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Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle M. Harner 2010 University of Maryland School of Law

Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle M. Harner

Faculty Scholarship

Corporations are vulnerable to the greed, self-dealing and conflicts of those in control of the corporation. Courts historically have regulated this potential abuse by designating the board of directors and senior management as fiduciaries. In some instances, however, shareholders, creditors or others outside of corporate management may influence corporate decisions and, in the process, extract corporate value. Courts generally address this type of corporate damage in one of two ways: they designate controlling shareholders as corporate fiduciaries and they characterize creditors, customers and others as contract parties with no fiduciary duties. The traditional roles of corporate shareholders and creditors may …


Saying What They Mean: The False Claims Act Amendments In The Wake Of Allison Engine, Jeremy E. Gersh 2010 University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

Saying What They Mean: The False Claims Act Amendments In The Wake Of Allison Engine, Jeremy E. Gersh

Journal of Business & Technology Law

No abstract provided.


Shareholder Democracy And The Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie 2010 Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law

Shareholder Democracy And The Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Corporate law is consumed with a debate over shareholder democracy. The conventional wisdom counsels that shareholders should have more voice in corporate governance, in order to reduce agency costs and provide democratic legitimacy. A second set of theorists, described as “board primacists,” advocates against greater shareholder democracy and in favor of increased board discretion. These theorists argue that shareholders need to delegate their authority in order to provide the board with the proper authority to manage the enterprise and avoid short-term decision making.

In the last few years, the classical economic underpinnings of corporate law have been destabilized by a …


Llcs Are The New King Of The Hill: An Empirical Study Of The Number Of New Llcs, Corporations And Lps Formed In The United States Between 2004-2007 And How Llcs Were Taxed For Tax Years 2002-2006, Rodney D. Chrisman 2010 Fordham Law School

Llcs Are The New King Of The Hill: An Empirical Study Of The Number Of New Llcs, Corporations And Lps Formed In The United States Between 2004-2007 And How Llcs Were Taxed For Tax Years 2002-2006, Rodney D. Chrisman

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.


Quantitative Proof Of Reputational Harm, Meiring De Villiers 2010 Fordham Law School

Quantitative Proof Of Reputational Harm, Meiring De Villiers

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.


Simultaneous Distress Of Residential Developers And Their Secured Lenders An Analysis Of Bankruptcy & Bank Regulation , Sarah Pei Woo 2010 Fordham Law School

Simultaneous Distress Of Residential Developers And Their Secured Lenders An Analysis Of Bankruptcy & Bank Regulation , Sarah Pei Woo

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.


Stretching The Limits Of Deal Protection Devices: From Omnicare To Wachovia, Eleonora Gerasimchuk 2010 Fordham Law School

Stretching The Limits Of Deal Protection Devices: From Omnicare To Wachovia, Eleonora Gerasimchuk

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.


A Dissent Dampened By Timing: How The Stock Market Exception Systematically Deprives Public , Jeff Goetz 2010 Fordham Law School

A Dissent Dampened By Timing: How The Stock Market Exception Systematically Deprives Public , Jeff Goetz

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.


I.R.C. Section 7430 Attorney's Fees: Navigating Section 7430 And A Call For The Final Act, Jeffrey E. Ouijano, Rodney P. Mock 2010 Fordham Law School

I.R.C. Section 7430 Attorney's Fees: Navigating Section 7430 And A Call For The Final Act, Jeffrey E. Ouijano, Rodney P. Mock

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.


In The Wake Of Empagran – Lights Out On Foreign Activity Falling Under Sherman Act Jurisdiction? Courts Carve Out A Prevailing Standard, Kelly L. Tucker 2010 Fordham Law School

In The Wake Of Empagran – Lights Out On Foreign Activity Falling Under Sherman Act Jurisdiction? Courts Carve Out A Prevailing Standard, Kelly L. Tucker

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.


Symposium: The Regulation Of Investment Funds, Andrew J. Donohue, Paul N. Roth, Mattew B. Siano, J.W. Verret 2010 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Symposium: The Regulation Of Investment Funds, Andrew J. Donohue, Paul N. Roth, Mattew B. Siano, J.W. Verret

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Symposium: The Regulation Of Investment Funds


Barriers To Effective Risk Management, Michelle M. Harner 2010 University of Maryland School of Law

Barriers To Effective Risk Management, Michelle M. Harner

Faculty Scholarship

“As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”**

This now infamous quote by Charles Prince, Citigroup’s former Chief Executive Officer, captures the high-risk, high-reward mentality and overconfidence that permeates much of corporate America. These attributes in turn helped to facilitate a global recession and some of the largest economic losses ever experienced in the financial sector. They also represent certain cognitive biases and cultural norms in corporate boardrooms and management suites that make implementing a meaningful risk culture and thereby mitigating the impact of future economic downturns a challenging proposition.

The …


Backdated Stock Options Ownership Impact On The Corporation, Management, & Shareholders, Karen Cascini, Alan DelFavero 2010 Sacred Heart University

Backdated Stock Options Ownership Impact On The Corporation, Management, & Shareholders, Karen Cascini, Alan Delfavero

WCBT Faculty Publications

In the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOx) world, there has been an unprecedented crackdown on fraudulent activity occurring within corporate America. During recent years, many companies have granted stock options to their executives and employees as part of compensation packages. While the issuance of stock options as a component of compensation is considered to be a legal practice, corruption has taken this corporate resource to unlawful heights. Recently, numerous corporations have been in the news for potentially backdating stock options. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to distinguish between legal and illegal aspects of backdating stock options, and to examine the …


Lecture At Fordham Corporate Law Center By William Dudley, President Of Federal Reserve Bank Of New York, William Dudley 2010 Fordham Law School

Lecture At Fordham Corporate Law Center By William Dudley, President Of Federal Reserve Bank Of New York, William Dudley

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.


Risks And Hedges Of Providing Liquidity In Complex Securities: The Impact Of Insider Trading On Options Market Makers, Stanislav Dolgopolov 2010 Fordham Law School

Risks And Hedges Of Providing Liquidity In Complex Securities: The Impact Of Insider Trading On Options Market Makers, Stanislav Dolgopolov

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.


Financial Statement Reporting Of Pending Litigation: Attorneys, Auditors, And Difference Of Opinions, W. R. Koprowski, Steven J. Arsenault, Michael Cipriano 2010 Fordham Law School

Financial Statement Reporting Of Pending Litigation: Attorneys, Auditors, And Difference Of Opinions, W. R. Koprowski, Steven J. Arsenault, Michael Cipriano

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.


A Short History Of Tontines, Kent McKeever 2010 Fordham Law School

A Short History Of Tontines, Kent Mckeever

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.


The Tenth Annual A. A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture On Corporate, Securities, & Financial Law, Elisse B. Walter 2010 Fordham Law School

The Tenth Annual A. A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture On Corporate, Securities, & Financial Law, Elisse B. Walter

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.


Stealth Preemption: The Irs's Nonprofit Corporate Governance Initiative, James J. Fishman 2010 Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University

Stealth Preemption: The Irs's Nonprofit Corporate Governance Initiative, James J. Fishman

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

The Internal Revenue Service, the primary federal regulator of charities, has initiated a corporate governance initiative. The intervention by the Internal Revenue Service into an area traditionally the preserve of state nonprofit corporate law has little relationship to issues of tax compliance. This corporate governance initiative has been accomplished in the face of IRS acknowledgement that it has no statutory authority relating to these issues. Yet, the power of the Service to recognize tax exempt status and the method it has used to ensure it vision of correct corporate governance practices through a series of questions when an organization applies …


Director Liability For Corporate Crimes: Lawyers As Safe Haven?, John A. Humbach 2010 Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University

Director Liability For Corporate Crimes: Lawyers As Safe Haven?, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

The fines and penalties assessed against corporations are running into the billions of dollars each year. Part of the reason is that the managers and employees of entrepreneurial organizations have inherent incentives to engage in conduct that exposes the entity to fines and penalties. This article considers the legal bases for shifting these law-enforcement losses back to directors who are actively involved in creating them, either because they approved or they deliberately ignored the corporation’s legal or regulatory violations (Part II). It then examines bases for shifting these losses back to directors even when their involvement in the non-compliance is …


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