Judges Commons^™

The Costs Of Judging Judges By The Numbers, Marin K. Levy, Kate Stith, Jose A. Cabranes

Faculty Scholarship

This essay discredits current empirical models that are designed to “judge” or rank appellate judges, and then assesses the harms of propagating such models. First, the essay builds on the discussion of empirical models by arguing that (1) the judicial virtues that the legal empiricists set out to measure have little bearing on what actually makes for a good judge; and (2) even if they did, the empiricists’ chosen variables have not measured those virtues accurately. The essay then concludes that by generating unreliable claims about the relative quality of judges, these studies mislead both decision-makers and the public, degrade …

Confirmatory Legislative History , James J. Brudney

Faculty Scholarship

Textualists and intentionalists regularly lock horns over the proper approach to construing statutory language regarded as inconclusive. The interpretive debate seems less contentious, however, when the words of the law are deemed clear. There may be reasonable disagreement as to whether the text at issue in a particular controversy has a plain meaning, but if it does then that meaning arguably preempts further inquiry. Since 1990, Supreme Court majority opinions are replete with declarations such as: "Given [a] straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history"; or "we do not resort to legislative history to cloud …

Limiting Article Iii Standing To "Accidental" Plaintiffs: Lessons From Environmental And Animal Law Cases, Robert J. Pushaw Jr.

Georgia Law Review

According to the Supreme Court, Article III's extension
of "judicialPower" to "Cases" and "Controversies"limits
standing to plaintiffs who can demonstrate an
individualized "injury in fact" that was caused by the
defendant and that is judicially redressable. Article III's
text and history, however, do not mention "injury,"
"causation,"or "redressability."
Furthermore, these standards are malleable and have
been applied to achieve ideological goals, especially in
cases involving environmental and animal-welfare laws.
Most notably, the Court has recognized an "injury in fact"
to one's aesthetic enjoyment of nature, but determining
such an injury is arbitrarybecause "aesthetics"is a matter
of personal taste. Judges have …

Current Issues In Judicial Disqualifications Symposium 2011, Michael W. Martin

Faculty Scholarship

Public confidence in the judiciary's integrity is critical, and

Understanding Caperton: Judicial Disqualification Under The Due Process Clause, Dmitry Bam

Faculty Publications

It is virtually impossible to discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. without hearing some variant of the following response: “I can’t believe it was as close as it was.” And it does not matter whether you are chatting with your next-door neighbor who had never thought about judicial ethics in his life or discussing the case with a judicial-recusal expert. Nearly everyone seems to agree: Caperton was an “easy” case and that four justices dissented is an indication that there is something terribly wrong. Not only has Caperton elevated the issue of judicial impartiality …

In Defense Of Appearances: What Caperton V. Massey Should Have Said, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

In June of 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled for the first time that an elected judge must recuse himself from a case that involves a major campaign contributor. In Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., a coal company had been hit with a $50 million jury verdict. While appealing this verdict, the company's CEO, Don Blankenship, spent $3 million to help a challenger, Brent Benjamin, who had no judicial experience, defeat the incumbent, West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Warren McGraw. Blankenship funded political attack ads by a political organization (And for the Sake of the Kids) that …

Telling Through Type: Typography And Narrative In Legal Briefs, Derek H. Kiernan-Johnson

Publications

Most legal authors today self-publish, using basic word-processing software and letting the software’s default settings determine what their documents will look like when printed. As these settings are not optimized for legal texts, they do so at their peril. The default font Times New Roman, for example, as Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook warns, is "utterly inappropriate for long documents [such as] briefs."

Commentators have started urging a more deliberate approach to legal typography. Their suggestions, however, have been content-neutral, intended for all legal texts and focused on goals such as legibility and readability.

Typography, however, has much greater potential. The …

Interring The Rhetoric Of Judicial Activism, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

For decades, leaders of the Republican Party have decried “judicial activism” and championed “judicial restraint.” For much of that time, Republican politicians have equated judicial restraint with a commitment to judicial deference, asserting that “activist” judges disrespect the will of popular majorities. More recently, as the Republican Party has solidified its control of the federal courts and made its own claims on the Constitution, Republican politicians have tended to define judicial activism in potentially conflicting ways, mixing deference frames with claims about the autonomy of law from mere politics or personal beliefs.

In this Article, I examine these two ways …

A Coase Theorem For Constitutional Theory, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

There is much to admire about Barry Friedman’s new book, The Will of the People. Explaining how the institution of judicial review was made safe for democracy in America, Friedman’s story is extensively researched, beautifully written, scrupulously nonpartisan about the modern Court, and frequently humorous. What is more, his primary claim - that the Supreme Court of the United States is very much a democratic institution because judicial review always has been responsive to public opinion - is, to a large extent, convincing. I have taught The Will of the People in my first-year constitutional law course, and I plan …

Countering The Majoritarian Difficulty, Amanda Frost

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

Most state court judges are elected to office, and thus must be attentive to voter preferences just like other elected officials. Critics of judicial elections fear that subjecting judges to majoritarian pressures jeopardizes the rights of disfavored groups and undermines the rule of law, and accordingly call for their abolition. The reality, however, is that judicial elections are firmly entrenched in thirty-eight states, and thus appear to be a permanent part of the legal landscape. This article suggests that the so-called “majoritarian difficulty” posed by elected judges can be tempered by regular interactions with appointed, life-tenured federal judges, who are …

Defending The Majoritarian Court, Amanda Frost

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.

Misplaced Modifiers - Say What, David Spratt

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.

Introductory Note To The Supreme Court Of The United States: Noriega V. Pastrana, Kenneth Anderson

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.

Why The Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not The American People, Lawrence Baum, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

Supreme Court Justices care more about the views of academics, journalists, and other elites than they do about public opinion. This is true of nearly all Justices and is especially true of swing Justices, who often cast the critical votes in the Court’s most visible decisions. In this Article, we will explain why we think this is so and, in so doing, challenge both the dominant political science models of judicial behavior and the significant work of Barry Friedman, Jeffrey Rosen, and others who link Supreme Court decision making to public opinion.

Judicial Elections As Popular Constitutionalism, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

One of the most important recent developments in American legal theory is the burgeoning interest in "popular constitutionalism." One of the most important features of the American legal system is the selection of state judges – judges who resolve thousands of state and federal constitutional questions each year – by popular election. Although a large literature addresses each of these subjects, scholarship has rarely bridged the two. Hardly anyone has evaluated judicial elections in light of popular constitutionalism, or vice versa.

This Article undertakes that thought experiment. Conceptualizing judicial elections as instruments of popular constitutionalism, the Article aims to show, …

Reply: Exploring Panel Effects, Pauline Kim

Scholarship@WashULaw

This Reply responds to methodological criticisms of an earlier empirical study of panel effects on the United States Court of Appeals, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals, which appeared in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. That study found that federal appellate judges appeared to be more or less open to influence by their panel colleagues depending upon how the preferences of the panel members align with the preferences of the circuit as a whole. On the other hand, their willingness to avoid dissents and go along with their panel colleagues seemed unaffected by their relative …

Constitutional Expectations, Richard A. Primus

Articles

The inauguration of Barack Obama was marred by one of the smallest constitutional crises in American history. As we all remember, the President did not quite recite his oath as it appears in the Constitution. The error bothered enough people that the White House redid the ceremony a day later, taking care to get the constitutional text exactly right. Or that, at least, is what everyone thinks happened. What actually happened is more interesting. The second time through, the President again departed from the Constitution's text. But the second time, nobody minded. Or even noticed. In that unremarked feature of …

What Elena Kagan Could Have & Should Have Said (& Still Have Been Confirmed), Eric J. Segall

Faculty Publications By Year

During her confirmation hearings, Justice Kagan backed away from numerous critical comments she had previously made about the nomination process. No one knows why she changed her mind but it is likely that the shift resulted more from a political calculation than a change of heart about the nature of the process. This Commentary suggests that Justice Kagan could have testified consistently with her previously expressed views and still have been confirmed.

What Elena Kagan Could Have & Should Have Said (& Still Have Been Confirmed): A Reply, Eric J. Segall

Faculty Publications By Year

No abstract provided.

Improving Federal Judicial Selection, Carl W. Tobias

Law Faculty Publications

Review of Benjamin Wittes, Confirmation Wars: Preserving Independent Courts in Angry Times (2006).