Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Judges Commons™

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

7,597 Full-Text Articles 5,548 Authors 6,545,934 Downloads 182 Institutions

All Articles in Judges

Faceted Search

7,597 full-text articles. Page 95 of 213.

Overwriting And Under-Deciding: Addressing The Roberts Court's Shrinking Docket, Meg Penrose 2019 Texas A&M University School of Law

Overwriting And Under-Deciding: Addressing The Roberts Court's Shrinking Docket, Meg Penrose

SMU Law Review Forum

No abstract provided.


In Re: Discipline Of James Colin, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 43 (Sep. 19, 2019), Jose Tafoya 2019 University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law

In Re: Discipline Of James Colin, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 43 (Sep. 19, 2019), Jose Tafoya

Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

The court found James Colin made statements he knew were false or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge. Colin also engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The court suspended him for six months and one day.


Overwriting And Under-Deciding: Addressing The Roberts Court's Shrinking Docket, Meg Penrose 2019 Texas A&M University School of Law

Overwriting And Under-Deciding: Addressing The Roberts Court's Shrinking Docket, Meg Penrose

Faculty Scholarship

How do we evaluate a Supreme Court that writes more than it decides? Despite having the lowest decisional output in the modern era, the Roberts Court is the most verbose Supreme Court in history. The current Justices are more likely than past Justices to have their individual say in cases, writing more concurring and dissenting opinions than prior Courts. These opinions are longer, often strongly worded, and rarely add clarity to the underlying decision. The Roberts Court has shifted from being a decisional body to becoming an institution that comments on more cases than it decides.

This article critiques the …


"To The Person": Rfra's Blueprint For A Sustainable Exemption Regime, Tanner Bean 2019 Brigham Young University Law School

"To The Person": Rfra's Blueprint For A Sustainable Exemption Regime, Tanner Bean

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.


Religion In Judicial Decision-Making: An Empirical Analysis, René Reyes, Jessica W. Reyes 2019 Brigham Young University Law School

Religion In Judicial Decision-Making: An Empirical Analysis, René Reyes, Jessica W. Reyes

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Case Of The Exemption Claimants: Religion, Conscience, And Identity, Steven D. Smith 2019 Brigham Young University Law School

The Case Of The Exemption Claimants: Religion, Conscience, And Identity, Steven D. Smith

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.


Judicial Ethics: A New Paradigm For A New Era, Charles G. Geyh 2019 Indiana University Maurer School of Law

Judicial Ethics: A New Paradigm For A New Era, Charles G. Geyh

St. Mary's Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics

As the preamble to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct indicates, traditional notions of judicial ethics operate within a rule of law paradigm, which posits that the “three I’s” of judicial ethics—independence, impartiality, and integrity—enable judges to uphold the law. In recent decades, however, social science, public opinion, and political commentary suggest that appointed judges abuse their independence by disregarding the law and issuing rulings in accord with their biases and other extralegal impulses, while elected judges disregard the law and issue rulings popular with voters, all of which calls the future of the three I’s and judicial ethics itself …


Festschrift Introduction, Melanie B. Leslie 2019 Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Festschrift Introduction, Melanie B. Leslie

Cardozo Law Review

It is my pleasure and honor to introduce this published tribute to my esteemed and wonderful colleague, Arthur Jacobson. Arthur has been a member of the Cardozo faculty since 1977, and has had a great deal to do with establishing the Cardozo Law School faculty's reputation for producing serious and deeply intellectual scholarship. He has attracted great thinkers to our school and to our faculty, many of whom have contributed to this volume.


Due Process Supreme Court Appellate Division Second Department, 2019 Touro University Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center

Due Process Supreme Court Appellate Division Second Department

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Due Process Supreme Court Appellate Division, 2019 Touro University Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center

Due Process Supreme Court Appellate Division

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Due Process People V. Scott (Decided June 5, 1996), 2019 Touro University Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center

Due Process People V. Scott (Decided June 5, 1996)

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Due Process Court Of Appeals, 2019 Touro University Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center

Due Process Court Of Appeals

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Supreme Court Queens County, 2019 Touro University Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center

Supreme Court Queens County

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Double Jeopardy, 2019 Touro University Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center

Double Jeopardy

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Double Jeopardy Supreme Court Appellate Division Second Department, 2019 Touro University Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center

Double Jeopardy Supreme Court Appellate Division Second Department

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Double Jeopardy, 2019 Touro University Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center

Double Jeopardy

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Defying Mcculloch? Jackson’S Bank Veto Reconsidered, David S. Schwartz 2019 University of Wisconsin, Madison

Defying Mcculloch? Jackson’S Bank Veto Reconsidered, David S. Schwartz

Arkansas Law Review

On July 10, 1832, President Andrew Jackson issued the most famous and controversial veto in United States history. The bill in question was “to modify and continue” the 1816 “act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States. This was to recharter of the Second Bank of the United States whose constitutionality was famously upheld in McCulloch v. Maryland. The bill was passed by Congress and presented to Jackson on July 4. Six days later, Jackson vetoed the bill. Jackson’s veto mortally wounded the Second Bank, which would forever close its doors four years later at the …


Overruling Mcculloch?, Mark A. Graber 2019 University of Marlyand, Baltimore

Overruling Mcculloch?, Mark A. Graber

Arkansas Law Review

Daniel Webster warned Whig associates in 1841 that the Supreme Court would likely declare unconstitutional the national bank bill that Henry Clay was pushing through the Congress. This claim was probably based on inside information. Webster was a close association of Justice Joseph Story. The justices at this time frequently leaked word to their political allies of judicial sentiments on the issues of the day. Even if Webster lacked first-hand knowledge of how the Taney Court would probably rule in a case raising the constitutionality of the national bank, the personnel on that tribunal provided strong grounds for Whig pessimism. …


M'Culloch In Context, Mark R. Killenbeck 2019 University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

M'Culloch In Context, Mark R. Killenbeck

Arkansas Law Review

M’Culloch v. Maryland is rightly regarded as a landmark opinion, one that affirmed the ability of Congress to exercise implied powers, articulated a rule of deference to Congressional judgments about whether given legislative actions were in fact “necessary,” and limited the ability of the states to impair or restrict the operations of the federal government. Most scholarly discussions of the case and its legacy emphasize these aspects of the decision. Less common are attempts to place M’Culloch within the ebb and flow of the Marshall Court and the political and social realities of the time. So, for example, very few …


The Confusing Language Of Mcculloch V. Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (Or Meant)?, Sanford Levinson 2019 University of Texas, Austin

The Confusing Language Of Mcculloch V. Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (Or Meant)?, Sanford Levinson

Arkansas Law Review

All legal “interpretation” involves confrontation with inherently indeterminate language. I have distinguished in my own work between what I call the Constitution of Settlement and the Constitution of Conversation. The former includes those aspects of the Constitution that do indeed seem devoid of interpretive challenge, such as the unfortunate assignment of two senators to each state or the specification of the terms of office of representatives, senators, and presidents. I am quite happy to concede that “two,” “four,” and “six” have determinate meaning, though my concession is not based on a fancy theory of linguistics. It is, rather, a recognition …


Digital Commons powered by bepress