Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Constructing Countervailing Power: Law And Organizing In An Era Of Political Inequality, Kate Andrias

Faculty Scholarship

This Article proposes an innovative approach to remedying the crisis of political inequality: using law to facilitate organizing by the poor and working class, not only as workers, but also as tenants, debtors, welfare beneficiaries, and others. The piece draws on the social-movements literature, and the successes and failures of labor law, to show how law can supplement the deficient regimes of campaign finance and lobbying reform and enable lower-income groups to build organizations capable of countervailing the political power of the wealthy. As such, the Article offers a new direction forward for the public-law literature on political power and …

The Future Of Disclosure: Esg, Common Ownership, And Systematic Risk, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. securities markets have recently undergone (or are undergoing) three fundamental transitions: (1) institutionalization (with the result that institutional investors now dominate both trading and stock ownership); (2) extraordinary ownership concentration (with the consequence that the three largest U.S. institutional investors now hold 20% and vote 25% of the shares in S&P 500 companies); and (3) the introduction of ESG disclosures (which process has been driven in the U.S. by pressure from large institutional investors). In light of these transitions, how should disclosure policy change? Do institutions and retail investors have the same or different disclosure needs? Why are …

Cleaning Corporate Governance, Jens Frankenreiter, Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Although empirical scholarship dominates the field of law and finance, much of it shares a common vulnerability: an abiding faith in the accuracy and integrity of a small, specialized collection of corporate governance data. In this paper, we unveil a novel collection of three decades’ worth of corporate charters for thousands of public companies, which shows that this faith is misplaced.

We make three principal contributions to the literature. First, we label our corpus for a variety of firm- and state-level governance features. Doing so reveals significant infirmities within the most well-known corporate governance datasets, including an error rate exceeding …

Debt’S Emotional Encumbrances, Pamela Foohey

Scholarly Works

This chapter focuses on the role of emotions in the theory and practice of commercial and consumer credit laws, including bankruptcy, in the United States. It assesses knowledge about people’s emotions regarding personal and business financial problems, and evaluates how “money law” systems account for these emotions. This assessment finds that emotions surrounding taking on and being able to pay back debt differ between business leaders and people who shoulder household debt. These differences are traceable in large part to historical understandings of the respectability of incurring debt. This history has shaped the development of bankruptcy, commercial, and consumer credit …

The Separation Of Voting And Control: The Role Of Contract In Corporate Governance, Gabriel Rauterberg

Faculty Scholarship

The default rules of corporate law make shareholders’ control rights a function of their voting power. Whether a director is elected or a merger is approved depends on how shareholders vote. Yet, in private corporations shareholders routinely alter their rights by contract. This phenomenon of shareholder agreements — contracts among the owners of a firm — has received far less attention than it deserves, mainly because detailed data about the actual contents of shareholder agreements has been lacking. Private companies disclose little, and shareholder agreements are thought to play a trivial or nonexistent role in public companies.

I show that …

Looking Back With A Legend: Ira Millstein Reflects On The Impact Of Milton Friedman's Views On Corporate Governance, Eric L. Talley, Ira M. Millstein, Leo E. Strine Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

In this discussion, corporate governance legend and frequent The Business Lawyer contributor Ira M. Millstein reflects on the impact of Milton Friedman and his adherents on our corporate governance system and economy generally, as well as the path forward to an economy that functions better for the many. Millstein takes an historical perspective in conversation with former Chief Justice and Chancellor of Delaware, Leo E. Strine, Jr., moderated by Professor Eric Talley of Columbia Law School. Millstein situates the evolution of our corporate governance system, including the effect of Friedman and the Chicago school on it, within the political dynamics …

Corporate Crime And Punishment: An Empirical Study, Dorothy S. Lund, Natasha Sarin

Faculty Scholarship

For many years, law and economics scholars, as well as politicians and regulators, have debated whether corporate punishment chills beneficial corporate activity or, in the alternative, lets corporate criminals off too easily. A crucial and yet understudied aspect of this debate is empirical evidence. Unlike most other types of crime, the government does not measure corporate crime rates; therefore, the government and researchers alike cannot easily determine whether disputed policies are effectively deterring future incidents of corporate misconduct. In this Article, we take important first steps in addressing these questions. Specifically, we use three novel sources as proxies for corporate …

Corporate Finance For Social Good, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

Corporations are under pressure to use their outsized power to benefit society, but this advocacy is unlikely to result in meaningful change because corporate law’s incentive structure rewards fiduciaries who maximize shareholder wealth. Therefore, this Essay proposes a way forward that works within the wealth-maximization framework and yet could result in dramatic social change. The idea is simple: Use private debt markets to provide incentives for public-interested corporate action. Specifically, individuals who value prosocial corporate decisions could finance them by contributing to corporate social responsibility (CSR) bonds that would offset the corporation’s implementation costs. To provide an incentive to depart …

The Corporate Governance Machine, Dorothy S. Lund, Elizabeth Pollman

Faculty Scholarship

The conventional view of corporate governance is that it is a neutral set of processes and practices that govern how a company is managed. We demonstrate that this view is profoundly mistaken: For public companies in the United States, corporate governance has become a “system” composed of an array of institutional players, with a powerful shareholderist orientation. Our original account of this “corporate governance machine” generates insights about the past, present, and future of corporate governance. As for the past, we show how the concept of corporate governance developed alongside the shareholder primacy movement. This relationship is reflected in the …

Federal Corporate Law And The Business Of Banking, Lev Menand, Morgan Ricks

Faculty Scholarship

The only profit-seeking business enterprises chartered by a federal government agency are banks. Yet there is barely any scholarship justifying this exception to state primacy in U.S. corporate law.

This Article addresses that gap. It reinterprets the National Bank Act (NBA) – the organic statute governing national banks, the heavyweights of the financial sector – as a corporation law and recovers the reasons why Congress wrote this law: not to catalyze private wealth creation or to regulate an existing industry, but to solve an economic governance problem. National banks are federal instrumentalities charged with augmenting the money supply – a …

Unlocking Progressive Corporate Governance: The Black And Brown Hdfc Key, Gregory Louis

American University Business Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Feca’S Foreign Nationals Prohibition In United States V. Singh: Criminalizing Campaign Contributions Without The Requisite Mens Rea And The Ramifications For Foreign Corporations With Domestic Subsidiaries, Abigail Gampher

American University Business Law Review

No abstract provided.

Deciphering Property Insurers’ Indemnification Obligations After Disasters, Pandemics And Business Interruption Losses: An Analysis Of State Supreme Courts And Federal Circuits’ Declaratory Judgments, Willy E. Rice

Journal of Business & Technology Law

No abstract provided.

Covid-19 And Corporate Social Responsibility: Business Responses To The Pandemic In The Inland Northwest, Jacob H. Rooksby

Law Faculty Publications

The novel coronavirus upended the world beginning in early spring of 2020. As travel ground to a halt, and governments issued stay-at-home orders, the impact on commerce was immediate and has proven to be lasting. Employees accustomed to working in offices and job sites were told to stay home. Certain industries received permission to have so-called “essential” personnel continue their labor in person, but for many employers the reality they faced was not so simple: learn to adapt to the new environment or succumb to the new environment. ...

Advisors Or Enablers? Bringing Professional Service Providers Into The Guiding Principles’ Fold, Anita Ramasastry

Articles

After a decade, different businesses adhere to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). Some key commercial entities, however, remain largely outside of the UNGPs universe, including professional service providers (PSPs) who are retained by businesses to provide  expert advice and services. These advisors include lawyers, management consultants, architects and others. Some may have specialized units that provide advice on the UNGPs when retained solely for that purpose. But when asked to provide general commercial legal advice, to design a building, or restructure a business, such advisors do not typically appear to apply the UNGPs, to identify …

Cleaning Corporate Governance, Jens Frankenreiter, Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili, Eric Talley

Scholarship@WashULaw

Although empirical scholarship dominates the field of law and finance, much of it shares a common vulnerability: an abiding faith in the accuracy and integrity of a small, specialized collection of corporate governance data. In this paper, we unveil a novel collection of three decades’ worth of corporate charters for thousands of public companies, which shows that this faith is misplaced.

We make three principal contributions to the literature. First, we label our corpus for a variety of firm- and state-level governance features. Doing so reveals significant infirmities within the most well-known corporate governance datasets, including an error rate exceeding …

M&A Advisor Misconduct: A Wrong Without A Remedy?, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

Merger and acquisition ("M&A") transactions are among the most high profile of corporate transactions. They are also among the most contentious, with around eighty percent of all completed deals litigated in recent years. And yet investment banks—essential advisors on these deals—have generally succeeded spectacularly in avoiding liability, an anomaly considering the routine nature of deal litigation and the frequency with which they face lawsuits in their other activities. This article examines this anomaly, explaining the doctrinal and practical reasons why it arises. In doing so, it puts in context aiding and abetting liability, a recently-successful shareholder strategy to bring M&A …

A General Defense Of Information Fiduciaries, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

Countless high-profile abuses of user data by leading technology companies have raised a basic question: should firms that traffic in user data be held legally responsible to their users as “information fiduciaries”? Privacy legislation to impose fiduciary-like duties of care, confidentiality, and loyalty on data collectors enjoys bipartisan support but faces strong opposition from scholars. First, critics argue that the information fiduciary concept flies in the face of fundamental corporate law principles that require firms to prioritize shareholder interests over those of users. Second, it is said that the overwhelming self-interest of digital companies makes fiduciary loyalty impossible as a …

Managing Management Buyouts: A Us-Uk Comparative Analysis, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

This chapter comparatively assesses U.S. and U.K. law governing management buyouts (MBOs), focusing on the duties of directors and officers in these systems. The analysis casts doubt on persistent but mistaken perceptions about U.S. and U.K. corporate fiduciary duties for self-dealing. The U.K. no-conflict rule is seen as strict, the U.S. fairness rule as flexible and pragmatic. As the analysis for MBOs demonstrates, these fiduciary rules operate similarly, tasking neutral or disinterested directors with policing self-dealing, enabling commercially sensitive responses to conflicts of interest. The analysis also reveals stronger formal private enforcement of corporate law and more robust disclosure rules …

Beyond Profit, Emilie Aguirre

Faculty Scholarship

Etsy was a crown jewel of socially responsible businesses. It prioritized female entrepreneurship, its employees, and environmental stewardship. It was widely admired as a company pursuing social goals alongside profit goals. But after scaling up through an IPO, Etsy fell apart both socially and financially. Similar stories proliferate in the world of socially conscious business. What happened? Standard accounts point to greedy investors, capitalism, and short-termism as the culprits.

But this Paper identifies a more fundamental problem: business law is not designed to facilitate scale-ups for companies that articulate objectives beyond profit. It lacks a durable commitment mechanism for these …