Securities Law Commons^™

Upper-Level Courses: Three Examplars, Mark Fagan, Tamar Frankel, Eric J. Gouvin, Kathy Z. Heller

Faculty Scholarship

I'm Mark Fagan, and I co-teach a course on securitization with Tamar Frankel at Boston University School of Law. We have come together to teach several interdisciplinary courses that combine law, business and public policy. Our course on securitization is a wonderful exemplar because it touches so many aspects of law as well as business and public policy.

We spent quite a bit of time wrestling with how to teach it. Do you teach it in a process fashion? Do you teach it by legal topic? Do you take examples and examine them? After much debate and discussion, we actually …

What Role For “Women,” “Men,” And Transpeople/Intersex People In Gender Equality: A Commentary, Edward D. Stein

Articles

This has been a very rich opening panel to what promises to be a terrific conference. The panelists' comments go in such varied directions that it is a challenge to be both a commentator and summarizer, especially when I have just a few minutes to speak. What I plan to do is say a little bit to draw together some of the themes that the panelists have been talking about that are connected to a couple of topics I have been working on while at the same time trying to look forward to some of the things I hope we …

Governing Securities Class Actions, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

Scholarly Works

This short essay, written for a symposium on The Principles and Politics of Aggregate Litigation: CAFA, PSLRA, and Beyond, decouples due process from a proceduralist’s intuition and explains why it matters in securities class actions. It begins by exploring several analytical models that shed light on the representative relationship in class actions, including a public law analogy to the administrative state, a private law analogy to corporate law, and another, more modern public law analogy to political governance. After finding that the political-governance model best addresses both sources of inadequate representation in securities class actions — rifts between class members …

Information Asymmetry And Information Failure: Disclosure Problems In Complex Financial Markets, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Disclosure of information has been a key to regulation of the financial markets in the United States. Indeed, some have argued that the ‘exclusive focus [of federal securities regulation] is on full disclosure’ (Hazen, 2005). Yet there is relatively little dispute that although most if not all of the risks giving rise to the collapse of the market for structured securities backed by subprime mortgages were disclosed, the disclosure was ineffective. Disclosure failed because of the complexity of those securities and transactions.

This chapter examines disclosure’s insufficiency in addressing information asymmetry, arguing that complexity can cause information failure. There are …

Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards An Analytical Framework, Steven L. Schwarcz, Iman Anabtawi

Faculty Scholarship

The global financial crisis demonstrated the inability and unwillingness of financial market participants to safeguard the stability of the financial system. It also highlighted the enormous direct and indirect costs of addressing systemic crises after they have occurred, as opposed to attempting to prevent them from arising. Governments and international organizations are responding with measures intended to make the financial system more resilient to economic shocks, many of which will be implemented by regulatory bodies over time. These measures suffer, however, from the lack of a theoretical account of how systemic risk propagates within the financial system and why regulatory …

Potentially Perverse Effects Of Corporate Civil Liability, Samuel W. Buell

Faculty Scholarship

Inadequate civil regulatory liability can be an incentive for public enforcers to pursue criminal cases against firms. This incentive is undesirable in a scheme with overlapping forms of liability that is meant to treat most cases of wrongdoing civilly and to reserve the criminal remedy for the few most serious institutional delicts. This effect appears to exist in the current scheme of liability for securities law violations, and may be present in other regulatory structures as well. In this chapter for a volume on "Prosecutors in the Boardroom," the author argues that enhancements of the SEC's enforcement processes likely would …

Keynote Address: A Regulatory Framework For Managing Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This accessible analysis of systemic risk regulation was delivered as the keynote speech at an October 20, 2011 European Central Bank conference on regulation of financial services. Many regulatory responses, like the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, consist largely of politically motivated reactions to the financial crisis, looking for villains (whether or not they exist). To be most effective, however, the regulation must be situated within a more analytical framework. In this speech, I attempt to build that framework, showing that preventive regulation is insufficient and that regulation also must be designed to limit the transmission of systemic risk …

Enhanced "Blue Sky" Enforcement: A Path To Help Solve Our Public School Funding Dilemma, Marc I. Steinberg

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

No abstract provided.

Corporate Monitorships And New Governance Regulation: In Theory, In Practice, And In Context, Cristie Ford, David Hess

All Faculty Publications

This paper was prepared for a conference on "New Governance and the Business Organization" at the University of British Columbia in May 2009. It considers government agencies' increasingly common strategy of resolving corporate criminal law and securities regulations violations by way of settlement agreements that require corporations to improve their compliance programs and hire independent monitors to oversee the changes. Based on our interviews with corporate monitors, regulators, and others in the United States and Canada, we identify the ways in which these monitorships in practice fall substantially short of the ideal new governance model we describe. These failings are …

Introduction To 'New Governance And The Business Organization', Cristie Ford, Mary Condon

All Faculty Publications

In the fall of 2010, the University of British Columbia Faculty of Law welcomed a group of scholars from around the world to consider the state, and evolution, of responsive regulation, in both theory and practice. The occasion was the presence of Dr. John Braithwaite as UBC Law’s inaugural Fasken Martineau Senior Visiting Scholar. This paper is an introductory essay to the special edition of the UBC Law Review devoted to the workshop’s resulting work products. The volume begins with John Braithwaite’s own reflections on the responsive regulation project. On one level, the set of essays that follows his can …

Promoting Employee Voice In The American Economy: A Call For Comprehensive Reform, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt

Articles by Maurer Faculty

It has become apparent that there are serious deficiencies in the American model of production. Our model of corporate governance has recently come under intense scrutiny in the academic literature and the popular press. There are increasing concerns that American corporations are too focused on short-run profits and stock prices, at the expense of long-term strategies and investments that would benefit the long-run value of the firm, employees, and the American economy at large. In the pursuit of short-run shareholder interests, American corporations have bestowed on senior executives enormous compensation packages that seem increasingly divorced from any notion of rationality, …

Macro- And Micro-Level Effects On Responsive Financial Regulation, Cristie Ford

All Faculty Publications

We are approaching the 20th anniversary of Ian Ayres’ and John Braithwaite’s 1992 book, Responsive Regulation. This paper, which was prepared for a September 2010 workshop at UBC, considers the implications of the recent financial crisis for Ayres’ and Braithwaite’s concept of “enforced self-regulation.” Its main thesis is that flexible and iterative regulatory strategies, such as enforced self-regulation and its progeny, are more porous to influence from different planes of action than prescriptive regulation would be. When focusing on technical regulatory design strategies, scholars should therefore be cautious about bracketing or underestimating the problem of power operating at the “macro …

Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, And Duties Of Entrustment, Donna M. Nagy

Articles by Maurer Faculty

This article refutes what has become the conventional wisdom that insider trading by members of Congress and legislative staffers is “totally legal” because such congressional officials are immune from federal insider trading law. It argues that this well-worn claim is rooted in twin misconceptions based on: (1) a lack of regard for the broad and sweeping duties of entrustment which attach to public office and (2) an unduly restrictive view of Supreme Court precedents, which have interpreted Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act to impose liability whenever a person trades securities on the basis of material nonpublic information in …

On The Role And Regulation Of Proxy Advisors, Paul Rose

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In anticipation of proxy season-the springtime ritual where companies prepare and deliver proxy statements in preparation for annual shareholder meetings-U.S. public companies typically reexamine their corporate governance structures and policies. Many corporate governance structures that were acceptable ten years ago are now considered outmoded or even evidence of managerial entrenchment. For example, consider the classified board of directors. In recent years, many companies have shifted from a classified board of directors to an annually elected board. A company might adopt an annually-elected board structure for a number of reasons. A classified board can serve as an entrenchment device, for instance, …

The Unjustified Judicial Creation Of Class Certification Merits Trials In Securities, Michael J. Kaufman, John M. Wunderlich

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The class action device is vital to deterring securities fraud and remedying its victims, who almost never suffer losses sufficient to justify an individual suit. Nonetheless, the federal courts have begun to convert the class certification process into a premature trial on the merits, thereby precluding victims of securities fraud from pursuing otherwise valid claims of financial wrongdoing. In particular, in a series of important decisions, the federal courts have required plaintiffs to prove the essential elements of their securities fraud claims at the preliminary class certification stage.

This Article demonstrates why this trend should end. The judicial creation of …

The End Of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, Jill I. Gross

Pace Law Review

No abstract provided.

Are Investors’ Gains And Losses From Securities Fraud Equal Over Time? Theory And Evidence, Alicia J. Davis

Law & Economics Working Papers

Most leading securities regulation scholars argue that compensating securities fraud victims is inefficient. They maintain that because diversified investors that trade frequently are as likely to gain from trading in fraud-tainted stocks as they are to suffer harm from doing so, these investors should have no expected net losses from fraud over the long term. This assertion, which analogizes trading in fraud-tainted stocks to participating in a coin toss game in which players win $1 on heads and lose $1 on tails, is problematic for a number of reasons. First, even if we accept this analogy, probability theory holds that …

Is Our Economy Safe? A Proposal For Assessing The Success Of Swaps Regulation Under The Dodd-Frank Act, Michael Greenberger

Faculty Scholarship

On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law. The central goal of the Dodd-Frank Act is to ensure that all standardized derivates products are regulated. The Act requires these trades be fully transparent and backed by adequate capital. The central question for evaluating the success of the Dodd-Frank Act is simple but profound: Has the Dodd-Frank Act made the economy any safer from the threat of another economic meltdown? This paper introduces a number of metrics that can be used to assess the success of the Dodd-Frank Act.

The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act - 1977 To 2010, Michael B. Bixby

San Diego International Law Journal

This Article discusses the history, purposes and provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and traces its use and enforcement activity from 1977 to the present. This once little-used law has in recent years become the focus of aggressive activity by both the U.S. Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The manuscript also includes numerous charts reporting on key cases and enforcement activities over the last thirty-three years by the DOJ and SEC, as well as other information and statistics regarding the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

Securities Law In The Roberts Court: Agenda Or Indifference?, Adam C. Pritchard

Law & Economics Working Papers

Historically, securities law has not been a high priority for the Supreme Court. The first five years of the Roberts Court, however, suggest an upsurge of interest in the federal securities laws, with nine cases decided, a significant increase from the Rehnquist Court’s average. These numbers are deceptive. Analysis of the opinions deciding these cases – and more importantly, the issues debated by the justices – suggests that the Court is not interested in the substance of the securities laws or the policies that animate them. Instead, securities law serves as a backdrop for debates over statutory interpretation and the …