Commercial Law Commons^™

The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional 'Safety And Soundness' To Systematic 'Financial Stability' In Financial Supervision, Robert C. Hockett

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Since the global financial dramas of 2008-09, authorities on financial regulation have come increasingly to counsel the inclusion of macroprudential policy instruments in the standard ‘toolkit’ of finance-regulatory measures employed by financial supervisors. The hallmark of this perspective is its focus not simply on the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions, as is characteristic of the traditional ‘microprudential’ perspective, but also on certain structural features of financial systems that can imperil such systems as wholes. Systemic ‘financial stability’ thus comes to supplement, though not to supplant, institutional ‘safety and soundness’ as a regulatory desideratum.

The move from primarily micro- …

Equity And Trusts [2014], Hang Wu Tang

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

No abstract provided.

Contract Resurrected! Contract Formation: Common Law – Ucc – Cisg, Sarah Howard Jenkins

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Agreement In Principle: A Compromise For Activist Shareholders From The Uk Stewardship Code, David W. Roberts

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

Equity ownership in the United States and Europe is now highly concentrated in the hands of institutional investors, which gives rise to new problems of agency and corporate governance. These large investment intermediaries, such as mutual funds, specialize in maximizing beneficial owner value based on short-term performance benchmarks but lack the expertise and incentive to actively engage corporate boards on business strategy and governance matters. Instead, institutional investors are "rationally reticent," meaning that they are willing to respond to governance proposals but not to propose them. Activist shareholders may offer an endogenous solution to address "latent activism" in institutional intermediaries …

Trust And Social Commerce, Julia Y. Lee

Faculty Scholarship

Internet commerce has transformed the marketing of goods and services. The separation between point of sale and seller, and the presence of geographically dispersed sellers who do not engage in repeated transactions with the same customers challenge traditional mechanisms for building the trust required for commercial exchanges. In this changing environment, legal rules and institutions play a diminished role in building trust. Instead, new systems and methods are emerging to foster trust in one-shot commercial transactions in cyberspace.

The Article focuses on the rise of “social commerce,” a socio-economic phenomenon centered on the use of social media and other modes …

Reservations And The Cisg: The Borderland Of Uniform International Sales Law And Treaty Law After Thirty-Five Years, Ulrich G. Schroeter

Brooklyn Journal of International Law

No abstract provided.

The Problem With Frand: How The Licensing Commitments Of Standard-Setting Organizations Result In The Misvaluing Of Patents, David Arsego

Brooklyn Journal of International Law

Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) are bodies that oversee the development of technical standards. Technical standards are common technological designs that are used across a variety of platforms, for instance LTE, which is utilized throughout the mobile phone industry. Members of SSOs contribute different pieces of technology to an ultimate design, and if a patent covers the technology, it is called a standard-essential patent (SEP). SSOs require their members to license these patents to each other on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms. This Note analyzes the FRAND requirement and the different ways that courts and private parties interpret it. The ambiguity …

Liquidity, Systemic Risk, And The Bankruptcy Treatment Of Financial Contracts, Rizwaan J. Mokal

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

No abstract provided.

Say On Pay Around The World, Randall Thomas, Christoph Van Der Elst

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Shareholders have long complained that top executives are overpaid by corporate directors irrespective of their performance. Largely powerless to stop these practices, in 2002, they prevailed upon the U.K. Parliament to adopt legislation requiring public companies to permit their shareholders to have a mandatory, non-binding vote on the compensation of their top executives (Say on Pay). Since that time, there has been a wave of such legislation enacted in countries around the world, including the U.S., Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden, while Switzerland, Germany and France appear to be moving rapidly in the same direction. In this article, we …

Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, Neil M. Richards

Scholarship@WashULaw

Laws regulating the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data are (mostly) constitutional, and critics who suggest otherwise are wrong. Since the New Deal, American law has rested on the wise judgment that, by and large, commercial regulation should be made on the basis of economic and social policy rather than blunt constitutional rules. This has become one of the basic principles of American Constitutional law. Although some observers have suggested that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health (2011) changes this state of affairs, such readings are incorrect. Sorrell involved a challenge to a poorly-drafted Vermont …

Equity And Trusts [2014], Hang Wu Tang

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

No abstract provided.

Grassroots Shareholder Activism In Large Commercial Bankruptcies, Diane Lourdes Dick

Faculty Articles

In early 2013, a group of similarly situated individuals gathered to discuss how they could defend themselves against a grave potential injustice. Time was of the essence, so they would need to act quickly to preserve their rights. Fortunately, their path to justice was already paved: the matter was pending in federal court, and each had standing to appear and be heard. But frustratingly, this seemingly well-paved path was barred to them. These individuals, who were technically parties to the proceeding, were virtually invisible to the court and largely disenfranchised in settlement negotiations. Striving to overcome these obstacles, they persisted …

Can Law Students Disrupt The Market For High-Priced Textbooks?, Jane K. Winn

Articles

The Center for Computer-Assisted Legal Instruction (CALI) is a non-profit organization whose mission is to advance legal education through technological innovation and collaboration. With its eLangdell Press project, CALI publishes American law school textbooks in open access, royalty-free form, offering faculty authors compensation equivalent to what most law school textbook authors would earn in royalties from a traditional full-price publisher.

I am writing a new sales textbook and “agreements supplement” based on contemporary business practice that I will publish in open access form with CALI’s eLangdell Press. Relatively few other American legal academics publish in open access form, however, suggesting …

Are Government Creditors Exempt From U.C.C. Article 9 Filing And Perfection Requirements?, Thomas Sica

Bankruptcy Research Library

(Excerpt)

Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) requires a creditor to perfect its security interests against its collateral in order to recover the creditor’s priority in such collateral. Former versions of the UCC that predate 2001 provided that the Article 9’s perfection requirements did not apply “[t]o a transfer by a government or a governmental unit of the state.” This exception was eliminated from the UCC in 2001. Thirty-two states, however, still have versions of the UCC that contain some version of this exception. Within the states that still enforce this exception for governmental units, there are …

Deconstructing Duty Free: Investor-State Arbitration As Private Anti-Bribery Enforcement, Andrew B. Spalding

Law Faculty Publications

Duty Free rests upon a kind of three-legged stool of legal argumentation. Those legs are: 1) the common law of contract; 2) principles of state liability for official misconduct; and 3) global anti-corruption policy. As this article will show, each leg of that stool is fundamentally flawed; the legal arguments are unpersuasive and occasionally incorrect. This article seeks to deconstruct that stool, exposing the fatal structural flaws in each leg. It thus clears the way for building an arbitral jurisprudence of corruption that actually does what Duty Free attempted: advance global anti-corruption policy in a way that will inure to …

The Keystone Xl Pipeline And The Dormant Commerce Clause: Would Action By Congress Preclude Adequate Environmental Regulation At The State Level?, S. Shane Stroud

Utah Law Review

The Commerce Clause significantly limits the ability of States and localities to regulate or otherwise burden the flow of interstate commerce, but it does not elevate free trade above all other values. As long as a State does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to place itself in a position of economic isolation, it retains broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources.

Alternative Investment Markets Under Criticism: Reasons To Be Worried? Lessons From Gowex, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

The recent financial scandal of Gowex in the Spanish Alternative Investment Market (MAB) has reopened the debate about the dangers of lightly regulated markets and their optimal level of regulation. This article argues that Gowex’s collapse was not a failure of these markets but a failure of the gatekeepers in charge of overseeing Gowex’s activities. Therefore, we propose that regulators should focus on providing mechanisms to encourage gatekeepers to do their work in an effective and credible way. Namely, we propose that regulators should enhance the role and effectiveness of Nominated Advisers, since these players have been created precisely for …

Convergence And Persistence In Corporate Law And Governance, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter discusses the question of “convergence or persistence” in corporate law and governance. It first considers efforts to measure convergence directly by focusing on the evolution of law-on-the-books governance provisions before analyzing capital market evidence on convergence, with particular emphasis on capital market indicators such as the decline in “cross-listings” onto US stock exchanges by firms from jurisdictions with weaker investor protection and the increase in initial public offerings (IPOs) on emerging market stock markets. The chapter proceeds by reviewing evidence of divergence, especially “divergence within convergence,” and the failure of the European Union to produce more convergent corporate …

Majority Control And Minority Protection, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter examines legal issues concerning majority control and minority protection in firms with concentrated ownership governance structures, with particular emphasis on the tradeoff between the goals of protecting minority shareholders and allowing controllers to pursue their vision and how corporate law should balance these conflicting goals. Focusing primarily on Delaware corporate law, it suggests that holding a control block allows majority shareholders to pursue their idiosyncratic vision in the manner they see fit, even against minority investors’ objections. Idiosyncratic vision refers to the subjective value that entrepreneurs attach to their business idea or vision, and this chapter considers its …

Tax And Corporate Governance: The Influence Of Tax On Managerial Agency Costs, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter examines the influence of tax on managerial agency costs, with particular emphasis on public companies in the United States. Focusing on “C-corporations,” this chapter first considers why tax is an imperfect vehicle for mitigating managerial agency costs. It then discusses how tax influences the compensation of managers, both in ways policy makers intended, and in ways they did not. The chapter also considers how tax affects management decisions about capital structure, hedging, and acquisitions. In addition, this chapter explores the tax system’s influence on the ability and incentives of shareholders to monitor management. This chapter then concludes with …