Tax Competition And The Case Of Bank Secrecy Rules: New Trends In International Tax Law,
2012
University of Michigan Law School
Tax Competition And The Case Of Bank Secrecy Rules: New Trends In International Tax Law, Linneu De Albuquerque Mello
SJD Dissertations
The current integration of world markets has led to an increase in the competition for businesses in addition to the competition for passive investments that already existed. In addition, the current financial crisis led countries to search for additional sources of revenue in order to work within their budget constraints. As tax is an area where such competition is more visible, it has also generated an effort – mainly from industrialized countries and international organizations – to curb tax practices deemed harmful to world economy. Bank secrecy rules and lack of transparency are aspects of these "harmful" tax practices. This …
Corporate Form And Social Entrepreneurship: A Status Report From California (And Beyond),
2012
Columbia Law School
Corporate Form And Social Entrepreneurship: A Status Report From California (And Beyond), Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
In January 2012, amendments to California’s corporate code permitted a new type of corporate form designed around for-profit entities also wishing to commit to serving a broader “social purpose” (or purposes). Although not the first state to embrace such reforms, California’s experiment is unique, in that it allowed companies to opt for one of two different social benefit entity forms: the “Benefit Corporation” (BC) and the “Flexible Purpose Corporation” (FPC). This essay summarizes the reforms and presents basic descriptive data about the rate at which business organizations have embraced them. Thus far, both forms have had relatively modest take-up rates; …
Dispersed Ownership: The Theories, The Evidence, And The Enduring Tension Between "Lumpers" And "Splitters",
2012
Columbia Law School
Dispersed Ownership: The Theories, The Evidence, And The Enduring Tension Between "Lumpers" And "Splitters", John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
This article argues that dispersed ownership resulted less from inexorable forces and more from private ordering. Neither legal nor political conditions mandated or prevented the appearance of dispersed ownership. Rather, entrepreneurs, investment bankers, and investors — all seeking to maximize value — sometimes saw reasons why selling control into the public market would maximize value for them. But when and why? That is the article's focus. It argues that law played less of a role than specialized intermediaries — investment banks, securities exchanges, and other agents — who found it to be in their self-interest to foster dispersed ownership and …
After The Great Recession: Regulating Financial Services For Low- And Middle-Income Communities,
2012
Columbia Law School
After The Great Recession: Regulating Financial Services For Low- And Middle-Income Communities, Ronald J. Mann
Faculty Scholarship
This paper, prepared as a speech at Washington and Lee Law School, discusses regulatory strategies for lending to LMI households after the Great Recession. It argues that the CFPB's emphasis on behavioral economics is likely to lead it astray, especially if it relies on assumptions drawn from experience with middle-class behavior to interfere with the choices made by LMI households that face a different set of opportunities than the middle-class households more familiar to regulators. More generally, the paper suggests that most of the financial distress faced by LMI households is a result of broader social and institutional problems, and …
Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation In Financial Firms: The Case For Convertible Equity-Based Pay,
2012
Columbia Law School
Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation In Financial Firms: The Case For Convertible Equity-Based Pay, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
Unlike the failure of a nonfinancial firm, the failure of a systemically important financial firm will reduce the value of a diversified shareholder portfolio because of economy-wide reductions in expected returns and a consequent increase in systematic risk. Thus, diversified shareholders of a financial firm generally internalize systemic risk, whereas managerial shareholders and blockholders do not. This means that the governance model drawn from nonfinancial firms will not fit financial firms. Regulations that limit risk-taking by financial firms can thus provide a benefit, rather than necessarily impose a cost, for the typical diversified public shareholder. Managerial shareholding also gives rise …
Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank's Dangers And The Case For A Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund,
2012
Columbia Law School
Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank's Dangers And The Case For A Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Christopher Muller
Faculty Scholarship
Inherent tensions in the financial sector mean that episodes of extreme stress are inevitable, if unpredictable. This is true even when financial regulatory and supervisory regimes are effective in many respects. The government's capacity to intervene may determine whether distress is confined to the financial sector or breaks out into the real economy Although adequate resolution authority to address a failing financial firm is a necessary objective of the current regulatory reforms, a firm-by-firm approach cannot address a major systemic failure. Major blows to the financial system, such as the financial crisis of 2007-2009, may require capital support of the …
The New Exit In Venture Capital,
2012
William & Mary Law School
The New Exit In Venture Capital, Darian M. Ibrahim
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
How America's Newest Consumer Credit Statute Fails To Protect Its Oldest Consumers: A Critique Of The Credit Card Act Of 2009,
2012
University of Oklahoma College of Law
How America's Newest Consumer Credit Statute Fails To Protect Its Oldest Consumers: A Critique Of The Credit Card Act Of 2009, Michael A. Furlong
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
More Money, More Problems: How Oklahoma’S Novel Approach To Ponzi Scheme Clawbacks In Oklahoma Department Of Securities Ex Rel. Faught V. Blair Means More Uncertainty For Investors,
2012
University of Oklahoma College of Law
More Money, More Problems: How Oklahoma’S Novel Approach To Ponzi Scheme Clawbacks In Oklahoma Department Of Securities Ex Rel. Faught V. Blair Means More Uncertainty For Investors, Elizabeth Blair Wozobski
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Measure Of A Mac: A Quasi-Experimental Protocol For Tokenizing Force Majeure Clauses In M&A; Agreements,
2012
Columbia Law School
The Measure Of A Mac: A Quasi-Experimental Protocol For Tokenizing Force Majeure Clauses In M&A; Agreements, Eric L. Talley, Drew O'Kane
Faculty Scholarship
This paper develops a protocol for using a familiar data set on force majeure provisions in corporate acquisitions agreements to tokenize and calibrate a machine-learning algorithm of textual analysis. Our protocol, built on regular expression (RE) and latent semantic analysis (LSA) approaches, serves to replicate, correct, and extend the hand-coded data. Our preliminary results indicate that both approaches perform well, though a hybridized approach improves predictive power further. Monte Carlo simulations suggest that our results are generally robust to out-of-sample predictions. We conclude that similar approaches could be used more broadly in empirical legal scholarship, especially including in business law.
Too Libor, Too Late: Time To Move To A Market Rate,
2012
University of Michigan Law School
Too Libor, Too Late: Time To Move To A Market Rate, Michael S. Barr
Articles
Barclays has been fined, the British have issued their report, and now the market is anxious for everything to go on as usual with the London Interbank Offer Rate (“LIBOR”). I think that would be a serious mistake. The U.S. and British investigations into rate-fixing by Barclays revealed a widespread culture of pervasive, deceitful conduct in the setting of the most important private sector benchmark for over $300 trillion in derivative contracts and $10 trillion in adjustable-rate loans. It is highly unlikely that Barclays was the only major bank engaging in this conduct, and public investigations and private lawsuits against …
Governing Interdependent Financial Systems: Lessons From The Vienna Initiative,
2012
Columbia Law School
Governing Interdependent Financial Systems: Lessons From The Vienna Initiative, Katharina Pistor
Faculty Scholarship
Financial markets have become globally interdependent, yet their governance has remained national at the core. This friction encumbers crisis management and distorts incentives for crisis prevention. The Vienna Initiative, formed to manage the fallout from the global crisis in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), offers an alternative coordinated, multi-stakeholder governance framework. A critical prerequisite for such a regime is a coordinating agent, or ‘anchor tenant’, that is deeply vested in the stability of transnational financial systems, but does not directly compete with market actors or regulators. Lessons for more effective governance of financial interdependence are discussed.
On The Theoretical Foundations For Regulating Financial Markets,
2012
Columbia Law School
On The Theoretical Foundations For Regulating Financial Markets, Katharina Pistor
Faculty Scholarship
How we think about financial markets determines how we regulate them. Since the 1970s modern finance theory has shaped how we think about and regulate financial markets. It is based on the notion that markets are or can be made (more) efficient. Financial markets have been deregulated when they were thought to achieve efficient outcomes on their own; and regulation was designed to lend crutches to them when it appeared that they needed support. While modern finance theory has suffered some setbacks in the aftermath of the global crisis, defenders hold that improving market efficiency should still be the overriding …
Application Of Default Rules To Address Financial Conflicts Of Interest In Academic Medical Centers,
2012
California Western School of Law
Application Of Default Rules To Address Financial Conflicts Of Interest In Academic Medical Centers, Joanna K. Sax
Indiana Law Journal
This Essay proposes that the rules governing financial conflicts of interest for scientists within the National Institutes of Health apply to scientists at Academic Medical Centers because scientists at both places receive federal funding. The rules governing financial conflicts of interest within the National Institutes of Health are stricter than the rules at Academic Medical Centers. The cornerstone of financial conflicts of interest rules at Academic Medical Centers is disclosure, which is inadequate. This Essay builds on previous work calling for significant changes to rules addressing financial conflicts of interest, and it promotes changes by calling for the application of …
Behaviorally Informed Regulation,
2012
University of Michigan Law School
Behaviorally Informed Regulation, Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan, Eldar Shafir
Book Chapters
Policy makers typically approach human behavior from the perspective of the rational agent model, which relics on normativc, a priori analyses. The model assumes people make insightful, well-planned, highly controlled, and calculated decisions guided by considerations of personal utility. This perspective is promoted in the social sciences and in professional schools and has come to dominate much of the formulation and conduct of policy. An alternative view, developed mostly through empirical behavioral research, and the one we will articulate here, provides a substantially difierent perspective on individual behavior and its policy and regulatory implications. According to the empirical perspective, behavior …
Contributor,
2012
Georgia State University College of Law
The New Exit In Venture Capital,
2012
Vanderbilt University Law School
The New Exit In Venture Capital, Darian M. Ibrahim
Vanderbilt Law Review
This Article is the first to explore the emergence of a potentially game-changing third exit option in venture capital: secondary markets for the sale of individual ownership interests in private start-ups and venture capital funds.6 Unlike IPOs and trade sales, secondary markets operate at the individual investor level rather than at the start-up level. Because investors have different liquidity needs, an individual-investor option offers exit to those who need it-for example, to the serial entrepreneur who wishes to start another venture or to the VC whose fund is about to expire and who must return capital to his investors. Secondary …
Responsible Profitability? Not On My Balance Sheet!,
2012
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
Responsible Profitability? Not On My Balance Sheet!, Arthur Acevedo
Catholic University Law Review
No abstract provided.
The International Court Of Justice's Treatment Of Circumstantial Evidence And Adverse Inferences,
2012
Case Western Reserve University - School of Law
The International Court Of Justice's Treatment Of Circumstantial Evidence And Adverse Inferences, Michael P. Scharf, Marqaux Day
Faculty Publications
This Article examines a vexing evidentiary question with which the International Court of Justice has struggled in several cases, namely: What should the Court do when one of the parties has exclusive access to critical evidence and refuses to produce it for security or other reasons? In its first case, Corfu Channel, the Court decided to apply liberal inferences of fact against the non-producing party, but in the more recent Crime of Genocide case, the Court declined to do so under seemingly similar circumstances. By carefully examining the treatment of evidence exclusively accessible by one party in these and other …
Reversible Rewards,
2012
Columbia Law School
Reversible Rewards, Omri Ben-Shahar, Anu Bradford
Faculty Scholarship
This article offers a new mechanism of private enforcement, combining sanctions and rewards into a scheme of “reversible rewards.” The enforcing party sets up a precommitted fund and offers it as reward to another party to refrain from violation. If the violator turns down the reward, the enforcer can use the money in the fund for one purpose only – to pay for punishment of the violator. The article shows that this scheme doubles the effect of funds invested in enforcement and allows the enforcer to stop violations that would otherwise be too costly to deter. It argues that reversible …
