Legal History Commons^™

A Commemorative, Eric Robert Herlan Editor-In-Chief

Maine Law Review

In this issue the Maine Law Review joins in the national celebration of the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution. Three distinguished federal judges, all of whom are intimately familiar with that great document, have kindly contributed essays to the Review based on speeches they have earlier given for the Bicentennial. We are happy to present these essays, each of which has an important perspective on the Constitution, as our commemorative on this special occasion.

A Genealogy Of Founders, Frank M. Coffin

Maine Law Review

Two hundred years ago this spring George Washington wrote to our fellow Mainer, General Henry Knox, that because of the illness of his mother he would not be able to attend the Philadelphia Convention. If her health had not speedily improved, we might have had quite a different kind of Bicentennial, for both Washington and Benjamin Franklin, though largely silent in the debates, were palpable sources of strength. As it is, we have the happy occasion to celebrate what Everett Ladd has called "the expression of a nation-defining consensus on political values," our nationalizing principle, the one supreme bond linking …

Whose Information Is Whose? Adult Adoptees And The Silent Struggle To Access Records, Alyssa Traina

Undergraduate Honors Theses

The United States has fifty-one different laws pertaining to adult adoptee access to their original birth certificates and adoption court records, with only fifteen states being unrestricted. These states give adult adoptees access to their documents upon request. Fifteen states are restricted, meaning they require a court order to obtain documents, which involves proving “good cause” to a judge. This requirement of “good cause” has no standard definition. The remaining twenty-one states are compromised, meaning they have complex requirements to obtain documentation. My research uses case studies of the restricted laws of California, the unrestricted laws of Louisiana, and the …

The Lost History Of Judicial Restraint, Derek A. Webb

Notre Dame Law Review

For over 125 years, jurists and scholars who have championed judicial restraint have looked back to James Bradley Thayer’s 1893 Harvard Law Review article, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, as the seminal authority for the rule that courts should presume the constitutionality of a challenged law and only invalidate it if its unconstitutionality is “clear” and “beyond a reasonable doubt.” But Thayer presented those three rules (presumption of constitutionality, clear error rule, and reasonable doubt standard) as rooted in historical legal practice in America. And yet none of his twentieth or twenty-first century …

Clark Memorandum: Fall 2024, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Byu Law School Alumni Association, J. Reuben Clark Law Society

The Clark Memorandum

• No Room for Compromise: Religious Polarization in the United States
• A Banking Lawyer’s Perspective on the Kirtland Safety Society Anti-Banking Company
• Hope in Dark Times
• Becoming a Master of Your Thoughts

Abdication Of Power: Arizona V. Navajo Nation And Judicial Refusal To Enforce The Federal Trust Relationship, Jessica Yin

Washington Law Review

Over 150 years ago, the federal government signed a treaty promising the Navajo people a permanent home within the bounds of their ancestral homeland. To this day, that promise remains unfulfilled because the Navajo people face a severe water access crisis. When the Navajo Nation brought the United States to the Supreme Court to enforce its promise, the Court declined to hold the federal government accountable.

This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Navajo Nation through the lens of the judiciary’s historical approach to the federal trust relationship. The Court has traditionally defined the federal trust relationship …

The Griffin's Case Phenomenon And The Problem Of Historical Knowledge In Legal Arguments, Rachel A. Shelden

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

The sudden relevance of a formerly little-known historic case is surely not new; much of legal history is necessarily about discovery and rediscovery of the past. Still, I think the clarity with which we can outline the development of the Griffin’s Case phenomenon offers an opportunity to think carefully about the role of history in constitutional conversation. What follows, then, is a short exploration of the case’s recent (re)entry into our historical consciousness. Tracing this phenomenon highlights (at least for me) some potential difficulties embedded in the interaction between legal advocacy and what we know about the past.

This abstract …

In Praise Of Ignoring Facts, Stephen E. Sachs

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Treating every use of legal rhetoric as equally probative of American law is fatal to the theoretical project—including to [Jack] Balkin’s own “thin” theory of constitutional law, which stretches itself past the breaking point in the hopes of accommodating the changing winds of social movements. Rather than take advocates’ rhetorical moves for granted, we scholars have the indulgence and time to look for the implicit theories underlying these moves, to air those theories explicitly, to identify what might make them true or false, and to assess how plausible they are on those grounds. Constitutional theories need microfoundations: a theory of …

Learning To Read Like An Eighteenth-Century Lawyer: The Historical Critique Of Originalism Revisited, Saul Cornell

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Historians have been among the fiercest critics of originalism. Among the many virtues of Jack Balkin’s book, Memory and Authority, is the deft way he analyzes and dismantles these efforts to insulate originalism from historical critique. In a short essay, it would be impossible to fully acknowledge the sophistication of Balkin’s analysis. Instead, I would like to build on his impressive achievement by pointing out additional problems with the originalist response to historical critique.

This abstract has been taken from the author's opening paragraph.

Memory, Resistance, And Doubt, Richard Primus

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

The Burroughs Court did not identify any enumerated power that warranted the Corrupt Practices Act, I suggest, because the Burroughs Court did not subscribe to the enumeration principle. The Justices did not believe—or at least, did not consistently believe— that every federal law must be grounded in some enumerated power. As I have explained at length elsewhere, the text of the Constitution does not actually prescribe the enumeration principle: it can be read to support that idea, but it need not be. And at various moments in American constitutional history, judges and other people have taken the view that Congress …

Shared Memories And Constitutional Foundations, Sanford Levinson

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

It is significant that the first word in the title of Jack Balkin’s new book [Memory and Authority] is “memory.” A repeated theme of the book is that what binds a nation—or a constitutional order—together is shared memories around which diverse individuals can gather together and therefore establish themselves as a community. Balkin refers to an impressive array of sources with regard to the topic of “public memory,” but I want to concentrate on one of them, which is cited but not extensively discussed. That is Ernest Renan’s famous speech, delivered at the Sorbonne in Paris on March …

Invocations Of Memory In State Constitutional Law, Fred O. Smith Jr.

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

This Symposium Essay discusses the roles of history and memory within the realm of state constitutional law. Building on Professor Balkin’s observations, I offer two claims. The initial argument, delineated in Part I, is descriptive. While the practice of state constitutional law often mirrors that of federal constitutional interpretation, the use of history in state constitutional interpretation has unique characteristics, both with respect to text and ethos. Regarding textual analysis, understanding the language of a state constitution often involves engaging with a concept referred to by some scholars as “interconstitutionalism.” This phenomenon occurs when a single governmental body has operated …

Reproductive Injustice, Feminist Resistance, And The Uses Of History In Constitutional Interpretation, Serena Mayeri

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Part I examines the erasure of constitutional memory about reproductive injustice and feminist mobilizations and the benefits of recovering these histories. Part II explores how cases involving women’s subordination provide particularly effective illustrations of the anti-democratic, even absurd, results the current supermajority’s approach to history-and-tradition is designed to produce. Part III concludes with a brief discussion of some sites for the expansion of constitutional memory about reproductive control and freedom.

This abstract has been taken from the author's introduction.

Freedom And Families: Reconstruction Republicans And The Question Of Women's Reproductive Autonomy, Kate Masur

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

This Essay proceeds in three Parts. In the first, I illuminate how congressional Republicans discussed women, gender, and families in the context of policymaking associated with abolishing slavery. Many Republicans worried that enslaved people’s family relationships had been damaged by the imposition of slavery and sought to impose on freedpeople what they saw as normative family values, including by encouraging heterosexual marriage and by insisting on patriarchal gender roles within families. Second, I show that Republicans were at pains to demonstrate that when they talked about equality, they meant race but not gender. Finally, I reflect on the limits of …

Strolling Down Memory Lane, Touring An Historical Restoration, And The Constitution Of December 11, 1865, Mark A. Graber

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

The following pages [compare] a stroll down the Reconstruction section of memory lane with a tour of a historical restoration dedicated to reproducing the Constitution of December 11, 1865. Part I strolls down the Reconstruction section of memory lane by elaborating the conventional legal account of what Republicans were thinking when they sought to improve the Thirteenth Amendment’s Constitution immediately after the ratification of the constitutional ban on slavery was assured. Their most vital and often sole concern, legal opinions from the Slaughter-House Cases to Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard agree, was to alleviate doubts among anti-slavery advocates about …

Recovering Constitutional Identity In Colonial South India: Sedition, Sovereignty, And Small-C Constitutionalism In Pudukkottai, Bharath Gururagavendran

National Law School Journal

Constitutional identity is easiest to identify when it has already been credentialed: by a constitutional text, constituent authorisation, or judicial recognition. What remains visible when those markers are absent? Through a historically grounded study of the ‘Little Kingdom’ of Pudukkottai, a princely state in colonial South India, this article examines whether constitutional identity can be recovered from the small-c life of a polity whose opportunities for formal constitution-making were structurally foreclosed. Pudukkottai had no big-C moment. Its constitutional life, if it had one, must be reconstructed from less authoritative materials. The article argues that the absence of a constitutional text …

The Enduring Relevance Of Congress Despite The Court's Shift To “Ordinary Reader” Statutory Interpretation, Abbe R. Gluck, Laila M. Robbins

Journal of Law and Policy

Has Congress become irrelevant to statutory interpretation? The dominant theoretical and doctrinal paradigm in American statutory interpretation has always been the conversation between Congress and the courts. Today, however, the Court’s new, second-generation textualists claim they have left Congress behind. They argue they have changed textualism’s perspective, from an “insider” perspective focused on Congress’s textual choices, to an “outsider” perspective based on how “ordinary people” read statutes. The Court’s self-professed shift away from a legiscentric approach, if true, would be a seismic shift in the conception of the judicial role. Whereas judges and scholars—including first-generation textualists—had for a century focused …

The Broad Church Of Modern Textualism, Nicole Steitz, Brian G. Slocum, Kevin Tobia

Journal of Law and Policy

Nearly thirty years ago, Justice Scalia’s Tanner lectures branded Holy Trinity Church v. United States (1892) as the anti-textualist archetype, a decision trumping the text’s plain meaning with a suspect judicial investigation of the law’s purpose or spirit. And so Holy Trinity seemed, until Gales and Solan’s groundbreaking empirical study supported an alternative reading of the key statutory term (“labor or service”) that would avoid this conflict between text and purpose. Taking inspiration from Gales and Solan, we reconsider Holy Trinity using the precepts of modern textualism, with its increased emphasis on context, pragmatics, anti-literalism, legal meaning, holistic meaning, non-compositionality, …

The Pet Fish Canon, William N. Eskridge Jr.

Journal of Law and Policy

Inspired by the work of the late Professor Larry Solan, this article proposes that judges recognize as one of the textualist canons of statutory construction a “pet fish” canon. Such a canon would posit that when an ordinary reader would understand two or more words to yield a meaning that is different than the sum of the two words defined separately, the statutory interpreter should not disaggregate them. The Roberts Court has already followed such a linguistic precept in some statutory cases, and this article proposes that the Court recognize this as a canon considered at least as seriously as …

Grammar & Syntax Arguments On The Roberts Court, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Journal of Law and Policy

In his excellent book, The Language of Judges, Professor Solan demonstrates how judges use grammatical or linguistic arguments to avoid acknowledging statutory ambiguity—and how they often get the grammar or linguistics wrong. Since his book was published, textualism has become the dominant interpretive approach on the U.S. Supreme Court—and we have seen increasingly prominent battles involving grammatical devices and rules. This comment takes Professor Solan’s analysis as a jumping off point to evaluate how grammar and linguistic arguments are employed on the modern Supreme Court, in the age of textualism. The comment offers a brief empirical and doctrinal assessment of …