Lessons Learned: Ignazio Angeloni,
2025
Yale University
Lessons Learned: Ignazio Angeloni, Mercedes Cardona
Journal of Financial Crises
Ignazio Angeloni was an adviser on financial integration, financial stability, and monetary policy to the Executive Board of the European Central Bank during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis and later became director general of financial stability. He coordinated the preparations for establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), a component of the European banking union. The SSM was created to address macroprudential gaps identified during the Global Financial Crisis and the Sovereign Debt Crisis. Angeloni has advocated in his academic papers for completing the work of the SSM by establishing a regional deposit insurance scheme that would backstop the work of …
Lessons Learned: Mark Branson,
2025
Yale University
Lessons Learned: Mark Branson, Mercedes Cardona
Journal of Financial Crises
Mark Branson joined the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) as head of the banking division in 2010, during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. He became deputy director of FINMA in 2013 and was named director a year later. Although Switzerland is not a member of the European Union (EU) or its banking union, the nation participates in bilateral agreements that govern trade with the EU, its largest trading partner. In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), it enacted a number of regulations to improve oversight of the financial sector. Branson left FINMA in 2021 to become head …
How Us Bank Regulation Failed Svb And Its Supervisors,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
How Us Bank Regulation Failed Svb And Its Supervisors, Greg Feldberg, Carey K. Mott, Jill Cetina
Journal of Financial Crises
It is well known that Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) failed in March 2023 because of a toxic combination of uninsured deposits and underwater securities. This article argues that the bank’s failure could have been avoided if SVB had been subject to two global standards established by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. First, the interest-rate risk in the banking book (IRR-BB) standard, never fully implemented in the United States, would have identified the bank’s extremely risky asset-liability management strategy and required remedial action 10 quarters before it failed. Second, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), from which US regulators had exempted …
Emergency Liquidity Assistance And Monetary Financing In The European Union: A Case Study In Fiscal Cooperation?,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
Emergency Liquidity Assistance And Monetary Financing In The European Union: A Case Study In Fiscal Cooperation?, Vincient Arnold
Journal of Financial Crises
In the European Union (EU), primary EU treaty law prohibits central banks from engaging in monetary financing, which includes lending to insolvent firms. This legal prohibition exists alongside, and in parallel to, various regulatory provisions of the Eurosystem. As a result, EU Member State central banks face unique legal limitations when acting in their roles as lenders of last resort, providing emergency liquidity assistance (ELA). In practice, European central banks—both members of the Eurosystem and not—lend to firms of questionable solvency with some frequency, often creatively employing fiscal guarantees to limit their balance sheet exposure and shift the lending risk …
United States: Rhode Island Limited Bank Holiday, 1991,
2025
University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy
United States: Rhode Island Limited Bank Holiday, 1991, Ayodeji George, Sophia Alden
Journal of Financial Crises
In 1990, the Rhode Island Share and Deposit Indemnity Corporation (RISDIC) was a private mutual deposit insurance corporation funded by member institutions. Late that year, after the failures of two of its insured institutions in July and October, other RISDIC member institutions faced large depositor withdrawals, as concerns began to focus on the financial health of RISDIC itself. RISDIC had maintained inadequate reserves, and on December 31, 1990, it found itself lacking the resources to cover depositor withdrawals from member institutions. RISDIC leadership requested a state-appointed conservator, which meant that all its member institutions no longer had the deposit insurance …
United States: Reserve Primary Fund Suspension, 2008,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
United States: Reserve Primary Fund Suspension, 2008, Anmol Makhija
Journal of Financial Crises
In 2008, the Reserve Primary Fund was the world’s third-largest money market fund with $62.5 billion in assets. Following Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing on September 15, the Primary Fund’s $785 million position in Lehman debt securities was underwater, and the fund faced severe redemption pressures from investors. In just two days, redemption requests surpassed $40 billion. Owing to the fund’s inability to liquidate assets at or above par value in the frozen markets and the inability of its sponsor, the Reserve Management Company, Inc. (RMCI), to support investors, the Reserve announced on September 16 that the Primary Fund had “broken …
India: Yes Bank Moratorium, 2020,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
India: Yes Bank Moratorium, 2020, Salil Gupta
Journal of Financial Crises
By December 2019, Yes Bank’s capital levels had dropped below the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) mandated threshold, as the bank was facing a combination of deposit withdrawals, losses from extraordinary credit provisions, and overexposure to stressed sectors. On March 5, 2020, India’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the RBI placed Yes Bank under a 30-day moratorium that restricted most banking functions and limited deposit withdrawals to INR 50,000 per person (USD 663). The purpose of this moratorium was to allow the RBI time to design a plan of reconstruction or amalgamation for Yes Bank to allow depositors limited access …
United States: National Bank Holiday, 1933,
2025
University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy
United States: National Bank Holiday, 1933, Ayodeji George
Journal of Financial Crises
By mid-February 1933, the United States was in the depths of the Great Depression and the banking system faced sustained depositor runs and currency hoarding. On February 14, the governor of Michigan declared a holiday for all banks and trusts in the state. There followed a wave of declared bank holidays and bank runs across the country. The public withdrew $1.8 billion in gold and currency from banks in February and early March, with nearly two-thirds of those withdrawals occurring in the week ended Friday, March 3. By that date, 25 of 48 states had implemented bank holidays or restricted …
Greece: National Bank Holiday, 2015,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
Greece: National Bank Holiday, 2015, Stella Schaefer-Brown
Journal of Financial Crises
In December 2014, deposit outflows from Greek banks intensified owing to political uncertainty following the announcement of a snap presidential election and a subsequent crash of the Greek stock market. This led to a liquidity crisis in the first half of 2015. Intensifying political uncertainty, worsening liquidity, and volatility in the macroeconomic and financial markets environment peaked in the first half of 2015. The crisis was exacerbated by a February decision by the European Central Bank (ECB) that made it difficult for Greek banks to continue borrowing from its monetary policy-related liquidity programs. On June 28, 2015, the ECB announced …
Cyprus: National Bank Holiday, 2013,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
Cyprus: National Bank Holiday, 2013, Stella Schaefer-Brown
Journal of Financial Crises
The Greek government debt crisis was especially hard on the two largest Cypriot banks. Bank of Cyprus (BoC) and Laiki Bank lost EUR 1.8 billion and EUR 2.3 billion, respectively, on their Greek government bonds after the European Union (EU) decision in October 2011 to haircut the bonds. Over the next year, Laiki Bank faced severe liquidity problems from depositor withdrawals, the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) extended to it significant emergency liquidity assistance, and the government owned 84% of the bank after injecting EUR 1.8 billion. The Cypriot economy also suffered negative effects and in March 2013, authorities negotiated …
Ecuador: National Bank Holiday, 1999,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
Ecuador: National Bank Holiday, 1999, Bailey Decker
Journal of Financial Crises
After a series of exogenous shocks hit Ecuador’s economy in 1997 and 1998, foreign creditors reduced external credit lines to the country, draining liquidity. The newly created Deposit Guarantee Agency (Agencia de Garantía de Depósitos, AGD) administered deposit insurance and a new blanket guarantee and had the authority to resolve failing banks. Despite these actions, bank runs continued. After depositors reportedly withdrew USD 400 million from banks over a two-week period, on Monday, March 8, 1999, one hour before banks were supposed to open, the bank superintendent declared a surprise bank holiday effective that day; banks reopened a week later …
Argentina: National Bank Holidays, 2001,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
Argentina: National Bank Holidays, 2001, Owen Heaphy
Journal of Financial Crises
Starting in 1991, Argentina operated a currency board regime under which the central bank guaranteed a one-to-one peg of the Argentine peso to the US dollar. But in 2001, markets became increasingly concerned that the central bank would be unable to maintain the peg and would allow the peso to devalue against the dollar. At that time, more than two-thirds of Argentine bank deposits were denominated in dollars. Throughout 2001, depositors withdrew funds from banks; by November, peso deposits had declined by more than one-third and dollar deposits had fallen by one-tenth. On November 28, 2001, the systemwide banking run …
Survey Of Bank Holidays And Fund Suspensions,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
Survey Of Bank Holidays And Fund Suspensions, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Owen Heaphy, Anmol Makhija, Stella Schaefer-Brown, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
In this paper, we analyze seven case studies involving bank holidays and two involving mutual fund suspensions produced by the Yale Program on Financial Stability. Our main purpose is to assist policymakers who are considering utilizing a bank holiday in designing the most effective program as efficiently as possible. We find that a bank holiday may be most useful when designing and implementing a comprehensive remedy to an underlying problem distressing banks, particularly when an exogenous shock rather than balance sheet weaknesses is the cause of general distress to the system. A holiday is also useful to “ring-fence” one or …
Argentina: Mutual Fund Suspensions, 2019,
2025
YPFS, Yale School of Management
Argentina: Mutual Fund Suspensions, 2019, Owen Heaphy, Anmol Makhija
Journal of Financial Crises
With Argentina facing a liquidity crisis and collapse in demand for government debt, on Wednesday, August 28, 2019, the country's minister of economy, Hernán Lacunza, announced after markets closed that the government was extending the maturity of USD 7 billion of its short-term public debt securities, among other measures. Lacunza stated that domestic retail investors would not be subject to the terms of the maturity extension and would be paid principal and interest on the affected securities per the original maturity schedule. This announcement caused confusion about the treatment of individual investors who held the affected securities indirectly through mutual …
Taxing Litigation Finance,
2025
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Taxing Litigation Finance, Young Ran (Christine) Kim
Articles
The emerging litigation finance industry has the capacity to expand access to justice but also raises important legal and ethical questions. Although much has been said about the industry’s potential to increase frivolous lawsuits and permit improper control over a claim by the funders, scholarly discussion on the proper tax treatment of the parties involved has fallen by the wayside. The problem arises in classifying litigation finance contracts as either a nonrecourse loan, immediate sale, or variable prepaid forward contract, all of which discretely impact the timing and character of income. Unfortunately, courts have traditionally found it difficult to draw …
On Simple Competition Policy,
2025
Boston University School of Law
On Simple Competition Policy, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
These remarks address the topic of “simple competition policy for a complex world”.[1] There is much to be said in favor of simplicity in legal rules. Complex legal rules are often difficult for the individuals who must comply with the rules to understand what they mean. Complex rules are often confusing, and take a long time to understand, when in the real business world decisions must be made quickly – at the pace at which business occurs. Businessmen do not have the luxury that academics possess to read, discuss, and think about rules for long periods of time. Markets …
Climate Change And Digital Nations: Harnessing The Metaverse To Perpetuate Small Island Statehood,
2025
Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Climate Change And Digital Nations: Harnessing The Metaverse To Perpetuate Small Island Statehood, Nicole Bessette
Villanova Environmental Law Journal (1991 - )
No abstract provided.
Gregory Keating’S Framework For Understanding Tort Law,
2025
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Gregory Keating’S Framework For Understanding Tort Law, Martin J. Stone
Articles
Gregory Keating seeks to ground tort rights and obligations in a balancing of people’s objective interests in liberty and security, with security taking priority because it is a requirement of effective agency. I argue that Keating’s approach shares in the structural shortcomings of the economic theories he criticizes. Both theories appeal to monadic, free-standing values (efficiency, effective agency) that concern individual parties in isolation; neither theory gives an adequate account of tort law’s relational (transactional) structure. The common law distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance illustrates the point. Keating’s harm-based framework fails to explain tort law’s most basic duty limitation, the …
Session 6: Ai Regulation: The Role Of Washington State Legal Organizations,
2025
Judge, Pierce County Superior Court, Co-Chair, Board for Judicial Administration
Session 6: Ai Regulation: The Role Of Washington State Legal Organizations, Alicia Burton, Michele Carney, Ryan Harkins, Craig Shank, Drew Simshaw, Christon Skinner, Leslie Veloz
SITIE Symposiums
In session six of the SITIE 2025 Symposium, the panelists discuss how legal institutions in the State of Washington are responding to the challenges surrounding artificial intelligence (AI). Being aware that AI is continuing to evolve and will inevitably be integrated more into the legal field, this session discusses the benefits and concerns of AI and what legal institutions like the Board of Judicial Administration, Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) Committee on Professional Ethics, and the Washington State Bar Association Legal Technology Task Force are doing to educate lawyers and what changes, if any, are being done to address AI …
Session 3: Conference Spotlight- Politics In A World Of Ai Misinformation: Regulatory Approaches,
2025
S. Walter Richey Professor of Corporate Law, University of Minnesota Law School (author of Deepfake 2024: Will Citizens United and Artificial Intelligence Together Destroy Representative Democracy?)
Session 3: Conference Spotlight- Politics In A World Of Ai Misinformation: Regulatory Approaches, Richard Painter, Mark Verstraete
SITIE Symposiums
Considering developments regarding AI-generated media, fake news, and impersonations, panelists discuss the challenges in regulating AI-generated media, particularly in the context of deepfakes and political misinformation. Panelists discuss the evolution of content from a text-based presentation to video-based manipulations, along with broader concerns, including the role of social media platforms, how platforms are becoming more focused, confirmation bias of individual voting publics, and the potential conflicts of interest in regulating AI-generated content. Panelists suggest solutions involving a proactive method to warn the public about AI-generated misinformation. Further, the panelists also call for greater inter-disciplinary collaboration to develop flexible and forward-thinking …
