Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Protecting And Fostering Online Platform Competition: The Role Of Antitrust Law, Jonathan Baker

Contributions to Books

This essay provides a perspective on the role of antitrust law in protecting and fostering competition in the digital economy, with particular attention to online platforms. It highlights the danger of anti-competitive exclusionary conduct by dominant online platforms and describes ways that antitrust law can challenge and deter such conduct. The essay also identifies a number of difficulties that U.S. courts and enforcers face in challenging harmful exclusionary conduct by dominant platforms, and discusses some ways regulation can supplement antitrust law in fostering competition.

Managerial Incentives To Repeatedly Collude: Frequency, Partners And Governance Rules, Catarina Marvao Dr., Chloé Le Coq

Articles

Cartel recidivism has been discovered among many convicted firms and is often perceived as a result of the limited efficiency of competition policy. The incentives for managers to collude have been linked to the firm’s organizational structure, the corporate culture, and the type of executive compensation packages in place.

To the extent that undetected cartels differ from detected ones in relevant dimensions, the current empirical results on illegal cartels are biased. To tackle this issue, we use a novel dataset of a population of cartels, which were legal in Sweden up until 1993. We contribute to the current debate on …

Investigating A Mega-Merger: Contextualizing The T-Mobile Merger To The Consumer Welfare Standard And The Competition Standard, Rahul Sukesh

Fordham Undergraduate Law Review

This Note explores the ruling of the U.S. Judge Victor Marrero in favor of the merger between T-Mobile and Sprint in terms of the specifics of the merger itself, and more broadly, the two dominant schools of antitrust thought: the consumer welfare standard and the competition standard and the specifics of the merger itself. Highlighting issues of antitrust law, this Note will first outline certain background concepts necessary to understand legal precedence around antitrust law. This Note will then trace the merger overtime and focus on how various opposition forces, citing violations of antitrust law, amassed a large body of …

Mere Common Ownership And The Antitrust Laws, Thomas A. Lambert

Faculty Publications

"Common ownership," also called "horizontal shareholding," refers to a stock investor's ownership of minority stakes in multiple competing firms. Recent empirical studies have purported to show that institutional investors' common ownership reduces competition among commonly owned competitors. "Mere common ownership" is horizontal shareholding that is not accompanied by any sort of illicit agreement, such as a hub-and-spoke conspiracy, or the holding of a control-conferring stake. This Article considers the legality of mere common ownership under the U.S. antitrust laws. Prominent antitrust scholars and the leading treatise have concluded that mere common ownership that has the incidental effect of lessening market …

Shifting The Burden On Pay-For-Delay Challenges: Analyzing Ab 824’S Effects On Reverse Payment Settlements And Drug Costs, Kevin Wallentine

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

Antitrust scholars and agencies have recognized the anticompetitive impact of reverse payment settlements—in which branded and generic drug companies settle patent disputes, typically by delaying the entry of generics into the market. Despite clear competition concerns, these settlements are typically subject to a rule of reason analysis that puts the burden on enforcers and plaintiffs to prove their anticompetitive harms. Recent California legislation—AB 824—shifts the burden to the settling drug companies to prove their arrangement is not anticompetitive. AB 824 presents an opportunity for advocates of lower drug costs but still faces hurdles and shortfalls. This Note examines the efficacy …

In Defense Of Breakups: Administering A “Radical” Remedy, Rory Van Loo

Faculty Scholarship

Calls for breaking up monopolies—especially Amazon, Facebook, and Google—have largely focused on proving that past acquisitions of companies like Whole Foods, Instagram, and YouTube were anticompetitive. But scholars have paid insufficient attention to another major obstacle that also explains why the government in recent decades has not broken up a single large company. After establishing that an anticompetitive merger or other act has occurred, there is great skepticism of breakups as a remedy. Judges, scholars, and regulators see a breakup as extreme, frequently comparing the remedy to trying to “unscramble eggs.” They doubt the government’s competence in executing such a …

Myth, Manipulation, And Minor League Baseball: How A Capitalist Democracy Engenders Income Inequality, Phillip J. Closius, Joseph S. Stephan

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

Enough Is As Good As A Feast, Noah C. Chauvin

Seattle University Law Review

Ipse Dixit, the podcast on legal scholarship, provides a valuable service to the legal community and particularly to the legal academy. The podcast’s hosts skillfully interview guests about their legal and law-related scholarship, helping those guests communicate their ideas clearly and concisely. In this review essay, I argue that Ipse Dixit has made a major contribution to legal scholarship by demonstrating in its interview episodes that law review articles are neither the only nor the best way of communicating scholarly ideas. This contribution should be considered “scholarship,” because one of the primary goals of scholarship is to communicate new ideas.

In-House Counsel Roundtable: Competition And Other Issues In A Pandemic Environment, Karen Hoffman Lent, Gabrielle Kohlmeier, Lutinski Lutinski, Rob Mahini, Suzanne Wachsstock

Fordham Competition Law Institute

No abstract provided.

Plenary Networking Event And Fireside Chat, James Keyte, Frédéric Jenny

Fordham Competition Law Institute

No abstract provided.

Welcome And Keynote Address, James Keyte

Fordham Competition Law Institute

No abstract provided.

Plenary Networking Event And Fireside Chat, James Keyte, William Kovacic, Barry E. Hawk

Fordham Competition Law Institute

No abstract provided.

Panel 2: Merger Issues — A Global Perspective, Josh Soven, Isabelle De Silva, Daniel Francis, D. Bruce Hoffman, Axel Schulz

Fordham Competition Law Institute

No abstract provided.

Panel 1: Tech, Platform, And Privacy — What The Future Holds, Renata Hesse, Cani Fernández, Bernard (Barry) Nigro, Jr., Sean Royall, Koren Wong-Ervin

Fordham Competition Law Institute

No abstract provided.

Welcome And Keynote Address, James Keyte

Fordham Competition Law Institute

No abstract provided.

Panel 2: Understanding Network Effects In The Platform Context, Mike Cragg, Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Evan Chesler, Lars Kjølbye, Kai-Uwe Kühn

Fordham Competition Law Institute

No abstract provided.

Panel 1: Econometrics And Modeling For Mergers Globally, Renée Duplantis, Konstantin Ebinger, Thorsten Mäger, Loren Smith, Justin Stewart-Teitelbaum

Fordham Competition Law Institute

No abstract provided.

Heads Of Authority Q&A, James Keyte, Andrea Coscelli, Isabelle De Silva, Cani Fernández, Olivier Guersent, Margarida Matos Rosa, Gabriella Muscolo, Christine Wilson

Fordham Competition Law Institute

No abstract provided.

Welcome And Opening Remarks; Conflicting Decisions In Pharmaceutical Class Certification, James Keyte, George Korenko, Jeffrey C. Bank, Justin Bernick, Danielle R. Foley, Tram Nguyen

Fordham Competition Law Institute

No abstract provided.

Challenges To The Conventional Wisdom About Mergers And Consumer Welfare In A Converging Internet Marketplace, Rob Frieden

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.