Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

A Tale Of Two Theories Of Well-Known Marks, Leah C. Grinvald

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

The well-known marks doctrine presents a conundrum in international trademark law. Although protecting foreign well-known trademarks has been a treaty obligation since 1925, courts around the world, and in the United States and China in particular, do not uniformly apply the doctrine. This lack of uniform protection leads to the question of whether these countries are complying with their international obligations. While brand owners and some commentators would answer this question in the negative, this Article provides a different perspective. This Article offers an alternative approach to answering the compliance question: Before considering the question, one must examine the perspective …

Commentary: Environmental Justice And The Bp Oil Spill: Does Anyone Care About The "Small People" Of Color?, Perry Wallace

The Modern American

No abstract provided.

How To Avoid The Constraints Of Rule 10b-5(B): A First Circuit Guide For Underwriters, 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 931 (2010), Eric H. Franklin

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Price Of Admission: How Inconsistent Enforcement Of Antitrust Laws In America's Live Entertainment Sector Hurts The Average Consumer, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 261 (2010), Nathan B. Grzegorek

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Federalism And Concurrent Jurisdiction In Global Markets: Why A Combination Of National And State Antitrust Enforcement Is A Model For Effective Economic Regulation, Katherine Mason Jones

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

The focus of the article is on the proper role of U.S. state governments in regulating international business. The specific issue analyzed is the desirability of having state attorneys general enforce federal antitrust laws in global markets concurrently with federal antitrust regulators. Congress granted state officials this power in 1976. In 2009, however, a large proportion of the world's commerce is now conducted in international, rather than national markets. This development has led Judge Richard A. Posner and others to advocate that the states be stripped of their statutory power to enforce federal antitrust laws on behalf of their residents …

Rafał Stasikowski, Funkcja Regulacyjna Administracji Publicznej. Studium Z Zakresu Nauki Prawa Administracyjnego Oraz Nauki Administracji [The Regulatory Function Of Public Administration. A Study Of The Science Of Administrative Law And The Science Of Administration] Branta Publishing Company, Bydgoszcz 2009, 336 P., Justyna Nawrot

Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies

No abstract provided.

International Disparities Panel, Sean Flynn

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.

Lorain, Aspen, And The Future Of Section 2 Enforcement, Xiao Jeff Liu

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

The Sherman Antitrust Act § 2 makes monopolizing or attempting to monopolize a particular trade or aspects of a trade a federal felony. More specifically, Section 2 of the Act addresses a firm's unilateral conduct. Under the administration of former President George W. Bush, a comprehensive guideline titled Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act ("Bush Guidelines") was adopted in September of 2008 for enforcing Section 2 violations. Under President Barack Obama's administration, however, the enforcement of antitrust laws is expected to undergo a radical transformation. On May 11, 2009, Christine A. Varney, the Assistant …

Iqbal, Twombly, And The Expected Cost Of False Positive Error, Mark Anderson

Articles

Iqbal and Twombly introduced a new standard for pleading federal claims by overruling five-decades old language from Conley v. Gibson. Instead of plaintiffs being entitled to discovery unless the complaint affirmatively forecloses the possibility of recovery, Iqbal and Twombly require a more searching evaluation of the complaint under an ambiguous "plausibility" standard. The policy behind this increased burden on plaintiffs is to prevent the false positive error that burdensome discovery creates. How the plausibility standard from Iqbal and Twombly should operate in the real world is poorly understood. There is general acknowledgement that no clear guidance exists about how to …

Churchill Downs, Inc. V. Thoroughbred Horsemen's Group, Llc "Antitrust Liability And The Horse Racing Industry", Tara N. Hester

Kentucky Journal of Equine, Agriculture, & Natural Resources Law

No abstract provided.

Antitrust And Institutions: Design And Change, Eleanor M. Fox

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Usługi Portów Lotniczych W Unii Europejskiej I W Polsce A Prawo Konkurencji I Regulacje Lotniskowe, Filip Czernicki, Tadeusz Skoczny

Monografie CARS/CARS Monographs

Piąta publikacja z serii Studiów i Monografii Antymonopolowych i Regulacyjnych”, powstała na podstawie raportu z badań przeprowadzonych w 2009 r. w ramach projektu badawczego „Porty Lotnicze” zrealizowanego przez zespół pracowników Wydziału Zarządzania UW oraz pracowników Przedsiębiorstwa Państwowego.

Huddle Up: Surveying The Playing Field On The Single Entity Status Of The National Football League In Anticipation Of American Needle V. Nfl, Constantine J. Avgiris

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal (1994 - )

No abstract provided.

The Evolution Of Trade Secret Law And Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Sharon Sandeen

Faculty Scholarship

In the spring of 2010, the Hamline Law Review hosted a symposium to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. This article was written for the symposium and provides an exhaustive and detailed account of the historical context and drafting history of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (the UTSA).

Among other stories that it tells, the article explains that the UTSA was prompted by the “Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze.” Because of the Supreme Court’s famous decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins in 1938, it was understood by business interests and their attorneys that the common …

Governing Gambling In The United States, Maria E. Garcia

CMC Senior Theses

The role risk taking has played in American history has helped shape current legislation concerning gambling. This thesis attempts to explain the discrepancies in legislation regarding distinct forms of gambling. While casinos are heavily regulated by state and federal laws, most statutes dealing with lotteries strive to regulate the activities of other parties instead of those of the lottery institutions. Incidentally, lotteries are the only form of gambling completely managed by the government. It can be inferred that the United States government is more concerned with people exploiting gambling than with the actual practice of wagering.

In an effort to …

Desperate Doctors And Antitrust Laws: The Best Ways For Lawmakers To Simulate Physician Collective Bargaining, Cristina Olson

Nevada Law Journal

This Note will examine the legality of bills that open up physician collective bargaining—and what kind of provisions lawmakers should include to ensure legality and good policy. Given the current economic downturn, states must look for ways to make health insurance more affordable; a low-cost adjustment of collective bargaining rules may be a good solution. Such an adjustment would not be the only, or necessarily the best, solution to the healthcare cost crisis that exists in America, but it would be worthwhile for legislators to consider. Furthermore, if lawmakers craft legislation that puts state governments in charge of actively supervising …

Much Ado About Possibly Pretty Little: Mccarran-Ferguson Repeal In The Health Care Reform Effort, Christopher L. Sagers

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

Since 1945, the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA) has shielded the “business of insurance” from antitrust liability, so long as the challenged conduct is “regulated by State Law” and does not constitute “boycott, coercion, or intimidation.” This law, like the dozens of other statutory antitrust exemptions that still exist for other industries, has more or less always been controversial, and efforts to repeal it date back more than thirty years. This Essay asks two questions: (1) what consequences the pending repeal measures might have if one of them becomes law; and (2) what a close examination of this effort might teach us …

Is The Forcing Of Services On Suppliers An Abuse Of A Dominant Position? Case Comment To The Judgment Of The Supreme Court Of 19 February 2009 – Drop (Ref. No. Iii Sk 31/08), Anna Piszcz

Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Censorship Of Economic Protest, Hillary Greene

Faculty Articles and Papers

Antitrust law accepts the competitive marketplace, its operation, and its outcomes as an ideal. Society itself need not and does not. Although antitrust is not in the business of evaluating, for example, the “fairness” of prices, society can, and frequently does, properly concern itself with these issues. When dissatisfaction results, it may manifest itself in an expressive boycott: a form of social campaign wherein purchasers express their dissatisfaction by collectively refusing to buy. Antitrust should neither participate in nor censor such normative discourse. In this Article, I explain how antitrust law impedes this speech, argue why it should not, and …

Patent Pools, Rand Commitments, And The Problematics Of Price Discrimination, Daniel A. Crane

Book Chapters

The social welfare problematics of patent pooling by competitors are well known. Competitor patent pooling has the potential to create powerful efficiencies by eliminating holdout problems and blocking positions and reducing transactions costs from licensing negotiations. At the same time, competitors can use patent pools to cartelize in a variety of ways, for example by fixing prices, entrenching patents of dubious validity, and discouraging rivalry for innovation. Determining legal norms capable of capturing the efficiencies without enabling cartels has not proven easy.

Perhaps because of the practical difficulty of separating pro-competitive from anticompetitive pools, antitrust scrutiny has swung from extreme …