The Sec In Bankruptcy,
2010
St. John's University School of Law
The Sec In Bankruptcy, G. Ray Warner, Keith Sharfman
Faculty Publications
(Excerpt)
Since its founding, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has played an important role as both an advisor and regulator in bankruptcy cases, valuing debtor assets, opining on plans of reorganization, regulating the trading of claims and the disclosure of information, and much else. After a period of relative inactivity following the passage of the Bankruptcy Code (which has a less expansive view of the SEC's role than that of the former Chandler Act whose regime the Code replaced), the SEC's involvement in bankruptcy has intensified in recent years with the ascendancy of equity committees and with the increased …
Fiduciary Duty - Now And In The Future,
2010
St. John's University School of Law
Fiduciary Duty - Now And In The Future, Christine Lazaro
Faculty Publications
(Excerpt)
The celebrated jurist Benjamin Cardozo opined that the fiduciary duty is “the duty of finest loyalty”, and that a fiduciary “is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.” The question most customers have is whether their broker is subject to this duty of finest loyalty, or if they are bound merely by the morals of the marketplace. Currently this is a very difficult question to answer, and will depend on whether the customer is dealing with a …
Guilty By Association? Regulating Credit Default Swaps,
2010
New York Law School
Guilty By Association? Regulating Credit Default Swaps, Houman B. Shadab
Articles & Chapters
A wide range of U.S. policymakers initiated a series of actions in 2008 and 2009 to bring greater regulation and oversight to credit default swaps (CDSs) and other over-the-counter derivatives. The policymakers’ stated motivations echoed widely expressed criticisms of the regulation, characteristics, and practices of the CDS market, and focused on the risks of the instruments and the lack of public transparency over their utilization and execution. Certainly, the misuse of certain CDSs enabled mortgage-related security risk to become overconcentrated in some financial institutions.
Yet as the analysis in this Article suggests, failing to distinguish between CDS derivatives and the …
Corporate Power In The Public Eye: Reassessing The Implications Of Berle’S Public Consensus Theory,
2010
Seattle University School of Law
Corporate Power In The Public Eye: Reassessing The Implications Of Berle’S Public Consensus Theory, Marc T. Moore, Antoine Rebérioux
Seattle University Law Review
We analyze Berle’s overall corporate governance project in accordance with what we see as its four core sub-themes: (A) the limitations of external market forces as a constraint on managerial decision-making power; (B) the desirability of internal (corporate) over external (market) actors in allocating corporate capital; (C) civil society and the public consensus as a continuous informal check on managerial decision-making power; and (D) shareholder democracy (as opposed to shareholder primacy or shareholder wealth maximization) as a socially instrumental institution. We seek to debunk the popular misconception that Berle’s early work was a defense of the orthodox shareholder primacy paradigm …
Freeze-Outs: Transcontinental Analysis And Reform Proposals,
2010
Penn State Law
Freeze-Outs: Transcontinental Analysis And Reform Proposals, Marco Ventoruzzo
Faculty Scholarship
One of the most crucial, but systematically neglected, comparative differences between corporate law systems in Europe and in the United States concerns the regulations governing freeze-out transactions in listed corporations. Freeze-outs can be defined as transactions in which the controlling shareholder exercises a legal right to buy out the shares of the minority, and consequently delists the corporation and brings it private. Beyond this essential definition, the systems diverge profoundly.
This gap exists despite the fact that minority freeze-outs are one of the most debated issues in corporate law, in the public media, in a vast body of scholarly work …
Voting Power Without Responsibility Or Risk--How Should Proxy Reform Address The Decoupling Of Economic And Voting Rights?,
2010
Brooklyn Law School
Voting Power Without Responsibility Or Risk--How Should Proxy Reform Address The Decoupling Of Economic And Voting Rights?, Roberta S. Karmel
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Greater Mutual Fund Transparency In India,
2010
Vanderbilt University Law School
Greater Mutual Fund Transparency In India, Stephen P. Smith
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
India has been one of the darlings among emerging market economies over the past decade. It has experienced dizzying economic growth that has lifted great numbers of Indians out of poverty and changed the economic outlook of much of its populace. For the first time, many Indians have excess funds to save or invest, and the Indian mutual fund industry has enjoyed an explosion in popularity as a result of this economic boom, particularly among first time mutual fund investors.
One of the most important mechanisms for investor protection in any capital market is the provision of information to investors …
The Use Of Mortgage-Backed Securities In International Comparative Perspective: Lessons And Insights,
2010
Vanderbilt University Law School
The Use Of Mortgage-Backed Securities In International Comparative Perspective: Lessons And Insights, Csaba Rusznak
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
The secondary mortgage market in the United States has helped millions of people purchase homes over the past half century. Following the burst of the real estate bubble and the credit crisis, it is important for American policymakers not to lose sight of the importance that the secondary mortgage market has played in increasing home ownership. The financial engineering in the form of securitization that led to the success of the secondary mortgage market needs to be preserved, although it should also be reworked so that the externalization of unappreciated risk is reduced and the possibility of a large-scale financial …
Introduction: Insider Trading (Oxford University Press 3d Ed.),
2010
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
Introduction: Insider Trading (Oxford University Press 3d Ed.), William K.S. Wang, Marc I. Steinberg
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
This paper is the introductory chapter to Insider Trading (Oxford University Press 3d ed. 2010). This treatise analyzes the application of various laws to stock market insider trading and tipping. Among the federal laws are Exchange Act section 10(b), SEC Rule 10b-5, mail/wire fraud, SEC Rule 14e-3, Exchange Act section 16, and Securities Act section 17(a). The state law discussed is both state common law and a state law claim by the issuer.
Another chapter addresses government enforcement of the insider trading/tipping prohibitions. A chapter on compliance programs deals with how firms can try to prevent illegal insider trading and …
Moving Beyond The Clamor For "Hedge Fund Regulation": A Reconsideration Of "Client" Under The Investment Advisers Act Of 1940,
2010
University of Washington School of Law
Moving Beyond The Clamor For "Hedge Fund Regulation": A Reconsideration Of "Client" Under The Investment Advisers Act Of 1940, Anita K. Krug
Articles
This Article argues that, from both theoretical and pragmatic perspectives, a better approach would be for law to regard private fund investors as clients of the managers of those funds for all purposes under the investment advisory regulatory regime. In making these arguments, it dissects the doctrinal and historical underpinnings and sources of the current doctrine--legislative history and case law, in particular, but also SEC interpretations and rule changes. In light of the policy considerations-- including investor protection--that gave rise to the Advisers Act, the growth of the investment advisory industry and private funds' role in it, and lessons learned …
Populist Retribution And International Competition In Financial Services Regulation,
2010
University of Michigan Law School
Populist Retribution And International Competition In Financial Services Regulation, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
The pattern of regulatory reform in financial services regulation follows a predictable pattern in democratic states. A hyperactive market generates a bubble, the bubble deflates, and much financial pain ensues for those individuals who bought at the top of the market. The financial mess brings the scrutiny of politicians, who vow "Never again!" A political battle ensues, with representatives of the financial services industry fighting a rearguard action to preserve its prerogatives amidst cries for the bankers' scalps. Regulations, carefully crafted to win the last war, are promulgated. Memories fade of the foolish enthusiasm that fed the last bubble. Slowly, …
Tracking Berle’S Footsteps: The Trail Of The Modern Corporation’S Last Chapter,
2010
Seattle University School of Law
Tracking Berle’S Footsteps: The Trail Of The Modern Corporation’S Last Chapter, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
Seattle University Law Review
Readers game enough to work through all three hundred pages of The Modern Corporation and Private Property looking for insights on corporate law today encounter two, apparently contradictory, lines of thought. One line, set out in Books II and III, resonates comfortably with today’s shareholder-centered corporate legal theory. Here the book teaches that even as ownership and control have separated, managers should function as trustees for the shareholders and so should exercise their wide-ranging powers for the shareholders’ benefit. The other line of thought emerges in Books I and IV, where The Modern Corporation encases this shareholder trust model in …
Rethinking The Separation Of Ownership From Management In American History,
2010
Seattle University School of Law
Rethinking The Separation Of Ownership From Management In American History, Kenneth Lipartito, Yumiko Morii
Seattle University Law Review
In <em>The Modern Corporation and Private Property</em>, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means would use AT&T as a prime example of what they saw as a dangerous new trend, the replacement of ownership-based capitalism with giant corporations controlled by a small group of propertyless managers. Indeed, AT&T became Berle and Means’ favorite example. . . . As we shall see, however, the claim that AT&T was a leading example of the separation of ownership from management is incomplete. More importantly, the common interpretation of Berle and Means’ work is mistaken, placing the emphasis incorrectly on the number of shareholders and reading …
Berle’S Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability,
2010
Seattle University School of Law
Berle’S Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, Claire Hill, Richard Painter
Seattle University Law Review
This essay, published in a symposium on the work of Adolf Berle, approaches the Berle-Dodd debate from the perspective that corporate managers have responsibilities beyond pursuing the interests of shareholders. Stock based executive compensation, designed to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders, has, in the investment banking industry in particular, failed to avert, and may have caused, managers (in this case, bankers) to take excessive risks that in the present financial crisis inflicted great damage on creditors and on society as a whole. We describe here the broad outlines of a proposal that we will discuss in future publications …
Enumerating Old Themes? Berle’S Concept Of Ownership And The Historical Development Of English Company Law In Context,
2010
Seattle University School of Law
Enumerating Old Themes? Berle’S Concept Of Ownership And The Historical Development Of English Company Law In Context, Lorraine E. Talbot
Seattle University Law Review
This paper offers some tentative suggestions as to why Berle’s work has been read and interpreted so selectively in the United Kingdom. I suggest that this must be partly attributable to the historical developments in English company law that entrenched the notion of shareholder ownership claims. Specifically, unincorporated associations’ normative values—that members are owners and there is no distinction between small organizations with no share dispersal and large organizations with wide share dispersal—have a continuing influence on this entrenched notion of shareholder ownership claims. First, I provide an overview of the origins of English company law. Next, I address how …
Attorneys As Arbitrators,
2010
University of Michigan Law School
Attorneys As Arbitrators, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch
Articles
We study the role of attorneys as arbitrators in securities arbitration. We find that arbitrators who also represent brokerage firms or brokers in other arbitrations award significantly less compensation to investor-claimants than do other arbitrators. We find no significant effect for attorney-arbitrators who represent investors or both investors and brokerage firms. The relation between representing brokerage firms and arbitration awards remains significant even when we control for political outlook. Arbitrators who donate money to Democratic political candidates award greater compensation than do arbitrators who donate to Republican can-didates. We also study the dynamics of panel interaction. We find that the …
Fiduciaries With Conflicting Obligations,
2010
Duke Law School
Fiduciaries With Conflicting Obligations, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This Article examines the dilemma of a fiduciary acting for parties who, as among themselves, have conflicting commercial interests - an inquiry fundamentally different from that of the traditional study of conflicts between fiduciaries and their beneficiaries. Existing legal principles do not fully capture this dilemma because agency law focuses primarily on an agent’s duty to a given principal, not on conflicts among principals; trust law focuses primarily on gratuitous transfers; and commercial law generally addresses arm’s length, not fiduciary, relationships. The dilemma has become critically important, however, as defaults increase in the multitude of conflicting securities (e.g., classes of …
Corporate Reform As A Credence Service,
2010
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law
Corporate Reform As A Credence Service, Omari Scott Simmons
Journal of Business & Technology Law
No abstract provided.
The Case For Employee Referenda On Transformative Transactions As Shareholder Proposals,
2010
Saint Louis University School of Law
The Case For Employee Referenda On Transformative Transactions As Shareholder Proposals, Matthew T. Bodie
All Faculty Scholarship
This Comment describes and advocates for employee referenda as implemented through a SEC Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal. The proposal provides for a nonbinding referendum amongst all employees whenever the corporation's shareholders must vote to approve a merger, acquisition, sale of substantially all assets, or other transformative transaction. The purpose of the referendum is to provide employees with a voice in the transaction and to provide shareholders with a mechanism for tapping into employee sentiment. Because the referendum would be nonbinding, it is best viewed as an informational tool for shareholders and employees to use in policing management's transactions. Given the …
Shareholder Democracy And The Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy,
2010
Southern Methodist University - Dedman School of Law
Shareholder Democracy And The Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
All Faculty Scholarship
Corporate law is consumed with a debate over shareholder democracy. The conventional wisdom counsels that shareholders should have more voice in corporate governance, in order to reduce agency costs and provide democratic legitimacy. A second set of theorists, described as “board primacists,” advocates against greater shareholder democracy and in favor of increased board discretion. These theorists argue that shareholders need to delegate their authority in order to provide the board with the proper authority to manage the enterprise and avoid short-term decision making.
In the last few years, the classical economic underpinnings of corporate law have been destabilized by a …
