Constitutional Law Commons^™

Rethinking Juror Impartiality, Anna Offit

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Jury impartiality in the contemporary court often justifies the perpetuation

of exclusionary selection practices that make juries more—not less—biased.

This Article calls for a rethinking of this important but flawed concept. Constitutional

interpretations and conceptions of “impartiality” frame it as a transient

orientation toward particular evidence or parties. Yet, during voir dire, the prevailing

conception of jury impartiality is that it is an immutable character trait

that must be discovered—if not created—by professional legal actors. What voir

dire creates is not an impartial jury, but precisely the opposite: a venire shaped

by the strategic biases of lawyers.

This Article offers …

Constitutional Theory And The Problem Of Disagreement, J. Joel Alicea

Scholarly Articles

For decades, constitutional theory has been haunted by the problem of disagreement: the reality that we are deeply divided on fundamental questions of justice and the good society. Theorists have generally responded to the problem of disagreement in one of two ways. One approach minimizes the extent to which constitutional theories rely on controversial moral premises and instead grounds constitutional theories in widely endorsed social practices. The other generally discards any social practices that reflect disagreement with the controversial moral views that the theorist holds.

Neither approach is sound. Constitutional theory requires both controversial moral claims and attention to social …

The Natural Law Moment In Constitutional Theory, J. Joel Alicea

Scholarly Articles

Something new is happening in American constitutional theory. Never before have so many legal scholars sought to ground constitutional theory in the natural-law tradition. Indeed, we can truly say that we are living through a natural-law moment in constitutional theory, a period of unprecedented interest in natural law among constitutional theorists. This immediately calls to mind three questions. First: how, if at all, are the theorists of this moment different from prior theorists who sought to ground constitutional theory in natural law? Second: what explains the rise of natural law in American constitutional theory? Third: what are the implications for …

Originalism And Truth-Telling: A Reply To Stephen Sachs, J. Joel Alicea

Scholarly Articles

Sachs focuses on my claim that a theory of constitutional adjudication needs to make a moral argument that justifies telling judges why they ought to decide constitutional disputes in a particular way rather than in some other way. Why be an originalist, for example, rather than a common-law constitutionalist? In answering that question, a theory of constitutional adjudication cannot depend exclusively on a positivist, descriptive account of what the law is—even if Sachs correctly identifies originalism as the law— because knowing that originalism is the “law” (in a positivist sense of “law”) does not tell us why anyone ought to …

‘Cruel And Unusual’ In 1689, 1791, And 1868: Shifts In Incorporation, Gregory Velloze

UC Law Constitutional Quarterly

Recently, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the scholarly debate over whether to apply the historical understanding of the Bill of Rights as ratified in 1791 or as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. This acknowledgment raises two important issues with regards to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. First, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was copied from the English Bill of Rights in 1689, generating a third, additional time period relevant to its historical understanding. Second, the more textualist framework of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause allows for more relatively bounded language and interpretation, which could remain …

Editor-In-Chief’S Foreword, Megan Stupi

UC Law Constitutional Quarterly

No abstract provided.

Beyond Agency Authority: Regulating Sulfur Hexafluoride Under An Enhanced Title Ii Framework Of The Clean Air Act, Matthew Gawley

Fordham Environmental Law Review

This paper explores the critical need for robust Congressional action to regulate sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), a greenhouse gas with a global warming potential more than 20,000 times greater than carbon dioxide. Recent Supreme Court decisions––in West Virginia v. EPA and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo––to restrict EPA authority and end the Chevron doctrine have curtailed federal environmental agencies’ regulatory authority, shifting the responsibility for addressing major environmental challenges back to Congress. Despite being addressed under Title I of the Clean Air Act (CAA) through the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), current SF6 regulations prove grossly inadequate. The utilities industry––the largest …

Kobaliya V. Russia: Curtailing Civil Society Through Labels Of Foreign Influence., Alida Blendonohy

Human Rights Brief

In a January 2025 judgment, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) held in the case of Kobaliya and Others v. Russia that the application of Russia’s foreign agent legislation violated Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the European Con­vention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) which pro­tect the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of association, and respect for private and family life.

In Kobaliya, the ECtHR assessed Russia’s foreign agent legislation, its evolution since 2012, and its increasing restrictiveness. In its initial 2012 enactment, the law applied to nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) that participated in political activity with foreign funding, …

A Silence After Slaughter-House: Nineteenth-Century State Constitutional Substantive Rights, Liberties, And Privileges, Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes

Faculty Publications

In rejecting federal constitutional challenges to the Louisiana legislature’s exclusive butchering grant in the Slaughter-House Cases, the United States Supreme Court opined that it was the states’ obligation to protect fundamental privileges, such as rights to acquire and possess property, engage in trade and commerce, and pursue happiness, subject only to those restraints necessary for the public good. But the states met this charge with silence. State courts across the nation consistently parroted Slaughter-House’s reasoning, even while occasionally acknowledging the decision did not bind their interpretation of state constitutional provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights, liberties, privileges, and immunities. Although two states …

303 Creative, Exclusive Private Enforcement, And Blue-State Revenge, Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Howard W. Wasserman

Faculty Publications

Red states have made exclusive private enforcement schemes targeting locally unpopular but constitutionally protected conduct a cornerstone of culture-war legal strategy. Laws such the Texas Heartbeat Act (“S.B. 8”) in 2021 and anti-“WOKE” laws forego public enforcement in favor of private enforcement; this precludes federal rights-holders from vindicating their rights through pre-enforcement offensive litigation in federal court against the government or government officials responsible for enforcing the law. This threatens rights-holders with defending a state-court wave of costly and burdensome litigation to adjudicate the law’s constitutional validity.

Blue states and liberal scholars and advocates have sought a progressive counterpart targeting …

The Political Question Of Public Lands, Ryan A. Semerad

Wyoming Law Review

The Property Clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution provides: “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” Thus, among other things, the Constitution assigns the disposal of federally owned lands to Congress alone. That means the other branches of the federal government, including the courts, have no jurisdiction to exercise this power or to compel Congress to use it. Put another way, when Congress does not dispose of public lands through sale or transfer, that inaction is not subject to …

Decentral Intelligence Agency: The Law And Autonomous Artificial Intelligence, Dr. Andrew W. Torrance , Ph. D., Dr. Bill Tomlinson , Ph.D.

Touro Law Review

Artificial intelligence (“AI”) is rapidly gaining autonomy across a range of domains, such as business, education, social relationships, and warfare. This article examines the legal and policy implications of autonomous AI agents, a rapidly evolving technology that challenges existing regulatory frameworks. Drawing from tort, agency, property, contract, privacy, human rights, and constitutional law, we propose a comprehensive approach to govern these increasingly independent entities. Our analysis begins with a historical perspective, tracing both the evolution of autonomous computational systems and of legal responses to such technologies. We then conduct a comparative study of AI governance across jurisdictions, highlighting regulatory gaps …

“Digital Integrity”: Defending The Judicial Integrity In The Digital Age, Guy Alon, Doron Menashe, Guy Itzhak Sender

Touro Law Review

Recent revelations have shown that the protection of the Fourth Amendment in the digital age is inadequate. Despite well-known exclusionary rules regarding evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure, current trends in the digital age and the law of evidence resulted in courts that tend to include such evidence, and by doing so, create significant risk of both substantive and procedural errors and hence increase the potential for wrongful convictions. To address the matter and try to empower and modernize the protection given by the Fourth Amendment, this article suggests performing a revolution in the law of evidence in the …

Variable Standards: How Many Uninjured Class Members Are Acceptable?, Tom Flesher

Touro Law Review

Purchasers of canned tuna filed a class action against tuna producers after a price-fixing scheme raised prices above competitive levels. To be certified, a class must include only members who have suffered an injury, in this case by paying a higher price than they would have in the absence of price-fixing, but it was difficult to identify which plaintiffs were uninjured and should be excluded. Dueling statistical models failed to resolve this uncertainty, with one model suggesting up to one in every three class members was not injured at all. The Ninth Circuit nonetheless allowed this class to be certified, …

Loopholes Of Liberty: The Supreme Court’S Evisceration Of The Fourth Amendment, David J. Looney

Touro Law Review

The Fourth Amendment’s protections against unwarranted government intrusion are currently undermined by the Supreme Court’s third party and open fields doctrines, which permit warrantless access to shared data and private land beyond a home’s curtilage, clashing with the Amendment’s aim to safeguard privacy and property in an era of advanced surveillance. These doctrines enable arbitrary governmental overreach, necessitating urgent review to restore constitutional protections. Rooted in Enlightenment principles, the Fourth Amendment historically protected “papers” and “effects” from physical trespass, as seen in Boyd v. United States. Katz v. United States introduced a “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, but its subjective …

Article Iii Standing For Cercla Private Cost Recovery Actions: How The Test's Strained Logic Belies Its Authority, Jonathan M. Palacios

Fordham Environmental Law Review

This Note examines how Article III standing doctrine applies to

private plaintiffs’ cost recovery actions under § 107(a)(4)(B) of the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act. A review of judicial decisions reveals inconsistencies

in the analysis of injury in fact and traceability, and suggests that

current Article III standing doctrine is misaligned with its purported

objectives. In response, this Note proposes a structured framework

for assessing injury in fact and a refined approach to analyzing

traceability that distinguishes between different forms of causal

uncertainty. These doctrinal adjustments should better align case

outcomes with Article III standing doctrine’s constitutional and …

The Challenge That The Advent Of Artificial Intelligence (Ai) Tools Poses To The Procedures For Determining The Existence Of The Preliminary Facts That Condition The Admissibility Of Items Of Evidence, Edward J. Imwinkelried

Marquette Law Review

“[A]d quæstionem facti non respondent judices; . . . ad quæstionem juris not respondent juratores.” Judges do not answer questions of fact; jurors do not answer questions of law.

The jury is a central institution in the American level infrastructure. The Sixth and Seventh Amendments elevate the jury trial right to constitutional status. Of course, when a judge presides at a jury trial, the question that naturally arises is the division of decision-making labor between judge and jury. In the past few decades, the Supreme Court’s Apprendi v. New Jersey line of authority has expanded the jury’s authority to decide …

Don’T Trust The Process: The Viability Of Eighth Amendment Claims For Ultra-Processed Food Overconsumption In Prisons, Markus C. Johnson, Rita L. Rahoi-Gilchrest

Marquette Law Review

With the largest prison population worldwide, American prisons serve more food than anywhere else. To cut costs, American prisons overwhelmingly (or even entirely) serve prisoners ultra-processed foods, which, if overconsumed, have detrimental and long-lasting health effects. Prisoners taking issue with the food being served to them rely on the courts to counteract any inappropriate prison dietary practices, wielding the Eighth Amendment as a constitutional guarantee to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. But courts are failing to protect this constitutional guarantee by relying on precedent that is at odds with modern Eighth Amendment principles. Indeed, when it comes to …

Substituting One Judge For Another: The Lax Standard Of Review In Involuntary Commitment, Caitlin Riordan

Marquette Law Review

Wisconsin involuntarily commits individuals at a rate nearly five times the national average, stripping them of core constitutional rights—including liberty, the ability to refuse treatment, and firearm possession. Yet, when these life-altering orders are appealed, they are almost always reviewed by a single appellate judge. This Comment argues that such a limited review undermines the constitutional weight of involuntary commitments, which closely mirror criminal convictions in the scope of rights deprived. Tracing the historical development of Wisconsin’s civil commitment statutes, this Comment demonstrates how commitments implicate both substantive and procedural due process concerns. It then compares Wisconsin’s one-judge review framework …

Church Autonomy, Textualism, And Originalism: Scotus’’S Use Of History To Give Definition To Church Autonomy Doctrine, Carl H. Esbeck

Marquette Law Review

Church autonomy is a First Amendment doctrine altogether distinct from the more familiar causes of action brought under the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. The principle of church autonomy was first recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in the post-Civil War case Watson v. Jones, holding that civil courts must not be drawn into resolving religious questions or settling disputes over church polity. And early this century, in the unanimous decision Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the theory of church autonomy took on its most fully developed form as a constitutional immunity …