Supreme Court of the United States Commons^™

The Confusing Language Of Mcculloch V. Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (Or Meant)?, Sanford Levinson

Arkansas Law Review

All legal “interpretation” involves confrontation with inherently indeterminate language. I have distinguished in my own work between what I call the Constitution of Settlement and the Constitution of Conversation. The former includes those aspects of the Constitution that do indeed seem devoid of interpretive challenge, such as the unfortunate assignment of two senators to each state or the specification of the terms of office of representatives, senators, and presidents. I am quite happy to concede that “two,” “four,” and “six” have determinate meaning, though my concession is not based on a fancy theory of linguistics. It is, rather, a recognition …

Mcculloch At 200, David S. Schwartz

Arkansas Law Review

March 6, 2019 marked the 200th anniversary of the Supreme Court’s issuance of its decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, upholding the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States, the successor to Alexander Hamilton’s national bank. McCulloch v. Maryland involved a constitutional challenge by the Second Bank of the United States to a Maryland tax on the banknotes issued by the Bank’s Baltimore branch. The tax was probably designed to raise the Second Bank’s cost of issuing loans and thereby disadvantage it relative to Maryland’s own state-chartered banks. Marshall’s opinion famously rejected the Jeffersonian strict-constructionist argument that implied powers …

State Standing's Uncertain Stakes, Aziz Z. Huq

Notre Dame Law Review

I offer a quite modest contribution to debates on state standing. I do not offer “right answers.” Rather, I posit that it is useful to understand the “stakes” of state standing. By “stakes,” I mean the practical consequences of resolving, one way or another, the unsettled doctrinal choices respecting the ability of states to initiate a matter in federal courts. Why, that is, does state standing matter? An inquiry into stakes can usefully proceed stepwise. A first task is to identify the subset of state standing cases that presently elicit division among the Justices. A second task is to articulate …

How The Boogeyman Saved Brett Kavanaugh, Cathren Page

Articles

We love to hate these boogeymen. When the societal narrative creates these invisible boogeymen, people can pour their rage against sexual abuse into these faceless antagonists. At the same time, the enraged survivors and protectors avoid conflicts with family, neighbors, colleagues, and social acquaintances who might actually commit or enable sexual abuse. We can dodge sticky questions regarding how a churchgoer, a judge, or an Ivy Leaguer could have committed a heinous act. The survivors can avoid all the victim-blaming backlash, threats of violence, and invalidation that accompanies reporting a sexual offense. Moreover, having less power on their own, survivors …

Ordinary Causation: A Study In Experimental Statutory Interpretation, James Macleod

Indiana Law Journal

In a series of recent split decisions interpreting criminal and tort-like legislation, the Supreme Court has purported to give statutory causation requirements their ordinary, plain meaning. Armed with dictionaries, examples from everyday speech, and commonsense intuitions, the Court’s majority has explained that statutory phrases like “because of” and “results from” entail but-for causation as a matter of ordinary usage. There’s just one problem: The Court’s majority (and the many state and federal courts following its lead) is wrong on the facts—specifically, the facts about how people ordinarily interpret, understand, and use causal language.

This Article considers a novel approach to …

Brief Amici Curiae Of Electronic Frontier Foundation, 1851 Center For Constitutional Law, And Profs. Jonathan Entin, David F. Forte, Andrew Geronimo, Raymond Ku, Stephen Lazarus, Kevin Francis O’Neill, Margaret Tarkington, Aaron H. Caplan, And Eugene Volokh In Support Of Respondent-Appellant, Joni Bey And Rebecca Rasawehr V. Jeffrey Rasawehr, Supreme Court Of Ohio (Case No. 2019-0295), David Forte, Stephen R. Lazarus, Kevin F. O'Neill, Jonathan L. Entin, Andrew Geronimo, Raymond Ku, Margaret Tarkington, Aaron H. Kaplan, Eugene Volokh

Law Faculty Briefs and Court Documents

The brief argues that the Third District Court of Appeals, in violation of the First Amendment, erred in upholding an injunction that barred defendant from any online postings regarding plaintiff, whether or not those postings were to plaintiff or to third parties.

Taming Sherman's Wilderness, Derrian Smith

Indiana Law Journal

This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I outlines the interpretive difficulties spawned by the vagueness of the Sherman Act—particularly, the judiciary’s necessary but undeniable departures from the text of the statute and the resulting doctrinal confusion. Part II considers ways in which the judiciary’s decision-making in Sherman Act cases approximates agency rulemaking and whether it makes sense to delegate interpretive authority to an antitrust agency. Yet, while the agency solution has upside, it would not easily escape criticisms that the Act does not provide sufficient notice of the conduct it proscribes and that the Act is an impermissible delegation …

Elite Patent Law, Paul Gugliuzza

Faculty Scholarship

Over the last twenty years, one of the most significant developments in intellectual property law has been the dramatic increase in the number of patent cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. That same time period has also seen the emergence of a small, elite group of lawyers specializing not in any particular area of substantive law but in litigation before the Supreme Court. In recent empirical work, I linked the Court’s growing interest in patent law to the more frequent participation of elite Supreme Court lawyers in patent cases, particularly at the cert. stage. Among other things, I found …

Symposium: In “Gundy Ii,” Auer Survives By A Vote Of 4.6 To 4.4, Michael Herz

Online Publications

Under the “Auer doctrine,” named for the 1997 decision Auer v. Robbins, courts accept an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation unless that interpretation is clearly erroneous, or flatly inconsistent with the text of the regulation, or unreasonable, or something like that. Auer is a principle of long standing. Just how long is one of the sources of disagreement in Kisor v. Wilkie, but however you count, it is a doctrine universally understood as well-settled until relatively recently. But a revolt has been brewing.

Confining Cases To Their Facts, Daniel P. Rice, Jack Boeglin

Faculty Publications

Stare decisis is the mainstay of doctrinal stability. But through the little-known expedient of “confining a case to its facts,” courts can evade the pull of stare decisis by overruling everything a decision stands for except its precise result. This doctrinal workaround has enabled courts to sidestep the formal requirements that attend overruling and quietly undermine precedent without stirring public interest. But confining’s conveniences are offset by its considerable dangers: it cuts courts loose from the constraints of stare decisis; it requires judges to engage in unprincipled, fact-bound adjudication; it dilutes the integrity of the law by enshrining contradictory legal …

The Locke Exception: What Trinity Lutheran Means For The Future Of State Blaine Amendments, Christopher Tyler Prosser

Pepperdine Law Review

At its core, this Article is about whether states have the discretion to discriminate against religious organizations by excluding them from generally available secular government aid programs. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Locke v. Davey, the federal courts have developed conflicting interpretations of whether the Court’s holding in Locke permits states to exclude religious organizations from generally available secular aid programs. However, the Court’s 2017 decision in Trinity Lutheran v. Comer has cast doubt on the ability of states to exclude religious organizations from such programs and seemingly restricts the Court’s prior decision in Locke …

Digital Realty, Legislative History, And Textualism After Scalia, Michael Francus

Pepperdine Law Review

There is a shift afoot in textualism. The New Textualism of Justice Scalia is evolving in response to a new wave of criticism. That criticism presses on the tension between Justice Scalia’s commitment to faithful agency (effecting the legislature’s will) and his rejection of legislative history in the name of ordinary meaning (which ignores legislative will). And it has caused some textualists to shift away from faithful agency, even to the point of abandoning it as textualism’s grounding principle. But this shift has gone unnoticed. It has yet to be identified or described, let alone defended, even as academic and …

Correspondence With The Chief Justice Of The Supreme Court Of The United States, William H. Rehnquist, Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Powell Correspondence

No abstract provided.

Correspondence With Fellow Associate Justices Of The Supreme Court Of The United States, Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Powell Correspondence

No abstract provided.

Categorical Confusion In Personal Jurisdiction Law, Todd Peterson

Washington and Lee Law Review

In Part I, the Article discusses the history of the U.S. Supreme Court’s substantive due process limitations on personal jurisdiction and, in particular, the standards for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction before the Court’s recent cases on that issue. Part II discusses the Court’s failure to provide a convincing theoretical justification for imposing substantive due process limitations on personal jurisdiction. It also discusses the consequences of that failure in three doctrinal areas of personal jurisdiction law, the traditional basis of service on an individual in the forum state, specific jurisdiction and corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. Part III then analyzes in detail the four recent Supreme …

Correspondence With The Chief Justice Of The Supreme Court Of The United States, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Powell Correspondence

No abstract provided.

Supreme Court Institute Annual Report, 2018-2019, Georgetown University Law Center, Supreme Court Institute

SCI Papers & Reports

During the U.S. Supreme Court’s October Term (OT) 2018 – corresponding to the 2018-2019 academic year –the Supreme Court Institute (SCI) provided moot courts for advocates in 99% of the cases heard by the Supreme Court, offered a variety of programs related to the Supreme Court, and continued to integrate the moot court program into the education of Georgetown Law students. The varied affiliations of advocates mooted this Term reflect SCI’s firm commitment to provide assistance to advocates without regard to the party represented or the position advanced.

A list of all SCI moot courts held in OT 2018 – …

Chevron Deference In The States: Lessons From Three States, Carrie Townsend Ingram

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

The appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court of the United States has left many wondering if a change to the Chevron doctrine is impending. Justice Gorsuch’s colleague on the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas, shares similar views on Chevron. This article will compare the federal rule to three different states: Indiana, Delaware, and Arizona. Each state has taken a different path in determining that the judiciary should not give deference to an agency’s interpretation of the statutes that it is charged with enforcing. Delaware has affirmatively declared that the Chevron doctrine is not applicable in its state. A …

The Need To Codify Roe V. Wade: A Case For National Abortion Legislation, Kathryn N. Peachman

Journal of Legislation

No abstract provided.

State Abortion Restrictions And The New Supreme Court: Women’S Access To Reproductive Health Services, Rebecca Reingold, Lawrence O. Gostin

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The US Supreme Court’s landmark 1973 ruling in Roe v Wade established a privacy right to choose abortion. In 1992, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey reaffirmed Roe with the Supreme Court calling reproductive decisions “the most intimate and personal choices a person may make…central to personal dignity.” Casey allows abortion regulations, but states cannot impose an “undue burden,” where the law’s “purpose or effect” places a substantial obstacle in a woman’s path in accessing an abortion previability.

State abortion restrictions—meaning laws that restrict whether, when, and under what circumstances a woman may obtain an abortion—increased in the aftermath …