Supreme Court of the United States Commons^™

Reconstituting A Constitution, And A Republic: The Architecture Of Authoritarian Rule, J. Maria Glover

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

A constitution can be remade without tearing it down, or even changing a single word. It is done by law.

“The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may establish,” whose “province and duty” it is to “say what the law is.” U.S. Const. Art. III §1; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 (Cranch) 137 (1803). It is not the power to remake the Constitution that grants it.

The Supreme Court is turning the inherited powers that hold power to law into instruments of its own aggrandizement. It is taking authority from …

Creation And The Republican Revival, William M. Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Gordon Wood's classic book Creation of the American Republic has long influenced legal thought and originalist scholarship in particular. It played a central role in the Republican Revival movement, an effort by leading scholars such as Cass Sunstein and Frank Michelman to recover a progressive originalism at the same time as conservative originalism was starting to shape constitutional jurisprudence. But, while the Republican Revival nominally relied on Wood, it misread central elements of his book - his concept of virtue and his belief that republicanism had largely been displaced at the time of the drafting of the Constitution.

The time …

Rethinking The Religious Purpose Test After Catholic Charities Bureau: The Sincerity-Then-Standards Framework, Victoria Litman

Roger Williams University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Police Use Of Force: Barnes V. Felix And Moving Beyond The Moment Of Threat, Rebecca Aitchison

Roger Williams University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Haze Gray, Stay Away: How Extending The Feres Doctrine To Ship Collisions Usurps Justice In Admiralty, Caroline Stanton Chlaupek

Roger Williams University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Another Look At Judicial Review Of Labor Arbitration Awards In Rhode Island, William E. Smith, Stefanie Fischer, Kai Wiggins, Sam Jaksa

Roger Williams University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Heller Was Egregiously Wrong And Should Be Overruled, Henry J. Renk

Roger Williams University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Breaking Patterns Of Abuse: How Amending The Federal Rules Of Evidence Would Strengthen Domestic Violence Prosecutions, Isabelle Ryan

Roger Williams University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Two Dogmas Of Free Speech Doctrine, David R. Dow

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

No Shelter: The Criminalization Of Homelessness And The Gaps In Constitutional Protections If Robinson Is Overruled, Shelby Stansbury

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Revisiting “Of Arms And The Militia: Gun Regulation By Legislatively Defining ‘Ordinary Military Equipment’”, Edward J. Curtis ,Jr.

Touro Law Review

In 2021, I published an article arguing that semi-automatic rifles and semi-automatic handguns, among other weapons, could be most effectively regulated by defining the “ordinary military equipment” that the states’ militia members were expected to produce in the event they were called to service. I based my argument on the rationale employed by the United States Supreme Court in its 1939 decision in United States v. Miller, which upheld the National Firearms Act of 1934.

Style And Substance: A Review Of Jill Barton's The Supreme Guide To Writing, Christina Frohock

Articles

No abstract provided.

Does Textualism Constrain Supreme Court Justices?, James J. Brudney, Lawrence Baum

Faculty Scholarship

A principal justification for textualism is the constraint hypothesis. Conservative Justices and leading textualist scholars contend that—in stark contrast to reliance on legislative history—focus on the ordinary meaning of enacted text leaves little room for the Justices to be policy-oriented or ideological in their interpretations. This Article represents the first systematic study probing the validity of the constraint hypothesis, one that employs both quantitative and qualitative analysis.

The Article examines the Justices’ reliance on interpretive resources in over 660 statutory decisions in the field of labor and employment, decided by the Burger Court, the Rehnquist Court, and the Roberts Court—during …

Beyond Judicial Intent: The Agency Of The Defense Counsel In Ozawa’S And Thind’S Supreme Court Cases, Bret K. Luchs

Master's Theses or Doctor of Nursing Practice

This thesis seeks to examine how specific legal strategies by the defense counsel in Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922), and United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923), compelled the Supreme Court of the United States into a reactive and contradictory position. A re-examination of Ozawa and Thind delves deeper into the legal briefs and arguments made by Takao Ozawa and Bhagat Singh Thind, alongside their legal teams. These briefs, opinions of the court, past lower court cases, and personal statements by Ozawa and Thind demonstrate how they did not surrender to the confines of …

Firearms And Fora: Constructing Public Carry Doctrine, Timothy Zick

Faculty Publications

Where can a person lawfully carry firearms in public? Under what conditions can they do so? Now that the Supreme Court has formally recognized a Second Amendment right to public carry, these are among the most important unresolved questions regarding the right to bear arms. The Second Amendment’s public carry doctrine is in its infancy. How the doctrine develops will have a profound impact on the exercise of Second Amendment rights in public places and on the public square. Integrating a new constitutional right into the public square is not a novel problem. After the Supreme Court recognized First Amendment …

Standard Textualism, James A. Macleod

Michigan Law Review

For as long as legal scholars have been writing about the rules-versus-standards distinction, textualism has been understood to produce characteristically rule-like law. This Article argues for the opposite view. Far from generating the “law of rules” that Scalia famously envisioned, the rule of modern textualism produces a law of standards—much more so than anybody, proponent of textualism or critic, appears to have recognized.

Two aspects of today’s textualism produce this result. The first is its emphasis on ordinary language and communication. Modern textualism typically produces standards because ordinary language and communication are typically standard-like. The second is modern textualism’s drive …

From Myers To Slaughter: A Brief Theory Of The Constitutionalization Of Secondary Sources, Dana Neacsu, Paul D. Callister

Faculty Works

For more than two centuries, American constitutional adjudication has relied upon secondary sources. Yet constitutional theory has almost entirely ignored them. Originalism debates constitutional text. Living constitutionalism debates constitutional evolution. Theories of precedent debate judicial authority. None asks a more fundamental question: What role do secondary sources play in constitutional adjudication? This Article argues that the answer has fundamentally changed in the last 100 of years. Chief Justice William Howard Taft's opinion in Myers v. United States (1926) marked a constitutional revolution by transforming secondary authorities from explanatory materials into evidence of constitutional continuity. Exactly one century later, Chief Justice …

Qui Tam Relators As Article Iv Officials, Chad Squitieri

Scholarly Articles

Since the earliest days of the republic, Congress has empowered private plaintiffs—called qui tam relators—to bring claims in court on behalf of the United States. Today, qui tam litigation accounts for billions of dollars in judgments and settlements each year. But despite qui tam’s modern significance and historical pedigree, its constitutionality has recently been questioned. To wit, several sitting Supreme Court Justices have suggested that qui tam violates the President’s Article II authority because it empowers private relators—who are neither appointed nor supervised by the President—to enforce federal law. Following similar logic, a lower federal court recently ruled a prominent …

Certiorari Transparency, Alexandra L. Klein, Michael L. Smith

Faculty Articles

Amid increasing controversy over the Supreme Court’s amassing of power, rejection of precedent, reliance on the shadow docket, and Justices’ undisclosed acceptance of lavish gifts, legal scholars, commentators, and politicians have called for bold and far-reaching reforms to the Court, including term limits for Justices, stripping the Court of jurisdiction in certain cases, and adding Justices to the Court. This Article proposes a more subtle reform to the Court’s proceedings: the Court should make its certiorari de-terminations, in which it decides which cases to take up and review, public. Currently, the Court exercises near-complete discretion over the cases it decides …

Challenging Agency Deregulation, Todd S. Aagaard

Faculty Publications

The administrative state is experiencing two seismic shifts. First, in recent years, the Supreme Court has issued a series of decisions that significantly curtailed the powers of administrative agencies. Second, President Donald Trump is using administrative agencies to aggressively deregulate in his second term. The conventional wisdom is that the Supreme Court’s recent precedent will facilitate the Trump Administration’s deregulatory agenda.

This Article argues the opposite. Instead of promoting agency deregulation, recent Supreme Court precedent restraining agency authority provides a potentially powerful basis for challenging agency deregulation as administrative overreach. Time and time again, the Court has taken agencies to …