Cuomo V. Clearing House Association: The Latest Chapter In The Occ's Pursuit Of Chevron Deference,
2010
University of North Carolina School of Law
Cuomo V. Clearing House Association: The Latest Chapter In The Occ's Pursuit Of Chevron Deference, Ramyn Atri
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
The Fdic's Special Assessment: Basing Deposit Insurance On Assets Instead Of Deposits,
2010
University of North Carolina School of Law
The Fdic's Special Assessment: Basing Deposit Insurance On Assets Instead Of Deposits, Peter S. Kim
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
Keeping Secured Lending Secure: The Limited Legacy Of Chrysler's Section 363 Bankruptcy,
2010
University of North Carolina School of Law
Keeping Secured Lending Secure: The Limited Legacy Of Chrysler's Section 363 Bankruptcy, Spencer C. Robinson
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
Credit Card Reform Goes To College,
2010
University of North Carolina School of Law
Credit Card Reform Goes To College, Regina L. Hinson
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
Evolving Regulation Of Corporate Governance And The Implications For D&O Liability: The United States And Australia,
2010
University of San Diego
Evolving Regulation Of Corporate Governance And The Implications For D&O Liability: The United States And Australia, Joan T.A. Gabel, Nancy R. Mansfield, Paul Von Nessen, Austin W. Hall, Andrew Jones
San Diego International Law Journal
This Article compares the modern corporate regulatory environments in the United States and Australia, including an analysis of the climate for Directors & Officers (D & O) liability coverage. Comparing these regulations across two large markets with similar historical bases for assessing director and officer liability allows us to explore which reforms may be more effective as new scandals emerge.
Placebo Ethics,
2010
University of Georgia School of Law
Placebo Ethics, Usha Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller
Scholarly Works
While there are innumerable theories on the best remedy for the current financial crisis, there is agreement on one point, at least: increased transparency is good. We look at a provision from the last round of financial regulation, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which imposed disclosure requirements tailored to prevent some of the kinds of abuses that led to the downfall of Enron. In response to Enron's self-dealing transactions, Section 406 of SOX required a public company to disclose its code of ethics and to disclose immediately any waivers from that code the company grants to its top …
Assessing The Chrysler Bankruptcy,
2010
Harvard Law School
Assessing The Chrysler Bankruptcy, Mark J. Roe, David Skeel
Michigan Law Review
Chrysler entered and exited bankruptcy in forty-two days, making it one of the fastest major industrial bankruptcies in memory. It entered as a company widely thought to be ripe for liquidation if left on its own, obtained massive funding from the United States Treasury, and exited via a pseudo-sale of its main assets to a new government-funded entity. The unevenness of the compensation to prior creditors raised concerns in capital markets, which we evaluate here. We conclude that the Chrysler bankruptcy cannot be understood as complying with good bankruptcy practice, that it resurrected discredited practices long thought interred in the …
The North Carolina Banking Institute Symposium On The Foreclosure Crisis: Overview,
2010
University of North Carolina School of Law
The North Carolina Banking Institute Symposium On The Foreclosure Crisis: Overview, Kathryn E. Johnson, Carolyn E. Waldrep
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
Private Equity Investment In Failed Banks: Appropriate Investors Welcome,
2010
University of North Carolina School of Law
Private Equity Investment In Failed Banks: Appropriate Investors Welcome, Frank Righeimer Martin
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
In Re Yellowstone Mountain Club: Equitable Subordination To Police Inequitable Conduct By Non-Insider Creditors,
2010
University of North Carolina School of Law
In Re Yellowstone Mountain Club: Equitable Subordination To Police Inequitable Conduct By Non-Insider Creditors, Marina Montes
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
Executive Compensation And Risk: Tarp Rules For Financial Institutions Trigger Broader Risk Assessment Of Compensation Policies,
2010
University of North Carolina School of Law
Executive Compensation And Risk: Tarp Rules For Financial Institutions Trigger Broader Risk Assessment Of Compensation Policies, Michael S. Melbinger
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
The North Carolina Banking Institute Symposium On The Foreclosure Crisis: The Unintended And Unconstitutional Consequences Of The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act,
2010
University of North Carolina School of Law
The North Carolina Banking Institute Symposium On The Foreclosure Crisis: The Unintended And Unconstitutional Consequences Of The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act, Leila A. Hicks
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
The North Carolina Banking Institute Symposium On The Foreclosure Crisis: The Right To Rent, Another Approach To Combat The Foreclosure Crisis,
2010
University of North Carolina School of Law
The North Carolina Banking Institute Symposium On The Foreclosure Crisis: The Right To Rent, Another Approach To Combat The Foreclosure Crisis, Daniel J. Behrend
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
Ubs Strikes A Deal: The Recent Impact Of Weakened Bank Secrecy On Swiss Banking,
2010
University of North Carolina School of Law
Ubs Strikes A Deal: The Recent Impact Of Weakened Bank Secrecy On Swiss Banking, Carolyn B. Lovejoy
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
Free Markets And Government Regulation: The Competing Views Of Thomas Woods And George Cooper,
2010
University of North Carolina School of Law
Free Markets And Government Regulation: The Competing Views Of Thomas Woods And George Cooper, David Shay Corbett Ii
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
Retirement Savings In The Face Of Increasing Longevity: The Advantages Of Deferring Retirement,
2010
University of North Carolina School of Law
Retirement Savings In The Face Of Increasing Longevity: The Advantages Of Deferring Retirement, Chase A. Tweel
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
The North Carolina Banking Institute Symposium On The Foreclosure Crisis: Mortgage Cramdown In Bankruptcy As A Necessary Incentive To Encourage Mortgage Modification,
2010
University of North Carolina School of Law
The North Carolina Banking Institute Symposium On The Foreclosure Crisis: Mortgage Cramdown In Bankruptcy As A Necessary Incentive To Encourage Mortgage Modification, Marjorie B. Maynard
North Carolina Banking Institute
No abstract provided.
Get Stupid: Film And Law Via Wim Wenders And Others,
2010
Birkbeck College
Get Stupid: Film And Law Via Wim Wenders And Others, Nathan Moore
Cardozo Law Review
No abstract provided.
Zappers - Retail Vat Fraud,
2010
Boston University School of Law
Zappers - Retail Vat Fraud, Richard Thompson Ainsworth
Faculty Scholarship
Zappers skim cash sales at retail. Zappers are add-on programs used by merchants with electronic cash registers (ECRs) or point-of-sale (POS) systems. Zappers are smart and selective. They do not skim all sales, and they never skim credit card transactions.
Although they are present in every jurisdiction, Zappers appear to be most widely used in developed economies that combine high levels of cash sales with high rates of consumption tax. Sweden, for example, has a cash-intensive economy, one of the world’s highest VAT rates (25%), and also reports that 70% of the ECRs in the country are either “… constructed …
Bringing To Heel The Elephants In The Economy: The Case For Ending “Too Big To Fail”,
2010
Texas Tech University School of Law
Bringing To Heel The Elephants In The Economy: The Case For Ending “Too Big To Fail”, Ann Graham
The University of New Hampshire Law Review
[Excerpt] “Financial institutions labeled “Too Big To Fail” (TBTF) are those whose insolvency could shake the foundations of the U.S. financial system and our economy. The term “too big to fail” became part of our popular vocabulary in the wake of federal bank regulatory intervention to prevent the failure of Continental Illinois National Bank in 1984. After the banking and savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s, the pros and cons of the TBTF policy were extensively debated. Despite Congressional efforts to limit application of TBTF, the doctrine has returned with renewed vigor during the current crisis. Responding on an ad hoc …
