Securities Law Commons^™

Owning Stock While Making Law: An Agency Problem And A Fiduciary Solution, Donna M. Nagy

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Ethical Concerns When Settlement Includes An Agreement About Expungement, Christine Lazaro

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

When a customer makes a complaint against his or her broker, oftentimes that complaint is reported on the broker’s public record and made available to the public through the BrokerCheck system provided by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) established BrokerCheck in 1998 to provide the public with information about the professional background, business practices, and conduct of brokers and brokerage firms.

Understandably, brokers generally attempt to keep as clean a record as possible because potential clients may use BrokerCheck to decide whether to invest with a particular broker. To remove a …

Setting Attorneys' Fees In Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Assessment, Lynn A. Baker, Michael A. Perino, Charles Silver

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

In 1995, Congress overrode President Bill Clinton's veto and enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), a key purpose of which was to put securities class actions under the control of institutional investors with large financial stakes in the outcome of the litigation. The theory behind this policy, set out in a famous article by Professors Elliot Weiss and John Beckerman, was simple: self-interest should encourage investors with large stakes to run class actions in ways that maximize recoveries for all investors. These investors should naturally want to hire good lawyers, incentivize them properly, monitor their actions, and …

Exchanging Shares To Settle A Lawsuit: Should A Confidentiality Agreement Bar Evidence Of Securities Fraud?, Christopher Tao

Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution

Suppose that two parties enter into a mediated written settlement, but in a subsequent court proceeding, one party claims to have discovered evidence clearly establishing fraud by the opposing party during the mediation process. When a court has to determine whether or not to enforce a negotiated settlement, do mediation confidentiality rules permit the court to admit one party's evidence of the other party's fraud or misrepresentations during the mediation?

A Federalist Blessing In Disguise: From National Inaction To Local Action On Underwater Mortgages, Robert C. Hockett, John Vlahoplus

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

While it is widely recognized that the mortgage debt overhang left by the housing price bubble and bust continues to operate as the principal drag upon U.S. macroeconomic recovery, few seem to appreciate just how locally concentrated the problem is. This paper takes the measure of the national mortgage debt overhang problem as a cluster of local problems warranting local action. It then elaborates on one form of such action that the localized nature of the ongoing mortgage crisis justifies - use of municipal eminent domain authority to purchase underwater loans, then modify them in a manner that benefits debtors, …

Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French

Faculty Scholarship

In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as “cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately and consider only its own interests in doing so. …

Employers United: An Empirical Analysis Of Corporate Political Speech In The Wake Of The Affordable Care Act, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Susan Scholz, Raquel Meyer Alexander

Scholarly Works

Is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) bad for business? Did the countries' most prominent companies game the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure process to make negative political statements about ObamaCare? Immediately following the ACA's enactment on March 23, 2010, a number of companies drew scrutiny for issuing SEC filings writing off millions – and in AT&T's case, one billion dollars – against expected earnings for 2010 alone, based on a single, discrete tax-law change in the ACA. Congressional and Administration officials accused the firms of being "irresponsible" and using "big numbers to exaggerate the health reform's …

Is The Corporate Director's Duty Of Care A "Fiduciary' Duty? Does It Matter?, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

While reference to "fiduciary duties" (plural) is routinely employed in the United States as a convenient short-hand for a corporate director's duties of care and loyalty, other common-law countries generally treat loyalty as the sole "fiduciary duty." This contrast prompts some important questions about the doctrinal structure for duty of care analysis adopted in Delaware, the principal jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. public companies. Specifically, has the evolution of Delaware's convoluted and problematic framework for evaluating disinterested board conduct been facilitated by styling care a "fiduciary" duty? If so, then how should Delaware lawmakers and judges respond moving forward?

In …

A Private Ordering Solution To Blockholder Disclosure, Joshua Mitts

Faculty Scholarship

The recent debate over reforming the Securities Exchange Act section 13(d) ten-day filing window demonstrates the importance of balancing the costs and benefits of delayed blockholder disclosure. While hedge fund activism may create shareholder value, short-termism is a very real problem for firms today. Rather than a rigid mandatory rule, the duration of the blockholder disclosure window should be set through a shareholder amendment to the corporate bylaws that empowers shareholders to set an optimal maximum length for each firm. To internalize the economic and moral costs to society of permitting trading on asymmetric information, the SEC should impose a …

On The Rise Of Shareholder Primacy, Signs Of Its Fall, And The Return Of Managerialism (In The Closet), Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Ipos And The Slow Death Of Section 5, Donald C. Langevoort, Robert B. Thompson

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Since its enactment, Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 has restricted sales-based communications with investors, but that effort is nearly dead even with respect to the most sensitive of offerings, the IPO. Our paper traces that devolution, which began almost as soon as the ’33 Act came into existence, though the SEC’s 2005 deregulatory reforms and Congress’ intervention in the JOBS Act of 2012. We show how much of this related to an embrace of “book-building” as the industry’s preferred method of price discovery, which requires private two-way communications between underwriters and potential sophisticated investors. But book-building (and …

Rural Crowdfunding, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

One reason that economic development in rural America lags behind its urban counterpart is the persistent lack of venture capital for rural entrepreneurs. Geography deserves much of the blame, as angel investors and venture capitalists tend to live and work in metropolitan areas on the coasts, in places like Silicon Valley and Boston. Many rural areas are literally thousands of miles away, with the result that venture capital has rarely found its way to rural regions.

Recent federal legislation, however, has the potential to change this dynamic. The JOBS Act authorizes the sale of securities over the Internet to large …

Keep It Light, Chairman White: Sec Rulemaking Under The Crowdfund Act, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

Title III of the JOBS Act, known as the CROWDFUND Act, authorizes the “crowdfunding” of securities, defined as raising capital online from many investors, each of whom contributes only a small amount. The Act was signed into law in April 2012, and will go into effect once the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) promulgates rules and regulations to govern the new marketplace for crowdfunded securities. This Essay offers friendly advice to the SEC as to how to exercise its rulemaking authority in a manner that will enable the Act to achieve its goals of creating an ultralow-cost method for raising …

The Social Network And The Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin, And Venture Capitalists' Dilution Of The Crowd, John S. (Jack) Wroldsen

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

By virtue of Title III of the JOBS Act, signed into law on April 5, 2012, crowdfunding could become a powerful, even revolutionary, force to finance start-up companies. It democratizes entrepreneurs' access to seed capital and converts the masses of Internet users into potential retail venture capitalists. Many have cautioned, though, that crowdfunding poses serious investment risks of start-up companies failing, committing fraud, and being mismanaged. Accordingly, the JOBS Act includes numerous disclosure obligations designed to mitigate such downside risks.

But what has been overlooked, and what this Article analyzes from a venture capitalist perspective, is that even if a …

Private Regulation Of Insider Trading In The Shadow Of Lax Public Enforcement: Evidence From Canadian Firms, Laura Nyantung Beny, Anita Anand

Articles

Like firms in the United States, many Canadian firms voluntarily restrict trading by corporate insiders beyond the requirements of insider trading laws (i.e., super-compliance). Thus, we aim to understand the determinants of firms’ private insider trading policies (ITPs), which are quasi-contractual devices. Based on the assumption that firms that face greater costs from insider trading (or greater benefits from restricting insider trading) ought to be more inclined than other firms to adopt more stringent ITPs, we develop several testable hypotheses. We test our hypotheses using data from a sample of firms included in the Toronto Stock Exchange/Standard and Poor’s (TSX/S&P) …

Revisiting 'Truth In Securities Revisited': Abolishing Ipos And Harnessing Private Markets In The Public Good, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

My thesis is that the transition between private- and public-company status could be less bumpy if we unify the public-private dividing line under the Securities Act and Exchange Act. The insight builds on Cohen's thought experiment where Congress first enacted the Exchange Act. My proposed public-private standard would take the company-registration model to its logical conclusion. The customary path to public-company status is through an IPO, typically with simultaneous listing of the shares on an exchange. There is nothing about public offerings, however, that makes them inherently antecedent to public-company status. What if companies became public, with required periodic disclosures …

Rethinking U.S. Investment Adviser Regulation, Anita K. Krug

Articles

Although the U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”) was not at the center of the post-financial crisis regulatory reform that culminated in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank” or “Dodd-Frank Act”), it was certainly part of the reform effort. In particular, Dodd-Frank amended the Advisers Act--the federal statute that regulates investment advisers and their activities--in a manner intended to address the ways in which privately-offered funds, particularly hedge funds, may have exacerbated the financial crisis. The primary regulatory concern, whether valid or not, was that, given the magnitude of assets invested in hedge …

Escaping Entity-Centrism In Financial Services Regulation, Anita K. Krug

Articles

In the ongoing discussions about financial services regulation, one critically important topic has not been recognized, let alone addressed. That topic is what this Article calls the “entity-centrism” of financial services regulation. Laws and rules are entity-centric when they assume that a financial services firm is a stand-alone entity, operating separately from and independently of any other entity. They are entity-centric, therefore, when the specific requirements and obligations they comprise are addressed only to an abstract and solitary “firm,” with little or no contemplation of affiliates, parent companies, subsidiaries, or multi-entity enterprises. Regulatory entity-centrism is not an isolated phenomenon, as …

Investment Company As Instrument: The Limitations Of The Corporate Governance Regulatory Paradigm, Anita K. Krug

Articles

U.S. regulation of public investment companies (such as mutual funds) is based on a notion that, from a governance perspective, investment companies are simply another type of business enterprise, not substantially different from companies that produce goods or provide (noninvestment) services. In other words, investment company regulation is founded on what this Article calls a “corporate governance paradigm,” in that it provides a significant regulatory role for boards of directors, as the traditional governance mechanism in business enterprises, and is “entity centric,” focusing on intraentity relationships to the exclusion of super-entity ones.

This Article argues that corporate governance norms, which …

When The Government Attempts To Change The Board, Investors Should Know, William O. Fisher

Law Faculty Publications

In 2008 and 2009, the federal government effectively hired and fired directors at American International Group and Bank of America. At AIG, the government exercised its power through the ownership of voting stock, which meant that the company’s public securities filings revealed the government influence, though at times slowly and at times only by inference. At BofA, by contrast, the government imposed its will through an unpublished bank regulatory action, and no securities filing provided even a hint of the federal role. The fact that current law allows the government to secretly reconstitute the governing bodies of multi-billion-dollar, publicly traded …