Judges Commons^™

Trumping The Ninth Circuit: How The 45th President’S Supreme Court Appointments Will Strengthen The Already Strong Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration, Eric Schleich

Arbitration Law Review (2009 - Present)

No abstract provided.

Courts And Arbitration: Reconciling The Public With The Private, Susan L. Karamanian

Arbitration Law Review (2009 - Present)

No abstract provided.

Punishing On A Curve, Adi Leibovitch

Northwestern University Law Review

Does the punishment of one defendant depend on how she fares in comparison to the other defendants on the judge’s docket? This Article demonstrates that the troubling answer is yes. Judges sentence a given offense more harshly when their caseloads contain relatively milder offenses and more leniently when their caseloads contain more serious crimes. I call this phenomenon “punishing on a curve.”

Consequently, this Article shows how such relative sentencing patterns put into question the prevailing practice of establishing specialized courts and courts of limited jurisdiction. Because judges punish on a curve, a court’s jurisdictional scope systematically shapes sentencing outcomes. …

Scotus's 2016-17 Term: The Calm Before The Storm?, John M. Greabe

Law Faculty Scholarship

[Excerpt] “The court's just-completed 2016-17 term contained no . . . blockbusters. Its highest profile ruling was an unsigned opinion that modified preliminary injunctions issued by lower courts to prevent President Donald Trump's "travel ban" orders from going into immediate effect.

But that ruling did not decide whether the president's orders are in fact unconstitutional. Instead, the court put that important question off until the fall, by which time further factual developments -for example, the executive branch completing its review and deciding to lift or modify the bans -may well render the issue moot.”

Keynote Address: Two Challenges For The Judge As Umpire: Statutory Ambiguity And Constitutional Exceptions, Brett M. Kavanaugh

Notre Dame Law Review

Justice Scalia believed in the rule of law as a law of rules. He wanted judges to be umpires, which ordinarily entails judges applying a settled legal principle to a particular set of facts. I agree with that vision of the judiciary. But there are two major impediments in current jurisprudence to achieving that vision of the judge as umpire. The first is the ambiguity trigger in statutory interpretation. The second is the amorphous tests employed in cases involving claimed constitutional exceptions. We should identify and study these issues. Inspired by Justice Scalia’s longstanding efforts to improve the law, we …

Beyond The Text: Justice Scalia's Originalism In Practice, Michael D. Ramsey

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay considers the late Justice Antonin Scalia’s contributions to constitutional originalism as a practical methodology. Justice Scalia was the leading judicial theorist and advocate of originalism of his era, and his legacy has widely been assessed in those terms. He was also, along with Justice Clarence Thomas, the leading judicial practitioner of originalism of his era. This latter role has received less comprehensive attention. Although there are of course countless articles analyzing and critiquing his originalist methodology in particular cases, or seeking to demonstrate that certain of his opinions are inconsistent with his theoretical commitments, relatively few articles have …

Did Justice Scalia Have A Theory Of Interpretation?, Gary Lawson

Notre Dame Law Review

It seems beyond bizarre to ask whether Justice Scalia had a theory of textual interpretation. If he did not have such a theory, what were he and his critics talking about for the past three decades? The answer is that they were talking about part of a theory of textual interpretation but not an actual, complete theory. A complete theory of textual interpretation must prescribe principles of admissibility (what counts towards meaning), significance (how much does the admissible evidence count), standards of proof (how much evidence do you need for a justified conclusion), burdens of proof (does inertia lie with …

Boyle As Constitutional Preemption, Bradford R. Clark

Notre Dame Law Review

Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. arguably departed from his usual preferences by recognizing a government contractor defense as a matter of federal common law. This Essay offers an alternative rationale for the decision in Boyle grounded in constitutional preemption, and explains why this approach is more consistent with Justice Scalia’s broader methodological and constitutional commitments.

Justice Scalia And Sherman Act Textualism, Alan J. Meese

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay offers a defense of Justice Scalia’s approach to the Sherman Act.

Justice Scalia And Class Actions: A Loving Critique, Brian T. Fitzpatrick

Notre Dame Law Review

I am not sure any other Justice of the Supreme Court in American history has done more to hinder the class action lawsuit than Justice Scalia did. Under the auspices of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the Justice authored two majority opinions giving a green light to corporations that want to opt out of class-wide liability entirely so long as they do so using arbitration contracts. It is very hard to square these opinions with either the text or the history of the FAA.

In Part I of this Essay, I review the Justice’s class action opinions; I give special …

Justice Scalia, Implied Rights Of Action, And Historical Practice, Anthony J. Bellia

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay examines a specific area that Justice Scalia influenced through the methods of interpretation that he applied—namely, the question of “implied rights of action.”

The idea that federal courts historically applied common law causes of action to remedy federal statutory violations without congressional authorization is a myth. From the first, federal courts heard only those causes of action that Congress had authorized them to hear. And there is reason to think that early federal courts would not have been understood to have power to define their own causes of action had Congress not provided this authorization from the start. …

Tailored Judicial Selection, Dmitry Bam

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

In Defense Of Popular Elections, Former Justice Robert L. Brown

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

Judicial Elections And Issue Advertising: A Two-State Study, Christopher Terry, Mitchell T. Bard

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

Living With Judicial Elections, Raymond J. Mckoski

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

Putting Equality To A Vote: Individual Rights, Judicial Elections, And The Arkansas Supreme Court, Billy Corriher

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Law—Why Amending The Consitution To Overrule Citizens United Is The Wrong Way To Fix Campaign Finance In The United States, Zachary Hale

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

Enhanced Campaing Finance Disclosure And Recusal Rules To Offset The Influence Of Dark Money In State Supreme Court Elections, Cathy R. Silak, Emily Siess Donnellan

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

Originalism And Stare Decisis, Amy Coney Barrett

Notre Dame Law Review

The question whether stare decisis is compatible with originalism has occupied both originalists and their critics. In this Essay, I explore what light Justice Scalia’s approach to precedent casts on that question. I argue that while he did treat stare decisis as a pragmatic exception to originalism, that exception was not nearly so gaping as his “fainthearted” quip suggests. In fact, a survey of his opinions regarding precedent suggests new lines of inquiry for originalists grappling with the role of stare decisis in constitutional adjudication.

The Limits Of Reading Law In The Affordable Care Act Cases, Kevin C. Walsh

Notre Dame Law Review

Justice Scalia’s leadership moved the law of interpretation closer to the central case of statutory interpretation appropriate for our constitutional order. He thereby lawfully improved that law over the course of his judicial tenure even though—over time—this involved transforming rather than simply transmitting the law of interpretation that had been handed down to him.