Is Incorporation Really Better Than Central Management And Control For Testing Corporate Residency? An Answer To Corporate Tax Evasion And Inversion,
2017
Texas A&M University School of Law
Is Incorporation Really Better Than Central Management And Control For Testing Corporate Residency? An Answer To Corporate Tax Evasion And Inversion, Charles Edward Andrew Lincoln Iv
Student Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Religious Conceptions Of Corporate Purpose,
2017
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University
Religious Conceptions Of Corporate Purpose, Ronald J. Colombo
Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
To Thine Own Ceo Be True: Tailoring Ceo Compensation To Individual Personality And Circumstances,
2017
University of Richmond
To Thine Own Ceo Be True: Tailoring Ceo Compensation To Individual Personality And Circumstances, William O. Fisher
Law Faculty Publications
Eight-figure compensation. Cash. Restricted stock. Options. Performance shares. And more. Companies shower their CEOs with pay in large amounts, delivered in multiple ways, and dependent on complex and intricate formulae. It is all intended to motivate the top officers to make decisions that will best benefit their companies. Common sense tells us that the value of a complicated, multifaceted pay package- and hence its ability to motivate- will depend on the psychological characteristics and financial circumstances of the particular executive being paid. Economic theory and empirical studies confirm this intuition. Yet, companies generally ignore these vital factors. Substantive and disclosure …
The Gatekeepers Of Shareholder Litigation,
2017
University of Richmond
The Gatekeepers Of Shareholder Litigation, Jessica Erickson
Law Faculty Publications
Concerns over agency costs dominate corporate law. The central challenge is ensuring that directors act in the corporation's best interests, rather than their own best interests. Shareholder litigation is a key tool in controlling these agency costs. If directors cross the line, the law provides an array of litigation options that shareholders can use to hold directors accountable. Shareholders can file securities class actions if directors lie to them. They can file shareholder derivative suits if directors engage in egregious misconduct. And they can file lawsuits under both state and federal law if directors try to sell the company at …
When Is It Necessary For Corporations To Be Essentially At Home: An Exploration Of Exceptional Cases,
2017
University of Richmond
When Is It Necessary For Corporations To Be Essentially At Home: An Exploration Of Exceptional Cases, Pricilla Heinz
Law Student Publications
This comment examines the current state of the law surrounding the exercise of general jurisdiction and forecasts the circumstances under which the Supreme Court is likely to clarify its recent decisions. Its purpose is to explore the principles announced in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown and Daimler AG v. Bauman and consider whether the due process rationales offered in the past coincide with the new essentially at home standard imposed for general jurisdiction. Moreover, this comment analyzes the reactions of the lower courts in the wake of these decisions and predicts where the Supreme Court is headed in …
Gibney V. Evolution Marketing Research, Llc,
2017
New York Law School, 2016
Gibney V. Evolution Marketing Research, Llc, Justin Offermann
NYLS Law Review
No abstract provided.
Insider Trading's Legality Problem,
2017
Brooklyn Law School
Insider Trading's Legality Problem, Miriam Baer
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Responsible Resource Development And Prevention Of Sex Trafficking: Safeguarding Native Women And Children On The Fort Berthold Reservation,
2017
American Indian Law Clinic, University of Colorado Law School
Responsible Resource Development And Prevention Of Sex Trafficking: Safeguarding Native Women And Children On The Fort Berthold Reservation, Kathleen Finn, Erica Gajda, Thomas Perin, Carla Fredericks
Publications
In 2010, large deposits of oil and natural gas were found in the Bakken shale formation, much of which is encompassed by the Fort Berthold Indian reservation, home to the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation (“MHA Nation” or “Three Affiliated Tribes” or “the Tribe”). However, rapid oil and gas development has brought an unprecedented rise of violent crime on and near the Fort Berthold reservation. Specifically, the influx of well-paid male oil and gas workers, living in temporary housing often referred to as “man camps,” has coincided with a disturbing increase in sex trafficking of Native women. The social risks …
Corporate Transparency And The First Amendment: Compelled Disclosures In The Wake Of National Association Of Manufacturers V. Sec,
2017
University of Oklahoma College of Law
Corporate Transparency And The First Amendment: Compelled Disclosures In The Wake Of National Association Of Manufacturers V. Sec, Emma Land
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
Selling Crowdfunded Equity: A New Frontier,
2017
University of Oklahoma College of Law
Selling Crowdfunded Equity: A New Frontier, Joan Macleod Heminway
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
Reevaluating Shareholder Voting Rights In M&A Transactions,
2017
University of Oklahoma College of Law
Reevaluating Shareholder Voting Rights In M&A Transactions, Afra Afsharipour
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Gatekeepers Of Shareholder Litigation,
2017
University of Oklahoma College of Law
The Gatekeepers Of Shareholder Litigation, Jessica Erickson
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
Shareholder Voting In Proxy Contests For Corporate Control, Uncontested Director Elections And Management Proposals: A Review Of The Empirical Literature,
2017
University of Oklahoma College of Law
Shareholder Voting In Proxy Contests For Corporate Control, Uncontested Director Elections And Management Proposals: A Review Of The Empirical Literature, Randall S. Thomas, Patrick C. Tricker
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
Introduction,
2017
University of Oklahoma College of Law
Selling Stock And Selling Legal Claims: Alienability As A Constraint On Managerial Opportunism,
2017
University of Oklahoma College of Law
Selling Stock And Selling Legal Claims: Alienability As A Constraint On Managerial Opportunism, Charles R. Korsmo
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Limits Of The Right To Sell And The Rise Of Federal Corporate Law,
2017
University of Oklahoma College of Law
The Limits Of The Right To Sell And The Rise Of Federal Corporate Law, James J. Park
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
Objections To Disclosure Settlements: A How-To Guide,
2017
University of Oklahoma College of Law
Objections To Disclosure Settlements: A How-To Guide, Sean J. Griffith, Anthony A. Rickey
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
Conflict Minerals, Ineffective Regulations: Comparing International Guidelines To Remedy Dodd-Frank’S Inefficiencies,
2017
New York Law School, 2016
Conflict Minerals, Ineffective Regulations: Comparing International Guidelines To Remedy Dodd-Frank’S Inefficiencies, Victoria Stork
NYLS Law Review
No abstract provided.
Social Capital Of Directors And Corporate Governance: A Social Network Analysis,
2017
Brooklyn Law School
Social Capital Of Directors And Corporate Governance: A Social Network Analysis, Zihan Niu, Christopher Chen
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
This Article examines how a director’s social capital might affect his or her behavior, the board’s performance, and corporate governance, as well as the potential normative implications of the director’s social network. We argue that the quality of board performance could be improved where the social network closure within the board is high and there are many non-redundant contacts beyond the board. Network closure can improve trust and collaboration within a board, while external contacts may benefit a company with more diverse sources of information. Moreover, different network positioning leads to the inequality of social capital for directors. With more …
Autonomous Vehicles Will Drive Themselves – But They Won’T Regulate Themselves,
2017
UC Law SF
Autonomous Vehicles Will Drive Themselves – But They Won’T Regulate Themselves, David Goldstein
UC Law Business Journal
The dawn of a new era of transportation is upon us. Cars that drive themselves are no longer relegated to our imaginations and science-fiction movies. Automobile companies like Tesla and Volvo, as well as search-engine giant Google, are rolling out new features that take over the duties previously charged to the driver of a vehicle. Given the uncertain nature of future legal liability and regulation of vehicles that can drive autonomously, it is imperative that we establish a liability and regulatory framework so that automakers can continue to make advances in the field and consumers can know what to expect …
