Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Shareholder Democracy And The Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

All Faculty Scholarship

Corporate law is consumed with a debate over shareholder democracy. The conventional wisdom counsels that shareholders should have more voice in corporate governance, in order to reduce agency costs and provide democratic legitimacy. A second set of theorists, described as “board primacists,” advocates against greater shareholder democracy and in favor of increased board discretion. These theorists argue that shareholders need to delegate their authority in order to provide the board with the proper authority to manage the enterprise and avoid short-term decision making.

In the last few years, the classical economic underpinnings of corporate law have been destabilized by a …

Accountable Care Organizations: A New New Thing With Some Old Problems, Thomas L. Greaney

All Faculty Scholarship

When pressed for evidence that the proposed health reform legislation will control costs, proponents invariably cite the numerous pilot programs and other innovations in Medicare payment policy contained in the bill. At first blush, the ACO model seems well designed to foster competition among providers. Not unlike health maintenance organizations and other integrated delivery forms, ACOs assume responsibility for coordinating care and thus have strong incentives to provide cost effective care and to do so in a manner that is transparent and hospitable to comparative shoppers. But at the same time, the path of ACO development could prove profoundly anti-competitive. …

Reply: Clawback To The Future, Miriam A. Cherry, Jarrod Wong

All Faculty Scholarship

In an earlier article also available on Scholarship Commons, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 94, p. 368, 2009, Professors Miriam Cherry and Jarrod Wong set out an initial description and analysis of contractual clawback provisions. In this Reply, Profs. Cherry and Wong address three aspects of Michael Macchiarola's Response: its application of the clawback doctrine to the recoupment of executive compensation; the criticism that the clawbacks doctrine introduces latent subjectivity into contractual analysis; and the apparent operational difficulties in implementing clawbacks.

Freeze-Outs: Transcontinental Analysis And Reform Proposals, Marco Ventoruzzo

Faculty Scholarship

One of the most crucial, but systematically neglected, comparative differences between corporate law systems in Europe and in the United States concerns the regulations governing freeze-out transactions in listed corporations. Freeze-outs can be defined as transactions in which the controlling shareholder exercises a legal right to buy out the shares of the minority, and consequently delists the corporation and brings it private. Beyond this essential definition, the systems diverge profoundly.

This gap exists despite the fact that minority freeze-outs are one of the most debated issues in corporate law, in the public media, in a vast body of scholarly work …