Can A Secured Creditor Be Denied The Right To Credit Bid When The Creditor’S Collateral Is Sold Pursuant To A Chapter 11 Plan Of Reorganization?,
2012
New York Law School
Can A Secured Creditor Be Denied The Right To Credit Bid When The Creditor’S Collateral Is Sold Pursuant To A Chapter 11 Plan Of Reorganization?, Marshall E. Tracht
Articles & Chapters
CASE AT A GLANCE
A bankruptcy plan can only be confirmed over the objection of a secured creditor if the plan is found to be “fair and equitable.” The fair and equitable standard requires, at a minimum, that (i) the creditor may retain its lien on its collateral; (ii) the collateral will be sold subject to the creditor’s right to credit bid its debt; or (iii) the creditor will receive the “indubitable equivalent” of its claim. The Supreme Court must decide whether a plan can provide for the sale of collateral without granting the creditor the right to credit bid …
The New Exit In Venture Capital,
2012
William & Mary Law School
The New Exit In Venture Capital, Darian M. Ibrahim
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Complexity, Innovation, And The Regulation Of Modern Financial Markets,
2012
Cornell Law School
Complexity, Innovation, And The Regulation Of Modern Financial Markets, Dan Awrey
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
The intellectual origins of the global financial crisis (GFC) can be traced back to blind spots emanating from within conventional financial theory. These blind spots are distorted reflections of the perfect market assumptions underpinning the canonical theories of financial economics: modern portfolio theory, the Modigliani and Miller capital structure irrelevancy principle, the capital asset pricing model and, perhaps most importantly, the efficient market hypothesis. In the decades leading up to the GFC, these assumptions were transformed from empirically (con)testable propositions into the central articles of faith of the ideology of modern finance: the foundations of a widely held belief in …
International Investments Arbitration: Winning, Losing And Why,
2012
American University Washington College of Law
International Investments Arbitration: Winning, Losing And Why, Susan D. Franck
Contributions to Books
In late 2008, as financial markets were crashing, the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment launched the Columbia FDI Perspectives. The first Perspective, entitled “The FDI recession has begun,” correctly forecast an FDI recession in the following year. From that first Perspective in late 2008 to the end of 2010, the series published thirty-three concise notes on topical FDI-related issues by diverse experts in the field. The purpose of these Perspectives is to inform readers about some of the important issues and trends in the contemporary debate on FDI, and to promote a wide-ranging discussion about the policy implications …
Built To Scale: Small Business Policy And The Meltdown,
2012
Pacific McGeorge School of Law
Built To Scale: Small Business Policy And The Meltdown, Michael P. Malloy
McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles
No abstract provided.
Understanding Regulatory Capture: An Academic Perspective From The United States,
2012
Duke Law School
Understanding Regulatory Capture: An Academic Perspective From The United States, Lawrence G. Baxter
Faculty Scholarship
Although it sometimes seems that financial regulatory agencies have been entirely captured by the larger players in the industry they regulate, a closer examination reveals that a variety of factors contribute to policy outcomes in this arena. Agencies have different agendas and stakeholders, and banks often perform quasi-governmental roles that blur the line between the captors and the captured. The real danger is that public policy can be distorted as a result of excessive influence by one set of interests at the expense of others. This danger is best thwarted or at least mitigated through the application of a range …
Shadow Banking, Financial Markets, And The Real Estate Sector,
2012
Duke Law School
Shadow Banking, Financial Markets, And The Real Estate Sector, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This is a relatively brief “firestarter” talk prepared by the author for the World Economic Forum’s Industry Partnership Strategists Meeting 2012 (held on October 3, 2012) on transformation of the real estate sector in light of ongoing shifts in the financial markets and broader global trends.
Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power And Limits Of Law,
2012
Duke Law School
Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power And Limits Of Law, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This Essay examines how law can help to control financial chaos. To that end, regulation should strive to not only maximize economic efficiency within the financial system but also protect the financial system itself. Any regulatory framework for achieving these goals, however, will be imperfect and have tradeoffs. Increasing financial complexity has created information failures that even disclosure cannot remedy, whereas law-imposed standardization would have its own flaws. Bounded human rationality limits the effectiveness of even otherwise ideal laws. Furthermore, the increasing dispersion of financial risk is undermining monitoring incentives. We also do not yet fully understand how systemic risk …
Fundamental Forces Driving United States And International Financial Regulations Reform,
2012
Duke Law School
Fundamental Forces Driving United States And International Financial Regulations Reform, Lawrence G. Baxter
Faculty Scholarship
Multiple forces create a systemic crisis of the proportions of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Global and domestic financial reform is a difficult and perplexing task, one that is likely to take many years, and one that will surely continue to be shaped by a diverse range of forces. Recent measures remain incomplete and in some cases are even proving to be misdirected. This article considers seven fundamental forces shaping actions on future reform, specifically the (1) long term impact of the Crisis (and all financial crises); (2) increase in the “financialization” of the global economy, seemingly disproportionate to …
Direct And Indirect U.S. Government Debt,
2012
Duke Law School
Direct And Indirect U.S. Government Debt, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Shadow Banking, Financial Markets, And The Real Estate Sector,
2012
Duke Law School
Shadow Banking, Financial Markets, And The Real Estate Sector, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This is a relatively brief “firestarter” talk prepared by the author for the World Economic Forum’s Industry Partnership Strategists Meeting 2012 (held on October 3, 2012) on transformation of the real estate sector in light of ongoing shifts in the financial markets and broader global trends.
Engineering An Orderly Greek Debt Restructuring,
2012
Duke Law School
Engineering An Orderly Greek Debt Restructuring, Mitu Gulati, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Faculty Scholarship
For some months now, discussions over how Greece will restructure its debt have been constrained by the requirement that the deal be “voluntary” – implying that Greece would continue debt service to any creditors that choose retain their old bonds rather than tender them in an exchange offer. In light of Greece’s deep solvency problems and lack of agreement with its creditors so far, the notion of a voluntary debt exchange is increasingly looking like a mirage. In this essay, we describe and compare three alternative approaches that would achieve an orderly restructuring but avoid an outright default: (1) “retrofitting” …
The Use And Abuse Of Special-Purpose Entities In Public Finance,
2012
Duke Law School
The Use And Abuse Of Special-Purpose Entities In Public Finance, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
States increasingly are raising financing indirectly through special-purpose entities (SPEs), variously referred to as authorities, special authorities, or public authorities. Notwithstanding their long history and increasingly widespread use, relatively little is known or has been written about these entities. This article examines state SPEs and their functions, comparing them to SPEs used in corporate finance. States, even more than corporations, use these entities to reduce financial transparency and avoid public scrutiny, seriously threatening the integrity of public finance. The article analyzes how regulation could be designed in order to control that threat while maintaining the legitimate financing benefits provided by …
What Is Securitization? And For What Purpose?,
2012
Duke Law School
What Is Securitization? And For What Purpose?, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
In Re: Defining Securitization, Professor Jonathan Lipson attempts to define a “true” securitization transaction, ultimately characterizing it as “a purchase of primary payment rights by a special purpose entity that (1) legally isolates such payment rights from a bankruptcy (or similar insolvency) estate of the originator, and (2) results, directly or indirectly, in the issuance of securities whose value is determined by the payment rights so purchased.” There is much to admire in Lipson’s attempt but also much to question.
Let me start with the admiration. Lipson’s article is by far the most systematic and thoughtful analysis of what …
Making A Voluntary Greek Debt Exchange Work,
2012
Duke Law School
Making A Voluntary Greek Debt Exchange Work, Mitu Gulati, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Faculty Scholarship
Within the next couple of months, the Greek government, is supposed to persuade private creditors holding about EUR 200bn in its bonds to voluntarily exchange their existing bonds for new bonds that pay roughly 50 percent less. This may work with large creditors whose failure to participate in a debt exchange could trigger a Greek default, but may not persuade smaller creditors, who will be told that their claims will continue to be fully serviced if they do not participate in the exchange. This paper proposes an approach to dealing with this free rider problem that exploits the fact that …
The 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture Protecting Investors In Securitization Transactions: Does Dodd–Frank Help, Or Hurt?,
2012
Duke Law School
The 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture Protecting Investors In Securitization Transactions: Does Dodd–Frank Help, Or Hurt?, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
Securitization has been called into question because of its role in the recent financial crisis. Schwarcz examines the potential flaws in the securitization process and compare how the Dodd–Frank Act treats them. Although Dodd–Frank addresses one of the flaws, it underregulates or fails to regulate other flaws. It also overregulates by addressing aspects of securitization that are not flawed.
Betting Big: Value, Caution And Accountability In An Era Of Large Banks And Complex Finance,
2012
Duke Law School
Betting Big: Value, Caution And Accountability In An Era Of Large Banks And Complex Finance, Lawrence G. Baxter
Faculty Scholarship
Big banks are controversial. Their supporters maintain that they offer products, services and infrastructure that smaller banks simply cannot match and enjoy unprecedented economies of scale and scope. Detractors worry about the risks generated by big banks, their threats to financial stability, and the way they externalize costs of operation to the public. This article explains why there is no conclusive argument one way or the other and why simple measures for restricting the danger of big banks are neither plausible nor effective.
The complex ecology of modern finance and the management and regulatory challenges generated by ultra-large banking, however, …
Marginalizing Risk,
2012
Duke Law School
Marginalizing Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
A major focus of finance is reducing risk on investments, a goal commonly achieved by dispersing the risk among numerous investors. Sometimes, however, risk dispersion can cause investors to underestimate and under-protect against risk. Risk can even be so widely dispersed that rational investors individually lack the incentive to monitor it. This Article examines the market failures resulting from risk dispersion and analyzes when government regulation may be necessary or appropriate to limit these market failures. The Article also examines how such regulation should be designed,including the extent to which it should limit risk dispersion in the first instance.
In-House Counsel’S Role In The Structuring Of Mortgage-Backed Securities,
2012
Duke Law School
In-House Counsel’S Role In The Structuring Of Mortgage-Backed Securities, Steven L. Schwarcz, Shaun Barnes, Kathleen G. Cully
Faculty Scholarship
The authors introduce the financial crisis and the role played by mortgage-backed securities. Then describe the controversy at issue: whether, in order to own and enforce the mortgage loans backing those securities, a special-purpose vehicle “purchasing” mortgage loans must take physical delivery of the notes and security instruments in the precise manner specified by the sale agreement. Focusing on this controversy, the authors analyze (i) the extent, if any, that the controversy has merit; (ii) whether in-house counsel should have anticipated the controversy; and (iii) what, if anything, in-house counsel could have done to avert or, after it arose, to …
The Roberta Mitchell Lecture: Structuring Responsibility In Securitization Transactions,
2012
Duke Law School
The Roberta Mitchell Lecture: Structuring Responsibility In Securitization Transactions, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
In this Lecture, Professor Schwarcz examines how complex securitization transactions may have created a “protection gap,” the conundrum that transaction parties may be unable to purchase or might not want to pay the price for full protection. As a result, they sometimes choose or are forced to assume the good faith of the other parties to the transaction and the consistency and completeness of protections provided in the transaction documents.
