Regulating Informational Intermediation,
2011
American University Washington College of Law
Regulating Informational Intermediation, Onnig H. Dombalagian
American University Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
Transparency Is The New Opacity: Constructing Financial Regulation After The Crisis,
2011
American University Washington College of Law
Transparency Is The New Opacity: Constructing Financial Regulation After The Crisis, Caroline Bradley
American University Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
Transparency And Contrarian Experts In Financial Regulation: A Brief Response To Professor Bradley,
2011
American University Washington College of Law
Transparency And Contrarian Experts In Financial Regulation: A Brief Response To Professor Bradley, Daniel Schwarcz
American University Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Terrible TousaS: Opinions Test The Patience Of Corporate Lending Practices,
2011
Georgia State University College of Law
The Terrible TousaS: Opinions Test The Patience Of Corporate Lending Practices, Jessica D. Gabel
Faculty Publications By Year
Two diametrically opposed decisions pit creditors against debtors. The case of troubled homebuilder TOUSA has generated shockwaves through the lending industry. Set against the backdrop of the housing collapse and risky lending, the bankruptcy court’s decision left secured creditors with a mixture of shock, anger, and worry over the repercussions. In that opinion, the bankruptcy court unwound a nearly $1 billion transaction of liens and loan proceeds, on grounds that the transactions drove the debtor company into the ground. In other words, the court found that a fraudulent transfer had occurred. Not surprisingly, the lenders appealed and the next decision …
Transparency Is The New Opacity: Constructing Final Regulation After The Crisis,
2011
University of Miami School of Law
Transparency Is The New Opacity: Constructing Final Regulation After The Crisis, Caroline Bradley
Articles
No abstract provided.
Overwhelming A Financial Regulatory Black Hole With Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank’S Attack On Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused By An Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market,
2011
University of Maryland School of Law
Overwhelming A Financial Regulatory Black Hole With Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank’S Attack On Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused By An Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, Michael Greenberger
Faculty Scholarship
It is now accepted wisdom that it was the non-transparent, poorly capitalized and almost wholly unregulated over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives market that lit the fuse that exploded the highly vulnerable worldwide economy in the fall of 2008.[1] Because tens of trillions of dollars of these financial products were pegged to the economic performance of an overheated and highly inflated housing market, the sudden collapse of that market triggered under-capitalized OTC derivative guarantees of the subprime housing market; and the guarantors’ multi-trillion dollar interconnectedness with thousands of other OTC derivatives’ counterparties within that OTC market (through interest rate, currency, foreign exchange, and …
Dodd-Frank For Bankruptcy Lawyers,
2011
University of Chicago Law School
Dodd-Frank For Bankruptcy Lawyers, Douglas G. Baird, Edward R. Morrison
Faculty Scholarship
The Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation creates an “Orderly Liquidation Authority” (OLA) that shares many features in common with the Bankruptcy Code. This is easy to overlook because the legislation uses a language and employs a decision-maker (both borrowed from bank regulation) that will seem foreign to bankruptcy lawyers. Our task in this essay is to identify the core congruities between OLA and the Code. In doing so, we highlight important differences and assess both their constitutionality and policy objectives. We conclude with a few thoughts on the likelihood that OLA will contribute to market stability.
A Model Of Optimal Corporate Bailouts,
2011
Columbia Law School
A Model Of Optimal Corporate Bailouts, Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric L. Talley, Ivo Welch
Faculty Scholarship
We analyze incentive-efficient government bailouts within a canonical model of intra-firm moral hazard. Bailouts exacerbate the moral hazard of firms and managers in two ways. First, they make them less averse to failing. Second, the taxes to fund bailouts dampen their incentives. Nevertheless, if third-party externalities from keeping the firm alive are strong, bailouts can improve welfare. Our model suggests that governments should use bailouts sparingly, where social externalities are large and subsidies small; eliminate incumbent owners and managers to improve a priori incentives; and finance bailouts through redistributive taxes on productive firms instead of forcing recipients to repay in …
Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards An Analytical Framework,
2011
Duke Law School
Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards An Analytical Framework, Steven L. Schwarcz, Iman Anabtawi
Faculty Scholarship
The global financial crisis demonstrated the inability and unwillingness of financial market participants to safeguard the stability of the financial system. It also highlighted the enormous direct and indirect costs of addressing systemic crises after they have occurred, as opposed to attempting to prevent them from arising. Governments and international organizations are responding with measures intended to make the financial system more resilient to economic shocks, many of which will be implemented by regulatory bodies over time. These measures suffer, however, from the lack of a theoretical account of how systemic risk propagates within the financial system and why regulatory …
Compensating Market Value Losses: Rethinking The Theory Of Damages In A Market Economy,
2011
Duke Law School
Compensating Market Value Losses: Rethinking The Theory Of Damages In A Market Economy, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
The BP Deepwater Horizon spill and the Toyota car recalls have highlighted an important legal anomaly that has been overlooked by scholars — judicial inconsistency and confusion in ruling whether to compensate for the loss in market value of wrongfully affected property. This article seeks to understand the anomaly and, in the process, to build a stronger foundation for enabling courts to decide when — and in what amounts — to award damages for market value losses. To that end, the Article analyzes the normative rationales for generally awarding damages, adapting those rationales to derive a theory of damages that …
A Vision For Scaling Microfinance: More Than Dollars And Smarts,
2011
Unviersity of Michigan Law School
A Vision For Scaling Microfinance: More Than Dollars And Smarts, Deborah Burand
Book Chapters
The following is a stock-taking of some of the key initiatives that have taken place to date in the world of microfinance at building an international financial architecture that attracts and retains flows of commercial capital to microfinance. It also is a call to those of us in the microfinance world to do much, much more.
Ability To Pay,
2011
University of Michigan Law School
Ability To Pay, John A. E. Pottow
Articles
The landmark Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank") transforms the regulation of consumer credit in the United States. Many of its changes have been high-profile, attracting considerable media and scholarly attention, most notably the establishment of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB"). Even specific consumer reforms, such as a so-called "plain vanilla" proposal, drew hot debate and lobbying firepower. But when the dust settled, one profoundly transformative innovation that did not garner the same outrage as plain vanilla or the CFPB did get into the law: imposing upon lenders a duty to assure a borrower's ability to repay. Ensuring a borrower's …
Wall Street As Community Of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation,
2011
Cornell Law School
Wall Street As Community Of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, Saule T. Omarova
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
This Article proposes an approach to regulatory design that aims to create structural incentives for the emergence of a new model of embedded self-regulation in the financial industry. Without a doubt, the ideas laid out in this Article are more of a thought experiment than a polished set of fully developed regulatory proposals. These ideas and suggestions need a great deal of additional thought and a deeper, more granular and rigorous analysis of their potential consequences, benefits, and costs. Moreover, this Article explores only how to create conditions conducive to the emergence of comprehensive industry self-regulation that is embedded in …
Destructive Coordination,
2011
Cornell Law School
Destructive Coordination, Charles K. Whitehead
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
An important goal of financial risk regulation is promoting coordination. Law's coordinating function minimizes costly conflict and encourages greater uniformity among market participants. Likewise, privately developed market standards, such as standard-form contracts and rules incorporated into widely-used vendor technology systems, help to lower transaction costs partly by increasing coordination.
By contrast, much of financial economics is premised on a world without coordination. Basic tools used to manage financial risk presume that changes in asset prices follow a random walk and individuals buy and sell assets independently. Thus, a bedrock premise of traditional risk management is that a portfolio manager’s actions …
323 Non-Managing Underwriters’ Role In Securities Offerings: Just Eye Candy?,
2011
Fordham Law School
323 Non-Managing Underwriters’ Role In Securities Offerings: Just Eye Candy?, Elena Marty-Nelson
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
While there is considerable scholarship on the due diligence defense of lead underwriters in defective corporate securities offerings, there is surprisingly little analysis of the due diligence defense of non-managing underwriters. This article challenges the common perception that lead and non-managing underwriters necessarily “sink or swim” together for purposes of due diligence. An analysis of the statutory structure of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 reveals that non-managing underwriters are not inextricably tethered to the lead. Rather, non-managing underwriters who actively question the lead’s due diligence investigation should be able to meet their own affirmative defense even when …
Giving State Tax Incentives To Corporations: How Much Is Too Much?,
2011
University of South Carolina
Giving State Tax Incentives To Corporations: How Much Is Too Much?, Kathleen E. Mcdavid
South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business
No abstract provided.
Incentivizing Economic Development: An Empirical Examination Of The Use Of Grants And Loans,
2011
University of South Carolina
Incentivizing Economic Development: An Empirical Examination Of The Use Of Grants And Loans, Robert T. Greenbaum, Daniele Bondonio
South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business
No abstract provided.
Bankruptcy’S Protection For Non-Debtors From Securities Fraud Litigation,
2011
Fordham Law School
Bankruptcy’S Protection For Non-Debtors From Securities Fraud Litigation, John M. M. Wunderlich
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Given the recent economic climate, the judiciary faces an all too familiar challenge: navigate through the web that is bankruptcy and securities fraud. So far, bankruptcy has evolved into a tool to resolve mass tort litigation, like securities fraud. However, this Article explores bankruptcy as a tool to resolve securities litigation against non-debtors, those that never file for bankruptcy protection. The protection the Bankruptcy Code provides to non-debtors, like officers and directors, goes largely unnoticed, much to the detriment of securities fraud victims. Mindful that we now are in the midst of another financial crisis and that attention will slowly …
Rolling The Dice On Financial Regulatory Reform: Gambling Law As A Framework For Regulating Structured Investments,
2011
Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Rolling The Dice On Financial Regulatory Reform: Gambling Law As A Framework For Regulating Structured Investments, Christopher B. Chuff
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal (1994 - )
No abstract provided.
Lyondell: A Note Of Approbation,
2011
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Lyondell: A Note Of Approbation, William W. Bratton
NYLS Law Review
No abstract provided.
