu’S Last Hope To Keep The Jcpoa Alive,
2019
University of North Carolina School of Law
An Attempt To Negate Iranian Sanctions: How Special Purpose Vehicles May Be The Eu’S Last Hope To Keep The Jcpoa Alive, Alexandria Ter Avest
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
Merger, Huh, What Is It Good For: The Impacts Of Credit Union Mergers,
2019
University of North Carolina School of Law
Merger, Huh, What Is It Good For: The Impacts Of Credit Union Mergers, T. Nute Thompson
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
Tribal Lending Under Cfpb Enforcement: Tribal Sovereign Immunity And The “True Lender” Distinction,
2019
University of North Carolina School of Law
Tribal Lending Under Cfpb Enforcement: Tribal Sovereign Immunity And The “True Lender” Distinction, Brianne Marino Glass
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
Banking At The Fed With Fedaccounts: The Demise Of Commercial Banks?,
2019
University of North Carolina School of Law
Banking At The Fed With Fedaccounts: The Demise Of Commercial Banks?, E. Kylie Norman
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
Treating Apples Like Oranges: The Benefits Of Exempting Community Banks From The Volcker Rule,
2019
Texas A&M University School of Law (Student)
Treating Apples Like Oranges: The Benefits Of Exempting Community Banks From The Volcker Rule, Gregory Butz
Texas A&M Law Review
In response to the Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession that followed, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Con- sumer Protection Act in 2010. The Volcker Rule is a controversial section of the Dodd–Frank Act that prohibits all banks, no matter their size, from pro- prietary trading and entering into certain relationships with private equity funds. But the Volcker Rule forces banks to incur significant costs to ensure compliance. While Big Banks have the capital and infrastructure to comply with the Volcker Rule, small Community Banks often do not. This gives Big Banks an unfair competitive …
Front Matter,
2019
University of North Carolina School of Law
Front Matter, North Carolina Banking Institute
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
Cryptocurrency And Financial Regulation: The Sec’S Rejection Of Bitcoin-Based Etps,
2019
University of North Carolina School of Law
Cryptocurrency And Financial Regulation: The Sec’S Rejection Of Bitcoin-Based Etps, Marion A. Brown
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
Sec You Later: Eliminating The Bank Holding Company And Reducing Sec Oversight Under Section 3(A)(2),
2019
University of North Carolina School of Law
Sec You Later: Eliminating The Bank Holding Company And Reducing Sec Oversight Under Section 3(A)(2), Blake Leger
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
