Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, And Changing Economic Conditions, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin

Faculty Scholarship

The recent financial crisis and recession provide an opportunity to reexamine the dynamic versus static efficiency tradeoff in antitrust enforcement policy. We examine implications of the optimal antitrust enforcement model when dynamic efficiency is incorporated. The “dynamic enforcement model” examined here provides a positive theory of Section 2 doctrine, some suggestions for modifying enforcement in light of its dynamic costs, and implies antitrust enforcers should put a greater weight on dynamic efficiency during recessions.

Short Selling And The News: A Preliminary Report On An Empirical Study, Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten, Paul C. Tetlock

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Counterparty Regulation And Its Limits: The Evolution Of The Credit Default Swaps Market, Houman B. Shadab

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Keynote Address: The Conflicted Trustee Dilemma, Steven L. Schwarcz

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Private litigation is the predominant means of antitrust enforcement in the United States. Other jurisdictions around the world are increasingly implementing private enforcement models. Private enforcement is usually justified on either compensation or deterrence grounds. While the choice between these two goals matters, private litigation is not very effective at advancing either one. Compensation fails because the true economic victims of most antitrust violations are usually downstream consumers who are too numerous and remote to locate and compensate. Deterrence is ineffective because the time lag between the planning of the violation and the legal judgment day is usually so long …

Strange Bedfellows: How The Ncaa And Ea Sports May Have Violated Antitrust And Right Of Publicity Laws To Make A Profit At The Exploitation Of Intercollegiate Amateurism, Andrew B. Carrabis

Barry Law Review

No abstract provided.

Desperate Doctors And Antitrust Laws: The Best Ways For Lawmakers To Simulate Physician Collective Bargaining, Cristina Olson

Nevada Law Journal

This Note will examine the legality of bills that open up physician collective bargaining—and what kind of provisions lawmakers should include to ensure legality and good policy. Given the current economic downturn, states must look for ways to make health insurance more affordable; a low-cost adjustment of collective bargaining rules may be a good solution. Such an adjustment would not be the only, or necessarily the best, solution to the healthcare cost crisis that exists in America, but it would be worthwhile for legislators to consider. Furthermore, if lawmakers craft legislation that puts state governments in charge of actively supervising …

D Is For Digitize: An Introduction, James Grimmelmann

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This symposium issue of the New York Law School Law Review collects seven articles springing from the D Is for Digitize conference on the Google Books lawsuit and settlement, held at New York Law School October 8-10, 2009. In the spirit of Chaucer's "good feyth," thirty panelists and over one hundred attendees (plus dozens more watching online) gathered to discuss the legal and social issues raised by the proposed settlement. For three days, lawyers, academics, librarians, programmers, and public-interest advocates met for a rich, respectful, and wide-ranging conversation on this once-in-a-lifetime settlement. These articles continue that conversation.

Does Monopoly Broth Make Bad Soup?, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

There is an oft-repeated maxim in U.S. antitrust law that a monopolist's conduct must be examined in its totality in order to determine its legality. Judges admonish that plaintiffs "should be given the full benefit of their proof without tightly compartmentalizating the various factual components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each." As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated in much-quoted language, "It is the mix of various ingredients ... in a monopoly broth that produces the unsavory flavor."' In this article, I examine the use and misuse of monopoly broth theories. Reflecting a …

Patent Pooling Behind The Veil Of Uncertainty: Antitrust, Competition Policy, And The Vaccine Industry, Hillary Greene

Faculty Articles and Papers

No abstract provided.

The Microsoft Chronicles, Rudolph J.R. Peritz

Articles & Chapters

No abstract provided.

Introduction: Expansion And Contraction In Monopolization Law, Michael S. Gal, Spencer Weber Waller, Avishalom Tor

Journal Articles

This article introduces a special symposium issue of the Antitrust Law Journal based on a conference on monopolization. It argues that monopolization law has been experiencing simultaneous expansion and contraction processes that are not wholly contradictory but at least partly complementary. Specifically, the authors suggest that the contraction of monopolization law in the United States and the EU might serve to facilitate its expansion and increased importance worldwide, providing other antitrust regimes with more focused and effective tools to address the challenges involved in regulating dominant firms. Moreover, monopolization law's increased reach internationally also has made its refinement and rationalization …

At The Brink Of Free Agency: Creating The Foundation For The Messersmith-Mcnally Decision - 1968-1975, Edmund P. Edmonds

Journal Articles

"One of the most dramatic periods in baseball’s long history of labor relations occurred from 1968 through 1975. The Major League Baseball Players Association negotiated baseball’s first Basic Agreement in 1968 without the benefit of any leverage that could alter most of Organized Baseball’s long practices that controlled the players’ mobility and wages. In 1975, however, the union won an arbitration panel hearing that determined that pitchers Dave McNally and Andy Messersmith were free agents after playing one full season under the renewed option year of their contracts and filing a grievance under the newly adopted arbitration process. This stunning …

The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons From The American Experience, Edward D. Cavanagh

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

The treble damage remedy has been a centerpiece of private antitrust enforcement since the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890. Aware that government resources were limited, Congress created the private right of action as a complement to public enforcement to assure the detection and prosecution of antitrust offenders. The private right of action has proven to be a very potent weapon in the civil enforcement arsenal. It is the very potency of the private remedy, however, that has made the private right of action a target of criticism by defendants and, more recently, the courts. Indeed, in the …

Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements: Implications For Competition And Innovation, John R. Thomas

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Although brand-name pharmaceutical companies routinely procure patents on their innovative medications, such rights are not self-enforcing. Brand-name firms that wish to enforce their patents against generic competitors must commence litigation in the federal courts. Such litigation ordinarily terminates in either a judgment of infringement, which typically blocks generic competition until such time as the patent expires, or a judgment that the patent is invalid or not infringed, which typically opens the market to generic entry. As with other sorts of commercial litigation, however, the parties to pharmaceutical patent litigation may choose to settle their case. Certain of these settlements have …

Patent Pools, Rand Commitments, And The Problematics Of Price Discrimination, Daniel A. Crane

Book Chapters

The social welfare problematics of patent pooling by competitors are well known. Competitor patent pooling has the potential to create powerful efficiencies by eliminating holdout problems and blocking positions and reducing transactions costs from licensing negotiations. At the same time, competitors can use patent pools to cartelize in a variety of ways, for example by fixing prices, entrenching patents of dubious validity, and discouraging rivalry for innovation. Determining legal norms capable of capturing the efficiencies without enabling cartels has not proven easy.

Perhaps because of the practical difficulty of separating pro-competitive from anticompetitive pools, antitrust scrutiny has swung from extreme …

Dr. Miles's Orphans: Vertical Conspiracy And Consignment In The Wake Of Leegin, Jeffrey L. Harrison

UF Law Faculty Publications

When the Supreme Court overturns a well-established case, the impact extends well beyond that ruling. Cases that have survived for extended periods of time typically spawn complementary cases. These complementary cases protect the ruling in the principal case from erosion by the imagination of business planners, lawyers, scholars, and judges. Or, these complementary cases may be the cases that narrow the rule in the principal case when the Court wants to temper the effect of—but not overrule—its prior decision. When the principal case is, however, overturned, both of these types of cases become orphans. Without the parent case, it is …

Antitrust Censorship Of Economic Protest, Hillary Greene

Faculty Articles and Papers

Antitrust law accepts the competitive marketplace, its operation, and its outcomes as an ideal. Society itself need not and does not. Although antitrust is not in the business of evaluating, for example, the “fairness” of prices, society can, and frequently does, properly concern itself with these issues. When dissatisfaction results, it may manifest itself in an expressive boycott: a form of social campaign wherein purchasers express their dissatisfaction by collectively refusing to buy. Antitrust should neither participate in nor censor such normative discourse. In this Article, I explain how antitrust law impedes this speech, argue why it should not, and …

Standardization Of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition And Contract Implications, Mark R. Patterson

Faculty Scholarship

Standard-form contracts are a common feature of commercial relationships because they offer the advantage of lower transaction costs. This advantage of standard contracts is increased when there is a second layer of standardization under which multiple firms agree on a standard contract. Trade associations and similar entities often effect standardization of this kind through collective agreement on a standard contract, sometimes under the aegis of state actors. Multifirm contract standardization can provide not only the usual transaction-cost advantages of standard-form contracts, but also increased competition among firms, because a standard contract makes comparison among firms’ offerings easier. But standardization among …

Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements: Presumptions, Procedural Burdens, And Covenants Not To Sue Generic Drug Manufacturers, Catherine J. K. Sandoval

Faculty Publications

This Article analyzes recent developments in antitrust law, focusing on agreements between pharmaceutical patent holders and generic drug manufacturers that require a generic manufacturer to delay its market entry in exchange for a payment or other consideration from the patent holder. A predictable consequence of settlements that delay the marketing of a generic drug is that prices for the patented drug will remain higher than if the generic competitor had prevailed in its challenge to the patent's validity or the patent holder had failed to show that the generic infringed on its patent. Analysis of the legality of these settlements …