Evidence Commons^™

Facing Up To The Risks Of Automated Facial-Recognition Technologies In Indian Law Enforcement, Ameen Jauhar

Indian Journal of Law and Technology

Within the larger discourse of risk mitigation of emerging technologies, the ever-expanding deployment of automated facial recognition technology (‘AFRT’) has garnered much skepticism. In India too, there has been a reported rise of states and law enforcement officials enthusiastically resorting to the use of AFRT.

The author will first delve into some of the controversial risks associated with AFRT, analysing them through the lens of Article 21 and the principle of due process under the Indian Constitution. The paper will then identify some of the regulatory solutions that are currently part of the discourse on minimising risks of AFRT and …

Sotomayor Cites Maurer Faculty Member In Scotus’ Decline To Hear Alabama Bite Mark Case, James Owsley Boyd

Keep Up With the Latest News from the Law School (blog)

The case of an Alabama man convicted of murdering his wife in 1985 will not be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court, despite evidence that, nearly 40 years later, has been “wholly discredited.”

The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case of McCrory v. Alabama, but Justice Sonia Sotomayor cited research from Indiana University Maurer School of Law Professor Valena Beety in her concurring agreement with the court’s decision.

Charles M. McCrory was convicted for the murder of his wife, Julie Bonds, based in large part on expert testimony from an odontologist who matched McCrory’s teeth to two bite marks …

Murder On The Hearsay Trail, Jeffrey Bellin

Faculty Publications

Judges, lawyers, and law students struggle to apply American evidence law’s most distinctive feature—the hearsay prohibition. The problem is that hearsay is difficult to master and somewhat dull. At the same time, hearsay evidence is ubiquitous and important. Every litigator has a story about a judge’s eccentric hearsay rulings; mine is the trial judge who waved his hand dismissively at hearsay objections, letting witnesses answer on the grounds that “I want to hear it.” And the case law is littered with appellate opinions scolding trial judges for erroneous hearsay rulings while introducing errors of their own.

That is just the …

The Needless Search For A Founding-Era "Hearsay" Definition, Jeffrey Bellin

Faculty Publications

Modern Confrontation Clause doctrine permits only unconfronted “out-of-court statements that would have been admissible in a criminal case at the time of the founding.” To operationalize this concept, the Supreme Court identifies “testimonial hearsay” as the Clause’s primary concern. Its opinions regularly dive into the historical record to refine what counts as “testimonial” but ignore that record in defining “hearsay.” This omission cannot last. Cases in the lower courts, and one on the Court’s recent docket, concern testimonial but (arguably) non-hearsay statements. And while confrontation jurisprudence is supposed to be tied to founding-era evidence law, the “hearsay” definition, casually referenced …

Guess Who?: First-Time In-Court Identifications And Due Process, Natalie Beers

Washington and Lee Law Review

Juries believe eyewitnesses. When an identifying eyewitness takes the stand and points to a defendant in a courtroom, the jury is more likely to render a guilty verdict. But how reliable is that identification? What if the eyewitness is on the stand identifying a perpetrator for the first time, in the court room, rather than at the police station with a lineup or photo array? How do those suggestive circumstances implicate a criminal defendant’s due process rights?

First-time in-court identifications are inherently suggestive. While the Supreme Court has acknowledged the suggestive nature of similar identifications, it did not directly address …

The Brain Is In Your Court: Evaluating Intellectual Property Infringement Audience Through The Lens Of Neuroscience, Madyson Kent

Washington and Lee Law Review

To protect creations of the mind, the law needs to understand the mind. Thankfully, the rapidly emerging field of neuroscience provides an invaluable glimpse into the inner workings of the human brain. Now that scientific instruments provide a window into the living brain, it is time to reexamine the way intellectual property law decides the outcomes of infringement lawsuits.

Critically examining neuroscience in the context of the law helps to answer the most fundamental question in an intellectual property lawsuit: Was there infringement? A judicial hesitancy to understand the thought processes of artists and creators results in relying on the …

The Needless Search For A Founding-Era "Hearsay" Definition, Jeffrey Bellin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Modern Confrontation Clause doctrine permits only unconfronted "out-of-court statements that would have been admissible in a criminal case at the time of the founding." To operationalize this concept, the Supreme Court identifies "testimonial hearsay" as the Clause's primary concern. Its opinions regularly dive into the historical record to refine what counts as "testimonial" but ignore that record in defining "hearsay." This omission cannot last. Cases in the lower courts, and one on the Court's recent docket, concern testimonial but (arguably) non-hearsay statements. And while confrontation jurisprudence is supposed to be tied to founding-era evidence law, the "hearsay" definition, casually referenced …

Confrontation, The Legacy Of Crawford, And Important Unanswered Questions, Paul F. Rothstein, Ronald J. Coleman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The right to confront has a long history. In the United States, the Confrontation Clause provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right… to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]” One of the most troublesome areas of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has been the Clause’s application to “hearsay statements offered against a criminal defendant pursuant to a hearsay exception or exemption[.]” The Supreme Court’s confrontation analysis in this situation once hinged on the statement’s reliability, with the traditional hearsay rule and its exceptions and exemptions as a guide. But in Crawford v. Washington, the Court considered …

Washington Civil Jury Trials Via Zoom: Perspectives From The Bench, Marisa Pasnick

Washington Law Review

Many professions have felt the impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, including the legal field. At the onset of COVID-19, many courthouses closed and trials halted, but as the pandemic continued, the need to resume judicial proceedings led courts to turn to virtual platforms to conduct civil jury trials. This Comment examines the response of judges in Washington State to the use of Zoom for conducting civil jury trials. Interviews with judges across Washington reveal a stark contrast in opinions among judges in different districts as well as within districts. This Comment answers the question of how judges feel about …

Getting Around The Marking Requirement: Closing The Loophole On Damages, Ethan Buresh

UMKC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Needless Search For A Founding-Era "Hearsay" Definition, Jeffrey Bellin

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Modern Confrontation Clause doctrine permits only unconfronted “out-of-court statements that would have been admissible in a criminal case at the time of the founding.” To operationalize this concept, the Supreme Court identifies “testimonial hearsay” as the Clause’s primary concern. Its opinions regularly dive into the historical record to refine what counts as “testimonial” but ignore that record in defining “hearsay.” This omission cannot last. Cases in the lower courts, and one on the Court’s recent docket, concern testimonial but (arguably) non-hearsay statements. And while confrontation jurisprudence is supposed to be tied to founding-era evidence law, the “hearsay” definition, casually referenced …

Authenticating Social Media Evidence In Chinese Criminal Procedure Law -- A Comparative Study, Yage Huang

Maurer Theses and Dissertations

Authentication requires the proponent to provide sufficient proof that the proposed social media evidence is, indeed, what it is claimed to be. The rapid proliferation of social media evidence has posed significant challenges for its authentication. This dissertation explores the authentication challenges for social media evidence in a comprehensive manner.

This research employs a qualitative research methodology, including theoretical and analytical methods, to examine the theoretical approaches, statutory provisions, and recent judicial rulings related to the authentication of social media evidence within the legal frameworks of China and the United States. Through a comparative analysis, this study reveals significant commonalities …

The Modern Energizer Bunny - Hopping Into The Nuclear Energy Revolution: The Tenth Circuit's Analysis In New Mexico Ex Rel. Balderas V. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Jack A. Mansur

Villanova Environmental Law Journal (1991 - )

No abstract provided.

Virtual Confessions: Examining The Clergy Privilege’S Extension To Artificially Intelligent Religious Robots, Samuel N. Dick

The University of Cincinnati Intellectual Property and Computer Law Journal

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is fundamentally changing the world. AI’s rapid development is driving its integration into every industry, including those traditionally untouched by technology—such as religion. Today, faith groups in America and globally, are integrating AI-driven robots in roles traditionally held by human priests, clergy, or pastors. AI robots have begun giving sermons, conducting funerals/weddings, providing spiritual counseling, and conducting the sacrament of confession. Some faith groups have gone further claiming the worship of AI as an independent religion, and have received § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status as a church. Whether thoughts of sacrileges, inevitability, or a science-fiction novel emerge, AI’s …

Standing And Criminal Law, F. Andrew Hessick, Sarah A. Benecky

BYU Law Review

According to the Supreme Court, the “irreducible constitutional minimum of Article III standing” is a concrete, particularized injury in fact that is traceable to the defendant and redressable by a favorable judgment. But this set of requirements does not apply in criminal cases. The federal government has authority to bring prosecutions for any violation of federal criminal law, regardless of whether the crime caused concrete harm to the United States or anyone else, and even though the punishment for the crime does not redress an injury in any conventional sense.

This Article argues that the difference in standing requirements between …

Gatekeeping & Class Certification: The Eleventh Circuit’S Stringent Approach To Admitting Expert Evidence In Support Of Class Certification, Pravin Patel, Mark Pinkert, Patrick Lyons

University of Miami Law Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is silent on whether evidence offered in support of a motion for class certification must be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, and there is currently no authoritative framework for incorporating all or some of the federal evidentiary rules into the class certification process. Resultantly, circuit courts are split on this question and have coalesced among several different approaches. The Eleventh Circuit follows a rigorous evidentiary standard in which evidence offered in support of class certification generally must be admissible under the Federal Rules of …

Computationally Assessing Suspicion, Wesley M. Oliver, Morgan A. Gray, Jaromir Savelka, Kevin D. Ashley

University of Cincinnati Law Review

Law enforcement officers performing drug interdiction on interstate highways have to decide nearly every day whether there is reasonable suspicion to detain motorists until a trained dog can sniff for the presence of drugs. The officers’ assessments are often wrong, however, and lead to unnecessary detentions of innocent persons and the suppression of drugs found on guilty ones. We propose a computational method of evaluating suspicion in these encounters and offer experimental results from early efforts demonstrating its feasibility. With the assistance of large language and predictive machine learning models, it appears that judges, advocates, and even police officers could …

Judges Should Be Discerning Consensus, Not Evaluating Scientific Expertise, David S. Caudill, Harry Collins, Robert Evans

University of Cincinnati Law Review

One of the most constructive critiques of the Daubert admissibility regime is Professor Edward Cheng’s recent proposal for a new Consensus Rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rejecting the notion that judges and juries have the capacity to evaluate scientific expertise, Cheng’s proposal would eliminate Daubert hearings—and judicial gatekeeping concerning expert testimony—and require judges and juries, in their verdicts, to follow consensus in the relevant scientific community. Significantly, Cheng argues that judges and juries would have an easier time identifying consensus than they have in deciding between experts who disagree.

We find Cheng’s emphasis on consensus compelling, and …

Deepfakes Reach The Advisory Committee On Evidence Rules, Daniel J. Capra

Fordham Law Review

A number of articles have been written in the last couple of years about the evidentiary challenges posed by “deepfakes”—inauthentic videos and audios generated by artificial intelligence (AI) in such a way as to appear to be genuine. You are probably aware of some of the widely distributed examples, such as: (1) Pope Francis wearing a Balenciaga jacket; (2) Jordan Peele’s video showing President Barack Obama speaking and saying things that President Obama never said; (3) Nancy Pelosi speaking while appearing to be intoxicated; and (4) Robert DeNiro’s de-aging in The Irishman.

The evidentiary risk posed by deepfakes is …

Eliminating Rule 609 To Provide A Fair Opportunity To Defend Against Criminal Charges: A Proposal To The Advisory Committee On The Federal Rules Of Evidence, Jeffrey Bellin

Faculty Publications

Federal Rule of Evidence 609 authorizes the admission of prior convictions to impeach criminal defendants who testify. And in this important and uniquely damaging application, the [r]ule’s logic fails, distorting American trials and depriving defendants of a fair opportunity to defend against the charges. The Advisory Committee [on Evidence Rules (the “Advisory Committee”)] should propose the elimination of Rule 609 and prohibit cross-examination with specific instances of a criminal defendant’s past conduct when those instances are unrelated to the defendant’s testimony and unconnected to the case.

This short essay begins by setting out the proposed rule change alongside a proposed …