The Law And Economics Of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies And Incapacitation,
2012
Texas A&M University School of Law
The Law And Economics Of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies And Incapacitation, Murat C. Mungan
Faculty Scholarship
Economic analyses of criminal law are frequently and heavily criticized for being unable to explain many criminal law rules and doctrines that people find intuitively just. Existing economic models cannot properly explain, for instance, why criminal law distinguishes between (i) repeat offenders and first-time offenders, (ii) murder and voluntary manslaughter, and (iii) remorseful and non-remorseful offenders.
In this Article, I propose a new and richer economic theory of crime that captures the rationales behind these practices, and potentially behind many other important criminal law principles and doctrines. Unlike an overwhelming majority of previous economic analyses, my theory accounts not only …
Accentuate The Normative: A Response To Professor Mckenna,
2012
St. John's University School of Law
Accentuate The Normative: A Response To Professor Mckenna, Jeremy N. Sheff
Faculty Publications
In his article, “A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trade-mark Law,” 98 Va. L. Rev. 67 (2012), Professor Mark McKenna makes two significant claims. The first is that the dominant Law and Economics theory of trademark law—the search-costs theory of the Chicago School—is in some way connected to recent undesirable expansions of trademark rights. The second is that a preferable theory of trademark law—one that would result in more tightly circumscribed and socially beneficial notions of trademark rights—would take consumer decision making, rather than search costs, as its guiding principle. I find myself sympathetic to these arguments, and yet I believe …
Special Access: The Harm Of Premature Deregulation In Telecommunications,
2012
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Special Access: The Harm Of Premature Deregulation In Telecommunications, Cary E. Adickman
Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal
No abstract provided.
One (Firm) Is Not Enough: A Legal-Economic Analysis Of Ec-Fasteners,
2012
Peterson Institute for International Economics
One (Firm) Is Not Enough: A Legal-Economic Analysis Of Ec-Fasteners, Chad P. Brown, Petros C. Mavroidis
Faculty Scholarship
The WTO’s Appellate Body (AB) dealt with a number of issues for the first time in the Report of EC-Fasteners. Importantly, the AB discussed the consistency of the European Union (EU) regulation with the multilateral rules on the conditions for deviating from the obligation to calculate individual dumping margins. Although China formally won the argument, the AB may have opened the door to treat China as a non-market economy (NME) even beyond 2016 when China’s NME-status was thought to expire under the terms of China’s 2001 WTO Accession Protocol. The AB further dealt with numerous other issues ranging from statistical …
The Market As A Legal Concept,
2012
University of Colorado Law School
The Market As A Legal Concept, Justin Deystone
Publications
In the wake of the recent financial crisis of 2008, and in the run-up to what some are calling a perfect fiscal storm, there is no shortage of commentary on the need for fundamental market reform. Though there are certainly disagreements about where the real problems are and what to do, almost all the commentary remains wedded to an old and entirely false image of “free competition.” Of course, there is hardly consensus about whether markets require the heavy hand of regulative control, or are better left to regulate themselves, but a belief in the distinction between these two images …
Genealogies Of Risk: Searching For Safety, 1930s-1970s,
2012
University of Colorado Law School
Genealogies Of Risk: Searching For Safety, 1930s-1970s, William Boyd
Publications
Health, safety, and environmental regulation in the United States are saturated with risk thinking. It was not always so, and it may not be so in the future. But today, the formal, quantitative approach to risk provides much of the basis for regulation in these fields, a development that seems quite natural, even necessary. This particular approach, while it drew on conceptual and technical developments that had been underway for decades, achieved prominence during a relatively short timeframe; roughly, between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s--a time of hard looks and regulatory reform. Prior to this time, formal conceptions of …
New Private Law Theory And Tort Law: A Comment,
2012
Boston University School of Law
New Private Law Theory And Tort Law: A Comment, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
This comment was prepared for the Harvard Law Review symposium on “The New Private Law,” as a response to Benjamin Zipursky’s principal paper on torts. I find Zipursky’s reliance on Cardozo’s Palsgraf opinion as a foundational source of tort theory troubling, for two reasons. First, Cardozo fails to offer a consistent theoretical framework for tort law in his opinions, many of which are difficult to reconcile with one another. Second, Palsgraf should be understood as an effort by Cardozo to provide greater predictability, within a special class of proximate cause cases, by reallocating decision-making power from juries to judges. It …
An Economic Perspective On Preemption,
2012
Boston University School of Law
An Economic Perspective On Preemption, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
This Essay has two goals. The first is to present an economic theory of preemption as a choice among regulatory regimes. The optimal regime choice model is used to generate specific implications for the court decisions on preemption of products liability claims. The second objective is to extrapolate from the regime choice model to consider its implications for broader controversies about preemption.
The 'Justice Deficit' Debate In Eu Private Law: New Directions,
2012
Boston Univeristy School of Law
The 'Justice Deficit' Debate In Eu Private Law: New Directions, Daniela Caruso
Faculty Scholarship
This essay outlines the ongoing debate on the justice deficit of EU private law – the ‘social justice’ debate – and then points at an underexplored avenue of inquiry that is essential for this debate to stay meaningful and constructive. Future research should aim to calibrate EU private law to the socio-economic asymmetries of the EU market, and to counterbalance the uneven weight of uniform rules, where they appear desirable, with proper compensatory mechanisms.
The Bizarre Law & Economics Of 'Business Roundtable V. Sec',
2012
Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law
The Bizarre Law & Economics Of 'Business Roundtable V. Sec', Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
Corporations are legal entities designed to foster certain kinds of collective economic activity. The decisionmaking power within a corporation ultimately rests with a board of directors elected by shareholders. Shareholders, however, do not use anything like a conventional ballot in these elections; instead, they fill out a “proxy ballot,” delivered to them by the incumbent board. This proxy ballot lists only the incumbent board’s chosen nominees, very often the board members themselves. If a shareholder wants to run for director or propose another nominee for the board, she needs to provide all other shareholders with a separate proxy ballot — …
Climate Justice,
2012
University of California, Berkeley
Climate Justice, Daniel A. Farber
Michigan Law Review
Eric Posner and David Weisbach take the threat of climate change seriously. Their book Climate Change Justice offers policy prescriptions that deserve serious attention. While the authors adopt the framework of conventional welfare economics, they show a willingness to engage with noneconomic perspectives, which softens their conclusions. Although they are right to see a risk that overly aggressive ethical claims could derail international agreement on restricting greenhouse gases, their analysis makes climate justice too marginal to climate policy. The developed world does have a special responsibility for the current climate problem, and we should be willing both to agree to …
Pangloss's Copyright,
2012
University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law
Pangloss's Copyright, Derek E. Bambauer
Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Taxing Family Work: Aid For Affluent Husband Care,
2012
University at Buffalo School of Law
Taxing Family Work: Aid For Affluent Husband Care, Martha T. Mccluskey
Journal Articles
The income of the classic breadwinner married to a homemaker receives a tax advantage under federal income tax law. The conventional wisdom holds that any resulting inequities to unmarried persons or dual-earning marriages cannot be corrected without producing similarly problematic inequities. This Article challenges that dilemma by analyzing the inequity of the marital tax system from a new perspective. This Article argues that the perceived "bonus" for breadwinner-homemaker marriages is best understood as an implicit policy of "aid for affluent husband care." Recent tax reforms (up for renewal in 2010) that partly reduced the "marriagep enalty "for some dualearning couples …
Ain't I A Victim? The Intersectionality Of Race, Class, And Gender In Domestic Violence And The Courtroom,
2012
Valparaiso University School of Law
Ain't I A Victim? The Intersectionality Of Race, Class, And Gender In Domestic Violence And The Courtroom, Geneva Brown
Cardozo Journal of Equal Rights & Social Justice
The legal system systematically fails to protect marginalized groups, particularly African American women, from intimate-partner violence due to entrenched race, gender, and class biases. These biases manifest in the courts' disregard for the unique experiences of African American women, as highlighted by Kimberlé Crenshaw's intersectionality theory. The article examines how systemic discrimination and the courts' failure to enforce protective orders perpetuate violence against this vulnerable population, emphasizing the lethal consequences of these failures. The analysis also critiques the Supreme Court's narrowing of constitutional protections in cases like DeShaney v. Winnebago County and Castle Rock v. Gonzales, which further erode …
The Failed Promise Of A General Theory Of Pure Economic Loss: An Accident Of History?,
2012
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
The Failed Promise Of A General Theory Of Pure Economic Loss: An Accident Of History?, Anthony J. Sebok
Articles
The article explores the evolution and challenges of pure economic loss doctrine in American tort law, focusing on the contrasting approaches of Robert Rabin and Gary Schwartz. While Schwartz critiques the feasibility of a general theory due to the diversity of economic injuries, Rabin advocates for a nuanced, fact-specific approach. The article highlights the ad hoc nature of the doctrine, as seen in key cases like JAire Corp. v. Gregory and Aas v. Superior Court, which reflect shifting judicial attitudes toward negligence and liability. It concludes that the failure to establish a coherent principle for determining duty underscores the ongoing …
Japan's Love For Derivative Actions: Irrational Behavior And Non-Economic Motives As Rational Explanations For Shareholder Litigation,
2012
Vanderbilt University Law School
Japan's Love For Derivative Actions: Irrational Behavior And Non-Economic Motives As Rational Explanations For Shareholder Litigation, Dan W. Puchniak, Masafumi Nakahigashi
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Not long ago, there was a consensus in the legal academy that the Japanese were irrational litigants. As the theory went, Japanese people would forgo litigating for financial gain because of a cultural obsession with maintaining social harmony. Based on this theory, it made perfect (but economically irrational) sense that Japanese shareholders let their U.S.-transplanted derivative action lay moribund for almost four post-war decades, while at the same time the derivative action was a staple of shareholder litigation in the United States.
The 1980s brought a wave of law and economics to the scholarship of Japanese law, which largely discredited …
Fragmentation Nodes: A Study In Financial Innovation, Complexity, And Systemic Risk,
2012
Columbia Law School
Fragmentation Nodes: A Study In Financial Innovation, Complexity, And Systemic Risk, Kathryn Judge
Faculty Scholarship
This Article resents a case study in how complexity arising from the evolution and proliferation of a financial innovation can increase systemic risk. The subject of the case study is the securitization of home loans, an innovation which played a critical and still not fully understood role in the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The Article introduces the term "fragmentation node" for these transaction structures, and it shows how specific sources of complexity inherent in fragmentation nodes limited transparency and flexibility in ways that undermined the stability of the financial system. In addition to shedding new light on the processes through which …
The Political Economy Of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends To Be Frustrated And Systemic Risk Perpetuated,
2012
Columbia Law School
The Political Economy Of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends To Be Frustrated And Systemic Risk Perpetuated, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
A good crisis should never go to waste. In the world of financial regulation, experience has shown – since at least the time of the South Sea Bubble three hundred years ago – that only after a catastrophic market collapse can legislators and regulators overcome the resistance of the financial community and adopt comprehensive "re-form" legislation. U.S. financial history both confirms and conforms to this generalization. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were the product of the 1929 stock-market crash and the Great Depression, with their enactment following the inauguration of President Franklin Roosevelt …
Stock Unloading And Banker Incentives,
2012
Columbia Law School
Stock Unloading And Banker Incentives, Robert J. Jackson Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Congress has directed federal regulators to oversee banker pay. For the first time, these regulators are now scrutinizing the incentives of risk-takers beyond the bank's top executives. Like most public company managers, these bankers are increasingly paid in stock rather than cash. The ostensible reason is that stock-based pay aligns manager and shareholder interests. But portfolio theory predicts that managers will diversify away, or "unload," stock-based pay unless they are restricted from doing so. One way to deter unloading may be to require managers to disclose it, as investors and colleagues will assume that managers are unloading because they are …
Poverty Offsetting,
2012
American University Washington College of Law
Poverty Offsetting, Ezra Rosser
Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals
No abstract provided.
