Common Law Commons^™

Debunking The Myth That Insurance Coverage Is Not Available Or Allowed For Intentional Torts Or Damages, Christopher French

Faculty Scholarship

Over the years, a myth has developed that insurance coverage is not available or allowed for intentional injuries or damage. This myth has two primary bases: one, the “fortuity” doctrine, which provides that insurance should only cover losses that happen by chance; and two, public policy, which allegedly disfavors allowing insurance for intentional injuries or damage. This article dispels that myth. Many types of liability insurance policies expressly cover intentional torts including trademark infringement, copyright infringement, invasion of privacy, defamation, disparagement, and improper employment practices such as discrimination. In addition, punitive damages, which typically are awarded for intentional misconduct, are …

Three Principles For Federal Housing Policy, David Reiss

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Legal Medievalism In Lex Mercatoria Scholarship, Ralf Michaels

Faculty Scholarship

This short reaction piece to an article by Emily Kadens asks why a long-refuted story of an alleged uniform medieval lex mercatoria is still being maintained. The answer is that the story serves not as an actual history but instead as a foundation myth. Attempts to falsify the myth with historical data are therefore futile: the myth derives its value not from its truth value but from its symbolic power.

Quasi-Property: Like, But Not Quite Property, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

Faculty Scholarship

Quasi-property interests refer to situations in which the law seeks to simulate the idea of exclusion, normally associated with property rights, through a relational liability regime, by focusing on the nature and circumstances of the interaction in question, which is thought to merit a highly circumscribed form of exclusion. In this Article, I unpack the analytical and normative bases of quasi-property interests, examine the primary triggering events that cause courts to invoke the category, and respond to potential objections to the recognition of quasi-property as an independent category of interests in the law.

Codifying Custom, Timothy Meyer

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Codifying decentralized forms of law, such as the common law and customary law, has been a cornerstone of the positivist turn in legal theory since at least the nineteenth century. Commentators laud codification’s purported virtues, including systematizing, centralizing, and clarifying the law. These attributes are thought to increase the general welfare of those subject to legal rules, and therefore to justify and explain codification. The codification literature, however, overlooks codification’s distributive consequences. In so doing, the literature misses the primary motive for codification: to define legal rules in a way that advantages individual codifying institutions, regardless of how codification affects …

Necessity Defense To Felon-In-Possession Charges: The Third Circuit Justifies A Federal Justification Defense In Virgin Islands V. Lewis, Kathryn Maza

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

The article presents information on the conceptions of morality and justice and the maximization of social welfare. The defense of necessity, its common law justification and the recognition of federal justification defense are discussed. The decisions made by the Third Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals in the trial of Virgin Islands v. Lewis, the judicial duty and the justification doctrine are also discussed.

Response: There Is No Common Law Of Severability, Kevin C. Walsh

Scholarly Articles

In this solicited response to The New General Common Law of Severability, I first offer an interpretation of Ayotte and subsequent Supreme Court decisions as continuous with existing doctrine instead of a departure from it. I then suggest that much of Scoville’s evidence for a federalization of severability doctrine is better viewed as evidence of doctrinal looseness rather than of doctrinal change. I conclude by returning to the lessons of severability’s doctrinal history, suggesting that the prehistory of severability doctrine may supply a better guide for how courts should deal with problems of partial unconstitutionality in the future.

American Electricpower V. Connecticut: Disaster Averted By Displacing The Federal Common Law Of Nuisance, Damian M. Brychey

Georgia Law Review

Historically, the federal common law of nuisance has
provided a means to regulate interstate pollution. With
the passing of legislative acts such as the Clean Water Act
and the Clean Air Act, however, traditional federal
nuisance lawsuits were displaced. The continued viability
of the federal common law of nuisance to regulate
pollution, specifically greenhouse gases, was brought to
the forefront of American jurisprudence in American
Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut. There, the Supreme
Court held that the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions the
Act authorizes displace any federal common law right to
seek abatement of greenhouse gases-reversing the …

Embracing Administrative Common Law, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

This Foreword begins with the descriptive claim that much of administrative law is really administrative common law: doctrines and requirements that are largely judicially created, as opposed to those specified by Congress, the President, or individual agencies. Although governing statutes exert some constraining force on judicial creativity, the primary basis of these judge-fashioned doctrines lies in judicial conceptions of appropriate institutional roles, along with pragmatic and normative concerns, that are frequently constitutionally infused and developed incrementally through precedent. Yet the judicially created character of administrative law is rarely acknowledged and often condemned by courts.

Turning from descriptive to more normative, …

The Evolution Of The Common Law And Efficiency, Nuno Garoupa, Carlos Liguerre

Faculty Scholarship

The efficiency of the common law hypothesis has generated a large bulk of literature in the last decades. The main argument is that there is an implicit economic logic to the common law; the doctrines in common law provide a coherent and consistent system of incentives which induce efficient behavior.

We start by observing that if the common law is overall evolutionarily efficient, we are left with no explanation for the important doctrinal differences across common law jurisdictions. The observation is more striking if we keep in mind that presumably the de jure initial condition was the same, namely English …

The Uncertain Future Of "Hot News" Misappropriation After Barclays Capital V. Theflyonthewall.Com, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

Faculty Scholarship

In this Essay, I attempt to disaggregate the Second Circuit’s decision in Barclays Capital to show that while the court may have reached the right conclusion in the end (a position I have argued for previously), its reasoning to reach that conclusion is rather confusing, while at the same time a rich source of information about the future of hot news doctrine. At every stage of its analysis, the Second Circuit went to significant lengths to cabin the reach of the doctrine quite considerably, despite reiterating that it was not abrogating it altogether. In analyzing the opinion, I thus consider …

Reason, The Common Law, And The Living Constitution (Review Of The Living Constitution By David Strauss), Matthew J. Steilen

Book Reviews

This article reviews David Strauss’s recent book, The Living Constitution. The thesis of Strauss’s book is that constitutional law is a kind of common law, based largely on judicial precedent and common-sense judgments about what works and what is fair. Strauss argues constitutional doctrines prohibiting discrimination and protecting free speech have a common law basis, and that the originalist would have to reject them. However, it is unclear that the common law can justify these rights. This review examines Strauss’s account of the common law and shows why it cannot justify our First Amendment protections of subversive advocacy, as Strauss …

Retrying The Acquitted In England Part Iii: Prosecution Appeals Against Judges' Rulings Of "No Case To Answer", David S. Rudstein

San Diego International Law Journal

The Order in Council permitting the prosecution appeal of "Mo" Courtney's acquittal and allowing him to be retried for the same offense of which he had previously been acquitted stems from the Criminal Justice Act 2003. That Act, which applies in England and Wales, grants the government the right to appeal certain rulings by the trial judge in criminal prosecutions on an indictment, including a ruling that there is no case to answer, i.e., a directed verdict of acquittal, and if the appeal is successful, allows the reviewing court to order that the acquitted defendant?s trial be resumed or that …

Joint Bank Accounts In New York: Confusion, Discrimination, And The Need For Change, Carolyn Satenberg

Cardozo Public Law, Policy & Ethics Journal

The note argues that New York's legal presumption of joint tenancy in joint bank accounts disproportionately burdens same-sex couples, leading to unfair gift and estate tax implications. It advocates for reforming New York's approach to align with the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which better reflects depositor intent and reduces discrimination. The current system, compounded by federal policies like the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), exacerbates financial and emotional hardships for same-sex couples in tax and probate matters.

Shedding Light On Shady Grove: Further Reflections On The Erie Doctrine From A Conflicts Perspective, Joseph P. Bauer

Journal Articles

This Article, a contribution to the Notre Dame Law Review symposium issue on the Supreme Court’s recent Shady Grove decision, is a follow-up to an article published in the same journal eleven years ago, in which I suggested that the Erie doctrine could be usefully informed by drawing on caselaw and jurisprudence from the horizontal choice of law setting. Shady Grove addressed the question of whether a New York state law, barring the assertion of claims for statutory damages, was binding in an action brought in the federal courts, or whether Federal Rule 23, which does not contain a similar …

The Right And Wrong Of “Knowing Receipt” In The Law Of Restitution, Tiong Min Yeo

2009 Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture

One distinctive feature of the common law system is its duality. No legal analysis is complete without considering both the rules of common law and the principles of equity. Civilians (non-lawyers in common law countries and lawyers from civil law countries) struggle to understand why there are two systems of justice in the legal discourse and how they interact with one another. The trite proposition that equity prevails whenever there is a conflict belies the complexity of the relationship. The other distinctive feature is that much of the law continues to be made in the courts rather than by legislation. …

When The Restatement Is Not A Restatement: The Curious Case Of The "Flagrant Trespasser", David Logan

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Finding Possession: Labor, Waste And The Evolution Of Property, Jill M. Fraley

Scholarly Articles

Although possession has long been intimately linked to labor, recent historical work on land claims during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries suggests that the clash of divergent legal cultures of possession drove the two apart. This clash yielded an American concept of possession much more deeply connected to industrialization than the traditional understanding of labor. By providing evidence of how our concept of labor was industrialized, this article questions the outcomes in modem possession cases, particularly as they impact development and environmental preservation in rural areas.

The Democratic Common Law, Matthew J. Steilen

Journal Articles

This article explores the democratic features of common-law judicial law-making. It begins by examining the so-called “classical” account of the common law, associated with English jurists Edward Coke and Matthew Hale. These jurists describe the common law as a kind of “reasonable custom” that emerges out of a public process in which lawyers exchange reasons with the court about how to resolve a dispute. The article then turns to modern common-law adjudication, and, drawing on the work of Fred Schauer, Edward Levi, Martin Golding, and others, shows how public deliberation prominently features in the modern adjudicative process as well. The …

Reshaping The Traditional Limits Of Affirmative Duties Under The Third Restatement Of Torts, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 319 (2011), Victor E. Schwartz, Christopher E. Appel

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.