Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Volume 09 (Part 1), District Court Of The United States For The Northern District Of Ohio, Eastern Division

City of Cleveland v. The Cleveland Illuminating Company, 1980

City of Cleveland, plaintiff vs. The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, defendant : civil action no. C75-560; proceedings had before the Honorable Robert B. Krupansky of said court, commencing on Tuesday, September 2, 1980 in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division

10/14/80-10/16/80

Antitrust Class Actions In The Wake Of Procedural Reform, Christine P. Bartholomew

Indiana Law Journal

What is the current vitality of antitrust enforcement? Antitrust class actions—the primary mode of competition oversight—has weathered two decades of procedural reform. This Article documents the effects of those reforms. Relying on an original dataset of over 1300 antitrust class action settlements, this Article finds such cases alive but far from well. Certain suits do succeed on an impressive scale, returning billions of dollars to victims. But class action reform has made antitrust enforcement narrower, more time-consuming, and costlier than only a decade ago. And, as this Article’s sources reveal, new battle lines are forming. Across the political spectrum, people …

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (Spacs) And The Sec, Neal Newman, Lawrence J. Trautman

Faculty Scholarship

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are simply enterprises that raise money from the public with the intention of purchasing an existing business and becoming publicly traded in the securities markets. If the SPAC is successful in raising money and the acquisition takes place, the target company takes the SPAC’s place on a stock exchange in a transaction that resembles a public offering. Also known as “blank-check” or “reverse merger” companies, this process avoids many of the pitfalls of a traditional initial public offering.

During late 2020 and 2021 an unprecedented surge in the popularity and issuance of Special Purpose Acquisition …

A Proposed Sec Cyber Data Disclosure Advisory Commission, Lawrence J. Trautman, Neal Newman

Faculty Scholarship

Constant cyber threats result in: intellectual property loss; data disruption; ransomware attacks; theft of valuable company intellectual property and sensitive customer information. During March 2022, The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a proposed rule addressing Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure, which requires: 1. Current reporting about material cybersecurity incidents; 2. Periodic disclosures about a registrant’s policies and procedures to identify and manage cybersecurity risks; 3. Management’s role in implementing cybersecurity policies and procedures; 4. Board of directors’ cybersecurity expertise, if any, and its oversight of cybersecurity risk; 5. Registrants to provide updates about previously reported cybersecurity …

The Challenge Of Holding Big Business Accountable, Roy Shapira

Cardozo Law Review

In July 2021, a sweeping Executive Order committed the entire U.S. federal government to reining in big business. Dozens of proposed bills at the state level similarly target big business for stricter regulatory treatment. But unlike in past decades, today’s calls to break up and intensely regulate big business do not hinge on harms to consumers qua consumers. Instead, today’s anti-bigness sentiment rests to a large extent on the claim that big is bad because it is ungovernable. Giant corporations with market power treat legal requirements as mere recommendations, and routinely engage in behavior that harms our civil liberties and …

On The Misuse Of Regressions Of Price On The Hhi In Merger Review, Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

The article explains why regressions of price on HHI should not be used in merger review. Both price and HHI are equilibrium outcomes determined by demand, supply, and the factors that drive them. Thus, a regression of price on the HHI does not recover a causal effect that could inform the likely competitive effects of a merger. Nonetheless, economic theory is consistent with the legal presumption that a merger is likely to have adverse competitive effects if it occurs in a concentrated market and makes that market more concentrated.

Highly Automated Vehicles & Discrimination Against Low-Income Persons, William H. Widen

Articles

Law reform in the United States often reflects a structural bias that advances narrow business interests without addressing broader public interest concerns.' This bias may appear by omitting protective language in laws or regulations which address a subject matter area, such as permitting the testing of highly automated vehicles ("HA Vs") on public roads, while omitting a requirement for a reasonable level of insurance as a condition to obtain a testing permit.2 This Article explores certain social and economic justice implications of laws and regulations governing the design, testing, manufacture, and deployment of HA Vs which might advance a business …

Optimal Standards Of Proof In Antitrust, Murat C. Mungan, Joshua Wright

Faculty Scholarship

Economic analyses of antitrust institutions have thus far focused predominantly on optimal penalties and the design of substantive legal rules, and have largely ignored the standard of proof used in trials as a policy tool in shaping behavior. This neglected tool can play a unique role in the antitrust context, where a given firm may have the choice to engage in exceptional anticompetitive or procompetitive behavior, or simply follow more conventional business practices. The standard of proof used in determining the legality of a firm’s conduct affects not only whether the firm chooses to engage in pro- versus anticompetitive behavior, …

Fenceposts Without A Fence, Katherine E. Dr Lucido, Nicholas K. Tabor, Jeffery Y. Zhang

Articles

Banking organizations in the United States have long been subject to two broad categories of regulatory requirements. The first is permissive: a “positive” grant of rights and privileges, typically via a charter for a corporate entity, to engage in the business of banking. The second is restrictive: a “negative” set of conditions on those rights and privileges, limiting conduct and imposing a program of oversight and enforcement, by which the holder of that charter must abide. Together, these requirements form a legal cordon, or “regulatory perimeter,” around the U.S. banking sector.

On Firms, Sanjukta Paul

Law & Economics Working Papers

This paper is about firms as an instance of economic coordination, and about how we think about them in relation to other forms of coordination as well as in relation to competition and markets. The dominant frame for thinking about firms--which has strongly influenced contemporary competition law as well as serving as a vital adjunct to the fundamental concepts of neoclassical price theory that guide many areas of law and policy--implicitly or explicitly explains and justifies the centralization of both decision-making rights and flows of income from economic activity on productive efficiency grounds. We have very good reasons to doubt …

Big Tech Is Why I Have (Anti)Trust Issues, Sophie Copenhaver

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

“There is a cost to bigness, even if it’s not passed onto the consumer.” Antitrust laws were once an effective tool to break up companies that had grown too large. However, subsequent rulings have altered their original meaning, and they are no longer useful in regulating large technology companies such as Amazon, Facebook, and Google. This Note will argue that judicial interpretation of antitrust laws should no longer be governed by the consumer welfare standard. Rather, judges should apply a two-part test, focusing on the market power and any anticompetitive business practices of the defendant corporation.

International Antitrust, Miguel Del Pino, Elizabeth Avery, Dilys Teng, Bruno Drago, Paola Pugliese, Milena Mundim, Adam S. Goodman, Simon Kupi, Peter Wang, Yizhe Zhang, Laurie-Anne Grelier, Peter Camesasca, Naval Satarawala Chopra, Aman Singh Sethi, Shigeyoshi Ezaki, Vassili Moussis, Kiyoko Yagami, Naoki Uemura, Youngjin Jung, Luke Shin, Hemi Lee, Lara Granville, Jasvinder Nakhwal, Jonathan Tickner, Lisl Dunlop, Shoshana Speiser

The Year in Review

No abstract provided.

Syarat Kebaruan Pada Desain Industri Sebagai Dasar Gugatan Pembatalan Desain Industri, Rizqi Tsaniati Putri

"Dharmasisya” Jurnal Program Magister Hukum FHUI

Abstract

Intellectual Property Rights, including Industrial Design Rights, are an important matter to be protected especially in relation to the growing market development in the world and in Indonesia itself. Protection of Industrial Designs is needed to encourage creativity and as a form of protection and appreciation for Industrial Designs for its creators. In Indonesia, the protection of industrial designs is regulated based on Law Number 31 of 2000 concerning Industrial Designs. Even though Indonesia already has laws and regulations governing the Industrial Designs, there are still some things in the Law that still need to be clarified in order …

Antitrust Class Actions In The Wake Of Procedural Reform, Christine P. Bartholomew

Journal Articles

What is the current vitality of antitrust enforcement? Antitrust class actions—the primary mode of competition oversight—has weathered two decades of procedural reform. This Article documents the effects of those reforms. Relying on an original dataset of over 1300 antitrust class action settlements, this Article finds such cases alive but far from well. Certain suits do succeed on an impressive scale, returning billions of dollars to victims. But class action reform has made antitrust enforcement narrower, more time-consuming, and costlier than only a decade ago. And, as this Article’s sources reveal, new battle lines are forming. Across the political spectrum, people …

Anticompetitive Merger Review, Samuel N. Weinstein

Articles

U.S. antitrust law empowers enforcers to review pending mergers that might undermine competition. But there is growing evidence that the merger-review regime is failing to perform its core procompetitive function. Industry concentration and the power of dominant firms are increasing across key sectors of the economy. In response, progressive advocates of more aggressive antitrust interventions have critiqued the substantive merger-review standard, arguing that it is too friendly to merging firms. This Article traces the problem to a different source: the merger-review process itself. The growing length of reviews, the competitive restrictions merger agreements place on acquisition targets during review, and …

Criminal Enforcement Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: An Empirical Assessment, Daniel A. Crane

Law & Economics Working Papers

The Biden Justice Department has announced that it may begin to bring criminal monopolization cases under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a practice that the Department has not employed in almost half a century. The Department's leadership has justified this idea by asserting that it used to be common practice for the Antitrust Division to bring such cases. This Article presents the findings of an empirical study of all of the Justice Department's antitrust case filings. It finds that the Justice Depart brought 175 criminal monopolization cases between 1903 and 1977, but that only 20 of these involved unilateral …

Hair On Fire: Why Companies Are Less Likely To Feel The Burn Under The Doj’S Newest Change To Antitrust Enforcement, Caroline M. Whitener

Pepperdine Law Review

In July 2019, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division announced that in an effort to help companies avoid “‘hair on fire’ experiences,” Division prosecutors are now, despite previous hesitancy, encouraged to offer prosecution alternatives in the form of deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) to corporate antitrust violators. Alternative prosecution agreements, such as DPAs and NPAs, are contracts between the government and corporate wrongdoers that allow companies to delay or entirely avoid prosecution, provided the company adheres to the contract terms. Additionally, as a part of the policy change, DOJ antitrust prosecutors must evaluate a corporation’s preexisting …

Bardy Diagnostics V. Hill-Rom: New Lessons On Material Adverse Effect Clauses, Robert T. Miller

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

In Bardy Diagnostics, Inc. v. Hill-Rom, Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery once again had to apply a Material Adverse Effect clause to determine whether an acquirer was required to close an acquisition. The case develops the law of MAEs in several important ways. First, the agreement between the parties substituted for the customary MAE objects (e.g., the company’s business, financial condition, and results of operations) a bespoke defined term. The court interpreted the definition of that term in a way that made it functionally equivalent to more customary MAE objects; then, consistent with an unacknowledged trend in Delaware law, …

Freeing Cryptoassets From Howey: A Defense Of Genuine Token Offering, Kathryn A. Daly

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) is the most powerful regulator of the U.S. securities market and serves to “protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation.” The agency’s task of protecting retail investors and regulating market participants has been, at times, reduced to a binary choice between “Main Street” investors and “Wall Street” insiders. Some regulators and legislators rely on this binary to put pressure on cryptoassets, claiming that more regulation leads to more effective investor protections. This Note rejects that premise. Genuine tokens offerings (i.e., unregistered security offerings not designed to defraud investors) must be …

A Continental Rift? The United States And European Union's Contrasting Approaches To Regulating The Monopolistic Behavior Of Gatekeeper Platforms, Peter R. Enia

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

Over the past decade, gatekeeper platforms, such as Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon), have created highly monopolistic business models to benefit themselves while undermining third-party merchants on digital marketplaces. To illustrate, Amazon collects third-party merchant and consumer data on its marketplace to improve its private-label brands while simultaneously selling them alongside third-party merchant products, creating a significant conflict of interest business model. To address this anticompetitive behavior, the United States (U.S.) and the European Union (E.U.) have proposed contrasting approaches. The U.S., through the Ending Platform Monopolies Act, offers a structural separation remedy, giving the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission …