Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Constitutional Law Commons™

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

35,018 Full-Text Articles 21,017 Authors 34,841,374 Downloads 250 Institutions

All Articles in Constitutional Law

Faceted Search

35,018 full-text articles. Page 902 of 902.

Constructing The Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution Of Federalist 10, Ian C. Bartrum 2010 University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law

Constructing The Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution Of Federalist 10, Ian C. Bartrum

Scholarly Works

This paper is part of larger symposium convened for the 2010 AALS annual meeting. In it the author adapts some of his earlier constitutional theoretical work to engage the topic of that symposium: the so-called “interpretation/construction distinction.” The author makes two related criticisms of the distinction: (1) it relies on a flawed conception of linguistic meaning, and (2) while these flaws may be harmless in the “easy” cases of interpretation, they are much more problematic in the difficult cases of most concern. Thus, the author doubts the ultimate utility of the distinction as part of a “true and correct” model …


Book Review: "The Lost History Of The Ninth Amendment", Thomas B. McAffee 2010 University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law

Book Review: "The Lost History Of The Ninth Amendment", Thomas B. Mcaffee

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.


The Treatment Of Isolationist Minorities, Gabriel Rauterberg 2010 Columbia Law School

The Treatment Of Isolationist Minorities, Gabriel Rauterberg

Faculty Scholarship

This Note examines what may be the most radical challenge posed by religious subcultures to the liberal politics of modern industrial nations – that of isolationist, nonliberal ( or even illiberal) religious minorities. These subcultures do not seek to integrate with mainstream society or gain power within it, but to withdraw in order to maintain norms widely discrepant from those that are socially dominant. They often seek to place restrictions upon their own members' freedom or activities, in part to maintain the group's differences from the greater society. These cultures, characterized by features as distinctive as collective property ownership, pacificism, …


Who Judges? Who Cares? History Now And Then, Barbara Aronstein Black 2010 Columbia University Law School

Who Judges? Who Cares? History Now And Then, Barbara Aronstein Black

Faculty Scholarship

There are two strands of history: Call them strand A and strand B. A: "How independent are those who judge?" B: "Where is the judicial power located?" At a high enough level of abstraction the strands merge (as, at a high enough level of abstraction, what does not?). The issue then becomes whether in a given society all judging is in the hands of independent judges. And the point is that there are two ways of avoiding the decision of cases by independent judges, corresponding, naturally, to the two strands of history:

[A] Through the judges: Punish them, reward them, …


Proportionality: An Assault On Human Rights: A Reply, Madhav Khosla 2010 Columbia Law School

Proportionality: An Assault On Human Rights: A Reply, Madhav Khosla

Faculty Scholarship

In a recent article in I•CON, Stavros Tsakyrakis presents a passionate critique of the proportionality test. Tsakyrakis regards proportionality as an illusory attempt to infuse objectivity into rights adjudication. Moreover, he posits that it necessitates weighing public interests against individual rights. Proportionality has emerged, globally, as the leading framework for evaluating rights violations. It serves as the uniform standard of rights review in jurisdictions as diverse as Israel, Germany, Canada, and South Africa. Remarkably, recent opinions by Justice Stephen Breyer of the United States Supreme Court indicate that the approach is gaining currency within America's constitutional jurisprudence. Considering proportionality's …


Completing Caperton And Clarifying Common Sense Through Using The Right Standard For Constitutional Judicial Recusal, Jeffrey W. Stempel 2010 University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law

Completing Caperton And Clarifying Common Sense Through Using The Right Standard For Constitutional Judicial Recusal, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the U.S. Supreme Court vacated a state supreme court decision in which a justice who had received $3 million in campaign support from a litigant cast the deciding vote to relieve the litigant of a $50 million liability. The Court reached this result, one I view as compelled by common sense, through a 5-4 vote, with the dissenters, led by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia, minimizing the danger of biased judging presented by the situation and questioning the practical feasibility of the Court's approach as well as the wisdom of …


Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!? Giving Adequate Attention To Failings Of Judicial Impartiality, Jeffrey W. Stempel 2010 University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law

Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!? Giving Adequate Attention To Failings Of Judicial Impartiality, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), the Supreme Court by a 5-4 vote vacated and remanded a decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in which Justice Brent Benjamin cast the deciding vote in favor of Massey, a company run by Don Blankenship, who had provided $3 million in support to Benjamin during his 2004 election campaign.

Despite the unsavory taste of the entire episode, the Court was excessively careful not to criticize Justice Benjamin. Overlooked because of this undue judicial civility and controversy about the constitutional aspects of the decision …


Ordinary Administrative Law As Constitutional Common Law, Gillian E. Metzger 2010 Columbia Law School

Ordinary Administrative Law As Constitutional Common Law, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

Henry Monaghan famously argued that much of constitutional interpretation takes the form of what he termed constitutional common law, a body of doctrines and rules that are constitutionally inspired but not constitutionally required and that can be altered or reversed by Congress. This Essay argues that a fair amount of ordinary administrative law qualifies as constitutional common law: Constitutional concerns permeate core administrative law doctrines and requirements, yet Congress enjoys broad power to alter ordinary administrative law notwithstanding its constitutional aspect. Unfortunately, the constitutional common law character of much of ordinary administrative law is rarely acknowledged by courts. A striking …


Judicial Elections As Popular Constitutionalism, David E. Pozen 2010 Columbia Law School

Judicial Elections As Popular Constitutionalism, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

One of the most important recent developments in American legal theory is the burgeoning interest in "popular constitutionalism." One of the most important features of the American legal system is the selection of state judges – judges who resolve thousands of state and federal constitutional questions each year – by popular election. Although a large literature addresses each of these subjects, scholarship has rarely bridged the two. Hardly anyone has evaluated judicial elections in light of popular constitutionalism, or vice versa.

This Article undertakes that thought experiment. Conceptualizing judicial elections as instruments of popular constitutionalism, the Article aims to show, …


The So-Called Right To Privacy, Jamal Greene 2010 Columbia Law School

The So-Called Right To Privacy, Jamal Greene

Faculty Scholarship

The constitutional right to privacy has been a conservative bugaboo ever since Justice Douglas introduced it into the United States Reports in Griswold v. Connecticut. Reference to the "so-called" right to privacy has become code for the view that the right is doctrinally recognized but not in fact constitutionally enshrined. This Article argues that the constitutional right to privacy is no more. The two rights most associated historically with the right to privacy are abortion and intimate sexual conduct, yet Gonzales v. Carhart and Lawrence v. Texas made clear that neither of these rights is presently justified by its …


Constitutionalising An Overlapping Consensus: The Ecj And The Emergence Of A Coordinate Constitutional Order, Charles F. Sabel, Oliver H. Gerstenberg 2010 Columbia Law School

Constitutionalising An Overlapping Consensus: The Ecj And The Emergence Of A Coordinate Constitutional Order, Charles F. Sabel, Oliver H. Gerstenberg

Faculty Scholarship

The European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) jurisprudence of fundamental rights in cases such as Schmidberger and Omega extends the court's jurisdiction in ways that compete with that of Member States in matters of visceral concern. And just as the Member States require a guarantee that the ECJ respect fundamental rights rooted in national tradition, so the ECJ insists that international organisations respect rights constitutive of the EU. The demand of such guarantees reproduces between the ECJ and the international order the kinds of conflicting jurisdictional claims that have shadowed the relation between the ECJ and the courts of the Member …


Faithful Agent, Integrative, And Welfarist Interpretation, Thomas W. Merrill 2010 Columbia Law School

Faithful Agent, Integrative, And Welfarist Interpretation, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

We are in the midst of a series of lively debates about how to interpret enacted laws such as written constitutions and statutes. In constitutional law, there is a spirited clash between "originalists" and "nonoriginalists". In the statutory arena, we have a three-way battle between "textualists," "intentionalists", and "pragmatists." A common feature of these contending schools is an insistence on a single, correct approach to interpretation. In this respect, however, each of these rival theories deviates from the Practice of interpretation. Real world interpreters – to a person – deploy a variety of interpretative methods when they seek to resolve …


Skelos V. Paterson: The Surprisingly Strong Case For The Governor's Surprising Power To Appoint A Lieutenant Governor, Richard Briffault 2010 Columbia Law School

Skelos V. Paterson: The Surprisingly Strong Case For The Governor's Surprising Power To Appoint A Lieutenant Governor, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

On July 8, 2009, Governor David Paterson surprised New York's legal and political world by announcing his intention to appoint Richard Ravitch to fill the vacancy in the office of lieutenant governor. No New York governor had ever appointed a lieutenant governor before. Paterson's action was widely denounced as unauthorized and unconstitutional. Four months later, observers were even more astonished when the Court of Appeals in Skelos v. Paterson upheld the governor's action. This article explains why the governor and Court of Appeals were right to conclude that the governor had statutory and constitutional authority for his action. Indeed, the …


Guns, Originalism, And Cultural Cognition, Jamal Greene 2010 Columbia Law School

Guns, Originalism, And Cultural Cognition, Jamal Greene

Faculty Scholarship

In a legal regime whose canonical text is Marbury v. Madison, it should be unremarkable that the Supreme Court's actions are bounded rather severely by public opinion. What makes the proposition remarkable – enough to be well worth Barry Friedman's time – is also what makes Marbury remarkable: namely, that judges so often go out of their way to deny it. Though not unheard of, it is rare for a judge to advertise that the content of a constitutional rule she is announcing is motivated by public opinion. Such an admission would be self-defeating, since it invites the charge …


Digital Commons powered by bepress