Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Toward A Unified Theory Of Exclusionary Vertical Restraints, Daniel A. Crane, Graciela Miralles

Law & Economics Working Papers

The law of exclusionary vertical restraints—contractual or other business relationships between vertically related firms—is deeply confused and inconsistent in both the United States and the European Union. A variety of vertical practices including predatory pricing, tying, exclusive dealing, price discrimination, and bundling are treated very differently based on formalistic distinctions that bear no relationship to the practices’ exclusionary potential. We propose a comprehensive, unified test for all exclusionary vertical restraints that centers on two factors, foreclosure and substantiality. We then assign economic content to these factors. A restraint forecloses if it denies equally efficient rivals a reasonable opportunity to make …

Accessing Truth: Marketplaces Of Ideas In The Information Age, Nima Darouian

Cardozo Public Law, Policy & Ethics Journal

The article argues that the Internet comprises numerous distinct virtual marketplaces, each with unique regulatory frameworks and dynamics, which are essential for the dissemination of information and public welfare. Current legal doctrines, such as those in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), and the Principles of the Law of Software Contracts (PLSC), are insufficient to protect the public interest in these virtual marketplaces. The article proposes that courts adopt the Reichman-Franklin standard, which requires mass-market contracts and non-negotiable access agreements to be fair, reasonable, and aligned with the public interest in education, science, research, …

Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs

William & Mary Law Review

Fueled by economics, antitrust has evolved into a highly sophisticated body of law. Its malleable doctrine enables courts to tailor optimal standards to a wide variety of economic phenomena. Indeed, economic theory has been so revolutionary that modern U.S. competition law bears little resemblance to that which prevailed fifty years ago. Yet, for all the contributions of economics, its explanatory powers are subject to important limitations. Profound questions remain at the borders of contemporary antitrust enforcement, but answers remain elusive. It is because of the epistemological limitations of economic analysis that antitrust remains unusually vulnerable to error. The fear of …

After The Fall: Financial Crisis And The International Order, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

Recent years have challenged the international order to a degree not seen since World War II — and perhaps the Great Depression. As the U.S. housing crisis metastasized into a financial and economic crisis of grave proportions, and spread to nearly every corner of the globe, the strength of our international institutions — the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the Group of Twenty, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and others — was tested as never before. Likewise tested, were the limits of our national commitment to those institutions, to our international obligations, and to global engagement more …

The Intel And Microsoft Settlements, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This article briefly compares and contrasts the recent U.S. Federal Trade Commission's antitrust settlement with Intel, and the antitrust cases brought against Microsoft. The article praises the FTC's settlement with Intel, and predicts that history will judge it very favorably compared to the settlement by the U.S. Department of Justice of its antitrust case against Microsoft.

Predatory Bundling And The Exclusionary Standard, J. Shahar Dillbary

Washington and Lee Law Review

Recent decisions-all relying on a stylized example first provided by the Ortho court-hold that a multi-product seller that uses a bundled discount in a way that excludes an equally or more efficient competitor engages in predatory bundling. According to these decisions, a bundle can be considered 'predatory" even when the price of the bundle exceeds its cost. This Article shows that the Ortho court's stylized example and its monopoly leveraging theory are erroneous. This Article further demonstrates that even when a bundle's price excludes more efficient competitors and even when a component in the bundle is priced below cost, and …

All Of The Economic Aid The U.S., Eu, And Japan Give To The Developing World Is Stolen Back By Our Illegal Price-Fixing Cartels, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This compares the magnitudes of two forms of economic interaction between the developed and developing world. The first is the amount of economic foreign aid provided by the developed world to the developing world during a single year. The second is an estimate of the yearly amount that illegal price fixing cartels, comprised of companies from the U.S., the EU, and Japan, overcharge – steal! – from purchasers in these same countries. This comparison shows these amounts are roughly equivalent. If anything, cartels probably steal more from the developing world than the developed world gives them in economic assistance.

This …

Panel I: Professor Brodley’S General Contributions To Antitrust Scholarship : Introduction, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

When I began teaching Antitrust, I was the junior colleague of a more senior antitrust scholar, teaching the course on opposite semesters to the relatively few students who were forced by scheduling conflicts to take the course with me as their teacher. After my senior colleague departed for another school – and after the departure of some other senior Law and Economics colleagues – I was for a brief period the senior antitrust scholar at the institution, and this was in only my fifth year of teaching law. Boston University soon approached me and my wife with the offer of …

Antitrust, Institutions, And Merger Control, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article makes two primary contributions to the antitrust literature. First, it identifies the dynamic interrelationship across antitrust institutions. Second, it provides new empirical evidence from practitioner surveys to explore how the dynamic institutional interrelationship plays out in the area of merger control. This Article provides a descriptive, analytical overview of the various institutions to better frame the larger institutional interrelations for a comparative institutional analysis. In the next Part it examines mergers as a case study of how one might apply antitrust institutional analysis across these different kinds and levels of antitrust institutions. The Article utilizes both quantitative and …

American Precedent, Australian Legislation—Are The Rules Of Golf In Violation Of Antitrust Law, Lynden Griggs, Leela Cejnar

Brigham Young University International Law & Management Review

No abstract provided.

Vertical Separation Of Telecommunications Networks: Evidence From Five Countries, Robert W. Crandall, Jeffrey A. Eisenach, Robert E. Litan

Federal Communications Law Journal

The widespread adoption of mandatory unbundling in telecommunications markets has led to growing interest in mandatory "functional separation," i.e., separation of upstream network operations from downstream retail operations. Since 2002, vertical separation has been implemented in five OECD countries: Australia, Italy, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In 2008, the International Telecommunications Union noted "a tremendous amount of interest" in functional separation around the world; and, in April 2009, the European Parliament held its second reading on a new regulatory framework that embraces functional separation as an "exceptional measure." While the U.S. does not currently require unbundling of broadband …

State Regulation Of Resale Price Maintenance On The Internet: The Constitutional Problems With The 2009 Amendment To The Maryland Antitrust Act, Katherine M. Brockmeyer

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Predation Analysis And The Ftc’S Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane

Law & Economics Working Papers

The Federal Trade Commission's pending antitrust case against Intel challenges a number of Intel's discounting and rebating practices. The Commission appears poised to apply a cost-price test to the challenged practices, but proposes to include "fixed sunk costs" in the appropriate measure of cost. This paper explains the importance of using cost-price screens to assess unilaterally imposed prices and analyzes the futility of including sunk costs in the relevant cost measure.

Ashcroft In A Defendant's Wonderland: Redefined Pleading Standards In Ashcroft V. Iqbal, Cassidy M. Flake

Mercer Law Review

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal is the Court's awaited clarification of its earlier decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. In the wake of Twombly, courts and commentators debated its application to cases other than antitrust disputes. The Court announced in Iqbal that the Twombly complaint requirement of facial plausibility applies to all civil actions filed in federal court, not just antitrust cases. Accordingly, Iqbal currently governs the standards by which all plaintiffs in federal court must draft complaints to state a legally sufficient claim for relief and survive a defendant's motion to …

Splitting Scales: Conflicting National And Regional Attempts To Manage Commercial Aquaculture In The Exclusive Economic Zone, Brandee Ketchum

Journal of Food Law & Policy

Like other environmental resources subject to public use, various interest groups struggle over joint management of scarce fisheries resources. Further, differing goals for resource management, such as financial goals versus conservation goals, frequently pit regional groups against one another. In some cases, regional interests may conflict with overall national interests. As goes the water and the air, so go the fish.

The Nba And The Single Entity Defense: A Better Case?, Michael A. Mccann

Law Faculty Scholarship

This Article will explore the relationship between the National Basketball Association, its independently-owned teams, and associated corporate entities, including the Women’s NBA, NBA Properties, NBA Developmental League, NBA China, and single entity analysis under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 chiefly aims to prevent competitors from combining their economic power in ways that unduly impair competition or harm consumers, be it in terms of raised prices, diminished quality, or limited choices. Single entities are exempt from section 1 because they are considered “one,” rather than competitors, and thus their collaboration does not implicate anticompetitive concerns.

In American Needle …

2009 International Trade Law Decisions Of The Federal Circuit, Patrick A. Fitch

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Expanding The Nafta Chapter 19 Dispute Settlement System: A Way To Declaw Trade Remedy Laws In A Free Trade Area Of The Americas?, Stephen J. Powell

UF Law Faculty Publications

Chapter 19 of the NAFTA transfers judicial review of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican government investigations under the controversial anti-dumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) laws from national courts to binational panels of private international law experts. The system stands as a unique surrender of judicial sovereignty to an international body, a hybrid of national courts and international dispute settlement with as yet no parallel in the world of international trade or other international law regimes. Binational panel decisions have been controversial because agencies chafe at their intimate examination of agency findings and supporting evidence. Panels also are viewed as substantially more …

Designing Antitrust Agencies For More Effective Outcomes: What Antitrust Can Learn From Restaurant Guides, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

Antitrust policy should be concerned with the quality and effectiveness of the antitrust system. Some efforts at agency effectiveness include self-study of antitrust agencies to determine the factors that lead to improving agency quality. Such studies, however, often focus only on enforcement decisions and other agency initiatives such as competition advocacy. They do not reflect at least one other part of the equation: what do non-government users of the antitrust system think about the quality of antitrust agencies? This Symposium Essay advocates the use of a ratings guide by antitrust practitioners for antitrust agencies to add to the tools in …

Internet Governance And Democratic Legitimacy, Oliver Sylvain

Federal Communications Law Journal

Even as the Internet goes pop, federal policymakers continue to surrender their statutory obligation to regulate communications in the first instance to extralegal nongovernmental organizations comprised of technical experts. The FCC's adjudication of a dispute concerning a major broadband service provider's network management practices is a case in point. There, in the absence of any enforceable legislative or regulatory rule, the FCC turned principally to the transmission principles of the Internet Engineering Taskforce, the preeminent nongovernmental Internet engineering standard-setting organization. This impulse to defer as a matter of course to such an organization without any legal mechanism requiring as much …