Supreme Court of the United States Commons^™

Ghost Guns: A Case Study On The Tension Between Public Exigencies And Statutory Construction, Bradley Krause

Catholic University Law Review

Administrative agencies often navigate public policy issues while simultaneously handling complex and highly technical matters. When facing a public emergency, how should courts interpret these agencies’ authorizing statutes? What rules of thumb exist to guide the courts? This Comment answers these questions through a case study on ongoing litigation pertaining to a recent ATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) regulation. The regulation, targeted towards ghost guns (also known as “privately manufactured firearms”), seeks to incorporate these weapons within pre-existing definitions in the ATF’s authorizing statute, the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA). In spite of challenges to the regulation, …

A Conversation With Justice Brett Kavanaugh, Brett M. Kavanaugh, J. Joel Alicea

Catholic University Law Review

On Thursday, September 26th, 2024, the Center for the Constitution and the Catholic Intellectual Tradition at The Catholic University of America hosted a conversation between Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh and Professor J. Joel Alicea. This was the inaugural event of the new Center. The conversation covered topics such as constitutional interpretation, the separation of powers, religious liberty, and the Catholic intellectual tradition. This is a transcript of the conversation, and the text appears substantially as it was delivered. The video of the event may be found at this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2sKvSwzkmqo.

Religion In Public Schools: Constitutional Revolution In Action, Noah R. Feldman

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

Colliding Doctrines: How Sffa V. Harvard Impacts Public University Officials' Legal Protections, Christo Fosse

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

Foia Vs. Fair Trial: How The Freedom Of Information Act Limits The Ability To Uncover Brady Material In Federal Post-Conviction Proceedings, Anna Marchiony

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Search For Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, Alina Sluzhyvenkova

Student Theses and Dissertations

There are certain rights that are explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, e.g., right to bear arms, right to free speech, right to a speedy and public trial. There are also rights that aren’t specifically written out but are nevertheless enjoyed by people nationwide. Rights that aren’t explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but which are fundamental to are called the unenumerated rights. Unenumerated rights are just as important and can be derived from natural law, enumerated rights, the Ninth Amendment, precedents, judicial opinions, and substantive due process.

Substantive due process is a principle guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which …

Dignity Defended, Privacy Preserved: A Call For Improved Legal Safeguards To Shield Victims Of Intimate Crimes From Public Scrutiny, Madeline E. Brown

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Case Of The Missing Case: How Neglecting Chisom V. Roemer Leaves § 2 Of The Voting Rights Act Analytically At Sea, James F. Blumstein

William & Mary Law Review Online

This article critiques the Supreme Court's decision in Allen v. Milligan for relying solely on Thornburg v. Gingles and overlooking Chisom v. Roemer, a key precedent interpreting § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Chisom established that vote dilution claims must be tied to unequal access to the political process, not just electoral outcomes. By ignoring this linkage, the Court risks turning § 2 into a vehicle for race-based electoral entitlements. The author argues that reaffirming Chisom is essential to preserving the statute’s process-focused intent and analytical clarity.

This abstract was written using generative artificial intelligence.

Stitch Incoming: Lindke V. Freed’S Impact On Social-Media-Blocking Litigation, Clare R. Norins, Mark L. Bailey

Washington and Lee Law Review Online

Since at least 2016, social-media-blocking litigation against government officials who censor their online critics has been an evolving battleground for First Amendment rights of free speech and petition. In 2024, the United States Supreme Court issued its first substantive opinion on social media blocking, holding that government officials’ social media activity, even on a personal account, constitutes state action triggering constitutional scrutiny if (1) the official possessed actual authority to speak on the State’s behalf, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when she spoke on social media.

In this Article, we explain the Court’s novel two-part test for determining …

We Are All Cafeteria Originalists Now (And We Always Have Been), Jack M. Balkin

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

In Memory and Authority, I argue that Americans, both in politics and in constitutional culture, are "‘cafeteria originalists.’ They pick and choose when to follow the views of the founders, framers, or adopters (as they understand them) and often artfully recharacterize these principles to support contemporary political and legal arguments.” Like customers in a cafeteria who take the chocolate cake and leave the boiled kale, Americans pick the features of the framers they like to support their arguments, and leave other, less savory, features behind.

[...]

My central claim is that cafeteria originalism is not a pathology or a …

The Griffin's Case Phenomenon And The Problem Of Historical Knowledge In Legal Arguments, Rachel A. Shelden

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

The sudden relevance of a formerly little-known historic case is surely not new; much of legal history is necessarily about discovery and rediscovery of the past. Still, I think the clarity with which we can outline the development of the Griffin’s Case phenomenon offers an opportunity to think carefully about the role of history in constitutional conversation. What follows, then, is a short exploration of the case’s recent (re)entry into our historical consciousness. Tracing this phenomenon highlights (at least for me) some potential difficulties embedded in the interaction between legal advocacy and what we know about the past.

This abstract …

Not-So-Special Solicitude, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Scholarship

In a high-profile case last term about state standing to sue in federal court, Justice Gorsuch deemed it “hard not to wonder why” the majority said “nothing about ‘special solicitude.’” The silence was indeed surprising, for in a landmark decision several years earlier, the Supreme Court had declared that states were “entitled to special solicitude”—presumably meaning some sort of preferential treatment—“in [the] standing analysis.” And since then, commentators had depicted the concept as permitting opportunistic states to wage ideological crusades in courts across the country, especially through administrative-law attacks on federal-government defendants.

But what if “special solicitude” is not so …

Reconceptualizing Property Law's Background Principles In Takings Law, Timothy M. Mulvaney

Faculty Scholarship

Both libertarians and progressives celebrated the result in Tyler v. Hennepin County. This Article asserts that this unified celebration has overshadowed the extent to which the Supreme Court’s reasoning calls into question even our most foundational assumptions about the meaning of property and the takings protections the constitution affords to it. Followed to its literal end, Tyler remarkably suggests that owners may well need to ground their expectations in the property laws endorsed by a majority of states rather than in the laws of their own state.

Suspicious that the Court intended such a revolutionary upheaval of the state variations …

Transforming Fair Use, Glynn Lunney

Faculty Scholarship

In the United States, the fate of fair use, and by extension, copyright itself, hang in the balance. In recent years, courts have disagreed over fair use’s proper scope. On the one side are appellate decisions that interpret fair use broadly. While these decisions do not go so far as to suggest that every reuse is fair, they typically use the talismanic phrase “transformative use” and give it a generous and flexible interpretation. On the other side are appellate decisions that interpret fair use restrictively. While again they do not go so far as to suggest no reuse is fair, …

Section 1: Defining Arbitration And Addressing Structural Bias, Nancy A. Welsh

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has successfully encouraged the use of arbitration to resolve disputes of all types, including those arising out of contracts of adhesion. Meanwhile, with one very limited exception, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has done anything to assure those bound by adhesive contracts that the required arbitration process will be fair, impartial, and consistent with due process principles. The FAA does not even include a definition of arbitration to guide arbitration providers and individual arbitrators. This chapter proposes the addition of a definition of arbitration to the FAA to …

Rwu Law Alumni Newsletter December 2024, Roger Williams University School Of Law, Pbn Connect, Edward Fitzpatrick, Danna Lorch

RWU Law

No abstract provided.

The Enduring Relevance Of Congress Despite The Court's Shift To “Ordinary Reader” Statutory Interpretation, Abbe R. Gluck, Laila M. Robbins

Journal of Law and Policy

Has Congress become irrelevant to statutory interpretation? The dominant theoretical and doctrinal paradigm in American statutory interpretation has always been the conversation between Congress and the courts. Today, however, the Court’s new, second-generation textualists claim they have left Congress behind. They argue they have changed textualism’s perspective, from an “insider” perspective focused on Congress’s textual choices, to an “outsider” perspective based on how “ordinary people” read statutes. The Court’s self-professed shift away from a legiscentric approach, if true, would be a seismic shift in the conception of the judicial role. Whereas judges and scholars—including first-generation textualists—had for a century focused …

The Broad Church Of Modern Textualism, Nicole Steitz, Brian G. Slocum, Kevin Tobia

Journal of Law and Policy

Nearly thirty years ago, Justice Scalia’s Tanner lectures branded Holy Trinity Church v. United States (1892) as the anti-textualist archetype, a decision trumping the text’s plain meaning with a suspect judicial investigation of the law’s purpose or spirit. And so Holy Trinity seemed, until Gales and Solan’s groundbreaking empirical study supported an alternative reading of the key statutory term (“labor or service”) that would avoid this conflict between text and purpose. Taking inspiration from Gales and Solan, we reconsider Holy Trinity using the precepts of modern textualism, with its increased emphasis on context, pragmatics, anti-literalism, legal meaning, holistic meaning, non-compositionality, …

The Pet Fish Canon, William N. Eskridge Jr.

Journal of Law and Policy

Inspired by the work of the late Professor Larry Solan, this article proposes that judges recognize as one of the textualist canons of statutory construction a “pet fish” canon. Such a canon would posit that when an ordinary reader would understand two or more words to yield a meaning that is different than the sum of the two words defined separately, the statutory interpreter should not disaggregate them. The Roberts Court has already followed such a linguistic precept in some statutory cases, and this article proposes that the Court recognize this as a canon considered at least as seriously as …

Grammar & Syntax Arguments On The Roberts Court, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Journal of Law and Policy

In his excellent book, The Language of Judges, Professor Solan demonstrates how judges use grammatical or linguistic arguments to avoid acknowledging statutory ambiguity—and how they often get the grammar or linguistics wrong. Since his book was published, textualism has become the dominant interpretive approach on the U.S. Supreme Court—and we have seen increasingly prominent battles involving grammatical devices and rules. This comment takes Professor Solan’s analysis as a jumping off point to evaluate how grammar and linguistic arguments are employed on the modern Supreme Court, in the age of textualism. The comment offers a brief empirical and doctrinal assessment of …