Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis Of Free Speech And Corporate Personhood In Citizens United,
2010
University of Georgia School of Law
Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis Of Free Speech And Corporate Personhood In Citizens United, Anne M. Tucker
Scholarly Works
No abstract provided.
School Choice And The Challenges That Remain: A Comment On Richard D. Komer's "School Choice And State Constitutions' Religion Clauses",
2010
Notre Dame Law School
School Choice And The Challenges That Remain: A Comment On Richard D. Komer's "School Choice And State Constitutions' Religion Clauses", Richard W. Garnett
Journal Articles
Richard Komer’s paper helpfully and carefully shows that, after the Supreme Court’s 2002 ruling in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, a formidable obstacle to choice-based educational reform has been removed, and also that other, no-less-formidable obstacles remain, in the form of anti-aid provisions contained in various states’ own constitutions. This brief, appreciative Comment notes, first, that uncertainties remain about the implementation and interpretation of Zelman, and even—considering the possibility of new appointments to the Court—the decision’s fate. Next, and moving beyond the Court’s First Amendment doctrine, this Comment suggests that the effort to implement choice-based educational reform is, and will remain, as …
Copyright And The First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, Or Uneasy Allies?,
2010
Notre Dame Law School
Copyright And The First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, Or Uneasy Allies?, Joseph P. Bauer
Journal Articles
The copyright regime and the First Amendment seek to promote the same goals. Both seek the creation and dissemination of more, better, and more diverse literary, pictorial, musical and other works. But, they use significantly different means to achieve those goals. The copyright laws afford to the creator of a work the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, transform, and perform that work for an extended period of time. The First Amendment, on the other hand, proclaims that Congress "shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech or of the press," thus at least nominally indicating that limitations on the reproduction …
The Puzzle Of Brandeis, Privacy, And Speech,
2010
Washington University in St. Louis School of Law
The Puzzle Of Brandeis, Privacy, And Speech, Neil M. Richards
Scholarship@WashULaw
Most courts and scholarship assume that privacy and free speech are always in conflict, even though each of these traditions can be traced back to writings by Louis D. Brandeis – his 1890 Harvard Law Review article “The Right to Privacy” and his 1927 concurrence in Whitney v. California. How can modern notions of privacy and speech be so fundamentally opposed if Brandeis played a major role in crafting both? And how, if at all, did Brandeis recognize or address these tensions? These questions have been neglected by scholars of First Amendment law, privacy, and Brandeis. In this paper, I …
The Unsettling ‘Well-Settled’ Law Of Freedom Of Association,
2010
Washington University in St. Louis School of Law
The Unsettling ‘Well-Settled’ Law Of Freedom Of Association, John D. Inazu
Scholarship@WashULaw
This article argues that the Supreme Court’s categories of expressive and intimate association first announced in its 1984 decision, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, are neither well-settled nor defensible. These indefensible categories matter deeply to groups that have sought to maintain an unpopular composition and message in the face of antidiscrimination laws. These groups have been denied associational protections. They have been forced to change their composition - and therefore their message. They no longer exist in the form they once held and desired to maintain.
The Roberts categories of intimate and expressive association are at least partly to blame. …
The Strange Origins Of The Constitutional Right Of Association,
2010
Washington University in St. Louis School of Law
The Strange Origins Of The Constitutional Right Of Association, John D. Inazu
Scholarship@WashULaw
Although much has been written about the freedom of association and its ongoing importance to American constitutionalism, much recent scholarship mistakenly relies on a truncated history that begins with Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), the case that divided constitutional association into intimate and expressive components. Roberts’s doctrinal framework has been rightly criticized. However, neither the right of association nor all of its doctrinal problems start there. The Supreme Court’s foray into the constitutional right of association began a generation earlier with NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
This article offers a new …
