Forum-Selection Bylaws Refracted Through An Agency Lens,
2015
Duke Law School
Forum-Selection Bylaws Refracted Through An Agency Lens, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
Both praise and controversy surround director-adopted bylaws that affect shareholders' litigation rights. Recent bylaws specify an exclusive forum for litigation of corporate governance claims, limit shareholder claims to resolution through arbitration, and (most controversially) impose a one-way regime of fee shifting on shareholder litigants. To one degree or another, courts have legitimated each development, while commentators differ in their assessments. This Article brings into clear focus issues so far blurred in debates surrounding these types of bylaws. Focusing on forum-selection bylaws, and on Delaware precedents, I argue that beginning from the standpoint of common law agency reveals the attenuated and …
Brief Of Corporate Law Professors As Amici Curie In Support Of Respondents,
2015
Duke Law School
Brief Of Corporate Law Professors As Amici Curie In Support Of Respondents, John C. Coates, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence Hamermesh, Henry B. Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier H. Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian Jm Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, Helen S. Scott
Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt …
What Kind Of Corporation Tax Regime?,
2015
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
What Kind Of Corporation Tax Regime?, Sijbren Cnossen
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
This article explores the taxation of corporations in the wider context of capital income taxation. The article discusses pros and cons of various income-based and cash-flow forms of corporation tax (CT) and concludes that the dual income tax (DIT), which taxes all capital income at the proportional CT rate, is to be preferred over other forms of taxing capital income. The DIT is best attuned to the reality of capital mobility and is not held hostage by the higher tax on labour income. Levied at a uniform flat rate, the DIT minimizes opportunities for tax arbitrage.
China's National Champions: Governance Change Through Globalization?,
2015
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia
China's National Champions: Governance Change Through Globalization?, Li-Wen Lin
All Faculty Publications
China is regarded as the world’s leading practitioner of state capitalism in which important capitalist enterprises have a close relationship with the state. One prominent feature of China’s state capitalism is the fundamental role of about 100 large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by organs of the central government in critical industries such as oil, telecom, and transportation. These SOEs are often dubbed “China’s national champions.” They are not only important players in China’s domestic economy but also major contributors to China’s fast growing global investment. Their global expansion however often encounters political and regulatory challenges abroad, partly because their corporate …
Series Of Unincorporated Business Entities: The Mobius Strip And Klein Bottle Of Business Entity Law,
2015
Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Series Of Unincorporated Business Entities: The Mobius Strip And Klein Bottle Of Business Entity Law, Daniel S. Kleinberger
Faculty Scholarship
Back in the day – say, 1990 – limited liability companies (LLCs) were the cutting edge of business entity law. Today, LLCs dominate entity formation, and the cutting edge has moved further out – to the notion of a “series,” a quasi-separate, quasi-person existing within an LLC.
Business lawyers are generally familiar with series of stocks and bonds, but those series have nothing to do with the LLC series discussed in this article. To avoid confusion, this article refers to protected series, which, as we will see, are the Mobius strips or Klein bottles of entity law.
La Determinación Obligatoria Del Objeto Social: Una Regla Anacrónica,
2015
Washington and Lee University School of Law
La Determinación Obligatoria Del Objeto Social: Una Regla Anacrónica, Alfonso Montoya Stahl, Fernando Loayza Jordán
Scholarly Articles
En el presente artículo, los autores discuten la presunta utilidad como inconvenientes de la obligación de determinar el objeto social. En ese sentido, se analiza las características exigidas al objeto social, como los supuestos beneficios que traería su regulación. Los autores proponen la eliminación de la obligación de determinar el objeto social a fin de permitir a las sociedades configurar libremente su actividad, sin verse limitadas por una norma rígida.
The authors discuss the alleged utility as well as the drawbacks of the mandatory determination of corporate purpose. They analyze and criticize the required characteristics of the corporate purpose by …
Keynote Reflections: The Public Governance Duty,
2015
Duke Law School
Keynote Reflections: The Public Governance Duty, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
Firms must take ever greater risks to try to innovate and create value in our increasingly competitive and complex global economy. Corporate governance law generally delegates control over excessive risk-taking to the firm’s investors, principally its risk-seeking shareholders. But this does not cover the type of risk-taking that led to the global financial crisis and that is becoming ever more common - risk-taking that could have systemic consequences to the financial system. I argue for a “public governance duty,” requiring managers of systemically important firms to assess the impact of risk-taking on the public as well as on investors, and …
Corporate Law And The Limits Of Private Ordering,
2015
Duke Law School
Corporate Law And The Limits Of Private Ordering, James D. Cox
Faculty Scholarship
Solomon-like, the Delaware legislature in 2015 split the baby by amending the Delaware General Corporation Law to authorize forum-selection bylaws and to prohibit charter or bylaw provisions that would shift to the plaintiff defense costs incurred in connection with shareholder suits that were not successfully concluded. The legislature acted after the Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund. v. Chevron Corp ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, broadly empowered the board vis-à-vis the shareholders through the board’s power to amend the bylaws. Repeatedly the analysis used by each court referenced the contractual relationship the shareholders had through the articles of …
If The Question Is Chocolate-Related, The Answer Is Always Yes: Why Doe V. Nestle Reopens The Door For Corporate Liability Of U.S. Corporations Under The Alien Tort Statute,
2015
American University Washington College of Law
If The Question Is Chocolate-Related, The Answer Is Always Yes: Why Doe V. Nestle Reopens The Door For Corporate Liability Of U.S. Corporations Under The Alien Tort Statute, Amanda A. Humphreville
American University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Piercing The Fiduciary Veil,
2015
University of Missouri - Kansas City, School of Law
Piercing The Fiduciary Veil, Colin P. Marks
Faculty Works
Limited partnerships (LPs) and limited liability companies (LLCs) permit formation with a unique management structure in that these entities may be managed by another limited liability entity, such as a corporation. Thus, the true managers are those individuals who manage the manager. It is well settled that the managing entity, such as a corporate general partner, owes default fiduciary duties, but what of these second-tier managers? Technically, it is the managing entity that owes the duties, not the managing entity's owners, officers, and directors, yet courts have struggled with strict adherence to this separation when it would seem inequitable to …
Producing Better Mileage: Advancing The Design And Usefulness Of Hybrid Vehicles For Social Business Ventures,
2015
University of Missouri - Kansas City, School of Law
Producing Better Mileage: Advancing The Design And Usefulness Of Hybrid Vehicles For Social Business Ventures, John E. Tyler, Evan Absher, Kathleen Garman, Anthony J. Luppino
Faculty Works
Since 2008 approximately half of the states in the U.S. have enacted statutes permitting “hybrid” business forms that blend aspects of traditional for-profit ventures with characteristics normally associated with traditional non-profit entities. This article analyzes theoretical, academic, practical, legal, and regulatory questions regarding the extent to which the existing hybrids are suited to achieving social purposes objectives, including in comparison to modified traditional forms of business organization. Finding the current fleet of hybrids an innovative, useful start, but with need to evolve, this article proposes statutory language (set forth in a detailed appendix, and summarized in the article text), and …
Prawne I Ekonomiczne Aspekty Polityki Promowania Narodowych Czempionów,
2015
Uniwersytet Szczeciński
Prawne I Ekonomiczne Aspekty Polityki Promowania Narodowych Czempionów, Rajmund Molski
Monografie CARS/CARS Monographs
Polityka promowania przez państwo tzw. narodowych czempionów budzi kontrowersje, co prowokuje ożywioną debatę w kwestii zasadności tej polityki. W debacie tej wciąż pada więcej pytań niż odpowiedzi. Kluczowy problem sprowadza się do odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy przedsiębiorstwa te powinny powstawać samoistnie, czy raczej aktywną rolę w procesie ich tworzenia i wzrostu powinny odgrywać władze państwowe, i na czym ewentualnie to wsparcie miałoby polegać? Odpowiedzi wymaga też pytanie o rzeczywisty wymiar polityki promowania narodowych czempionów realizowanej w praktyce przez różne państwa, a także o jej zgodność z szeroko rozumianym prawem i polityką ochrony konkurencji. Jakkolwiek pytania te zyskały szczególną doniosłość w …
Koncepcja Jednego Organizmu Gospodarczego W Prawie Ochrony Konkurencji,
2015
Wydział Zarządzania Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego/Faculty of Management University of Warsaw
Koncepcja Jednego Organizmu Gospodarczego W Prawie Ochrony Konkurencji, Piotr Semeniuk
Monografie CARS/CARS Monographs
W książce przeanalizowane zostało zastosowanie koncepcji jednego organizmu gospodarczego (ang. single economic unit) w prawie ochrony konkurencji. Podstawowym porządkiem prawnym analizowanym przez autora jest polskie oraz unijne prawo ochrony konkurencji (prawo antymonopolowe, antytrustowe). Z powodu wysoce ogólnikowego odwołania się do koncepcji jednego organizmu gospodarczego przez przepisy regulacji antymonopolowej, zarówno polskiej, jak i unijnej, w pracy przedstawione są też rozwiązania przyjęte przez inne porządki prawne, przede wszystkim prawo Stanów Zjednoczonych.
Autor bada różne uzasadnienia dla istnienia w prawie ochrony konkurencji koncepcji jednego organizmu gospodarczego, konfrontuje tą koncepcję z naukami ekonomicznymi (w szczególności z tzw. teorią firmy) oraz dokonuje przeglądu podstawowych poglądów …
Corporate Social Responsibility Versus Business And Human Rights: Bridging The Gap Between Responsibility And Accountability,
2015
University of Washington School of Law
Corporate Social Responsibility Versus Business And Human Rights: Bridging The Gap Between Responsibility And Accountability, Anita Ramasastry
Articles
This article explores the evolution of business and human rights (BHR) from a lawyer’s perspective and examines how it is contextually and conceptually different from corporate social responsibility (CSR) in its aims and ambitions. While CSR emphasizes responsible behavior, BHR focuses on a more delineated commitment in the area of human rights. BHR is, in part, a response to CSR and its perceived failure. This has led to a gap with two disciplines or strands of discourse that are diverging rather than converging. This article explores how the quest for accountability shapes a very different narrative for BHR, which takes …
White Paper: Options For A Treaty On Business And Human Rights,
2015
University of Washington
White Paper: Options For A Treaty On Business And Human Rights, Anita Ramasastry, Douglass Cassell
Articles
The United Nations Human Rights Council decided in June 2014 to establish an Intergovernmental Working Group to “elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.” The first meeting of the Working Group took take place in Geneva in July 2015. The Council did not further specify what sort of instrument should be drafted. The Center for Human Rights of the American Bar Association and the Law Society of England and Wales asked the present authors to prepare a “White Paper” on possible options for a treaty …
A Failure Of Substance And A Failure Of Process: The Circular Odyssey Of Oklahoma's Corporate Law Amendments In 2010, 2012, And 2013,
2015
University of Oklahoma College of Law
A Failure Of Substance And A Failure Of Process: The Circular Odyssey Of Oklahoma's Corporate Law Amendments In 2010, 2012, And 2013, Steven Cleveland
Faculty Articles
No abstract provided.
Profiles - Chicago Literacenter,
2015
New York Law School
Profiles - Chicago Literacenter, James Hagy
Rooftops Project
Business news is often filled with stories about incubator spaces and entrepreneurial hubs in which start-up companies can hang out, network, and grow. What might result when these concepts are adapted to bring together diverse not-for-profit organizations focused on similar missions? Professor James Hagy visits Stacy Ratner, Co-Founder and Creative Director of the Chicago Literacy Alliance, and Transwestern’s Larry Serota at the grand opening of Literacenter in downtown Chicago.
Shareholder Primacy And Corporate Compliance,
2015
Mercer University School of Law
Shareholder Primacy And Corporate Compliance, Judd F. Sneirson
Articles
Corporations, like the rest of us, must comply with environmental and other laws or suffer the consequences. Unfortunately, these consequences can pale in comparison to the gains to be made from non-compliance. Law-and-economics scholarship recognizes this and, by treating many laws as mere costs of doing business, encourages a certain amount of deliberate non-compliance. According to this view, corporate compliance should turn on profitability or whether compliance would otherwise benefit the firm. This Article argues that the law-and-economics scholarship is wrong on the law, wrong as a matter of economics, and does not reflect how most firms in fact behave. …
Delaware’S Implied Contractual Covenant Of Good Faith And “Sibling Rivalry” Among Equity Holders,
2015
Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Delaware’S Implied Contractual Covenant Of Good Faith And “Sibling Rivalry” Among Equity Holders, Daniel S. Kleinberger
Faculty Scholarship
An obligation of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every common law contract and is codified in the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C”). The terminology differs: Some jurisdictions refer to an “implied covenant;” others to an “implied contractual obligation;” still others to an “implied duty.” But whatever the label, the concept is understood by the vast majority of U.S. lawyers as a matter of commercial rather than entity law. And, to the vast majority of corporate lawyers, “good faith” does not mean contract law but rather conjures up an important aspect of a corporate director’s duty of loyalty.
Nonetheless, …
Ceo Stock Ownership Policies: Rhetoric And Reality,
2015
Harvard Law School
Ceo Stock Ownership Policies: Rhetoric And Reality, Nitzan Shilon
Indiana Law Journal
This Article is the first academic endeavor to analyze the efficacy and transparency of stock ownership policies (SOPs) in U.S. public firms. SOPs generally require managers to hold some of their firms’ stock for the long term. Following the 2008 financial crisis, firms universally adopted these policies and cited them more than any other policy as a key element in their mitigation of risk. However, my analysis of the recent SOPs of S&P 500 CEOs disputes what firms claim about these policies. First, I find that SOPs are extremely ineffectual in making CEOs hold on to their firm’s stock; this …
