Jurisprudence Commons^™

Human Rights Hero: The Supreme Court In Griswold V. Connecticut, Stephen Wermiel

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.

Are Physician-Patient Communications Protected By The First Amendment?, Martha Swartz

Cardozo Law Review de•novo

In the past several years, a number of states have enacted laws restricting physicians’ rights to speak freely with their patients. These laws go beyond informed consent laws enacted in most states in the 1960s and 1970s. While the informed consent laws require physicians to provide certain categories of information to patients prior to invasive treatment—such as the nature of the risks and benefits entailed—these new laws either prohibit physicians from discussing certain topics or mandate that they provide specific information to their patients that is only questionably supported by medical evidence. In the past several years, a number of …

Structuralist Legal Histories, Justin Deystone

Publications

This is a contribution to a symposium titled "Theorizing Contemporary Legal Thought." The central theme of the piece is the relation between legal structuralism and legal historiography.

Interruptions In Search Of A Purpose: Oral Argument In The Supreme Court, October Terms 1958–60 And 2010–12, Barry Sullivan, Megan Canty

Utah Law Review

We tend to think of the Supreme Court as an institution that is unchanging. Nothing, of course, could be further from the truth. The Court has changed in important ways throughout its history. During the last few decades, the Court has experienced many significant changes: Congress has virtually eliminated the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction; the Court has reduced by almost half the number of cases in which it grants review; the number of law clerks has increased; the numbers of lower court cases and judges have increased substantially; the Court has shortened by half the amount of time normally allowed for …

Time-Mindedness And Jurisprudence, David Luban

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Analytic jurisprudence often strikes outsiders as a discipline unto itself, unconnected with the problems that other legal scholarship investigates. Gerald Postema, in the article to which this paper responds, traces this “unsociability” to two narrowing defects in the project of analytic jurisprudence: (1) from Austin on, it has concerned itself largely with the analysis of professional concepts, without connecting that analysis with other disciplines that study law, nor with the history of jurisprudence itself, nor with general philosophy; (2) analytic jurisprudence studies only time-­‐slice legal systems, rather than legal systems unfolding in history. He argues that a time-­‐slice legal system …

Two Excursions Into Current U.S. Supreme Court Opinion-Writing, Paul F. Rothstein

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In the last weeks in June, 2015, as the present term of the U.S. Supreme Court drew to a close, many controversial and important decisions were handed down by the Court. The substance of the decisions has been written about extensively. Two of the decisions in particular, though, caught my eye as a teacher of legal techniques, not for the importance of the subject of the particular decision, but for what they may illustrate in a teachable fashion about at least some opinion writing. The two cases are Ohio v. Clark (June 18, 2015) interpreting the Confrontation Clause of the …

Stare Decisis In The Second-Best World, Randy J. Kozel

Journal Articles

If judges disagree about the proper interpretation of the law, can they find common ground in the treatment of precedent? The doctrine of stare decisis weighs the value of legal continuity against the value of legal accuracy. But that analysis is complicated by pervasive disputes over the implications of legal error. Likewise, the scope of a precedent's impact in future cases depends on underlying assumptions about the ends and means of legal interpretation. When those assumptions vary among judges, so too will applications of stare decisis. For stare decisis to promote the continuity and impersonality of law, it requires an …

The Place Of Force In General Jurisprudence, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Journal Articles

This essay reviews Frederick Schauer’s book, The Force of Law (2015). Schauer argues that coercion is central to legal practice and should be no less important in legal theory. In doing so, Schauer presents formidable challenges to standard versions of legal positivism—and does so from within the positivist framework. Much of Schauer’s criticism on that score is sound. His analysis of the role coercion can play in accomplishing law’s moral tasks is also welcome and important. Nevertheless, Schauer’s jurisprudential framework comes up short in its inability to distinguish law from other social practices that also use force. The Force of …

Originalism As A Theory Of Legal Change, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

Originalism is usually defended as a theory of interpretation. This Article presents a different view. Originalism ought to be defended, if at all, not based on normative goals or abstract philosophy, but as a positive theory of American legal practice, and particularly of our rules for legal change.

One basic assumption of legal systems is that the law, whatever it is, stays the same until it's lawfully changed. Originalism begins this process with an origin, a Founding. Whatever rules we had when the Constitution was adopted, we still have today -- unless something happened that was authorized to change …

Individualized Injunctions And No-Modification Terms: Challenging "Anti-Reform" Provisions In Arbitration Clauses, Myriam E. Gilles

Articles

The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and American Express v. Italian Colors have considered only whether class actions for monetary damages may be barred by arbitration clauses requiring individual adjudication. The Justices have not examined the enforceability of arbitration clauses or arbitral rules which explicitly prohibit claimants from seeking or arbitrators from granting broad injunctive relief in an individual dispute. I term these "anti-reform" provisions because they broadly prohibit an individual arbitral claimant from seeking to end a practice, change a rule, or enjoin an act that causes injury to itself and to similarly-situated non-parties. This …

Goveille V. Liberty Mutual: An Opportunity To Correct The Problems Of Erisa Preemption, Edward A. Zelinsky

Articles

No abstract provided.

Why Instrumentalism Matters, Kyron J. Huigens

Articles

Alon Harel argues that the acts of a public official acting with "fidelity of deference," are "necessary," "non-contingent," "intrinsic," "constitutive," integrative," "expressive," or "inherent" features of legal punishment. Accordingly, he calls his argument "noninstrumental." This can be taken as an argument for logical necessity, definition, extension, or modest or immodest conceptual necessity. Only the last interpretation fits Harel's text, but such an argument fails because instrumentality is necessarily present in any event in the natural world, including punishment. Harel does not say which aspects of natural instrumentality he means to exclude from his argument, or how, or why.

Mos Americanus Or Common Law In Partibus Infidelium, Peter Goodrich

Articles

No abstract provided.

The Legacy Of Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013): A Legal Theory And Methodology For Hedgehogs, Hercules, And One Right Answers, Imer Flores

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this paper the author addresses Ronald Dworkin’s work and assesses his legacy to legal, moral and political philosophy. And so, considers among its merits having developed an original legal theory with its distinctive methodology, which not only has transcended the Natural Law and Legal Positivism dichotomy, but also has reintegrated law into a branch of political morality and defended as a corollary the one right answer thesis. Hence, commences by identifying the dworkininan challenge; continues by introducing some basic definitions and distinctions between jurisprudence, legal philosophy (or philosophy of law) and legal theory (or theory of law), on the …

What's A Lower Court To Do? Limiting Lawrence V. Texas And The Right To Sexual Autonomy, John Tuskey

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Week After, Lawrence K. Karlton

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Look Back At The Rehnquist Era And An Overview Of The 2004 Supreme Court Term, Erwin Chemerinsky

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Conservative-Libertarian Turn In First Amendment Jurisprudence, Steven J. Heyman

All Faculty Scholarship

Conservative constitutional jurisprudence in the United States has an important libertarian dimension. In recent years, a conservative majority of the Supreme Court has strengthened the constitutional protections for property rights, recognized an individual right to own firearms, imposed limits on the welfare state and the powers of the federal government, cut back on affirmative action, and held that closely held corporations have a right to religious liberty that permits them to deny contraceptive coverage to their female employees. This libertarian streak also can be seen in decisions on freedom of speech and association. In several leading cases, conservative judges have …

How Wartime Detention Ends, Deborah N. Pearlstein

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.

When Things Went Terribly, Terribly Wrong Part Ii, Steven L. Winter

Law Faculty Research Publications

No abstract provided.