When And How (If At All) Does Law Constrain Official Action?,
2010
University of Virginia
When And How (If At All) Does Law Constrain Official Action?, Frederick Schauer
Georgia Law Review
Debates about the obligation to obey the law have been around for literally thousands of years, but the empirical side has received much less attention. Moreover, most of the existing empirical work has focused on citizens and not officials, and consequently we know little about the extent to which law qua law motivates official action. This Article seeks to encourage empirical inquiry into the particular question of whether officials obey the law as law, independent of the content of the law and independent of the possibility of sanctions for non-compliance. It offers the hypothesis that although there is much talk …
Real Copyright Reform,
2010
University of Michigan Law School
Real Copyright Reform, Jessica D. Litman
Articles
A copyright system is designed to produce an ecology that nurtures the creation, dissemination, and enjoyment of works of authorship. When it works well, it encourages creators to generate new works, assists intermediaries in disseminating them widely, and supports readers, listeners, and viewers in enjoying them. If the system poses difficult entry barriers to creators, imposes demanding impediments on intermediaries, or inflicts burdensome conditions and hurdles on readers, then the system fails to achieve at least some of its purposes. The current U.S. copyright statute is flawed in all three respects. In this Article, I explore how the current copyright …
State Bystander Responsibility,
2010
University of Michigan Law School
State Bystander Responsibility, Monica Hakimi
Articles
International human rights law requires states to protect people from abuses committed by third parties. Decision-makers widely agree that states have such obligations, but no framework exists for identifying when states have them or what they require. The practice is to varying degrees splintered, inconsistent, and conceptually confused. This article presents a generalized framework to fill that void. The article argues that whether a state must protect someone from third-party harm depends on the state's relationship with the third party and on the kind of harm caused. A duty-holding state must take reasonable measures to restrain the abuser. That framework …
Deconstructing Nondelegation,
2010
Cornell Law School
Deconstructing Nondelegation, Cynthia R. Farina
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
This Essay (part of the panel on "The Administrative State and the Constitution" at the 2009 Federalist Society Student Symposium) suggests that the persistence of debates over delegation to agencies cannot persuasively be explained as a determination finally to get constitutional law “right,” for nondelegation doctrine—at least as traditionally stated—does not rest on a particularly sound legal foundation. Rather, these debates continue because nondelegation provides a vehicle for pursuing a number of different concerns about the modern regulatory state. Whether or not one shares these concerns, they are not trivial, and we should voice and engage them directly rather than …
Ronald Dworkin’S Justice For Hedgehogs And Partnership Conception Of Democracy (With A Comment To Jeremy Waldron’S 'A Majority In The Lifeboat'),
2010
Georgetown Law Center
Ronald Dworkin’S Justice For Hedgehogs And Partnership Conception Of Democracy (With A Comment To Jeremy Waldron’S 'A Majority In The Lifeboat'), Imer Flores
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In this article the author focuses mainly in the last part of Ronald Dworkin´s Justice for Hedgehogs and in his argument for a partnership conception of democracy. For that purpose, first, he recalls some of the main features that Dworkin had advanced in previous but intrinsically related works, about political morality, equality and democracy; second, he reassess the arguments for a partnership conception of democracy; third, he reconsiders the resistance produced by Jeremy Waldron in his “A Majority in the Lifeboat” and the response provided by Dworkin, but since it may appear insufficient, he intends to present an alternative—or complementary—riposte …
The Interpretation-Construction Distinction,
2010
Georgetown University Law Center
The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, Lawrence B. Solum
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The interpretation-construction distinction, which marks the difference between linguistic meaning and legal effect, is much discussed these days. I shall argue that the distinction is both real and fundamental – that it marks a deep difference in two different stages (or moments) in the way that legal and political actors process legal texts. My account of the distinction will not be precisely the same as some others, but I shall argue that it is the correct account and captures the essential insights of its rivals. This Essay aims to mark the distinction clearly!
The basic idea can be explained by …
Rights, Harms, And Duties: A Response To Justice For Hedgehogs,
2010
Georgetown University Law Center
Rights, Harms, And Duties: A Response To Justice For Hedgehogs, Robin West
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The author responds to the three jurisprudential positions that Ronald Dworkin discusses in his book--albeit briefly--so as to integrate them into his hedgehoggian program. The first is that we should think of rights as political trumps, such that the individual liberty protected by the right, and hence the behavior protected by the right, trumps in importance and in effect, both in law and in popular imaginings, the various collective goals with which the right might be in conflict. Second, we should think about our collective life, and the principles that should guide it, through the lens of the rights of …
